PAPER URGES ARMENIA TO SOLVE KARABAKH CONFLICT BEFORE IT IS NOT TOO LATE
by Armen Bagdasaryan
168 Zham, Armenia
Dec 7 2006
"The man who is in the dancing hall should dance perfectly"
As was expected, "a window of opportunities" [for the Karabakh conflict
settlement] in 2006 is closed and the parties have not reached an
agreement. In all probability, 2007 will bring nothing new in this
sense. Parallel to this, the Javakhk problem is gradually coming to
the fore of public attention.
Certainly, one can see here only a "Russian trace" and claim no other
reasons. It is clear that Russia will try to "punish" disobedient
Georgia and they may "need" Javakhk in this matter. But is the problem
only in the Russian trace? Is that accidental that the Javakhk problem
is becoming more active just at the moment when it becomes clear that
the Karabakh talks failed this time as well?
We asked the leader of Dashink [Bloc] Party, Samvel Babayan, to
comment on possible options for the Karabakh settlement. He said that
Karabakh should gain transitional independence (let us say, under
the EU). Pre-conditions should be created for the Karabakh economy
to develop, the return of refugees should be organized and only after
that a status of Karabakh should be determined via a referendum.
As you see, there is no word about the liberated territories (but
it is supposed that they should be returned otherwise, the return of
the refugees is impossible). This is obvious as it would be hard for
Samvel Babayan to speak about this [because he was the commander of
the Karabakh army].
The point is that there is an idea on the basis of this project that
the South Caucasus should strive to integration with the EU, should be
guided by democracy and human rights ideas which will make the final
settlement possible just on these grounds. But the problem is that
Azerbaijan does not want this and is striving to isolate Armenia from
all the regional programmes. Incidentally, Samvel Babayan understands
very well that we are not interested in preserving the current
situation in the Karabakh conflict. The situation is as following -
today Azerbaijan has taken quite a harsh position and refuses to make
serious concessions. Incidentally, Azerbaijan has grounds to act in
such a way as it has successes in the matter of isolating Armenia.
Moreover, after construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku railway,
Armenia will almost be absolutely isolated. In such a situation,
Armenia has two ways out, either to go to serious concessions to settle
the conflict as soon as possible and avoid regional isolation, or make
such steps which will force Azerbaijan "lose hopes" in the matter of
Armenia's isolation (it is clear that after that Azerbaijanis will
make more concessions).
Briefly, Armenia has found itself in dilemma. As preserving
the status-quo is in our favour, we have to choose whether to
agree to a stage-by-stage option and remove troops at least from
five districts, or a movement will start in Javakhk to hinder the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railway project. Anyway, a man who stands in
the dancing hall should either dance or leave the hall. If we continue
imitation of the Karabakh talks and at the same time undertake nothing
in Javakh, Armenia will find itself in an absolute blockade.
If we continue imitation of the Karabakh talks but do not prevent
worsening of the situation in Javakh, in that case, military actions
will restart at the Karabakh front and we shall have two fronts in
the conditions of absolute blockade. There is only one way out, i.e.
to prevent possible developments in Javakh and to try really settle
the Karabakh conflict. But Armenian politicians think that this option
is something like to a "national defeat" and immediately transfers
the problem to a moral field. And in this case, we may have only a
moral victory.
by Armen Bagdasaryan
168 Zham, Armenia
Dec 7 2006
"The man who is in the dancing hall should dance perfectly"
As was expected, "a window of opportunities" [for the Karabakh conflict
settlement] in 2006 is closed and the parties have not reached an
agreement. In all probability, 2007 will bring nothing new in this
sense. Parallel to this, the Javakhk problem is gradually coming to
the fore of public attention.
Certainly, one can see here only a "Russian trace" and claim no other
reasons. It is clear that Russia will try to "punish" disobedient
Georgia and they may "need" Javakhk in this matter. But is the problem
only in the Russian trace? Is that accidental that the Javakhk problem
is becoming more active just at the moment when it becomes clear that
the Karabakh talks failed this time as well?
We asked the leader of Dashink [Bloc] Party, Samvel Babayan, to
comment on possible options for the Karabakh settlement. He said that
Karabakh should gain transitional independence (let us say, under
the EU). Pre-conditions should be created for the Karabakh economy
to develop, the return of refugees should be organized and only after
that a status of Karabakh should be determined via a referendum.
As you see, there is no word about the liberated territories (but
it is supposed that they should be returned otherwise, the return of
the refugees is impossible). This is obvious as it would be hard for
Samvel Babayan to speak about this [because he was the commander of
the Karabakh army].
The point is that there is an idea on the basis of this project that
the South Caucasus should strive to integration with the EU, should be
guided by democracy and human rights ideas which will make the final
settlement possible just on these grounds. But the problem is that
Azerbaijan does not want this and is striving to isolate Armenia from
all the regional programmes. Incidentally, Samvel Babayan understands
very well that we are not interested in preserving the current
situation in the Karabakh conflict. The situation is as following -
today Azerbaijan has taken quite a harsh position and refuses to make
serious concessions. Incidentally, Azerbaijan has grounds to act in
such a way as it has successes in the matter of isolating Armenia.
Moreover, after construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku railway,
Armenia will almost be absolutely isolated. In such a situation,
Armenia has two ways out, either to go to serious concessions to settle
the conflict as soon as possible and avoid regional isolation, or make
such steps which will force Azerbaijan "lose hopes" in the matter of
Armenia's isolation (it is clear that after that Azerbaijanis will
make more concessions).
Briefly, Armenia has found itself in dilemma. As preserving
the status-quo is in our favour, we have to choose whether to
agree to a stage-by-stage option and remove troops at least from
five districts, or a movement will start in Javakhk to hinder the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railway project. Anyway, a man who stands in
the dancing hall should either dance or leave the hall. If we continue
imitation of the Karabakh talks and at the same time undertake nothing
in Javakh, Armenia will find itself in an absolute blockade.
If we continue imitation of the Karabakh talks but do not prevent
worsening of the situation in Javakh, in that case, military actions
will restart at the Karabakh front and we shall have two fronts in
the conditions of absolute blockade. There is only one way out, i.e.
to prevent possible developments in Javakh and to try really settle
the Karabakh conflict. But Armenian politicians think that this option
is something like to a "national defeat" and immediately transfers
the problem to a moral field. And in this case, we may have only a
moral victory.