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Regnum, Russia
June 9 2006
Viktor Yakubyan: Infamous finish of `Prague Process' - Karabakh epic
to be continued
The Bucharest `draw' between Kocharyan and Aliyev and the following
statement by Steven Mann that he will be shortly replaced as OSCE MG
US Co-Chair have put an end to the so-called `Prague Process.'
Obviously, the Euro-American project to accelerate the Karabakh peace
process by diplomatic pressure on the sides has failed. One could
easily predict the outcome of the Bucharest meeting and the very
atmosphere of the talks if one heard the statement Kocharyan made just
one day before going to Romania. `Since the UN was formed no single
nation exercising its self-determination right and attaining de facto
independence has changed its decision and has rejoined the state it
broke away with. I don't understand why the Karabakh people should be
the first to decide that their independence is not good for them for
some reasons. We have given no cause for such conclusions.' That's
what Kocharyan said. It is obvious that besides expressing the
position of the Armenian side on the basic issue of Nagorno Karabakh's
future, this statement hints at the parade of sovereignties in the
Balkans triggered by the referendum in Montenegro. In fact, it reads:
`Is Karabakh worse than Montenegro or Kosovo?'
Today, it does no longer matter which of the `Prague Process' points
the sides have failed to agree on. It is clear that Bucharest was an
attempt to squeeze agreement out of them after their failure in
Rambouillet, and this will hardly be continued. It is also clear that
after Bucharest the US will only increase its pressure but how it
will do this is hard to say yet. Much will depend on who will replace
Mann in the OSCE MG. On the other hand, the OSCE may also try to
involve some new co-chair countries in the negotiating format, while
Europe will try to step up its diplomacy by couple-two new
resolutions, like the work of Atkinson.
Summing up the results of the `Prague Process,' we can say that the
co-chair countries were actually unwilling to unfreeze the conflict.
In all the other things, each of them tried to push its interests or
not to yield its positions. For example, France, who represents the
EU to a certain extent, did its best to ensure `the victory of the
European diplomacy' by putting on the negotiating table a document
that would lead the problem away from `dangerous' Balkan precedents.
On the other hand, it sought to ensure the military presence of
European countries in the `new neighbor' region.
Though empathizing with the hopes of the Europeans, Washington still
pushed forth its own interests thereby putting spokes in France's
wheel. The whole result of Mann's work is that he has almost opened
the US' cards. It turns out that the Americans closely link the
Karabakh conflict with the developments over Iran, which is extremely
dangerous for the South Caucasus. In fact, right after the visit of
Ilham Aliyev to Washington, the international community witnessed
sharply escalating situation in Iran's mostly-Azeri provinces.
Baku demonstratively ignored this situation and made no single
official statement in this respect. Obviously, Baku was expecting to
get or had already got compensation from the US for its neutrality.
No coincidence that US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia Daniel Fried said right after Bucharest that as a
representative of America he wants Azerbaijan to get back as much
territory as possible and to see Azeri refugees going back to their
homes. Of course, he said nothing about Armenian refugees.
Concerning Russia, Arif Yunusov, Azeri political expert who proved to
be surprisingly right when forecasting Mann's resignation, says that
its co-chair Yuri Merzlyakov `sabotages the talks.' We dare say he
`sabotages' the talks not alone but, at least, together with one of
the presidents.
Thus, all i's are dotted. It was obvious from the very beginning that
the US, France and Russia simply can't be unanimous on such an issue.
If in general they tried not to destabilize the situation, in details
- particularly, on the issue of possible peacekeeping operation -
there is no unanimity and cannot be, in principle. No coincidence
that the Russian Defense Minister keeps reiterating his commitment to
send Russian peacekeepers to the conflict zone, thereby leaving no
chances for anybody to ignore the Russian interest.
Following the same logic, the Bush administration, whose electoral
priority was foreign policy and who is already running short of time,
will shortly start consistently changing the negotiating format, will
try to draw Azerbaijan even deeper into the anti-Iranian campaign and
will, simultaneously, increase its diplomatic and political pressure
on Armenia. We can also expect a new wave of Azeri activity in the
UN, something Armenia once overcome by allowing an OSCE fact-finding
mission to visit occupied territories.
As regards Russia, the importance of its functions in the Karabakh
peace process depends of its general positions in the region.
Obviously, Moscow will try to prevent escalation or transformation of
the conflict until it resolves all of its urgent problems with
Georgia and strengthens its positions in the region. At the same
time, Russia will continue regarding all these three ethnic conflicts
in the South Caucasus - Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia - as a
direct challenge to its security and, consequently, as a field for
its peacekeeping activities as well as in the context of global
tendencies - particularly, the re-division of the Balkans according
to American scenario.
