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"European Turkey" In The Caucasus

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  • "European Turkey" In The Caucasus

    "EUROPEAN TURKEY" IN THE CAUCASUS
    Sergey Markedonov for RIA Novosti

    RIA Novosti, Russia
    July 5 2006

    Few people know that Henrik H. Kroner, Secretary General of the
    European Movement International, was in Yerevan, the capital of the
    South Caucasian republic of Armenia, in May 2006. He visited the
    Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan and laid a wreath to the
    victims of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915.

    The European Movement was created to "contribute to the establishment
    of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human
    rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and
    solidarity and citizens' participation."

    Henrik Kroner wrote in the book of honorary guests of the Memorial
    that such crimes as the Armenian genocide must not be allowed to
    happen again. He wrote that the European Union's values were in favor
    of future unification.

    He said in the museum that the EU was resolved to prevent a repetition
    of such tragedies, and that Turkey would not be admitted to the Union
    unless it assumed responsibility for its past crimes.

    The process has barely begun and will last years, he said, and Ankara
    will eventually have to do as requested.

    Kroner's visit to Yerevan almost coincided with a serious discussion
    on criminal liability for the denial of responsibility for the genocide
    against Armenians, held in the National Assembly of France.

    Deeply offended, Turkey recalled its ambassador "for consultations,"
    while the advocates of criminal liability for the denial of
    responsibility for the genocide and the supporters of the "democratic"
    principle of discussing this delicate issue rallied in the streets
    of Paris.

    In short, the issue of the Armenian genocide remains a European
    headache. However, the issue of admitting Turkey to the EU is usually
    considered from two aspects: Turkey's ability to accept European
    values, and the EU's ability to absorb new members and spread European
    values to them.

    Experts are analyzing not so much the essence of integration as
    the timeframe and speed with which Turkey could acquire "European
    registration."

    But the European future of Turkey is not limited to the political
    struggle of Brussels bureaucrats, or discussions of where Europe ends
    and Asia begins. The "Europeanization" of Turkey is an acute problem
    of Caucasian geopolitics, which has a direct bearing on the issue
    of genocide.

    Firstly, the Europeanization of Turkey is related to the painful
    aspect of the "big Caucasian game", or relations between Turkey
    and the "Armenian world", which is not limited to Armenia. Other
    important parts of this "world" are the self-proclaimed republic of
    Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora, which seriously influences
    public opinion in Armenia and many other countries, notably the United
    States, France and Russia.

    These parts of the "Armenian world" are divided over the future of
    Armenian-Turkish relations. During the rule of Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
    the first president of Armenia (1991-1998), the Yerevan authorities
    and the diaspora quarreled more than once over the recognition of
    the 1915 Armenian genocide. Ter-Petrosyan was not ready to soften
    his attitude to the tragedy in the name of better relations with his
    country's western neighbor.

    Although Armenia's second president, Robert Kocharyan, is pursuing a
    harsher policy towards Turkey, Yerevan has withdrawn its territorial
    claims against it.

    But not all parts of the "Armenian world" are prepared to regard
    the issue of genocide without territorial claims, restitution, or
    compensation for the property lost during the 1915 tragedy.

    Tigran Martirosyan, a prominent Armenian political analyst, said:
    "The current demands of the Armenian people [part of the "Armenian
    world"] regarding Western Armenia [modern Turkey] are based on
    the international requirement on clearing up the consequences of
    genocide. This norm proceeds from the statutes of international
    [military] tribunals, UN General Assembly resolutions, and the
    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
    [adopted on December 9, 1948 and enforced on January 12, 1951]."

    Secondly, Turkey's accession to the EU should outline the post-conflict
    settlement in the Caucasus and the region's development as a whole. The
    decision will also bear on Russia's presence in the South Caucasus.

    Apparently, the main problem in relations between Turkey and Armenia
    (and the "Armenian world") is the recognition of the Armenian
    genocide in 1915. Many people regard Turkey's interpretation of the
    1915 tragedy as a genocide (not a civil war, massacre, or deportation
    of Armenians, as modern Turkish historians prefer to write about it)
    as proof of Turkey's "Europeanization". But Turkish historians and
    political experts on the Armenian problem have other arguments.

    Professor Halil Berktay said: "This is a very serious issue, and it
    represents a mistake on the part of Turkey, which seems unable to
    make a decision on its political and legal attitude to the Ottoman
    Empire. Turkey has not fully accepted the fact that it freed itself
    from Ottoman rule and created a modern republic in its place. This
    is a very serious contradiction. The republic is not responsible for
    those events."

    "The Turkish Republic can say that it was established in 1923,
    whereas the Armenian tragedy took place in 1915," the professor said.

    "The army and state institutions of the Turkish Republic are not
    responsible for those events. The Turkish Republic is a new state.

    >>From a legal point of view, it is not the successor to the Ottoman
    government or the reformist Young Turks of the Ittihad ve Terakki
    (Unity and Progress) party."

    Other Turkish researchers of Armenian-Turkish relations call for
    cleansing the 1915 problem of political complications and "leaving
    the issue to historians." But many Turkish academics, officials and
    politicians regard statements like the one made by Professor Berktay
    as excessively liberal.

