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TURKISH PAPER VIEWS RISKS, BENEFITS OF TURKISH-IRANIAN "RAPPROCHEMENT"
Hurriyet website, Istanbul
1 Jul 06
Text of article by Ilter Turkmen entitled "Turkish-Iranian
rapprochement" published by Turkish daily Hurriyet website on 1 July
Turkish-Iranian relations have followed a see-saw course, often marked
with mutual distrust, especially since the Islamic revolution.
Recently we see that this situation has changed substantially,
that cooperation in the economic and energy spheres has increased,
and that coinciding interests are better evaluated in the light of
developments in the Middle East.
Indeed there is an impression that Turkey wants to play a special
role with regard to the resolution of the crisis that has erupted
over Iran's nuclear programmes. However, Western perceptions and
reactions to this role sometimes do not appear to be as positive or
encouraging as might be expected. One sign of that was the statement
issued by the spokesman of the US State Department during Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul's visit to Tehran with regard to reports that
Turkey is playing a mediating role.
The spokesman said that, although there is general agreement between
the views of the United States and Turkey, a communication channel with
Iran already exists for the package of proposals offered by the five
UN Security Council permanent members plus Germany and that EU Council
Diplomatic Representative Javier Solana is performing that function.
Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, apparently told
Westerners that Tehran wants Turkey's mediation. This should not
be surprising. Larijani probably hopes that Turkey will be more
sympathetic to Iran's positions or that he can at least gain some
more time.
That is fine but what would Turkey gain from such mediation? Prestige
or disappointment? After all, at the end of the day, it is possible
that Turkey may upset both sides. Consequently it would be best to
continue parallel contacts with Iran as is being done now and to make
the necessary suggestions in a friendly manner. Furthermore taking on
airs of mediator - or "facilitator" as Gul calls it - in the problems
of the Middle East is not very good from an image standpoint.
We give the impression that we think we have a monopoly on dialogue
with Muslim countries. We must not forget that Western countries often
have better relations than us with these countries in many spheres.
Although it is very significant that our relations with Iran are
much better today than they were in the past, this development must
not lead to a myth about the history of these relations. For example
the argument that Turkey and Iran have had goodneighbourly relations
with stable borders since the Treaty of Qasri-shirin in 1639 is not
quite true.
There was no shortage of wars between Turkey and Iran after 1639. Iran
attempted to seize Baghdad and Basra several times. In the first years
of the Turkish republic Kurdish gangs armed by Armenians entered Turkey
from Iran and provoked a rebellion movement. Everyone remembers that
in the very near past Iran supported both the PKK and fundamentalist
terrorism in Turkey.
It is true that one needs to be free of the emotional claws of the
past when relations are on the mend. However, this must not be done
selectively. These days it is hard not to notice attempts at ridding
Turkey's collective memory of negative historical perceptions of not
only Iran but also Russia.
One cannot object to this as long as history is not distorted. However,
there is also a tremendous effort under way to create the perception
that our relations with the West, especially the United States,
were always marked with adversity. Selective collective memory
always prevents a country's foreign policy from being set on a
rational course.
Hurriyet website, Istanbul
1 Jul 06
Text of article by Ilter Turkmen entitled "Turkish-Iranian
rapprochement" published by Turkish daily Hurriyet website on 1 July
Turkish-Iranian relations have followed a see-saw course, often marked
with mutual distrust, especially since the Islamic revolution.
Recently we see that this situation has changed substantially,
that cooperation in the economic and energy spheres has increased,
and that coinciding interests are better evaluated in the light of
developments in the Middle East.
Indeed there is an impression that Turkey wants to play a special
role with regard to the resolution of the crisis that has erupted
over Iran's nuclear programmes. However, Western perceptions and
reactions to this role sometimes do not appear to be as positive or
encouraging as might be expected. One sign of that was the statement
issued by the spokesman of the US State Department during Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul's visit to Tehran with regard to reports that
Turkey is playing a mediating role.
The spokesman said that, although there is general agreement between
the views of the United States and Turkey, a communication channel with
Iran already exists for the package of proposals offered by the five
UN Security Council permanent members plus Germany and that EU Council
Diplomatic Representative Javier Solana is performing that function.
Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, apparently told
Westerners that Tehran wants Turkey's mediation. This should not
be surprising. Larijani probably hopes that Turkey will be more
sympathetic to Iran's positions or that he can at least gain some
more time.
That is fine but what would Turkey gain from such mediation? Prestige
or disappointment? After all, at the end of the day, it is possible
that Turkey may upset both sides. Consequently it would be best to
continue parallel contacts with Iran as is being done now and to make
the necessary suggestions in a friendly manner. Furthermore taking on
airs of mediator - or "facilitator" as Gul calls it - in the problems
of the Middle East is not very good from an image standpoint.
We give the impression that we think we have a monopoly on dialogue
with Muslim countries. We must not forget that Western countries often
have better relations than us with these countries in many spheres.
Although it is very significant that our relations with Iran are
much better today than they were in the past, this development must
not lead to a myth about the history of these relations. For example
the argument that Turkey and Iran have had goodneighbourly relations
with stable borders since the Treaty of Qasri-shirin in 1639 is not
quite true.
There was no shortage of wars between Turkey and Iran after 1639. Iran
attempted to seize Baghdad and Basra several times. In the first years
of the Turkish republic Kurdish gangs armed by Armenians entered Turkey
from Iran and provoked a rebellion movement. Everyone remembers that
in the very near past Iran supported both the PKK and fundamentalist
terrorism in Turkey.
It is true that one needs to be free of the emotional claws of the
past when relations are on the mend. However, this must not be done
selectively. These days it is hard not to notice attempts at ridding
Turkey's collective memory of negative historical perceptions of not
only Iran but also Russia.
One cannot object to this as long as history is not distorted. However,
there is also a tremendous effort under way to create the perception
that our relations with the West, especially the United States,
were always marked with adversity. Selective collective memory
always prevents a country's foreign policy from being set on a
rational course.