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"EUROPEAN TURKEY" IN THE CAUCASUS
Sergey Markedonov for RIA Novosti
RIA Novosti, Russia
July 5 2006
Few people know that Henrik H. Kroner, Secretary General of the
European Movement International, was in Yerevan, the capital of the
South Caucasian republic of Armenia, in May 2006. He visited the
Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan and laid a wreath to the
victims of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915.
The European Movement was created to "contribute to the establishment
of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human
rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and
solidarity and citizens' participation."
Henrik Kroner wrote in the book of honorary guests of the Memorial
that such crimes as the Armenian genocide must not be allowed to
happen again. He wrote that the European Union's values were in favor
of future unification.
He said in the museum that the EU was resolved to prevent a repetition
of such tragedies, and that Turkey would not be admitted to the Union
unless it assumed responsibility for its past crimes.
The process has barely begun and will last years, he said, and Ankara
will eventually have to do as requested.
Kroner's visit to Yerevan almost coincided with a serious discussion
on criminal liability for the denial of responsibility for the genocide
against Armenians, held in the National Assembly of France.
Deeply offended, Turkey recalled its ambassador "for consultations,"
while the advocates of criminal liability for the denial of
responsibility for the genocide and the supporters of the "democratic"
principle of discussing this delicate issue rallied in the streets
of Paris.
In short, the issue of the Armenian genocide remains a European
headache. However, the issue of admitting Turkey to the EU is usually
considered from two aspects: Turkey's ability to accept European
values, and the EU's ability to absorb new members and spread European
values to them.
Experts are analyzing not so much the essence of integration as
the timeframe and speed with which Turkey could acquire "European
registration."
But the European future of Turkey is not limited to the political
struggle of Brussels bureaucrats, or discussions of where Europe ends
and Asia begins. The "Europeanization" of Turkey is an acute problem
of Caucasian geopolitics, which has a direct bearing on the issue
of genocide.
Firstly, the Europeanization of Turkey is related to the painful
aspect of the "big Caucasian game", or relations between Turkey
and the "Armenian world", which is not limited to Armenia. Other
important parts of this "world" are the self-proclaimed republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora, which seriously influences
public opinion in Armenia and many other countries, notably the United
States, France and Russia.
These parts of the "Armenian world" are divided over the future of
Armenian-Turkish relations. During the rule of Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
the first president of Armenia (1991-1998), the Yerevan authorities
and the diaspora quarreled more than once over the recognition of
the 1915 Armenian genocide. Ter-Petrosyan was not ready to soften
his attitude to the tragedy in the name of better relations with his
country's western neighbor.
Although Armenia's second president, Robert Kocharyan, is pursuing a
harsher policy towards Turkey, Yerevan has withdrawn its territorial
claims against it.
But not all parts of the "Armenian world" are prepared to regard
the issue of genocide without territorial claims, restitution, or
compensation for the property lost during the 1915 tragedy.
Tigran Martirosyan, a prominent Armenian political analyst, said:
"The current demands of the Armenian people [part of the "Armenian
world"] regarding Western Armenia [modern Turkey] are based on
the international requirement on clearing up the consequences of
genocide. This norm proceeds from the statutes of international
[military] tribunals, UN General Assembly resolutions, and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[adopted on December 9, 1948 and enforced on January 12, 1951]."
Secondly, Turkey's accession to the EU should outline the post-conflict
settlement in the Caucasus and the region's development as a whole. The
decision will also bear on Russia's presence in the South Caucasus.
Apparently, the main problem in relations between Turkey and Armenia
(and the "Armenian world") is the recognition of the Armenian
genocide in 1915. Many people regard Turkey's interpretation of the
1915 tragedy as a genocide (not a civil war, massacre, or deportation
of Armenians, as modern Turkish historians prefer to write about it)
as proof of Turkey's "Europeanization". But Turkish historians and
political experts on the Armenian problem have other arguments.
