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Eurasia Daily Monitor
Monday, July 24, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 142
SUMMIT PRESCRIBES CIS LITE; PUTIN BLINKS BEFORE SAAKASHVILI; VORONIN
STANDS UP TO PUTIN
by Vladimir Socor
Devalued by an unusually low attendance -- only eight out of twelve
presidents -- the CIS informal summit in Moscow on July 21-22 marks the
official transition of this organization to a `lite' version of its former
self. With Russian President Vladimir Putin's acquiescence, Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev presented a set of proposals to reduce the CIS to a few
functions, mainly in the sphere of social projects. Moreover, Putin blinked
before the absent Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, by eschewing a
discussion on Russian `peacekeeping' in Abkhazia, even though the Kremlin
itself and all of Russia's officialdom insisted all along that this issue
belongs to the CIS competency.
The summit's agenda included a CIS `assessment of world
developments' -- the usual exercise to line up the presidents behind a
Kremlin-drafted statement on international issues -- as well as CIS reform.
In view of the low attendance, however, the Kremlin decided to drop the
joint statement at the last moment on July 21. The following day, Putin
asked Nazarbayev to present proposals for CIS reform that Nazarbayev had
been authorized to prepare in his capacity as chairman of the CIS Council of
Heads of State.
Nazarbayev's report explicitly acknowledges that the CIS does not meet
the requirements of an integration organization, having failed to create
even a free-trade zone, let alone a customs or monetary union or a common
security policy. He proposes that the CIS henceforth focus on harmonizing
member states' policies on five issues: a) regulating migration; b)
developing transport links; c) promoting exchanges in the sphere of
education; d) dealing with cultural and humanitarian issues [often a
euphemism for maintaining a Russian-language cultural environment]; and e)
tackling trans-border criminality.
Under this proposal, CIS decisions are to be adopted by unanimous
consent and to be deemed obligatory once adopted. This mechanism seems a
recipe for weak and even meaningless decisions. It gives each country not
only the possibility to withhold its consent but actually an incentive to
withhold consent if necessary to avoid obligatory decisions that contravene
its interests.
Moreover, Nazarbayev proposes continuing cuts in the personnel of
Moscow-based CIS structures and transferring their functions to `national
coordinators' who would reside in the member countries' capitals. Reducing
the budget and personnel of CIS offices in Moscow is a trademark Nazarbayev
idea, and it is partly thanks to his insistence that those structures have
been cut radically in recent years. Any further cut would almost certainly
bring their final demise. The proposed institution of nationally based
coordinators seems inspired by the GUAM model. Although GUAM is not yet
functional, its national coordinators at least provide a flexible and
cost-effective mechanism for development and implementation of policy
decisions.
The report was circulated belatedly and could not be seriously
discussed at the summit. It has on the whole been accepted as a basis for
further discussion, and the presidents are to submit suggestions to
Nazarbayev for further development of the proposals. Nazarbayev will retain
his chairmanship of the presidents' conclave (temporarily suspending the
rotation in that chair) in order to finalize his report. He concluded,
`Everyone knows that the CIS states are unhappy about the work of this
organization, and some are very unhappy . . . The CIS has actually turned
into a club for the presidents' meetings' (NTV Mir, July 22).
The club function is supposed to enable the presidents to hold
bilateral or small-format meetings on the summit's sidelines. However, even
the club function is questionable with only eight presidents in attendance,
and Putin declining to meet bilaterally with the two presidents who had
wanted such meetings: Georgia's Saakashvili, who was refused one day before
the summit, and Moldova's Vladimir Voronin who was denied a bilateral
meeting with Putin while the summit was in progress.
The gist of what Voronin might have told Putin can be gauged from the
Moldovan president's interview with the liberal Ekho Moskvy radio -- one of
the few Moscow media outlets still open to him -- on the summit's opening
day, when he was still hoping for a bilateral meeting with the Russian
president. Voronin pointed to Russia's recruitment of Transnistria's leaders
`in the Siberian Taiga and [Soviet] Riga special police [reference to these
leaders' actual backgrounds]; called for replacement of Russia's
`peacekeeping' operations with an international mission of observers, both
military and civilian; ridiculed Moscow's claim that Transnistria's
authorities `do not permit' Russia to remove its arsenals and troops from
the area (a claim repeated on July 20 by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov); protested against Russia's politically motivated embargo on
Moldovan wines (50% market share in Russia prior to the recent ban); and
deplored Russia's `destruction' of what Voronin described as traditional
Moldovan good will toward Russia (Ekho Moskvy, July 21).
Putin pointedly expressed his `thanks to those who found it possible
to come to Moscow.' Among those who did not find it possible, Turkmen
President Saparmurat Niyazov is often absent from CIS summits; this time,
however, he is openly in conflict with Moscow over the price of Turkmen gas
deliveries to Gazprom.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko canceled his attendance with
less than 24 hours' advance notice, citing the complicated political
situation in the country. A presidential communiqué went out of its way to
assure Russia and Putin personally of the `sincerity of Ukraine's relations
with Russia as well as of the fact that Russia is a strategic partner of
Ukraine' and invited Putin to visit Ukraine. A further invitation will
follow by official letter from Yushchenko, his office announced
(Interfax-Ukraine, July 21). This marks at least the fifth public and
somewhat supplicating invitation from Yushchenko to Putin to visit Ukraine.
Yushchenko previously issued such invitations in August, November, and
December 2005 and January 2006 publicly, and was also hoping to receive
Putin in Ukraine ahead of the March 26 parliamentary elections.
Armenian President Robert Kocharian was set to attend and likely to
meet with Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev in Putin's presence at this
summit. However, Kocharian canceled his attendance at the summit only hours
before its opening on July 21, citing a viral respiratory problem. In any
case, he faces an internal political problem, as Defense Minister Serge
Sarkisian seems set to launch a bid for supreme power.
(Interfax, Khabar, Mediamax, Arminfo, July 21, 22)
--Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Monday, July 24, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 142
SUMMIT PRESCRIBES CIS LITE; PUTIN BLINKS BEFORE SAAKASHVILI; VORONIN
STANDS UP TO PUTIN
by Vladimir Socor
Devalued by an unusually low attendance -- only eight out of twelve
presidents -- the CIS informal summit in Moscow on July 21-22 marks the
official transition of this organization to a `lite' version of its former
self. With Russian President Vladimir Putin's acquiescence, Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev presented a set of proposals to reduce the CIS to a few
functions, mainly in the sphere of social projects. Moreover, Putin blinked
before the absent Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, by eschewing a
discussion on Russian `peacekeeping' in Abkhazia, even though the Kremlin
itself and all of Russia's officialdom insisted all along that this issue
belongs to the CIS competency.
The summit's agenda included a CIS `assessment of world
developments' -- the usual exercise to line up the presidents behind a
Kremlin-drafted statement on international issues -- as well as CIS reform.
In view of the low attendance, however, the Kremlin decided to drop the
joint statement at the last moment on July 21. The following day, Putin
asked Nazarbayev to present proposals for CIS reform that Nazarbayev had
been authorized to prepare in his capacity as chairman of the CIS Council of
Heads of State.
Nazarbayev's report explicitly acknowledges that the CIS does not meet
the requirements of an integration organization, having failed to create
even a free-trade zone, let alone a customs or monetary union or a common
security policy. He proposes that the CIS henceforth focus on harmonizing
member states' policies on five issues: a) regulating migration; b)
developing transport links; c) promoting exchanges in the sphere of
education; d) dealing with cultural and humanitarian issues [often a
euphemism for maintaining a Russian-language cultural environment]; and e)
tackling trans-border criminality.
Under this proposal, CIS decisions are to be adopted by unanimous
consent and to be deemed obligatory once adopted. This mechanism seems a
recipe for weak and even meaningless decisions. It gives each country not
only the possibility to withhold its consent but actually an incentive to
withhold consent if necessary to avoid obligatory decisions that contravene
its interests.
