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CSTO SUMMIT: MILITARY BLOC NOT YET CEMENTED
by Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, June 28, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 125
Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus,
Robert Kocharian of Armenia, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan,
Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, Imomali Rahmonov of Tajikistan,
and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan met on June 23 in Minsk for a dual
summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc). The two groups' membership
rosters are identical except in the case of Armenia, a member of the
CSTO but not of EurAsEc.
Speaking to journalists during a break between the two meetings,
Putin asserted, "Developing closer cooperation between EurAsEc and
the CSTO is one of the most topical tasks, which will make it possible
to protect integration processes from various threats" (NTV Mir, June
23). "Integration processes" being the classic code word for Russian
policies, Putin's statement confers a distinctly military dimension to
such processes. Combining the CSTO and EurAsEc summits into a single
event in Minsk underscored that idea. Trading chairs at this summit,
Putin handed over the CSTO's rotating chairmanship to Lukashenka
while the latter turned the EurAsEc chairmanship over to Putin.
This CSTO summit decided to place the Collective Rapid Deployment
Force under the command of a single headquarters that would operate
on a permanent basis. Until now, a standing operational group
based in Bishkek has been in charge of that Force under Russia's
Major-General Sergei Chernomordin, who is also deputy chief of staff of
the Volga-Urals Military District. The 4,000-strong Rapid Deployment
Force, earmarked for possible operations in Central Asia, presently
consists -- at least on paper -- of 10 battalions of varying readiness
levels, including: three battalions from Russia, three from Tajikistan
(two of these apparently from the Russian division stationed in that
country and one from Tajikistan itself), two from Kazakhstan, and two
from Kyrgyzstan (the latter country has pleaded poverty asking to be
excused from contributing a second battalion). These units are based
in the respective countries under national control and hold joint
exercises, usually at annual intervals, under joint command. Russia's
air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, with some 10 tactical combat aircraft
and about a dozen helicopters, is designated a CSTO base and assigned
to the Collective Rapid Deployment Force.
According to some Russian media reports (RTR Russia Television, June
23), participants in the Minsk summit approved a decision whereby
any CSTO member country wishing to accept a deployment of non-CSTO
troops on its territory must first obtain the agreement of all the
other CSTO countries. If so, this implies that military exercises
involving U.S. or NATO countries' troops, their transit passage,
or their use of military installations in any CSTO member country,
for example on anti-terrorism missions, would necessitate Russian
approval. Thus, Washington or NATO allies would have to negotiate
the approval not just with possible host countries, but with Moscow,
which could either withhold the approval, maneuver one or several CSTO
countries into withholding it, or try to trade Moscow's approval for
some geopolitical quid-pro-quo elsewhere.
Thus, if this summit decision is final, Moscow would insert itself
between the Western alliance system and CSTO member countries,
trying to force the latter to deal with the West through Russia,
not directly. In Central Asia, such a situation would reverse the
Pentagon's historic diplomatic achievements of 2001-2002, when it
negotiated basing agreements directly with Central Asian presidents,
who felt encouraged to resist Moscow's pressures at that time.
The decision in Minsk may also aim to nudge NATO into
alliance-to-alliance contacts and common activities with the CSTO,
thus granting the latter a form of political recognition. However,
CSTO member countries are generally interested in cooperating with
NATO in a national capacity, and NATO has always related to them
directly, consistently avoiding the pitfall of dealing with the
CSTO collectively.
At present, NATO prepares to expand its operations in Afghanistan and
may request logistical support from certain Central Asian countries.
Moscow apparently calculates that it could in that case arrange to
refer the request formally to the CSTO for consideration, so as to
press NATO into dealing with this Russia-led structure. One item in
the Minsk summit declaration (such documents are Moscow-drafted as
a rule) says that alliance obligations among CSTO member countries
take precedence over other obligations.
Participants in the Minsk summit approved measures designed to
turn the CSTO into a multifunctional organization. At Putin's and
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's initiative and Lukashenka's
proposal, the summit resolved to develop joint structures of the member
countries' intelligence and law-enforcement agencies and Internal
Affairs ministries, as well as strengthen the Defense Ministries'
joint structures. Beyond its military and political-military remit,
the CSTO would create joint capabilities to deal with natural and
technological disasters, illegal migration, and the narcotics traffic.
Contrary to some expectations, the summit did not officially announce
an intent to create CSTO peacekeeping troops or a legal mechanism for
rendering emergency military assistance to member countries in the
event of aggression against them from outside the CSTO. Kocharian
in particular expressed regret over the failure to advance on the
assistance issue (Arminfo, Itar-Tass, June 23). For its part, Moscow
has developed a full-fledged concept for CSTO "peacekeeping" operations
within the CSTO area and collective participation in international
operations beyond that area. Moscow will almost certainly call in the
months ahead for adoption of this concept and a political decision
on creating CSTO peacekeeping troops.
The dual summit was timed to coincide with the final phase of a
Russia-Belarus military exercise, the largest-ever held in the CSTO's
framework. Forces from Russia and Belarus comprise the CSTO's "regional
group of forces" in the West, along with the Russian-Armenian group
and the Russian-led Central Asian group in the respective theaters.