Professor Halil Berktay said: "This is a very serious issue, and it
represents a mistake on the part of Turkey, which seems unable to
make a decision on its political and legal attitude to the Ottoman
Empire. Turkey has not fully accepted the fact that it freed itself
from Ottoman rule and created a modern republic in its place. This
is a very serious contradiction. The republic is not responsible for
those events."
"The Turkish Republic can say that it was established in 1923,
whereas the Armenian tragedy took place in 1915," the professor said.
"The army and state institutions of the Turkish Republic are not
responsible for those events. The Turkish Republic is a new state.
>>From a legal point of view, it is not the successor to the Ottoman
government or the reformist Young Turks of the Ittihad ve Terakki
(Unity and Progress) party."
Other Turkish researchers of Armenian-Turkish relations call for
cleansing the 1915 problem of political complications and "leaving
the issue to historians." But many Turkish academics, officials and
politicians regard statements like the one made by Professor Berktay
as excessively liberal.
Taner Akcam, the first Turkish historian to describe the 1915 tragedy
as a genocide, is currently a professor at a U.S.university.
Turkey could make a point of "bidding farewell to its past," using the
"liberal" historians' idea that the republic is not a legal successor
to the previous regimes to denounce the "Ottoman past" that made the
Armenian genocide possible (the absence of legal succession has been
a key ideological precept of the Turkish Republic since the rule of
its founder, Kemal Ataturk).
Moreover, Ankara could accept the gesture of Yerevan, which has
abandoned its territorial claims to Western Armenia, now part
of Turkey. It could solve the problem by acknowledging the 1915
Armenian genocide. The point is to separate the territorial problem
(and restitution) from the request for accepting responsibility for
the Armenian genocide.
One might think that Turkey's admission to the European Union would
make the territorial claims of the "Armenian world" history, since
the EU is categorically against territorial re-divisions even in the
name of "historical justice."
But the situation is not that simple. The Turkey of Kemal Ataturk,
which rejects the heritage of the "anti-popular Ottoman regime," is
mostly pursuing an old foreign and domestic policy. I am referring
to its policy regarding Cyprus, relations with Greece, Bulgaria,
Armenia and the former-Yugoslav territory, and its attitude towards
ethnic minorities (the Kurd issue).
Throughout the 20th century Turkey cleverly played on contradictions
between great powers to strengthen its position in the world. During
Kemal Ataturk's revolution, the Turks smartly used contradictions
between Soviet Russia and the Entente. During the Cold War, they used
the left-wing threat in Greece and Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem
in their favor.
This is why Armenia and the "Armenian world" are concerned about
the European future of Turkey, which has fully used NATO resources
disregarding the high standards of "European security." We can also
assume that Turkey will use EU resources to advance its foreign
policy ambitions.
No country has yet been excluded from the EU. Will Turkey, if it
engages in unacceptable behavior, become the first outlaw? And if it
is, what foreign policy strategy will the authorities in Ankara adopt?
As an EU member, Turkey will use its European "privileges," notably
the cover of "European interference," to pursue an active policy in
the Caucasus. Acting not so much on behalf of united Europe, as in the
pursuit of its self-serving goals, Turkey will use democratic rhetoric
to try to minimize Russia's "imperial" influence in the region.
Unlike other members of NATO and the EU, Turkey has its own national
interests in the Caucasus. Just as in 1918-1920, Azerbaijan has
become Turkey's main partner in the South Caucasus. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan's independence on December 16, 1991, and helped it during
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In 1993, it closed the border
with Armenia but, unlike in 1918-1920, stopped short of a full-scale
military intervention. In 1994, Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev
spoke in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey about strategic
relations. In the 1990s, Turkey acted as Azerbaijan's agent in NATO
and other international organizations.
Military cooperation is a major part of Azerbaijani-Turkish
relations. Since 1996, Turkish military advisers have been working
in Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani military has been trained in Turkey.
