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  • Draft Joint Opinion On Draft Amendments To The Electoral Code Of The

    DRAFT JOINT OPINION ON DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
    by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR

    National Assembly of RA, Armenia
    June 14 2006

    on the basis of comments by Mr Carlos CLOSA MONTERO (Venice Commission
    Member, Spain) Mr Michael KRENNERICH (Venice Commission Electoral
    Expert, Germany) Mr Jessie PILGRIM (OSCE/ODIHR Electoral Expert)

    I. Introduction

    1. This opinion focuses on the electoral reform package that was
    sent for consideration to the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR by the
    then President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia,
    Mr Arthur Baghdasaryan, on 28 March 2006. The reform package consists
    of 100 draft amendments to the Electoral Code, four draft amendments to
    the Law on Political Parties and 12 draft amendments to the Criminal
    Code. The views expressed in this opinion are restricted to the text
    of the amendments (CDL-EL(2006)020), and do not refer to the Electoral
    Code, the Party Law or the Criminal Code as a whole.

    2. These proposed draft amendments have been evaluated against the
    background of the most recent joint opinions by the Venice Commission
    and OSCE/ODIHR, an unofficial English translation of the current
    Electoral Code, as well as the Venice Commission Code of Good Practice
    in Electoral Matters.

    3. This comment should, for the reasons stated, be read together with
    the following documents:

    Final Opinion on the Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic
    of Armenia, by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR.

    Strasbourg/Warsaw, 25 October 2005 (CDL-AD(2005)027).

    Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia (including the amendments
    adopted on 17 May 2005 by the National Assembly of Armenia)
    (CDL-EL(2006)019).

    Draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the Electoral Code of the
    Republic of Armenia (CDL-EL(2006)020).

    The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission
    (CDL-AD(2002)023rev).

    4. Previous joint (interim) opinions and recommendations by the
    Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR are also applicable as they address
    the Electoral Code as a whole and previous electoral amendments,
    see e.g. CDL-AD (2005)019, CDL-AD(2005)008; CDL-AD(2004)049,
    CDL-AD(2003)021.

    5. Evaluating the proposed electoral reform package, one can
    distinguish between:

    draft amendments which improve the legal framework for elections (Part
    II); draft amendments which might have positive effects, but need
    further clarification or have to be proved in practice (Part III);
    draft amendments which might have ambivalent or negative effects and
    should be re-considered (Part IV); recommendations of previous joint
    opinions by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR which have not been
    addressed (Part V).

    6. The Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia is a very long
    document (141 articles) with very detailed provisions. This may not
    hide the fact that, as the former opinion signalled, the biggest
    shortcoming in the conduct of elections lies in the implementation of
    the Code rather than in the Code itself. Electoral laws alone cannot
    guarantee democratic elections. The democratic character of elections
    depends first and foremost on the responsibility of the authorities
    to properly implement the electoral law and the commitment of all
    other election stakeholders (voters, candidates, parties, media etc.)
    to conduct democratic elections. As previous opinions have stated,
    a major shortcoming in the conduct of the elections in Armenia has
    been in the implementation of the Electoral Code. The good faith
    implementation of the Code remains crucial for the conduct of genuinely
    democratic elections.

    7. Technical note: The numbering of articles of the draft amendments is
    not identical with the articles in the respective documents (Electoral
    Code, Law on Political Parties, Criminal Code). In this comment, first
    the numbering of articles of the existing laws will be mentioned,
    followed by the number of the articles of the draft amendments.

    II. Amendments which improve the legal framework for elections

    8. The proposed amendments to the electoral legislation contain
    a number of provisions that can be regarded as positive (or at
    least unproblematic) steps. Besides minor clarifying provisions,
    the following articles should be pointed out here:

    9. Right to vote in local elections for non citizens (Article 2,
    Paragraph 1 of the Electoral Code): According to Article 2 of the draft
    amendments, the right to vote in local elections seems to be granted
    generally to all non-citizens who reside in the specific community
    (and not only to non-citizens with refugee status). In accordance
    with the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Participation
    of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level , the introduction
    of general voting rights for foreign residents in local elections
    is greatly welcomed. However, "citizen" is used as a conditioning
    term in several places in the articles regulating compilation of
    the voter list. Although Paragraph 1 of Article 10 also references
    "persons who have the right to vote in accordance with Article 2",
    the concern remains that the articles (e.g., Article 11) regulating
    the voter list could be applied to limit the rights of non-citizens
    in local elections. The articles regulating the voter list should be
    amended to prevent the limitation of voting rights of non-citizens
    due to the manner in which the voter list is compiled.

    10. Secrecy of vote (Article 6 of the Electoral Code): Article 3 of the
    draft amendments clarifies that the secrecy of the vote is not only a
    right, but also a responsibility (to be understood as an obligation)
    of the voter. It also stipulates that control over the free expression
    of the voters' will shall be prohibited and prosecuted by law. Against
    the background of open voting practices, which have been observed in
    Armenian elections, this clarification is welcome.

    11. Voter identification (Article 11, Paragraph 3, and Article
    55, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code): According to Articles 7
    and 39 of the draft amendments, not only the voter, but also the
    responsible electoral commission member shall sign the voter list,
    after proving the voter's identity in the polling station. Such a
    signature requirement might be a measure to improve the integrity
    of the voter identification process and the accountability of the
    election officials. It is also a measure for providing evidence in
    the case of violations of the electoral law.

