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Vladimir Socor in EDM: CSTO Summit: Military Bloc Not Yet Cemented

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  • Vladimir Socor in EDM: CSTO Summit: Military Bloc Not Yet Cemented

    CSTO SUMMIT: MILITARY BLOC NOT YET CEMENTED
    by Vladimir Socor

    Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
    Wednesday, June 28, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 125

    Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus,
    Robert Kocharian of Armenia, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan,
    Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, Imomali Rahmonov of Tajikistan,
    and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan met on June 23 in Minsk for a dual
    summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the
    Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc). The two groups' membership
    rosters are identical except in the case of Armenia, a member of the
    CSTO but not of EurAsEc.

    Speaking to journalists during a break between the two meetings,
    Putin asserted, "Developing closer cooperation between EurAsEc and
    the CSTO is one of the most topical tasks, which will make it possible
    to protect integration processes from various threats" (NTV Mir, June
    23). "Integration processes" being the classic code word for Russian
    policies, Putin's statement confers a distinctly military dimension to
    such processes. Combining the CSTO and EurAsEc summits into a single
    event in Minsk underscored that idea. Trading chairs at this summit,
    Putin handed over the CSTO's rotating chairmanship to Lukashenka
    while the latter turned the EurAsEc chairmanship over to Putin.

    This CSTO summit decided to place the Collective Rapid Deployment
    Force under the command of a single headquarters that would operate
    on a permanent basis. Until now, a standing operational group
    based in Bishkek has been in charge of that Force under Russia's
    Major-General Sergei Chernomordin, who is also deputy chief of staff of
    the Volga-Urals Military District. The 4,000-strong Rapid Deployment
    Force, earmarked for possible operations in Central Asia, presently
    consists -- at least on paper -- of 10 battalions of varying readiness
    levels, including: three battalions from Russia, three from Tajikistan
    (two of these apparently from the Russian division stationed in that
    country and one from Tajikistan itself), two from Kazakhstan, and two
    from Kyrgyzstan (the latter country has pleaded poverty asking to be
    excused from contributing a second battalion). These units are based
    in the respective countries under national control and hold joint
    exercises, usually at annual intervals, under joint command. Russia's
    air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, with some 10 tactical combat aircraft
    and about a dozen helicopters, is designated a CSTO base and assigned
    to the Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

    According to some Russian media reports (RTR Russia Television, June
    23), participants in the Minsk summit approved a decision whereby
    any CSTO member country wishing to accept a deployment of non-CSTO
    troops on its territory must first obtain the agreement of all the
    other CSTO countries. If so, this implies that military exercises
    involving U.S. or NATO countries' troops, their transit passage,
    or their use of military installations in any CSTO member country,
    for example on anti-terrorism missions, would necessitate Russian
    approval. Thus, Washington or NATO allies would have to negotiate
    the approval not just with possible host countries, but with Moscow,
    which could either withhold the approval, maneuver one or several CSTO
    countries into withholding it, or try to trade Moscow's approval for
    some geopolitical quid-pro-quo elsewhere.

    Thus, if this summit decision is final, Moscow would insert itself
    between the Western alliance system and CSTO member countries,
    trying to force the latter to deal with the West through Russia,
    not directly. In Central Asia, such a situation would reverse the
    Pentagon's historic diplomatic achievements of 2001-2002, when it
    negotiated basing agreements directly with Central Asian presidents,
    who felt encouraged to resist Moscow's pressures at that time.

    The decision in Minsk may also aim to nudge NATO into
    alliance-to-alliance contacts and common activities with the CSTO,
    thus granting the latter a form of political recognition. However,
    CSTO member countries are generally interested in cooperating with
    NATO in a national capacity, and NATO has always related to them
    directly, consistently avoiding the pitfall of dealing with the
    CSTO collectively.

    At present, NATO prepares to expand its operations in Afghanistan and
    may request logistical support from certain Central Asian countries.

    Moscow apparently calculates that it could in that case arrange to
    refer the request formally to the CSTO for consideration, so as to
    press NATO into dealing with this Russia-led structure. One item in
    the Minsk summit declaration (such documents are Moscow-drafted as
    a rule) says that alliance obligations among CSTO member countries
    take precedence over other obligations.

    Participants in the Minsk summit approved measures designed to
    turn the CSTO into a multifunctional organization. At Putin's and
    Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's initiative and Lukashenka's
    proposal, the summit resolved to develop joint structures of the member
    countries' intelligence and law-enforcement agencies and Internal
    Affairs ministries, as well as strengthen the Defense Ministries'
    joint structures. Beyond its military and political-military remit,
    the CSTO would create joint capabilities to deal with natural and
    technological disasters, illegal migration, and the narcotics traffic.

    Contrary to some expectations, the summit did not officially announce
    an intent to create CSTO peacekeeping troops or a legal mechanism for
    rendering emergency military assistance to member countries in the
    event of aggression against them from outside the CSTO. Kocharian
    in particular expressed regret over the failure to advance on the
    assistance issue (Arminfo, Itar-Tass, June 23). For its part, Moscow
    has developed a full-fledged concept for CSTO "peacekeeping" operations
    within the CSTO area and collective participation in international
    operations beyond that area. Moscow will almost certainly call in the
    months ahead for adoption of this concept and a political decision
    on creating CSTO peacekeeping troops.

    The dual summit was timed to coincide with the final phase of a
    Russia-Belarus military exercise, the largest-ever held in the CSTO's
    framework. Forces from Russia and Belarus comprise the CSTO's "regional
    group of forces" in the West, along with the Russian-Armenian group
    and the Russian-led Central Asian group in the respective theaters.

    (Interfax, Belarus Television Channel One, June 23, 24) --Vladimir
    Socor

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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