Moreover, Nazarbayev proposes continuing cuts in the personnel of
Moscow-based CIS structures and transferring their functions to `national
coordinators' who would reside in the member countries' capitals. Reducing
the budget and personnel of CIS offices in Moscow is a trademark Nazarbayev
idea, and it is partly thanks to his insistence that those structures have
been cut radically in recent years. Any further cut would almost certainly
bring their final demise. The proposed institution of nationally based
coordinators seems inspired by the GUAM model. Although GUAM is not yet
functional, its national coordinators at least provide a flexible and
cost-effective mechanism for development and implementation of policy
decisions.
The report was circulated belatedly and could not be seriously
discussed at the summit. It has on the whole been accepted as a basis for
further discussion, and the presidents are to submit suggestions to
Nazarbayev for further development of the proposals. Nazarbayev will retain
his chairmanship of the presidents' conclave (temporarily suspending the
rotation in that chair) in order to finalize his report. He concluded,
`Everyone knows that the CIS states are unhappy about the work of this
organization, and some are very unhappy . . . The CIS has actually turned
into a club for the presidents' meetings' (NTV Mir, July 22).
The club function is supposed to enable the presidents to hold
bilateral or small-format meetings on the summit's sidelines. However, even
the club function is questionable with only eight presidents in attendance,
and Putin declining to meet bilaterally with the two presidents who had
wanted such meetings: Georgia's Saakashvili, who was refused one day before
the summit, and Moldova's Vladimir Voronin who was denied a bilateral
meeting with Putin while the summit was in progress.
The gist of what Voronin might have told Putin can be gauged from the
Moldovan president's interview with the liberal Ekho Moskvy radio -- one of
the few Moscow media outlets still open to him -- on the summit's opening
day, when he was still hoping for a bilateral meeting with the Russian
president. Voronin pointed to Russia's recruitment of Transnistria's leaders
`in the Siberian Taiga and [Soviet] Riga special police [reference to these
leaders' actual backgrounds]; called for replacement of Russia's
`peacekeeping' operations with an international mission of observers, both
military and civilian; ridiculed Moscow's claim that Transnistria's
authorities `do not permit' Russia to remove its arsenals and troops from
the area (a claim repeated on July 20 by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov); protested against Russia's politically motivated embargo on
Moldovan wines (50% market share in Russia prior to the recent ban); and
deplored Russia's `destruction' of what Voronin described as traditional
Moldovan good will toward Russia (Ekho Moskvy, July 21).
Putin pointedly expressed his `thanks to those who found it possible
to come to Moscow.' Among those who did not find it possible, Turkmen
President Saparmurat Niyazov is often absent from CIS summits; this time,
however, he is openly in conflict with Moscow over the price of Turkmen gas
deliveries to Gazprom.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko canceled his attendance with
less than 24 hours' advance notice, citing the complicated political
situation in the country. A presidential communiqué went out of its way to
assure Russia and Putin personally of the `sincerity of Ukraine's relations
with Russia as well as of the fact that Russia is a strategic partner of
Ukraine' and invited Putin to visit Ukraine. A further invitation will
follow by official letter from Yushchenko, his office announced
(Interfax-Ukraine, July 21). This marks at least the fifth public and
somewhat supplicating invitation from Yushchenko to Putin to visit Ukraine.
Yushchenko previously issued such invitations in August, November, and
December 2005 and January 2006 publicly, and was also hoping to receive
Putin in Ukraine ahead of the March 26 parliamentary elections.
Armenian President Robert Kocharian was set to attend and likely to
meet with Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev in Putin's presence at this
summit. However, Kocharian canceled his attendance at the summit only hours
before its opening on July 21, citing a viral respiratory problem. In any
case, he faces an internal political problem, as Defense Minister Serge
Sarkisian seems set to launch a bid for supreme power.
(Interfax, Khabar, Mediamax, Arminfo, July 21, 22)
--Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress