PAPER SEES RUSSIA'S PLAN TO BUY IRAN-ARMENIA GAS PIPELINE AS "STRATEGIC LOSS"
Aykakan Zhamanak, Yerevan
1 Jul 06
Excerpt from report by Armenian newspaper Aykakan Zhamanak on 1 July
headlined "New sign of Russia's ill will"
At the stage of planning a gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia,
Russia had done everything possible for it to be only of local
significance. As a result, the gas pipeline was built with the diameter
of 700mm. After putting it into operation, its transit capacity will
be 1.2bn cu. m. of gas a year.
This will cover slightly more than half of Armenia's annual demand. The
volume of the supplied gas will reach 2bn cu.m. at a later stage. But
by that time, Russia will already own the gas pipeline. There were
two reasons for Russia being against the construction of the pipeline
with a larger diameter. One reason is that such pipelines could be
both of regional and European significance. That is to say, it could
become the first section of a new gas pipeline towards Europe. But
the existence of such a gas pipeline is beneficial to Russia because
an alternative would deprive it of an opportunity to apply gas levers
to gain concessions from Europe and Armenia.
By intending to acquire the Iran-Armenia pipeline, Russia is trying
to deprive Armenia of gas. There is also a political aspect: will
the Armenian authorities be able to preserve at least this strategic
facility to ensure a better future for their country?
The future of the gas pipeline depends on Iran. The West promises the
latter greater economic benefits in case of a peaceful settlement
of the nuclear crisis. Let us assume that the crisis is settled
peacefully, Iran will benefit from that by getting the status of an
alternative gas supplier for Europe.
Naturally there are several ways in which Iranian gas could reach
Europe.
Iran would prefer the Armenian route. Of course, in terms of geography
Azerbaijan is also an option. But Iran is not going to benefit from
Azerbaijan's acquizition of an extra source of income because it
cannot help but worry about Azerbaijan.
Naturally Armenia has no alternative in this sense. But there is one
"but".
It is a matter of principle for Europe that the new gas pipeline
should not belong to Russia, but if it does, Armenia will stop being
seen as a transit route and Azerbaijan will become the only route. In
this sense if Russia buys the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, it would be
a strategic loss to Armenia. The point is that Russia does not need
the pipeline, to be correct, it needs it but not to satisfy its own
needs but to hinder others.
By the way, Russia has clashed with Turkmenistan as the latter does
not want to supply cheap gas to Russia as the latter sells it more
expensively to Europe. The conflict might result in Turkmenistan
supporting the construction of a gas pipeline to Europe via the South
Caucasus. And if Russia buys our pipeline, then the gas from Iran
and Turkmenistan will enter Azerbaijan and Europe via Georgia.
[Passage omitted: reiterates the point]
Aykakan Zhamanak, Yerevan
1 Jul 06
Excerpt from report by Armenian newspaper Aykakan Zhamanak on 1 July
headlined "New sign of Russia's ill will"
At the stage of planning a gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia,
Russia had done everything possible for it to be only of local
significance. As a result, the gas pipeline was built with the diameter
of 700mm. After putting it into operation, its transit capacity will
be 1.2bn cu. m. of gas a year.
This will cover slightly more than half of Armenia's annual demand. The
volume of the supplied gas will reach 2bn cu.m. at a later stage. But
by that time, Russia will already own the gas pipeline. There were
two reasons for Russia being against the construction of the pipeline
with a larger diameter. One reason is that such pipelines could be
both of regional and European significance. That is to say, it could
become the first section of a new gas pipeline towards Europe. But
the existence of such a gas pipeline is beneficial to Russia because
an alternative would deprive it of an opportunity to apply gas levers
to gain concessions from Europe and Armenia.
By intending to acquire the Iran-Armenia pipeline, Russia is trying
to deprive Armenia of gas. There is also a political aspect: will
the Armenian authorities be able to preserve at least this strategic
facility to ensure a better future for their country?
The future of the gas pipeline depends on Iran. The West promises the
latter greater economic benefits in case of a peaceful settlement
of the nuclear crisis. Let us assume that the crisis is settled
peacefully, Iran will benefit from that by getting the status of an
alternative gas supplier for Europe.
Naturally there are several ways in which Iranian gas could reach
Europe.
Iran would prefer the Armenian route. Of course, in terms of geography
Azerbaijan is also an option. But Iran is not going to benefit from
Azerbaijan's acquizition of an extra source of income because it
cannot help but worry about Azerbaijan.
Naturally Armenia has no alternative in this sense. But there is one
"but".
It is a matter of principle for Europe that the new gas pipeline
should not belong to Russia, but if it does, Armenia will stop being
seen as a transit route and Azerbaijan will become the only route. In
this sense if Russia buys the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, it would be
a strategic loss to Armenia. The point is that Russia does not need
the pipeline, to be correct, it needs it but not to satisfy its own
needs but to hinder others.
By the way, Russia has clashed with Turkmenistan as the latter does
not want to supply cheap gas to Russia as the latter sells it more
expensively to Europe. The conflict might result in Turkmenistan
supporting the construction of a gas pipeline to Europe via the South
Caucasus. And if Russia buys our pipeline, then the gas from Iran
and Turkmenistan will enter Azerbaijan and Europe via Georgia.
[Passage omitted: reiterates the point]