Tweet
Syria draws a line at the border
By Sami Moubayed
Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Aug. 25, 2006
DAMASCUS - When United Nations Resolution 1701 was passed on August
11, it was seen as a diplomatic breakthrough to end 33 days of war
between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Many today, however, are having serious doubts whether this ceasefire
will last and whether 1701 is actually a diplomatic victory - or
failure - for the UN. In addition to a ceasefire, the resolution
demands the deployment of the Lebanese army, and eventually
multinational troops, on the border to prevent any future
war between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah. It gives
Israel the right to self-defense, however, while denying this right
to Hezbollah, explaining why the party's secretary general, Hassan
Nasrallah, accepted the resolution "with reservations".
If implemented to the word, the resolution would deprive Hezbollah of
the territory it has used to wage war against Israel since the 1980s.
A Hezbollah that is deprived of southern Lebanon would be a Hezbollah
that cannot fire rockets against northern Israel. The resolution
also asked for implementation of Resolution 1559, which calls for
the complete disarming of Hezbollah, and strongly says that no arms
should be transferred to the Lebanese military group.
The first loophole in 1701 is that it does not give any mechanism for
the disarming of Hezbollah, something that neither the United Nations
Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) nor the Lebanese army - nor Israel
- has been able to do. The expanded UN troop presence on the border
will not be able to disarm Hezbollah. If the troops try to do that,
they will certainly be attacked.
This was something made clear by French Major-General Alain Pelligrini,
the UNIFIL commander in Lebanon, who said: "The Israelis cannot ask
UNIFIL to disarm Hezbollah. This is not written in our mandate." He
added that the ceasefire "is tense, very fragile, very volatile. Any
provocation or misunderstanding could escalate very, very rapidly."
Speaking to the Financial Times on August 3, Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert related what he saw as the perfect objective of UNIFIL in
Lebanon. He said it should aim at "stopping violence against innocent
Israelis from Lebanon and disarming this murderous organization,
the Hezbollah, which is the long arm of Iran".
Olmert's distorted version of UNIFIL, however, seems to be very
different from the one that is likely to emerge in Lebanon in the
coming weeks. French newspaper Le Monde leaked a 21-page document
distributed at the UN last week showing what the new expanded UNIFIL
troops would look like.
First, very clearly, they would not be authorized to disarm
Hezbollah. They would also lack the authority to search Hezbollah
strongholds or bunkers. Second, they are authorized "to use force,
up to and including deadly force", to implement peace on the
Lebanese-Israeli border and to defend themselves against attack by
either the IDF or Hezbollah. Third, they have to protect civilians,
and fourth, they will have to provide backup to the Lebanese army.
Actually, bringing 15,000 troops from the Lebanese army to the border
is easy. It has even been accepted by Nasrallah, who previously had
rejected deployment of the Lebanese army to the south. Deploying an
equal number of multinational troops is more difficult - but doable.
The history of multinational troops in Lebanon during the Israeli
invasion of 1982 showed that these troops are vulnerable and could
be driven out of Lebanon with ease. In October 1983, an attack on US
marines in Lebanon led to the killing of 241 US and 58 French troops
and the exodus of about 5,000 multinational troops from Lebanon.
No Arab country today, except Morocco, is willing to take part in such
a force, since it would be viewed by the Arab street as a multinational
force used to protect Israel from Hezbollah. Given Hezbollah's
popularity in the Arab world, such a step would be political suicide -
even for moderate Arab regimes such as Egypt and Jordan.
Turkey showed willingness to send troops to Lebanon, but this proposal
was vetoed by the Lebanese-Armenians, who cannot forget Turkish
massacres against the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during World
War I. Germany at first showed similar willingness to comply, but then
backed down and said it would send advisers rather than troops. As
one German journalist told this correspondent, this U-turn was because
German troops on the border with Israel would be entitled to shoot -
and use - "deadly force" to prevent any confrontation between the
IDF and Hezbollah. Because of the historical luggage carried by the
Germans from World War II, a German soldier today simply cannot fire
against an Israeli.
Yet despite these obstacles, Greece, France and Italy, which alone
will contribute 2,000-3,000 troops to UNIFIL, have all agreed to
send troops. On Thursday, French President Jacques Chirac agreed to
increase the number of French troops to 2,000.
Olmert made things more difficult for the UN by saying he would
not accept troops at UNIFIL whose countries didn't have diplomatic
relations with Israel. He was referring to Indonesia, Malaysia
and Bangladesh. The Israeli premier does not have the luxury of
hand-picking what countries will join the multinational troops in
Lebanon, since not many countries have shown great enthusiasm to get
involved in a new war in the Middle East.
French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said on Wednesday that
UNIFIL forces in Lebanon would have two missions. One would be to
let the Lebanese army deploy in the south. The second would be "to
guarantee the embargo on arms delivery across all borders - I repeat -
across all borders".
The Syrian factor The minister was referring to the Syria-Lebanon
border, which is considered by many in Lebanon and the international
community to be the only source from which Syria can channel arms
to Hezbollah.
According to Resolution 1701, this supply of arms must end, to bring
Hezbollah to a gradual military end. Syria immediately snapped back
by turning down the request to station troops on Lebanon's side of
the Syrian-Lebanese border, with authority to administer checkpoints
searching for arms coming in from Syria.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said on Dubai TV that UNIFIL troops
on Lebanon's border with Syria "is an infringement on Lebanese
sovereignty and a hostile position" toward Syria. He added, "First,
this means creating hostile conditions between Syria and Lebanon.
Second, it is a hostile move toward Syria, and naturally it will
create problems."
Assad's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualim threatened from a state
visit to Finland that if multinational troops were stationed on the
Syrian-Lebanese border, Syria would close its border with Lebanon.
The White House immediately responded to Syria's stance through its
spokeswoman Dana Perino, who said, "If the president of Syria were
not supplying Hezbollah, this wouldn't have been a problem in the
first place."
Closing the border with Lebanon is an old trick practiced by the
Syrians ever since prime minister Khalid al-Azm did it in 1950
to prevent the influx of Lebanese goods into Syria. President Adib
al-Shishakli did it again in 1954 when he accused Lebanon of supporting
a Druze uprising against his regime in Damascus. President Shukri
al-Quwatli did it in 1957 when Lebanon retaliated to a series of overt
Syrian intelligence operations on its territory by funding anti-regime
activities in Damascus to obstruct Syria's honeymoon with Egypt.
It was semi-repeated by Assad last summer when Lebanese cargo trucks
were held up for weeks at the Syrian border, causing some goods to
rot, and forcing Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora to go to Syria to
solve the crisis.
This was at the apex of strained Syrian-Lebanese relations over
the murder of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri. If
Syria does carry out its threats and shut the border with Lebanon,
it would cause a severe economic crisis in its neighbor, since Syria
is the only land route for Lebanon.
The other country bordering Lebanon is Israel, with which diplomatic
relations and passage routes are impossible at this stage. Currently,
all sea routes to Lebanon are sealed by the Israelis, and so is
landing at Lebanese airports.
With Israel controlling the skies and waters, and Syria controlling the
ground routes, Lebanon would be stranded, with no connection to the
outside world. Syria believes that only through such a harsh measure
can it force the Lebanese government to say no to international troops
on the Syrian border.
After all, it cannot say no to the troops itself, since they would
not be stationed on its territory, but Damascus can use its leverage
in Lebanon to force Siniora to say no. It does not mind UN troops
on the Lebanese-Israeli border, nor does it mind the deployment of
the Lebanese army, but it is categorically opposed to troops on the
border with Syria.
Olmert has that he had no immediate plans of ending the air and sea
blockade on Lebanon until an international peacekeeping force was
deployed on Lebanon's borders, to prevent the arming of Hezbollah
and their attacks on north Israel.
As things stand, multinational troops will be placed on the
Syrian-Lebanese border in addition to the Lebanese-Israeli border.
Otherwise, they would be useless. But if that happens, Syria could
strangle Lebanon by closing down the border. Yet Olmert's rules say
that only when Syria's border is monitored - meaning when Syria's
ground route is closed - will Lebanon regain its air and sea routes.
To understand Syria's position one must understand how the Syrian
regime is thinking in relation to the Israeli war in Lebanon. Assad
claimed victory in this war, for his unconditional backing of
Hezbollah, just as Syria claimed co-victory with Hezbollah when it
liberated south Lebanon from the Israelis in May 2000.
The Syrians will not let Resolution 1701 destroy these victories by
ruining or disarming Hezbollah. Not only is patrolling the Syrian
border offensive to the Syrians, but if this is done, it would
actually mean that no arms would in fact arrive in Lebanon to be used
by Hezbollah. It would mean the military end to the Lebanese group -
something Syria will not permit.
Hezbollah is the last-standing Syrian card in Lebanon. It is the card
that will launch a political coup in Lebanon against the coalition
government of Saad al-Hariri - the group that launched its own putsch
against Syria in 2005 and drove the Syrian army out of Lebanon.
Syria will do all that is in its power to preserve Hezbollah. The
Syrians believe that if this means obstructing UNIFIL on Lebanon's
border with Syria, ruining Resolution 1701 or shutting Syria's border
with Lebanon - then so be it. All is fair in love and war for Damascus,
especially when it comes to Lebanon.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)
By Sami Moubayed
Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Aug. 25, 2006
DAMASCUS - When United Nations Resolution 1701 was passed on August
11, it was seen as a diplomatic breakthrough to end 33 days of war
between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Many today, however, are having serious doubts whether this ceasefire
will last and whether 1701 is actually a diplomatic victory - or
failure - for the UN. In addition to a ceasefire, the resolution
demands the deployment of the Lebanese army, and eventually
multinational troops, on the border to prevent any future
war between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah. It gives
Israel the right to self-defense, however, while denying this right
to Hezbollah, explaining why the party's secretary general, Hassan
Nasrallah, accepted the resolution "with reservations".
If implemented to the word, the resolution would deprive Hezbollah of
the territory it has used to wage war against Israel since the 1980s.
A Hezbollah that is deprived of southern Lebanon would be a Hezbollah
that cannot fire rockets against northern Israel. The resolution
also asked for implementation of Resolution 1559, which calls for
the complete disarming of Hezbollah, and strongly says that no arms
should be transferred to the Lebanese military group.
The first loophole in 1701 is that it does not give any mechanism for
the disarming of Hezbollah, something that neither the United Nations
Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) nor the Lebanese army - nor Israel
- has been able to do. The expanded UN troop presence on the border
will not be able to disarm Hezbollah. If the troops try to do that,
they will certainly be attacked.
This was something made clear by French Major-General Alain Pelligrini,
the UNIFIL commander in Lebanon, who said: "The Israelis cannot ask
UNIFIL to disarm Hezbollah. This is not written in our mandate." He
added that the ceasefire "is tense, very fragile, very volatile. Any
provocation or misunderstanding could escalate very, very rapidly."
Speaking to the Financial Times on August 3, Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert related what he saw as the perfect objective of UNIFIL in
Lebanon. He said it should aim at "stopping violence against innocent
Israelis from Lebanon and disarming this murderous organization,
the Hezbollah, which is the long arm of Iran".
Olmert's distorted version of UNIFIL, however, seems to be very
different from the one that is likely to emerge in Lebanon in the
coming weeks. French newspaper Le Monde leaked a 21-page document
distributed at the UN last week showing what the new expanded UNIFIL
troops would look like.
First, very clearly, they would not be authorized to disarm
Hezbollah. They would also lack the authority to search Hezbollah
strongholds or bunkers. Second, they are authorized "to use force,
up to and including deadly force", to implement peace on the
Lebanese-Israeli border and to defend themselves against attack by
either the IDF or Hezbollah. Third, they have to protect civilians,
and fourth, they will have to provide backup to the Lebanese army.
Actually, bringing 15,000 troops from the Lebanese army to the border
is easy. It has even been accepted by Nasrallah, who previously had
rejected deployment of the Lebanese army to the south. Deploying an
equal number of multinational troops is more difficult - but doable.
The history of multinational troops in Lebanon during the Israeli
invasion of 1982 showed that these troops are vulnerable and could
be driven out of Lebanon with ease. In October 1983, an attack on US
marines in Lebanon led to the killing of 241 US and 58 French troops
and the exodus of about 5,000 multinational troops from Lebanon.
No Arab country today, except Morocco, is willing to take part in such
a force, since it would be viewed by the Arab street as a multinational
force used to protect Israel from Hezbollah. Given Hezbollah's
popularity in the Arab world, such a step would be political suicide -
even for moderate Arab regimes such as Egypt and Jordan.
Turkey showed willingness to send troops to Lebanon, but this proposal
was vetoed by the Lebanese-Armenians, who cannot forget Turkish
massacres against the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during World
War I. Germany at first showed similar willingness to comply, but then
backed down and said it would send advisers rather than troops. As
one German journalist told this correspondent, this U-turn was because
German troops on the border with Israel would be entitled to shoot -
and use - "deadly force" to prevent any confrontation between the
IDF and Hezbollah. Because of the historical luggage carried by the
Germans from World War II, a German soldier today simply cannot fire
against an Israeli.
Yet despite these obstacles, Greece, France and Italy, which alone
will contribute 2,000-3,000 troops to UNIFIL, have all agreed to
send troops. On Thursday, French President Jacques Chirac agreed to
increase the number of French troops to 2,000.
Olmert made things more difficult for the UN by saying he would
not accept troops at UNIFIL whose countries didn't have diplomatic
relations with Israel. He was referring to Indonesia, Malaysia
and Bangladesh. The Israeli premier does not have the luxury of
hand-picking what countries will join the multinational troops in
Lebanon, since not many countries have shown great enthusiasm to get
involved in a new war in the Middle East.