(Interfax, Belarus Television Channel One, June 23, 24) --Vladimir
Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, June 28, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 125
Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus,
Robert Kocharian of Armenia, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan,
Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, Imomali Rahmonov of Tajikistan,
and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan met on June 23 in Minsk for a dual
summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc). The two groups' membership
rosters are identical except in the case of Armenia, a member of the
CSTO but not of EurAsEc.
Speaking to journalists during a break between the two meetings,
Putin asserted, "Developing closer cooperation between EurAsEc and
the CSTO is one of the most topical tasks, which will make it possible
to protect integration processes from various threats" (NTV Mir, June
23). "Integration processes" being the classic code word for Russian
policies, Putin's statement confers a distinctly military dimension to
such processes. Combining the CSTO and EurAsEc summits into a single
event in Minsk underscored that idea. Trading chairs at this summit,
Putin handed over the CSTO's rotating chairmanship to Lukashenka
while the latter turned the EurAsEc chairmanship over to Putin.
This CSTO summit decided to place the Collective Rapid Deployment
Force under the command of a single headquarters that would operate
on a permanent basis. Until now, a standing operational group
based in Bishkek has been in charge of that Force under Russia's
Major-General Sergei Chernomordin, who is also deputy chief of staff of
the Volga-Urals Military District. The 4,000-strong Rapid Deployment
Force, earmarked for possible operations in Central Asia, presently
consists -- at least on paper -- of 10 battalions of varying readiness
levels, including: three battalions from Russia, three from Tajikistan
(two of these apparently from the Russian division stationed in that
country and one from Tajikistan itself), two from Kazakhstan, and two
from Kyrgyzstan (the latter country has pleaded poverty asking to be
excused from contributing a second battalion). These units are based
in the respective countries under national control and hold joint
exercises, usually at annual intervals, under joint command. Russia's
air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, with some 10 tactical combat aircraft
and about a dozen helicopters, is designated a CSTO base and assigned
to the Collective Rapid Deployment Force.
According to some Russian media reports (RTR Russia Television, June
23), participants in the Minsk summit approved a decision whereby
any CSTO member country wishing to accept a deployment of non-CSTO
troops on its territory must first obtain the agreement of all the
other CSTO countries. If so, this implies that military exercises
involving U.S. or NATO countries' troops, their transit passage,
or their use of military installations in any CSTO member country,
for example on anti-terrorism missions, would necessitate Russian
approval. Thus, Washington or NATO allies would have to negotiate
the approval not just with possible host countries, but with Moscow,
which could either withhold the approval, maneuver one or several CSTO
countries into withholding it, or try to trade Moscow's approval for
some geopolitical quid-pro-quo elsewhere.
Thus, if this summit decision is final, Moscow would insert itself
between the Western alliance system and CSTO member countries,
trying to force the latter to deal with the West through Russia,
not directly. In Central Asia, such a situation would reverse the
Pentagon's historic diplomatic achievements of 2001-2002, when it
negotiated basing agreements directly with Central Asian presidents,
who felt encouraged to resist Moscow's pressures at that time.
The decision in Minsk may also aim to nudge NATO into
alliance-to-alliance contacts and common activities with the CSTO,
thus granting the latter a form of political recognition. However,
CSTO member countries are generally interested in cooperating with
NATO in a national capacity, and NATO has always related to them
directly, consistently avoiding the pitfall of dealing with the
CSTO collectively.
At present, NATO prepares to expand its operations in Afghanistan and
may request logistical support from certain Central Asian countries.
Moscow apparently calculates that it could in that case arrange to
refer the request formally to the CSTO for consideration, so as to
press NATO into dealing with this Russia-led structure. One item in
the Minsk summit declaration (such documents are Moscow-drafted as
a rule) says that alliance obligations among CSTO member countries
take precedence over other obligations.
Participants in the Minsk summit approved measures designed to
turn the CSTO into a multifunctional organization. At Putin's and
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's initiative and Lukashenka's
proposal, the summit resolved to develop joint structures of the member
countries' intelligence and law-enforcement agencies and Internal
Affairs ministries, as well as strengthen the Defense Ministries'
joint structures. Beyond its military and political-military remit,
the CSTO would create joint capabilities to deal with natural and
technological disasters, illegal migration, and the narcotics traffic.
Contrary to some expectations, the summit did not officially announce
an intent to create CSTO peacekeeping troops or a legal mechanism for
rendering emergency military assistance to member countries in the
event of aggression against them from outside the CSTO. Kocharian
in particular expressed regret over the failure to advance on the
assistance issue (Arminfo, Itar-Tass, June 23). For its part, Moscow
has developed a full-fledged concept for CSTO "peacekeeping" operations
within the CSTO area and collective participation in international
operations beyond that area. Moscow will almost certainly call in the
months ahead for adoption of this concept and a political decision
on creating CSTO peacekeeping troops.
The dual summit was timed to coincide with the final phase of a
Russia-Belarus military exercise, the largest-ever held in the CSTO's
framework. Forces from Russia and Belarus comprise the CSTO's "regional
group of forces" in the West, along with the Russian-Armenian group
and the Russian-led Central Asian group in the respective theaters.
(Interfax, Belarus Television Channel One, June 23, 24) --Vladimir
Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress