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AN ENTIRE MECHANISM OF REPRODUCTION IS DISSOLVING
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir.am
04 July 06
Armenia and Azerbaijan reacted to the revelation of negotiations
for the Karabakh conflict by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Mathew
Bryza rather strangely. Official Yerevan complained of Mathew Bryza's
statements more than Baku. It would not seem strange if there were
not for a circumstance. Complaining of the publication of the proposal
on the table of negotiations, Yerevan announced that it approves the
proposal. Baku did the contrary; it did not complain of publication but
it announced that the proposal was unacceptable for Azerbaijan. This
situation is a little strange, we should confess.
But I wish this situation were only strange. Because when after the
death of Heidar Aliyev Ilham Aliyev sat at the table, Azerbaijan
demanded to start from zero, and Armenia demanded to start from Key
West. In fact, everything started from Prague. It is difficult to
tell whether Prague is closer to Key West or zero, but most probably
Prague is close to neither of them, it is closer to the reality.
Perhaps because the leaders of the conflict sides constantly tried to
present their reality to their societies. No doubt, it is not helpful
for the settlement of the Karabakh issue and other problems, which
have accumulated so far. The presidents of both countries avoided
the reality, inventing another reality, and the problem of Karabakh
was a wonderful opportunity. Therefore, perhaps, Mathew Bryza and the
other co-chairs of the Minsk Group decided to reveal the reality to the
societies to protect them from manipulation by presidents, especially
that elections are drawing nearer in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Karabakh issue has always been a core issue in these elections,
both directly and indirectly. Even when it was not discussed, it was
always taken into account. Moreover, the Karabakh issue served the
governments of both countries as a peculiar shield against outside
intervention in home political processes. In fact, with regard to the
internal situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan the West was also guided
by the light of the Karabakh conflict, expecting that if reproduction
of power in both countries is bad in terms of democratization, it
may serve as a factor of stability in the conflict over Karabakh.
Perhaps, it was also expected that by guaranteeing reproduction of
power the parties would come closer to the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain in Armenia and
Azerbaijan that it was delicately instilled in public consciousness
in both Armenia and Azerbaijan that only Kocharyan and Aliyev could
resolve the issue of Karabakh, and any other circumstance would cause
the war to ignite. In Armenia it went even farther. In addition,
the representatives of some traditional parties announced that only
a president, who comes from Karabakh, can settle the Karabakh issue.
The minister of foreign affairs went farther and shifted this thesis
to the level of a right, announcing that the fact that Robert Kocharyan
comes from Karabakh gives him the right to act on behalf of Karabakh.
In fact, by a single interview Mathew Bryza destroyed the entire
mythology, which used to protect governments of Armenia and
Azerbaijan with the laurel of a settler. To say that Bryza did not
do it on purpose or he did it unconsciously, or not as seriously as
we think he did means to be at least an Armenian politician. By their
statements Bryza and the other co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group let
Kocharyan and Aliyev know that they are unlikely to foster their
reproduction because they used to foster it to achieve reforms in
internal policies rather than only resolving or not only resolving
the Karabakh issue. If it fails, the West does not see a point in
overlooking electoral fraud using delicately the Karabakh issue with
expressions like "What democracy are you talking about? Look out,
they may take Karabakh away from us."
In other words, it is certain that the settlement of the Karabakh
issue is not as urgent for the West and namely the United States as
the promotion of democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore,
on the one hand, Armenia is disturbed by Bryza's statement, and
on the other hand, it endorses talks based on the proposals on the
table. Armenia is troubled because it realizes that Karabakh is not
the problem. They are not going to take Karabakh away from us, they
are not going to take away anything, some people are losing power
rather. Therefore, they are worried. If in Azerbaijan Aliyev has
oil resources, which might be a lever in negotiating with the West
to keep power, in Armenia Karabakh has always been the only resource
of Robert Kocharyan for keeping power, which is now checked out from
the agenda by the Americans. There are two things to do: to rely
on the short-term effect of accepting the proposals on the table
of negotiation or to look for a more reliable and modern resource,
such as democratization of the government system.
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir.am
04 July 06
Armenia and Azerbaijan reacted to the revelation of negotiations
for the Karabakh conflict by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Mathew
Bryza rather strangely. Official Yerevan complained of Mathew Bryza's
statements more than Baku. It would not seem strange if there were
not for a circumstance. Complaining of the publication of the proposal
on the table of negotiations, Yerevan announced that it approves the
proposal. Baku did the contrary; it did not complain of publication but
it announced that the proposal was unacceptable for Azerbaijan. This
situation is a little strange, we should confess.
But I wish this situation were only strange. Because when after the
death of Heidar Aliyev Ilham Aliyev sat at the table, Azerbaijan
demanded to start from zero, and Armenia demanded to start from Key
West. In fact, everything started from Prague. It is difficult to
tell whether Prague is closer to Key West or zero, but most probably
Prague is close to neither of them, it is closer to the reality.
Perhaps because the leaders of the conflict sides constantly tried to
present their reality to their societies. No doubt, it is not helpful
for the settlement of the Karabakh issue and other problems, which
have accumulated so far. The presidents of both countries avoided
the reality, inventing another reality, and the problem of Karabakh
was a wonderful opportunity. Therefore, perhaps, Mathew Bryza and the
other co-chairs of the Minsk Group decided to reveal the reality to the
societies to protect them from manipulation by presidents, especially
that elections are drawing nearer in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Karabakh issue has always been a core issue in these elections,
both directly and indirectly. Even when it was not discussed, it was
always taken into account. Moreover, the Karabakh issue served the
governments of both countries as a peculiar shield against outside
intervention in home political processes. In fact, with regard to the
internal situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan the West was also guided
by the light of the Karabakh conflict, expecting that if reproduction
of power in both countries is bad in terms of democratization, it
may serve as a factor of stability in the conflict over Karabakh.
Perhaps, it was also expected that by guaranteeing reproduction of
power the parties would come closer to the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain in Armenia and
Azerbaijan that it was delicately instilled in public consciousness
in both Armenia and Azerbaijan that only Kocharyan and Aliyev could
resolve the issue of Karabakh, and any other circumstance would cause
the war to ignite. In Armenia it went even farther. In addition,
the representatives of some traditional parties announced that only
a president, who comes from Karabakh, can settle the Karabakh issue.
The minister of foreign affairs went farther and shifted this thesis
to the level of a right, announcing that the fact that Robert Kocharyan
comes from Karabakh gives him the right to act on behalf of Karabakh.
In fact, by a single interview Mathew Bryza destroyed the entire
mythology, which used to protect governments of Armenia and
Azerbaijan with the laurel of a settler. To say that Bryza did not
do it on purpose or he did it unconsciously, or not as seriously as
we think he did means to be at least an Armenian politician. By their
statements Bryza and the other co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group let
Kocharyan and Aliyev know that they are unlikely to foster their
reproduction because they used to foster it to achieve reforms in
internal policies rather than only resolving or not only resolving
the Karabakh issue. If it fails, the West does not see a point in
overlooking electoral fraud using delicately the Karabakh issue with
expressions like "What democracy are you talking about? Look out,
they may take Karabakh away from us."
In other words, it is certain that the settlement of the Karabakh
issue is not as urgent for the West and namely the United States as
the promotion of democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore,
on the one hand, Armenia is disturbed by Bryza's statement, and
on the other hand, it endorses talks based on the proposals on the
table. Armenia is troubled because it realizes that Karabakh is not
the problem. They are not going to take Karabakh away from us, they
are not going to take away anything, some people are losing power
rather. Therefore, they are worried. If in Azerbaijan Aliyev has
oil resources, which might be a lever in negotiating with the West
to keep power, in Armenia Karabakh has always been the only resource
of Robert Kocharyan for keeping power, which is now checked out from
the agenda by the Americans. There are two things to do: to rely
on the short-term effect of accepting the proposals on the table
of negotiation or to look for a more reliable and modern resource,
such as democratization of the government system.