French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said on Wednesday that
UNIFIL forces in Lebanon would have two missions. One would be to
let the Lebanese army deploy in the south. The second would be "to
guarantee the embargo on arms delivery across all borders - I repeat -
across all borders".
The Syrian factor The minister was referring to the Syria-Lebanon
border, which is considered by many in Lebanon and the international
community to be the only source from which Syria can channel arms
to Hezbollah.
According to Resolution 1701, this supply of arms must end, to bring
Hezbollah to a gradual military end. Syria immediately snapped back
by turning down the request to station troops on Lebanon's side of
the Syrian-Lebanese border, with authority to administer checkpoints
searching for arms coming in from Syria.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said on Dubai TV that UNIFIL troops
on Lebanon's border with Syria "is an infringement on Lebanese
sovereignty and a hostile position" toward Syria. He added, "First,
this means creating hostile conditions between Syria and Lebanon.
Second, it is a hostile move toward Syria, and naturally it will
create problems."
Assad's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualim threatened from a state
visit to Finland that if multinational troops were stationed on the
Syrian-Lebanese border, Syria would close its border with Lebanon.
The White House immediately responded to Syria's stance through its
spokeswoman Dana Perino, who said, "If the president of Syria were
not supplying Hezbollah, this wouldn't have been a problem in the
first place."
Closing the border with Lebanon is an old trick practiced by the
Syrians ever since prime minister Khalid al-Azm did it in 1950
to prevent the influx of Lebanese goods into Syria. President Adib
al-Shishakli did it again in 1954 when he accused Lebanon of supporting
a Druze uprising against his regime in Damascus. President Shukri
al-Quwatli did it in 1957 when Lebanon retaliated to a series of overt
Syrian intelligence operations on its territory by funding anti-regime
activities in Damascus to obstruct Syria's honeymoon with Egypt.
It was semi-repeated by Assad last summer when Lebanese cargo trucks
were held up for weeks at the Syrian border, causing some goods to
rot, and forcing Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora to go to Syria to
solve the crisis.
This was at the apex of strained Syrian-Lebanese relations over
the murder of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri. If
Syria does carry out its threats and shut the border with Lebanon,
it would cause a severe economic crisis in its neighbor, since Syria
is the only land route for Lebanon.
The other country bordering Lebanon is Israel, with which diplomatic
relations and passage routes are impossible at this stage. Currently,
all sea routes to Lebanon are sealed by the Israelis, and so is
landing at Lebanese airports.
With Israel controlling the skies and waters, and Syria controlling the
ground routes, Lebanon would be stranded, with no connection to the
outside world. Syria believes that only through such a harsh measure
can it force the Lebanese government to say no to international troops
on the Syrian border.
After all, it cannot say no to the troops itself, since they would
not be stationed on its territory, but Damascus can use its leverage
in Lebanon to force Siniora to say no. It does not mind UN troops
on the Lebanese-Israeli border, nor does it mind the deployment of
the Lebanese army, but it is categorically opposed to troops on the
border with Syria.
Olmert has that he had no immediate plans of ending the air and sea
blockade on Lebanon until an international peacekeeping force was
deployed on Lebanon's borders, to prevent the arming of Hezbollah
and their attacks on north Israel.
As things stand, multinational troops will be placed on the
Syrian-Lebanese border in addition to the Lebanese-Israeli border.
Otherwise, they would be useless. But if that happens, Syria could
strangle Lebanon by closing down the border. Yet Olmert's rules say
that only when Syria's border is monitored - meaning when Syria's
ground route is closed - will Lebanon regain its air and sea routes.
To understand Syria's position one must understand how the Syrian
regime is thinking in relation to the Israeli war in Lebanon. Assad
claimed victory in this war, for his unconditional backing of
Hezbollah, just as Syria claimed co-victory with Hezbollah when it
liberated south Lebanon from the Israelis in May 2000.
The Syrians will not let Resolution 1701 destroy these victories by
ruining or disarming Hezbollah. Not only is patrolling the Syrian
border offensive to the Syrians, but if this is done, it would
actually mean that no arms would in fact arrive in Lebanon to be used
by Hezbollah. It would mean the military end to the Lebanese group -
something Syria will not permit.
Hezbollah is the last-standing Syrian card in Lebanon. It is the card
that will launch a political coup in Lebanon against the coalition
government of Saad al-Hariri - the group that launched its own putsch
against Syria in 2005 and drove the Syrian army out of Lebanon.
Syria will do all that is in its power to preserve Hezbollah. The
Syrians believe that if this means obstructing UNIFIL on Lebanon's
border with Syria, ruining Resolution 1701 or shutting Syria's border
with Lebanon - then so be it. All is fair in love and war for Damascus,
especially when it comes to Lebanon.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)