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Russia's Stance on Disputed Territories: Just How Hypocritical is it?
By Michael Averko
Serbianna.com, MI
Dec 23 2006
As of late, there has been a good deal of action on matter pertaining
to post Communist bloc land disputes. Within the confines of the former
Soviet Union, representatives of Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester regularly meet, with some of their
discussions occurring in Russia. On another front, former Yugoslavia
is embroiled in an international dialogue on whether Kosovo should
be allowed to separate from Serbia. This has no doubt encouraged
Republika Srpska to consider breaking away from Bosnia.
Certain elements in the West accuse Moscow of showing a bias for
pro-Russian independence movements and recalcitrance towards not
so pro-Russian ones. The New York Times' C.J. Chivers ("Sun and
Surf, but Also Lines in the 'Russian' Sand," Aug. 20) and Publius
Pundit's Robert Mayer ("Russia's Kosovo Double Standard," Nov. 14)
are among those suggesting such. The title of Mayer's article is
enough of a hint to his view. Chivers cites Russia~Rs refusal to let
Chechnya become formally independent, while sympathizing with some
independence movements elsewhere. Chivers' point is non-parallel,
since most Chechens aren't supportive of independence because of what
"independence" had twice done to their republic over the last decade.
On two different occasions during that period, Chechnya operated as
an independent entity. In each instance, there was an enhanced chaos
that made life more miserable for Chechnya's population. Like it or
not, a greater Russian control of Chechnya has led to an increased
stability in that republic.
Those arguing in support of the Russian position (myself included)
stress that each of the disputed former Soviet and former Yugoslav
regions have different degrees of legitimacy for independence. Under
this very same belief, there are those going against Russia. A critical
review of these areas is therefore required.
The Kremlin hasn't formally recognized the four disputed former Soviet
territories as independent states. With the exception of Nagorno
Karabakh, the other three have shown an interest in reunifying with
Russia. Nagorno Karabakh is interested in unifying with Armenia. In
this sense, these regions aren't necessarily seeking to become
independent.
Nagorno Karabakh's separatist drive has the least enthusiasm among
Russian political elites. It's a landlocked area within Azerbaijan's
Communist drawn boundaries, thereby making its separation from
Azerbaijan all the more difficult. The Russian city/region of
Kaliningrad is an example of how a territory can exist outside of its
affiliated country. However, unlike Nagorno Karabakh - Kaliningrad
hasn't been involved in a violent dispute for decades (towards the
end of World War II, under its former name Konigsberg and as a part
of Germany, it was the scene of a violent ethnic cleansing campaign
against the ethnic German population).
As the Soviet Union broke up, old hatreds between Orthodox Christian
Armenians and Turkic Muslim Azeris re-ignited. Up to 30,000 were
killed over who would govern Nagorno Karabakh. In the end, the
Armenian government supported Nagorno Karabakh Armenians defeated
the Azeri government forces. For well over a decade, there has been
a cold peace between Yerevan and Baku.
Russia's position on that dispute is tempered by conflicting
realities. Armenia has historically been more pro-Russian than
Azerbaijan. Materialistically, fossil fuel rich Azerbaijan is of
greater value. Current Azeri foreign policy appears motivated to play
the West and Russia off with each other. It's not out of the realm to
hypothesize that a "deal" (official or otherwise) could be made where
Russia could tacitly support an Azeri takeover of Nagorno Karabakh
in exchange for Azerbaijan becoming geo-politically closer to Russia.
Azerbaijan is using its energy revenue to enhance its military.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia share a border with Russia. These two
regions were part of a pre-19th century independent Georgia. Between
1801 and the Soviet breakup, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia
proper were affiliated with Russia as parts of the Russian Empire
and the USSR. South Ossetia's majority ethnic Ossetian population
is related to the majority Ossetian population in the neighboring
Russian republic of North Ossetia. The two Ossetias share the same
flag and coat of arms.
When in office, the three post-Soviet Georgian presidents have
advocated closer ties to the West and a lessened dependency on
Russia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia prefer the opposite. As is true
with the Armenians and Azeris, there's animosity between Georgians
and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian communities. These differences
could be attenuated with an improvement of Russo-Georgian relations.
