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THE TENSE STATUS QUO IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Comment By Sergei Markedonov
Special to Russia Profile
Russia Profile, Russia
Dec 8 2006
Another Year Without a Lasting Peace
Yet another year has passed without a resolution in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the negotiations for a settlement,
which began in 2004, have been put off indefinitely.
On Nov. 28, during the CIS summit in Minsk, Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev met with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan at the
Russian Embassy. The meeting was conducted at first in an "expanded
format" with the additional involvement of the two countries' foreign
ministers - Elmar Mamedyarov and Vardan Oskanyan - along with Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Karel de Gucht, then-president of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
his personal representative, Andrzej Kasprzyk. Also present at the
meeting was the Russian co-chairman of the OSCE's Minsk Group, Yury
Merzlyakov. The two presidents later held talks behind closed doors.
To say that the results of this meeting - in all likelihood this year's
last meeting - were modest would be an exaggeration. The outcome of
the Minsk talks was no different than the outcome of previous meetings
in London, Rambouillet, and Bucharest.
Following the talks, Aliyev said that he and Kocharyan managed to
reach agreement on previously unresolved issues, and that they were
"nearing the last stage of negotiations on resolving the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh." At the same time, the Azerbaijani president admitted
that there remained "fundamental questions on which the two sides'
opinions diverge." In all likelihood, Aliyev was referring to the
refugee problem, as well as the liberation of occupied territories
(from an Armenian point of view, this means the "security zone"
around Nagorno-Karabakh). And, of course, the issue of the status of
Karabakh itself has yet to be addressed.
After the conclusion of a previous round of talks this year, an
Azerbaijani diplomat said that the sides had managed to reach an
agreement on seven issues, and that differences remained on just two.
These "two questions" turned out to be the refugee problem and the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The diplomat's comments reveal a common
misconception held by many young politicians: that it is possible
to move toward peace without resolving the question of the status
of Karabakh, or agreeing on terms for the return of refugees and
liberating the seven districts occupied by the Armenians around the
de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In many ways, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have reached
the last stage. But now they will have to solve "just two issues,"
and the remaining discussion of these issues could nullify all the
previously reached agreements. Unfortunately, neither side today has
the political will or responsibility to admit the obvious facts. The
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is in crisis, without an obvious road
map to resolution.
As 2006 draws to a close, the groundless optimism that opened the
year has become ever more apparent. At his first press conference as
the new OSCE president, de Gucht said that there were signs Armenia
and Azerbaijan could solve the Karabakh conflict, and that he saw a
"window of opportunity," given that Azerbaijan was holding elections
while a constitutional referendum was taking place in Armenia.
"Windows of opportunity" are very important in politics, de Gucht
said, and he indicated that several countries had received signals
about a possible solution to the Karabakh problem.
Although politicians and political analysts did not know what the
sources behind de Gucht's statement might have been, Russian diplomats
were also optimistic. As Lavrov put it in January 2006, "there have
been movements on the issue of solving the Karabakh conflict based on
what we saw in 2005" - without elaborating as to what these movements
had been.
As of early 2006, no key issues on the Karabakh problem had been
resolved. Azeri refugees did not return to where they had previously
lived, the status of the region was not clarified and no territories
were liberated. Armenians driven out of the territory of then-Soviet
Azerbaijan in the first years of the conflict received no compensation
- although this position was not made clear during the talks.
Also unmentioned was the issue of the occupied Armenian enclave of
Artsvashen, which is not part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian experts
are actively involved in discussions of this problem, although Yerevan
officially tries not to push it too hard. Issues such as the economic
rehabilitation of Karabakh, the restoration of Armenian-Azerbaijani
economic relations and the establishment of at least minimal contacts
between Armenia and Azerbaijan outside the context of Karabakh all
remained gridlocked.
As Europe and Russia were expressing optimism for finding a
resolution to the conflict, a wave of hopefulness arrived from the
United States. After assuming the position of co-chairman of the
OSCE Minsk Group, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia Matthew Bryza declared that the key to solving the problem
was within reach. In an interview with Radio Liberty in June 2006,
Bryza said that there was a "proposal on the table, and we would very
much encourage the presidents to accept this framework."
The points of this agreement, however, remained a mystery, as
did the issue of why both Baku and Yerevan were refusing to sign
such a great document. What flaws in the peace proposals prevented
Azerbaijan and Armenia from reaching a compromise? Unfortunately,
these substantive aspects of the peace process have not been subject
to the necessary discussion; instead the public was fed optimistic
forecasts throughout 2006.
Although such confidence continues to be expressed, the political
formula for the peace process has still not been clearly defined.
Even the Middle Eastern formula of "Land for Peace" is not being
used. And the question of Karabakh's status remains unsolved. Since
1988, most of what used to be the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
has been outside Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. Since 1991, there has
been a de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (existing in peacetime
conditions since 1994).