Turkey has been energetically promoting relations with Georgia since
the early 1990s, despite such minor political differences as the
Abkhazian problem and the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks. In 1998,
the Georgian Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff signed a
memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, which provides
for Turkey's assistance in the training of Georgian officers. The
two countries are also promoting transportation and communications.
Turkey may turn the Armenian genocide into an element of political
bargaining. As a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, Turkey will most
likely do this, pledging to accept responsibility for the crime of a
genocide if pressure is put on Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. It may
encourage the EU to pressure Armenia into forcing the self-proclaimed
Karabakh republic to accept abstract and far-fetched peace plans of
international structures.
On the other hand, Turkey may suggest "an exchange of confessions"
between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On March 26, 1998,
Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev issued a decree "On the
Azerbaijani Genocide." March 31 was declared the Day of the Azerbaijani
Genocide. The decree mentioned the "dismembering" of the Azerbaijani
nation, the "re-division of historical [Azerbaijani] territory" and
the "occupation" of Azerbaijan as a result of the Golestan (1813) and
Turkmanchai (1828) peace treaties that ended two Russo-Persian wars.
The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Armenia and the Armenian nation
have been accused of the Azerbaijani genocide. Turkey may presumably
pledge to assume responsibility for the Armenian genocide if Armenia
accepts responsibility for the Azerbaijani genocide. If Yerevan
rejects the offer (which it will most certainly do), Turkey would
redirect the EU wrath from itself to Armenia.
In short, the Europeanization of Turkey, which may be positive to
a degree, would also create problems for Armenia and the "Armenian
world". Turkey may devise all kinds of unacceptable conditions for
admitting responsibility for the 1915 Armenian genocide.
As for Europe, the advocates of integration, acting in accordance
with the principle of political correctness and for the noble purpose
of bringing an Asian country into the lap of European democracy,
may sacrifice the interests of Armenians, just as they sacrificed
the interests of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo, and of Greeks in Cyprus.
Sergey Markedonov is head of the department of ethnic relations at
the Institute of Military and Political Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
Sergey Markedonov for RIA Novosti
RIA Novosti, Russia
July 5 2006
Few people know that Henrik H. Kroner, Secretary General of the
European Movement International, was in Yerevan, the capital of the
South Caucasian republic of Armenia, in May 2006. He visited the
Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan and laid a wreath to the
victims of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915.
The European Movement was created to "contribute to the establishment
of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human
rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and
solidarity and citizens' participation."
Henrik Kroner wrote in the book of honorary guests of the Memorial
that such crimes as the Armenian genocide must not be allowed to
happen again. He wrote that the European Union's values were in favor
of future unification.
He said in the museum that the EU was resolved to prevent a repetition
of such tragedies, and that Turkey would not be admitted to the Union
unless it assumed responsibility for its past crimes.
The process has barely begun and will last years, he said, and Ankara
will eventually have to do as requested.
Kroner's visit to Yerevan almost coincided with a serious discussion
on criminal liability for the denial of responsibility for the genocide
against Armenians, held in the National Assembly of France.
Deeply offended, Turkey recalled its ambassador "for consultations,"
while the advocates of criminal liability for the denial of
responsibility for the genocide and the supporters of the "democratic"
principle of discussing this delicate issue rallied in the streets
of Paris.
In short, the issue of the Armenian genocide remains a European
headache. However, the issue of admitting Turkey to the EU is usually
considered from two aspects: Turkey's ability to accept European
values, and the EU's ability to absorb new members and spread European
values to them.
Experts are analyzing not so much the essence of integration as
the timeframe and speed with which Turkey could acquire "European
registration."
But the European future of Turkey is not limited to the political
struggle of Brussels bureaucrats, or discussions of where Europe ends
and Asia begins. The "Europeanization" of Turkey is an acute problem
of Caucasian geopolitics, which has a direct bearing on the issue
of genocide.
Firstly, the Europeanization of Turkey is related to the painful
aspect of the "big Caucasian game", or relations between Turkey
and the "Armenian world", which is not limited to Armenia. Other
important parts of this "world" are the self-proclaimed republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora, which seriously influences
public opinion in Armenia and many other countries, notably the United
States, France and Russia.
These parts of the "Armenian world" are divided over the future of
Armenian-Turkish relations. During the rule of Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
the first president of Armenia (1991-1998), the Yerevan authorities
and the diaspora quarreled more than once over the recognition of
the 1915 Armenian genocide. Ter-Petrosyan was not ready to soften
his attitude to the tragedy in the name of better relations with his
country's western neighbor.
Although Armenia's second president, Robert Kocharyan, is pursuing a
harsher policy towards Turkey, Yerevan has withdrawn its territorial
claims against it.
But not all parts of the "Armenian world" are prepared to regard
the issue of genocide without territorial claims, restitution, or
compensation for the property lost during the 1915 tragedy.
Tigran Martirosyan, a prominent Armenian political analyst, said:
"The current demands of the Armenian people [part of the "Armenian
world"] regarding Western Armenia [modern Turkey] are based on
the international requirement on clearing up the consequences of
genocide. This norm proceeds from the statutes of international
[military] tribunals, UN General Assembly resolutions, and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[adopted on December 9, 1948 and enforced on January 12, 1951]."
Secondly, Turkey's accession to the EU should outline the post-conflict
settlement in the Caucasus and the region's development as a whole. The
decision will also bear on Russia's presence in the South Caucasus.
Apparently, the main problem in relations between Turkey and Armenia
(and the "Armenian world") is the recognition of the Armenian
genocide in 1915. Many people regard Turkey's interpretation of the
1915 tragedy as a genocide (not a civil war, massacre, or deportation
of Armenians, as modern Turkish historians prefer to write about it)
as proof of Turkey's "Europeanization". But Turkish historians and
political experts on the Armenian problem have other arguments.
Professor Halil Berktay said: "This is a very serious issue, and it
represents a mistake on the part of Turkey, which seems unable to
make a decision on its political and legal attitude to the Ottoman
Empire. Turkey has not fully accepted the fact that it freed itself
from Ottoman rule and created a modern republic in its place. This
is a very serious contradiction. The republic is not responsible for
those events."
"The Turkish Republic can say that it was established in 1923,
whereas the Armenian tragedy took place in 1915," the professor said.
"The army and state institutions of the Turkish Republic are not
responsible for those events. The Turkish Republic is a new state.
>>From a legal point of view, it is not the successor to the Ottoman
government or the reformist Young Turks of the Ittihad ve Terakki
(Unity and Progress) party."
Other Turkish researchers of Armenian-Turkish relations call for
cleansing the 1915 problem of political complications and "leaving
the issue to historians." But many Turkish academics, officials and
politicians regard statements like the one made by Professor Berktay
as excessively liberal.
Taner Akcam, the first Turkish historian to describe the 1915 tragedy
as a genocide, is currently a professor at a U.S.university.
Turkey could make a point of "bidding farewell to its past," using the
"liberal" historians' idea that the republic is not a legal successor
to the previous regimes to denounce the "Ottoman past" that made the
Armenian genocide possible (the absence of legal succession has been
a key ideological precept of the Turkish Republic since the rule of
its founder, Kemal Ataturk).
Moreover, Ankara could accept the gesture of Yerevan, which has
abandoned its territorial claims to Western Armenia, now part
of Turkey. It could solve the problem by acknowledging the 1915
Armenian genocide. The point is to separate the territorial problem
(and restitution) from the request for accepting responsibility for
the Armenian genocide.
One might think that Turkey's admission to the European Union would
make the territorial claims of the "Armenian world" history, since
the EU is categorically against territorial re-divisions even in the
name of "historical justice."