This isn't impossible because many Georgians welcome close ties
with Russia.
As part of a March 1, 2006 Russia Blog feature on Moldova, my article
"Moldova: The Most Overlooked of the European Former Soviet Republics"
detailed Trans-Dniester's excellent case for independence.
This region was never part of an independent Moldova.
Trans-Dniester's captial Tiraspol, was founded in 1792 by Russian
Field Marshall Alexander Suvorov. (arguably Russia's greatest military
commander) At the time, Tiraspol served as a fortress marking the
border on the Dniester River between Imperial Russia and Ottoman Empire
ruled Moldova. In a recent referendum, Trans-Dniester's peaceful,
multi-ethnic and democratic society expressed the desire to reunify
with Russia.
For a variety of reasons, Kosovo doesn't have a great case for
independence. It has been a continuous part of Serbia since 1912.
Prior to that, it had been under Ottoman occupation for a lengthy
period. Centuries earlier, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia. It
was never an independent entity unto itself or a part of an independent
Albania. For decades, Kosovo's non-Albanian population has lived
under constant threat from extreme Albanian nationalists.
Since the end of the Bosnian Civil War, Republika Srpska has been at
peace as a good number of Muslims and Croats have resettled in that
republic. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accord governing Bosnia gave Republika
Srpska the right to establish its own relations with other states.
In comparison, UN Resolution 1244 governing Kosovo states that
the province is a continued part of Serbia. This resolution also
calls for a return of Serb military and civilian administration to
that province. Serbia is internationally recognized as the de facto
successor state of the now defunct Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which
had signed UN Resolution 1244. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. At the time and to the present,
Kosovo is recognized as a part of Serbia.
On the matter of hypocrisy, there's a recent New York Times editorial
("No More Delays for Kosovo," Nov. 17) which nonchalantly supports
Kosovo independence. "The paper of record" has yet to endorse
Trans-Dniester's independence even though it has a much better case
than Kosovo.
Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst
and media critic. His commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine
Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson's Russia List, Russia
Blog, The New York Times and The Tiraspol Times.
By Michael Averko
Serbianna.com, MI
Dec 23 2006
As of late, there has been a good deal of action on matter pertaining
to post Communist bloc land disputes. Within the confines of the former
Soviet Union, representatives of Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester regularly meet, with some of their
discussions occurring in Russia. On another front, former Yugoslavia
is embroiled in an international dialogue on whether Kosovo should
be allowed to separate from Serbia. This has no doubt encouraged
Republika Srpska to consider breaking away from Bosnia.
Certain elements in the West accuse Moscow of showing a bias for
pro-Russian independence movements and recalcitrance towards not
so pro-Russian ones. The New York Times' C.J. Chivers ("Sun and
Surf, but Also Lines in the 'Russian' Sand," Aug. 20) and Publius
Pundit's Robert Mayer ("Russia's Kosovo Double Standard," Nov. 14)
are among those suggesting such. The title of Mayer's article is
enough of a hint to his view. Chivers cites Russia~Rs refusal to let
Chechnya become formally independent, while sympathizing with some
independence movements elsewhere. Chivers' point is non-parallel,
since most Chechens aren't supportive of independence because of what
"independence" had twice done to their republic over the last decade.
On two different occasions during that period, Chechnya operated as
an independent entity. In each instance, there was an enhanced chaos
that made life more miserable for Chechnya's population. Like it or
not, a greater Russian control of Chechnya has led to an increased
stability in that republic.
Those arguing in support of the Russian position (myself included)
stress that each of the disputed former Soviet and former Yugoslav
regions have different degrees of legitimacy for independence. Under
this very same belief, there are those going against Russia. A critical
review of these areas is therefore required.
The Kremlin hasn't formally recognized the four disputed former Soviet
territories as independent states. With the exception of Nagorno
Karabakh, the other three have shown an interest in reunifying with
Russia. Nagorno Karabakh is interested in unifying with Armenia. In
this sense, these regions aren't necessarily seeking to become
independent.