June 9 2006
Viktor Yakubyan: Infamous finish of `Prague Process' - Karabakh epic
to be continued
The Bucharest `draw' between Kocharyan and Aliyev and the following
statement by Steven Mann that he will be shortly replaced as OSCE MG
US Co-Chair have put an end to the so-called `Prague Process.'
Obviously, the Euro-American project to accelerate the Karabakh peace
process by diplomatic pressure on the sides has failed. One could
easily predict the outcome of the Bucharest meeting and the very
atmosphere of the talks if one heard the statement Kocharyan made just
one day before going to Romania. `Since the UN was formed no single
nation exercising its self-determination right and attaining de facto
independence has changed its decision and has rejoined the state it
broke away with. I don't understand why the Karabakh people should be
the first to decide that their independence is not good for them for
some reasons. We have given no cause for such conclusions.' That's
what Kocharyan said. It is obvious that besides expressing the
position of the Armenian side on the basic issue of Nagorno Karabakh's
future, this statement hints at the parade of sovereignties in the
Balkans triggered by the referendum in Montenegro. In fact, it reads:
`Is Karabakh worse than Montenegro or Kosovo?'
Today, it does no longer matter which of the `Prague Process' points
the sides have failed to agree on. It is clear that Bucharest was an
attempt to squeeze agreement out of them after their failure in
Rambouillet, and this will hardly be continued. It is also clear that
after Bucharest the US will only increase its pressure but how it
will do this is hard to say yet. Much will depend on who will replace
Mann in the OSCE MG. On the other hand, the OSCE may also try to
involve some new co-chair countries in the negotiating format, while
Europe will try to step up its diplomacy by couple-two new
resolutions, like the work of Atkinson.
Summing up the results of the `Prague Process,' we can say that the
co-chair countries were actually unwilling to unfreeze the conflict.
In all the other things, each of them tried to push its interests or
not to yield its positions. For example, France, who represents the
EU to a certain extent, did its best to ensure `the victory of the
European diplomacy' by putting on the negotiating table a document
that would lead the problem away from `dangerous' Balkan precedents.
On the other hand, it sought to ensure the military presence of
European countries in the `new neighbor' region.
Though empathizing with the hopes of the Europeans, Washington still
pushed forth its own interests thereby putting spokes in France's
wheel. The whole result of Mann's work is that he has almost opened
the US' cards. It turns out that the Americans closely link the
Karabakh conflict with the developments over Iran, which is extremely
dangerous for the South Caucasus. In fact, right after the visit of
Ilham Aliyev to Washington, the international community witnessed
sharply escalating situation in Iran's mostly-Azeri provinces.
Baku demonstratively ignored this situation and made no single
official statement in this respect. Obviously, Baku was expecting to
get or had already got compensation from the US for its neutrality.
No coincidence that US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia Daniel Fried said right after Bucharest that as a
representative of America he wants Azerbaijan to get back as much
territory as possible and to see Azeri refugees going back to their
homes. Of course, he said nothing about Armenian refugees.
Concerning Russia, Arif Yunusov, Azeri political expert who proved to
be surprisingly right when forecasting Mann's resignation, says that
its co-chair Yuri Merzlyakov `sabotages the talks.' We dare say he
`sabotages' the talks not alone but, at least, together with one of
the presidents.
Thus, all i's are dotted. It was obvious from the very beginning that
the US, France and Russia simply can't be unanimous on such an issue.
If in general they tried not to destabilize the situation, in details
- particularly, on the issue of possible peacekeeping operation -
there is no unanimity and cannot be, in principle. No coincidence
that the Russian Defense Minister keeps reiterating his commitment to
send Russian peacekeepers to the conflict zone, thereby leaving no
chances for anybody to ignore the Russian interest.
Following the same logic, the Bush administration, whose electoral
priority was foreign policy and who is already running short of time,
will shortly start consistently changing the negotiating format, will
try to draw Azerbaijan even deeper into the anti-Iranian campaign and
will, simultaneously, increase its diplomatic and political pressure
on Armenia. We can also expect a new wave of Azeri activity in the
UN, something Armenia once overcome by allowing an OSCE fact-finding
mission to visit occupied territories.
As regards Russia, the importance of its functions in the Karabakh
peace process depends of its general positions in the region.
Obviously, Moscow will try to prevent escalation or transformation of
the conflict until it resolves all of its urgent problems with
Georgia and strengthens its positions in the region. At the same
time, Russia will continue regarding all these three ethnic conflicts
in the South Caucasus - Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia - as a
direct challenge to its security and, consequently, as a field for
its peacekeeping activities as well as in the context of global
tendencies - particularly, the re-division of the Balkans according
to American scenario.