At the same time, questions about its status remain key to any push
toward peace in the region. If Baku were to recognize the republic,
it would - or at least should - be possible to force Karabakh to
remove troops from territories it occupied during the war, which
it is holding as a security guarantee. These seven regions outside
Nagorno-Karabakh play a peacekeeping role in other conflict flashpoints
by keeping the situation permanently "frozen."
All current peacemaking efforts appear not to notice the strengthening
of Karabakh's sovereignty. In 2005, the region held its own census,
and on Dec. 10 it will hold a referendum on a constitution - both
indications that the republic is strengthening its institutions of
power. At the same time, Baku officially says it is ready to grant
Nagorno-Karabakh a status similar to that held by Tatarstan within
Russia. The only problem is that Tatarstan achieved its status through
complex negotiations with Moscow, without military action and without
15 years of experience as an independent state.
Without a doubt, the status question is dragging the negotiations
down. And if negotiators chose to focus on this question, they
could solve several of the other outstanding issues as well. But,
unfortunately, one of the main problems with the work of the Minsk
Group is its inability to determine political priorities for the talks,
consumed by a desire to solve them all at once.
But the most important thing is that no trust has been achieved
between the sides in the talks over Karabakh. The negotiations have
virtually become a matter between two gentlemen-presidents, Aliyev
and Kocharyan. No lawmakers, NGOs, or experts are involved in the
process. More accurately, they are involved despite, rather than
because of, the Minsk Group. All of these contacts are more like
private initiatives than a system of measures.
It should have been a high priority to get a broad range of people
involved, rather than just a small group of intimates: this would
have freed the presidents of both countries from the social pressure
that they find themselves under. As the leaders of the two countries,
the presidents cannot give promises to the opposing sides, and nor
can they agree on a compromise.
If the circle of negotiators were widened, personal responsibility
for the peace process participants would also be shared. On the other
hand, the diplomatic side of the peace process - drafting concrete
political formulas and decisions - should stop being a PR project
and become routine work for experts.
Thus, the peace process for Nagorno-Karabakh needs some serious
reworking. It needs to incorporate fresh people with fresh ideas in
order to encourage trust between the parties, while at the same time
engaging in some diplomatic "routinization," leaving the bulk of the
negotiations to professionals, not heads of state. Revitalizing the
discussion over Nagorno-Karabakh should be a priority for 2007.
Another year of dashed expectations will only continue to hold back
any real movement in the process.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. He
contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
http://www.russiaprofile.org/internation al/2006/12/8/4861.wbp
Comment By Sergei Markedonov
Special to Russia Profile
Russia Profile, Russia
Dec 8 2006
Another Year Without a Lasting Peace
Yet another year has passed without a resolution in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the negotiations for a settlement,
which began in 2004, have been put off indefinitely.
On Nov. 28, during the CIS summit in Minsk, Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev met with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan at the
Russian Embassy. The meeting was conducted at first in an "expanded
format" with the additional involvement of the two countries' foreign
ministers - Elmar Mamedyarov and Vardan Oskanyan - along with Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Karel de Gucht, then-president of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
his personal representative, Andrzej Kasprzyk. Also present at the
meeting was the Russian co-chairman of the OSCE's Minsk Group, Yury
Merzlyakov. The two presidents later held talks behind closed doors.
To say that the results of this meeting - in all likelihood this year's
last meeting - were modest would be an exaggeration. The outcome of
the Minsk talks was no different than the outcome of previous meetings
in London, Rambouillet, and Bucharest.
Following the talks, Aliyev said that he and Kocharyan managed to
reach agreement on previously unresolved issues, and that they were
"nearing the last stage of negotiations on resolving the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh." At the same time, the Azerbaijani president admitted
that there remained "fundamental questions on which the two sides'
opinions diverge." In all likelihood, Aliyev was referring to the
refugee problem, as well as the liberation of occupied territories
(from an Armenian point of view, this means the "security zone"
around Nagorno-Karabakh). And, of course, the issue of the status of
Karabakh itself has yet to be addressed.
After the conclusion of a previous round of talks this year, an
Azerbaijani diplomat said that the sides had managed to reach an
agreement on seven issues, and that differences remained on just two.
These "two questions" turned out to be the refugee problem and the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The diplomat's comments reveal a common
misconception held by many young politicians: that it is possible
to move toward peace without resolving the question of the status
of Karabakh, or agreeing on terms for the return of refugees and
liberating the seven districts occupied by the Armenians around the
de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In many ways, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have reached
the last stage. But now they will have to solve "just two issues,"
and the remaining discussion of these issues could nullify all the
previously reached agreements. Unfortunately, neither side today has
the political will or responsibility to admit the obvious facts. The
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is in crisis, without an obvious road
map to resolution.
As 2006 draws to a close, the groundless optimism that opened the
year has become ever more apparent. At his first press conference as
the new OSCE president, de Gucht said that there were signs Armenia
and Azerbaijan could solve the Karabakh conflict, and that he saw a
"window of opportunity," given that Azerbaijan was holding elections
while a constitutional referendum was taking place in Armenia.
