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CHEAPENING PEACEKEEPING
By Alexander Golts
The Moscow Times, Russia
June 6 2006
No good deed goes unpunished, as they say. For more than 10 years,
Russian peacekeeping troops have prevented the renewal of hostilities
in the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transdnestr. Now we are hearing calls for them to withdraw. Belgian
Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht has said that the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, which he chairs, is prepared to
allocate up to 10 million euros ($12.9 million) to cover the removal of
Russian troops from Transdnestr. Georgian lawmakers have threatened to
declare the mission in South Ossetia illegal. And Ukrainian Defense
Minister Anatoly Gritsenko has said that GUAM -- an alliance that
includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova -- should develop
its own peacekeeping force. Considering that the hot spots in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (apart from Nagorno-Karabakh)
are all monitored by Russian troops, Gritsenko's comments amount to
a call for their withdrawal.
Russian leaders have responded with righteous indignation. "Our
peacekeepers are a bone in the throat of one side in these conflicts,"
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said recently. "Endless provocations
and dirty tricks have been directed against the peacekeepers. I have
spoken about this many times in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Our
soldiers will carry out their mandate until political solutions and
agreements are in place."
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov maintains that the attacks on
peacekeepers in South Ossetia are the result of Tbilisi's intention to
resort to force to resolve the conflict there. Top Russian officials
insist that the peacekeeping missions can legally remain in Georgia and
Moldova even against the will of the governments of these countries.
Tbilisi and Chisinau consistently argue that the Russian military is
using the peacekeepers to pursue its own interests in the region. The
leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr have repeatedly
called for their self-proclaimed states to be absorbed into the
Russian Federation. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity has even
taken his case to the Russian Constitutional Court.
For its part, Moscow has adopted a provocative stance. A Foreign
Ministry spokesman has observed that, where Georgia is concerned,
only negotiations can make this a reality, and that the South Ossetian
position was based on the right of national self-determination. This
when Russia has been handing out passports to South Ossetian
residents for years. Passions on both sides have reached the point
where missions originally intended to prevent armed conflict could
lead to the outbreak of war.
All of these self-proclaimed republics appeared as the result
of conflicts initiated by the leaders of newly minted Soviet
successor states. They sought to secure power with victorious wars
that inevitably devolved into the murder of civilians, widespread
atrocities and defeat. Russian peacekeepers were deployed to separate
the warring factions and to stop the killing.
Regulation of the conflicts did not follow, however, because the
parties involved did not try to reconcile. The self-proclaimed
republics believed the peacekeepers had been sent in to preserve
their independence. Tbilisi and Chisinau took the opportunity to
accuse Russia of violating their territorial integrity. In the CIS,
reconciliation efforts never go anywhere, in large part because of
the position adopted by Moscow. President Vladimir Putin was telling
the truth when he said recently that Russia had no intention of
annexing neighboring territories. Moscow is simply exploiting existing
conflicts because before these countries can integrate into European
institutions they must settle their internal disputes, so the best
way to keep them out of the European Union and NATO is to keep those
conflicts simmering.
Moscow feels no obligation to influence the leaders of these
republics to push them toward a compromise. On the contrary, the
Kremlin's actions have created the illusion that Russian guns will
always protect the status quo in these would-be states. Abkhazia,
Transdnestr and South Ossetia have turned into criminal-controlled
enclaves, and Georgia and Moldova have appealed to the international
community for help to secure the removal of Russian peacekeepers from
their territory.
The Russian peacekeeping experience offers an important lesson:
Such missions can only succeed when they are disinterested. When a
country such as Russia sends its peacekeepers into conflict zones, its
goal must be to prevent bloodshed, not to pursue ulterior political
motives. Moscow has given in to this temptation, and in so doing has
cheapened a noble undertaking.
Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny
Zhurnal.
By Alexander Golts
The Moscow Times, Russia
June 6 2006
No good deed goes unpunished, as they say. For more than 10 years,
Russian peacekeeping troops have prevented the renewal of hostilities
in the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transdnestr. Now we are hearing calls for them to withdraw. Belgian
Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht has said that the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, which he chairs, is prepared to
allocate up to 10 million euros ($12.9 million) to cover the removal of
Russian troops from Transdnestr. Georgian lawmakers have threatened to
declare the mission in South Ossetia illegal. And Ukrainian Defense
Minister Anatoly Gritsenko has said that GUAM -- an alliance that
includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova -- should develop
its own peacekeeping force. Considering that the hot spots in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (apart from Nagorno-Karabakh)
are all monitored by Russian troops, Gritsenko's comments amount to
a call for their withdrawal.
Russian leaders have responded with righteous indignation. "Our
peacekeepers are a bone in the throat of one side in these conflicts,"
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said recently. "Endless provocations
and dirty tricks have been directed against the peacekeepers. I have
spoken about this many times in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Our
soldiers will carry out their mandate until political solutions and
agreements are in place."
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov maintains that the attacks on
peacekeepers in South Ossetia are the result of Tbilisi's intention to
resort to force to resolve the conflict there. Top Russian officials
insist that the peacekeeping missions can legally remain in Georgia and
Moldova even against the will of the governments of these countries.
Tbilisi and Chisinau consistently argue that the Russian military is
using the peacekeepers to pursue its own interests in the region. The
leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr have repeatedly
called for their self-proclaimed states to be absorbed into the
Russian Federation. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity has even
taken his case to the Russian Constitutional Court.
For its part, Moscow has adopted a provocative stance. A Foreign
Ministry spokesman has observed that, where Georgia is concerned,
only negotiations can make this a reality, and that the South Ossetian
position was based on the right of national self-determination. This
when Russia has been handing out passports to South Ossetian
residents for years. Passions on both sides have reached the point
where missions originally intended to prevent armed conflict could
lead to the outbreak of war.
All of these self-proclaimed republics appeared as the result
of conflicts initiated by the leaders of newly minted Soviet
successor states. They sought to secure power with victorious wars
that inevitably devolved into the murder of civilians, widespread
atrocities and defeat. Russian peacekeepers were deployed to separate
the warring factions and to stop the killing.
Regulation of the conflicts did not follow, however, because the
parties involved did not try to reconcile. The self-proclaimed
republics believed the peacekeepers had been sent in to preserve
their independence. Tbilisi and Chisinau took the opportunity to
accuse Russia of violating their territorial integrity. In the CIS,
reconciliation efforts never go anywhere, in large part because of
the position adopted by Moscow. President Vladimir Putin was telling
the truth when he said recently that Russia had no intention of
annexing neighboring territories. Moscow is simply exploiting existing
conflicts because before these countries can integrate into European
institutions they must settle their internal disputes, so the best
way to keep them out of the European Union and NATO is to keep those
conflicts simmering.
Moscow feels no obligation to influence the leaders of these
republics to push them toward a compromise. On the contrary, the
Kremlin's actions have created the illusion that Russian guns will
always protect the status quo in these would-be states. Abkhazia,
Transdnestr and South Ossetia have turned into criminal-controlled
enclaves, and Georgia and Moldova have appealed to the international
community for help to secure the removal of Russian peacekeepers from
their territory.
The Russian peacekeeping experience offers an important lesson:
Such missions can only succeed when they are disinterested. When a
country such as Russia sends its peacekeepers into conflict zones, its
goal must be to prevent bloodshed, not to pursue ulterior political
motives. Moscow has given in to this temptation, and in so doing has
cheapened a noble undertaking.
Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny
Zhurnal.