But the situation is not that simple. The Turkey of Kemal Ataturk,
which rejects the heritage of the "anti-popular Ottoman regime," is
mostly pursuing an old foreign and domestic policy. I am referring
to its policy regarding Cyprus, relations with Greece, Bulgaria,
Armenia and the former-Yugoslav territory, and its attitude towards
ethnic minorities (the Kurd issue).
Throughout the 20th century Turkey cleverly played on contradictions
between great powers to strengthen its position in the world. During
Kemal Ataturk's revolution, the Turks smartly used contradictions
between Soviet Russia and the Entente. During the Cold War, they used
the left-wing threat in Greece and Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem
in their favor.
This is why Armenia and the "Armenian world" are concerned about
the European future of Turkey, which has fully used NATO resources
disregarding the high standards of "European security." We can also
assume that Turkey will use EU resources to advance its foreign
policy ambitions.
No country has yet been excluded from the EU. Will Turkey, if it
engages in unacceptable behavior, become the first outlaw? And if it
is, what foreign policy strategy will the authorities in Ankara adopt?
As an EU member, Turkey will use its European "privileges," notably
the cover of "European interference," to pursue an active policy in
the Caucasus. Acting not so much on behalf of united Europe, as in the
pursuit of its self-serving goals, Turkey will use democratic rhetoric
to try to minimize Russia's "imperial" influence in the region.
Unlike other members of NATO and the EU, Turkey has its own national
interests in the Caucasus. Just as in 1918-1920, Azerbaijan has
become Turkey's main partner in the South Caucasus. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan's independence on December 16, 1991, and helped it during
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In 1993, it closed the border
with Armenia but, unlike in 1918-1920, stopped short of a full-scale
military intervention. In 1994, Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev
spoke in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey about strategic
relations. In the 1990s, Turkey acted as Azerbaijan's agent in NATO
and other international organizations.
Military cooperation is a major part of Azerbaijani-Turkish
relations. Since 1996, Turkish military advisers have been working
in Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani military has been trained in Turkey.
Turkey has been energetically promoting relations with Georgia since
the early 1990s, despite such minor political differences as the
Abkhazian problem and the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks. In 1998,
the Georgian Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff signed a
memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, which provides
for Turkey's assistance in the training of Georgian officers. The
two countries are also promoting transportation and communications.
Turkey may turn the Armenian genocide into an element of political
bargaining. As a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, Turkey will most
likely do this, pledging to accept responsibility for the crime of a
genocide if pressure is put on Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. It may
encourage the EU to pressure Armenia into forcing the self-proclaimed
Karabakh republic to accept abstract and far-fetched peace plans of
international structures.
On the other hand, Turkey may suggest "an exchange of confessions"
between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On March 26, 1998,
Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev issued a decree "On the
Azerbaijani Genocide." March 31 was declared the Day of the Azerbaijani
Genocide. The decree mentioned the "dismembering" of the Azerbaijani
nation, the "re-division of historical [Azerbaijani] territory" and
the "occupation" of Azerbaijan as a result of the Golestan (1813) and
Turkmanchai (1828) peace treaties that ended two Russo-Persian wars.
The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Armenia and the Armenian nation
have been accused of the Azerbaijani genocide. Turkey may presumably
pledge to assume responsibility for the Armenian genocide if Armenia
accepts responsibility for the Azerbaijani genocide. If Yerevan
rejects the offer (which it will most certainly do), Turkey would
redirect the EU wrath from itself to Armenia.
In short, the Europeanization of Turkey, which may be positive to
a degree, would also create problems for Armenia and the "Armenian
world". Turkey may devise all kinds of unacceptable conditions for
admitting responsibility for the 1915 Armenian genocide.
As for Europe, the advocates of integration, acting in accordance
with the principle of political correctness and for the noble purpose
of bringing an Asian country into the lap of European democracy,
may sacrifice the interests of Armenians, just as they sacrificed
the interests of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo, and of Greeks in Cyprus.
Sergey Markedonov is head of the department of ethnic relations at
the Institute of Military and Political Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.