"Windows of opportunity" are very important in politics, de Gucht
said, and he indicated that several countries had received signals
about a possible solution to the Karabakh problem.
Although politicians and political analysts did not know what the
sources behind de Gucht's statement might have been, Russian diplomats
were also optimistic. As Lavrov put it in January 2006, "there have
been movements on the issue of solving the Karabakh conflict based on
what we saw in 2005" - without elaborating as to what these movements
had been.
As of early 2006, no key issues on the Karabakh problem had been
resolved. Azeri refugees did not return to where they had previously
lived, the status of the region was not clarified and no territories
were liberated. Armenians driven out of the territory of then-Soviet
Azerbaijan in the first years of the conflict received no compensation
- although this position was not made clear during the talks.
Also unmentioned was the issue of the occupied Armenian enclave of
Artsvashen, which is not part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian experts
are actively involved in discussions of this problem, although Yerevan
officially tries not to push it too hard. Issues such as the economic
rehabilitation of Karabakh, the restoration of Armenian-Azerbaijani
economic relations and the establishment of at least minimal contacts
between Armenia and Azerbaijan outside the context of Karabakh all
remained gridlocked.
As Europe and Russia were expressing optimism for finding a
resolution to the conflict, a wave of hopefulness arrived from the
United States. After assuming the position of co-chairman of the
OSCE Minsk Group, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia Matthew Bryza declared that the key to solving the problem
was within reach. In an interview with Radio Liberty in June 2006,
Bryza said that there was a "proposal on the table, and we would very
much encourage the presidents to accept this framework."
The points of this agreement, however, remained a mystery, as
did the issue of why both Baku and Yerevan were refusing to sign
such a great document. What flaws in the peace proposals prevented
Azerbaijan and Armenia from reaching a compromise? Unfortunately,
these substantive aspects of the peace process have not been subject
to the necessary discussion; instead the public was fed optimistic
forecasts throughout 2006.
Although such confidence continues to be expressed, the political
formula for the peace process has still not been clearly defined.
Even the Middle Eastern formula of "Land for Peace" is not being
used. And the question of Karabakh's status remains unsolved. Since
1988, most of what used to be the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
has been outside Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. Since 1991, there has
been a de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (existing in peacetime
conditions since 1994).
At the same time, questions about its status remain key to any push
toward peace in the region. If Baku were to recognize the republic,
it would - or at least should - be possible to force Karabakh to
remove troops from territories it occupied during the war, which
it is holding as a security guarantee. These seven regions outside
Nagorno-Karabakh play a peacekeeping role in other conflict flashpoints
by keeping the situation permanently "frozen."
All current peacemaking efforts appear not to notice the strengthening
of Karabakh's sovereignty. In 2005, the region held its own census,
and on Dec. 10 it will hold a referendum on a constitution - both
indications that the republic is strengthening its institutions of
power. At the same time, Baku officially says it is ready to grant
Nagorno-Karabakh a status similar to that held by Tatarstan within
Russia. The only problem is that Tatarstan achieved its status through
complex negotiations with Moscow, without military action and without
15 years of experience as an independent state.
Without a doubt, the status question is dragging the negotiations
down. And if negotiators chose to focus on this question, they
could solve several of the other outstanding issues as well. But,
unfortunately, one of the main problems with the work of the Minsk
Group is its inability to determine political priorities for the talks,
consumed by a desire to solve them all at once.
But the most important thing is that no trust has been achieved
between the sides in the talks over Karabakh. The negotiations have
virtually become a matter between two gentlemen-presidents, Aliyev
and Kocharyan. No lawmakers, NGOs, or experts are involved in the
process. More accurately, they are involved despite, rather than
because of, the Minsk Group. All of these contacts are more like
private initiatives than a system of measures.
It should have been a high priority to get a broad range of people
involved, rather than just a small group of intimates: this would
have freed the presidents of both countries from the social pressure
that they find themselves under. As the leaders of the two countries,
the presidents cannot give promises to the opposing sides, and nor
can they agree on a compromise.
If the circle of negotiators were widened, personal responsibility
for the peace process participants would also be shared. On the other
hand, the diplomatic side of the peace process - drafting concrete
political formulas and decisions - should stop being a PR project
and become routine work for experts.
Thus, the peace process for Nagorno-Karabakh needs some serious
reworking. It needs to incorporate fresh people with fresh ideas in
order to encourage trust between the parties, while at the same time
engaging in some diplomatic "routinization," leaving the bulk of the
negotiations to professionals, not heads of state. Revitalizing the
discussion over Nagorno-Karabakh should be a priority for 2007.
Another year of dashed expectations will only continue to hold back
any real movement in the process.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. He
contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
http://www.russiaprofile.org/internation al/2006/12/8/4861.wbp