    Taner Akcam, the first Turkish historian to describe the 1915 tragedy
    as a genocide, is currently a professor at a U.S.university.

    Turkey could make a point of "bidding farewell to its past," using the
    "liberal" historians' idea that the republic is not a legal successor
    to the previous regimes to denounce the "Ottoman past" that made the
    Armenian genocide possible (the absence of legal succession has been
    a key ideological precept of the Turkish Republic since the rule of
    its founder, Kemal Ataturk).

    Moreover, Ankara could accept the gesture of Yerevan, which has
    abandoned its territorial claims to Western Armenia, now part
    of Turkey. It could solve the problem by acknowledging the 1915
    Armenian genocide. The point is to separate the territorial problem
    (and restitution) from the request for accepting responsibility for
    the Armenian genocide.

    One might think that Turkey's admission to the European Union would
    make the territorial claims of the "Armenian world" history, since
    the EU is categorically against territorial re-divisions even in the
    name of "historical justice."

    But the situation is not that simple. The Turkey of Kemal Ataturk,
    which rejects the heritage of the "anti-popular Ottoman regime," is
    mostly pursuing an old foreign and domestic policy. I am referring
    to its policy regarding Cyprus, relations with Greece, Bulgaria,
    Armenia and the former-Yugoslav territory, and its attitude towards
    ethnic minorities (the Kurd issue).

    Throughout the 20th century Turkey cleverly played on contradictions
    between great powers to strengthen its position in the world. During
    Kemal Ataturk's revolution, the Turks smartly used contradictions
    between Soviet Russia and the Entente. During the Cold War, they used
    the left-wing threat in Greece and Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem
    in their favor.

    This is why Armenia and the "Armenian world" are concerned about
    the European future of Turkey, which has fully used NATO resources
    disregarding the high standards of "European security." We can also
    assume that Turkey will use EU resources to advance its foreign
    policy ambitions.

    No country has yet been excluded from the EU. Will Turkey, if it
    engages in unacceptable behavior, become the first outlaw? And if it
    is, what foreign policy strategy will the authorities in Ankara adopt?

    As an EU member, Turkey will use its European "privileges," notably
    the cover of "European interference," to pursue an active policy in
    the Caucasus. Acting not so much on behalf of united Europe, as in the
    pursuit of its self-serving goals, Turkey will use democratic rhetoric
    to try to minimize Russia's "imperial" influence in the region.

    Unlike other members of NATO and the EU, Turkey has its own national
    interests in the Caucasus. Just as in 1918-1920, Azerbaijan has
    become Turkey's main partner in the South Caucasus. Turkey recognized
    Azerbaijan's independence on December 16, 1991, and helped it during
    the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In 1993, it closed the border
    with Armenia but, unlike in 1918-1920, stopped short of a full-scale
    military intervention. In 1994, Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev
    spoke in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey about strategic
    relations. In the 1990s, Turkey acted as Azerbaijan's agent in NATO
    and other international organizations.

    Military cooperation is a major part of Azerbaijani-Turkish
    relations. Since 1996, Turkish military advisers have been working
    in Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani military has been trained in Turkey.

    Turkey has been energetically promoting relations with Georgia since
    the early 1990s, despite such minor political differences as the
    Abkhazian problem and the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks. In 1998,
    the Georgian Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff signed a
    memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, which provides
    for Turkey's assistance in the training of Georgian officers. The
    two countries are also promoting transportation and communications.

    Turkey may turn the Armenian genocide into an element of political
    bargaining. As a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, Turkey will most
    likely do this, pledging to accept responsibility for the crime of a
    genocide if pressure is put on Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. It may
    encourage the EU to pressure Armenia into forcing the self-proclaimed
    Karabakh republic to accept abstract and far-fetched peace plans of
    international structures.

    On the other hand, Turkey may suggest "an exchange of confessions"
    between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On March 26, 1998,
    Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev issued a decree "On the
    Azerbaijani Genocide." March 31 was declared the Day of the Azerbaijani
    Genocide. The decree mentioned the "dismembering" of the Azerbaijani
    nation, the "re-division of historical [Azerbaijani] territory" and
    the "occupation" of Azerbaijan as a result of the Golestan (1813) and
    Turkmanchai (1828) peace treaties that ended two Russo-Persian wars.

    The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Armenia and the Armenian nation
    have been accused of the Azerbaijani genocide. Turkey may presumably
    pledge to assume responsibility for the Armenian genocide if Armenia
    accepts responsibility for the Azerbaijani genocide. If Yerevan
    rejects the offer (which it will most certainly do), Turkey would
    redirect the EU wrath from itself to Armenia.

    In short, the Europeanization of Turkey, which may be positive to
    a degree, would also create problems for Armenia and the "Armenian
    world". Turkey may devise all kinds of unacceptable conditions for
    admitting responsibility for the 1915 Armenian genocide.

    As for Europe, the advocates of integration, acting in accordance
    with the principle of political correctness and for the noble purpose
    of bringing an Asian country into the lap of European democracy,
    may sacrifice the interests of Armenians, just as they sacrificed
    the interests of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo, and of Greeks in Cyprus.

    Sergey Markedonov is head of the department of ethnic relations at
    the Institute of Military and Political Analysis.

    The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
    may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
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