Nagorno Karabakh's separatist drive has the least enthusiasm among
Russian political elites. It's a landlocked area within Azerbaijan's
Communist drawn boundaries, thereby making its separation from
Azerbaijan all the more difficult. The Russian city/region of
Kaliningrad is an example of how a territory can exist outside of its
affiliated country. However, unlike Nagorno Karabakh - Kaliningrad
hasn't been involved in a violent dispute for decades (towards the
end of World War II, under its former name Konigsberg and as a part
of Germany, it was the scene of a violent ethnic cleansing campaign
against the ethnic German population).
As the Soviet Union broke up, old hatreds between Orthodox Christian
Armenians and Turkic Muslim Azeris re-ignited. Up to 30,000 were
killed over who would govern Nagorno Karabakh. In the end, the
Armenian government supported Nagorno Karabakh Armenians defeated
the Azeri government forces. For well over a decade, there has been
a cold peace between Yerevan and Baku.
Russia's position on that dispute is tempered by conflicting
realities. Armenia has historically been more pro-Russian than
Azerbaijan. Materialistically, fossil fuel rich Azerbaijan is of
greater value. Current Azeri foreign policy appears motivated to play
the West and Russia off with each other. It's not out of the realm to
hypothesize that a "deal" (official or otherwise) could be made where
Russia could tacitly support an Azeri takeover of Nagorno Karabakh
in exchange for Azerbaijan becoming geo-politically closer to Russia.
Azerbaijan is using its energy revenue to enhance its military.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia share a border with Russia. These two
regions were part of a pre-19th century independent Georgia. Between
1801 and the Soviet breakup, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia
proper were affiliated with Russia as parts of the Russian Empire
and the USSR. South Ossetia's majority ethnic Ossetian population
is related to the majority Ossetian population in the neighboring
Russian republic of North Ossetia. The two Ossetias share the same
flag and coat of arms.
When in office, the three post-Soviet Georgian presidents have
advocated closer ties to the West and a lessened dependency on
Russia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia prefer the opposite. As is true
with the Armenians and Azeris, there's animosity between Georgians
and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian communities. These differences
could be attenuated with an improvement of Russo-Georgian relations.
This isn't impossible because many Georgians welcome close ties
with Russia.
As part of a March 1, 2006 Russia Blog feature on Moldova, my article
"Moldova: The Most Overlooked of the European Former Soviet Republics"
detailed Trans-Dniester's excellent case for independence.
This region was never part of an independent Moldova.
Trans-Dniester's captial Tiraspol, was founded in 1792 by Russian
Field Marshall Alexander Suvorov. (arguably Russia's greatest military
commander) At the time, Tiraspol served as a fortress marking the
border on the Dniester River between Imperial Russia and Ottoman Empire
ruled Moldova. In a recent referendum, Trans-Dniester's peaceful,
multi-ethnic and democratic society expressed the desire to reunify
with Russia.
For a variety of reasons, Kosovo doesn't have a great case for
independence. It has been a continuous part of Serbia since 1912.
Prior to that, it had been under Ottoman occupation for a lengthy
period. Centuries earlier, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia. It
was never an independent entity unto itself or a part of an independent
Albania. For decades, Kosovo's non-Albanian population has lived
under constant threat from extreme Albanian nationalists.
Since the end of the Bosnian Civil War, Republika Srpska has been at
peace as a good number of Muslims and Croats have resettled in that
republic. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accord governing Bosnia gave Republika
Srpska the right to establish its own relations with other states.
In comparison, UN Resolution 1244 governing Kosovo states that
the province is a continued part of Serbia. This resolution also
calls for a return of Serb military and civilian administration to
that province. Serbia is internationally recognized as the de facto
successor state of the now defunct Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which
had signed UN Resolution 1244. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. At the time and to the present,
Kosovo is recognized as a part of Serbia.
On the matter of hypocrisy, there's a recent New York Times editorial
("No More Delays for Kosovo," Nov. 17) which nonchalantly supports
Kosovo independence. "The paper of record" has yet to endorse
Trans-Dniester's independence even though it has a much better case
than Kosovo.
Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst
and media critic. His commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine
Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson's Russia List, Russia
Blog, The New York Times and The Tiraspol Times.