    12. Voters per electoral precinct (Article 15, Paragraph 6 of the
    Electoral Code): Article 11 of the draft amendments reduces the number
    of voters per each electoral precinct from 2,000 to 1,600 voters. This
    is an improvement as smaller electoral precincts usually facilitate
    the management of the voting process on the election day.

    13. Allocation and scheduling of free broadcasting time in public
    media (Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code): Article 14 of
    the draft amendments provides that the procedures for allocating and
    scheduling free airtime on public radio and television shall be set
    on the next day (up to now: within three days) after the deadline
    for the registration of candidates. If this shorter deadline can be
    realised in practice, this will facilitate earlier planning of spots
    on radio and television by candidates and parties.

    14. Incompatibility between candidature and media coverage (Article
    22, Paragraph 1 of the Electoral Code): According to Article 15 of
    the draft amendments, reporters and editors not only from public, but
    also from other radio and television companies, who are registered
    as candidates, shall be prohibited from covering the elections and
    hosting radio and TV programmes. It is welcomed that this provision
    has been extended to private media.

    15. Deadline for income declaration (Article 25, Paragraph 11 of the
    Electoral Code): Article 17 of the draft amendments allows candidates
    and parties running for the National Assembly to submit their income
    and expenditure declarations of pre-election funds by 15 days (up
    to now: 6 days) after the end of elections. This is a more realistic
    deadline.

    16. Rights of proxies (Article 271 of the Electoral Code): Article
    20 of the draft amendments clarifies and strengthens the rights
    of proxies. For example, it is quite important that they are now
    explicitly allowed to be physically near commission members during
    voting day procedures. Furthermore, they are now explicitly allowed to
    offer observations and recommendations about the work of the electoral
    commission to the commission's chairman.

    17. Remuneration of Electoral Commission Members (Article 33,
    Paragraph 9 of the Electoral Code): Article 23 of the draft amendments
    modifies the remuneration conditions of election commission members. Of
    particular importance is the fact that, during the period of elections,
    not only chairmen, deputy chairmen and secretaries of the respective
    Territorial Electoral Commissions and Precinct Electoral Commissions
    shall be remunerated, but also ordinary members of TECs and PECs (with
    the only exception of court judges, appointed to TECs, and members
    of PECs formed in diplomatic or consular missions abroad). The
    fact that, in principle, all members of the CEC, TECs and PECs
    shall be remunerated is a positive amendment, which may strengthen
    their commitment to the commission's duties and reduce the risk of
    bribes. At the same time, a failure to carry out responsibilities
    for no compelling reason shall now be punishable by law, according
    to the amendments.

    18. Access to the area of voting booths (Article 48, Paragraph 1
    of the Electoral Code): Article 34 of the draft amendments contains
    provisions for a limited access area around the voting booths.

    Although such provisions usually are not regulated in the electoral law
    (but rather in electoral commission instructions) they might be helpful
    to guarantee the secrecy of the vote and to prevent group voting.

    19. Preparation of ballot envelopes (Article 491, Paragraph 11 of the
    Electoral Code): On the basis of Article 35 of the draft amendments,
    this new article provides that the preparation of ballot envelopes,
    which will be introduced by the draft amendments, shall be ensured by
    the Central Election Commission. If several elections are conducted
    concurrently, differently coloured envelopes shall be prepared for
    every voting event. The colour of the envelopes shall correspond to the
    colour of the respective ballots. The introduction of ballot envelopes,
    the CEC's responsibility over the production of the envelopes and
    the colour issue can generally be regarded as positive.

    (However, the way in which both the ballot paper and the ballot
    envelopes must be stamped raises concerns; see below).

    20. Authentification of ballots (Article 58, Paragraph 1 of the
    Electoral Code): According to Article 42 of the draft amendments, to
    be valid, ballots must not only be correctly marked and stamped; they
    must also be signed by authorised election officials (three members
    of the PEC). This is a positive amendment in order to safeguard the
    ballot, which reflects the practice that in many countries ballots
    bear both an official stamp specific to the polling station and the
    signature of authorised election officials.

    21. Tabulation and transmission of results (Article 63 of the Electoral
    Code): Article 49 of the draft amendments provides additional
    safeguards for correction of the PEC protocol by the TEC and the
    tabulation and transmission of the TEC results. The amendments also
    provide for immediate public posting of the election results at the
    TEC. However, the amendments do not provide that published results
    are broken down to polling station level which has previously been
    recommended by the OSCE/ODIHR.

    22. Share of votes required to regain electoral deposits (Articles 71,
    79 and 123 of the Electoral Code): Articles 54, 63 and 89 of the draft
    amendments stipulate that the required vote share of the candidates
    in order to retain electoral deposits are calculated on the basis of
    the valid ballots cast. This is a welcome clarification.

    23. The option to vote "against all" partially remains in the Electoral
    Code, as this is a voting option where there is only one candidate
    on the ballot. Although this is some improvement, the Electoral Code
    still fails to reflect previous recommendations (see CDL-AD(2005)027,
    Paragraph 23) that the option to vote "against all" be completely
    removed from the law. Additionally, one-candidate elections should
    be discouraged and re-registration considered in an event when there
    is only one candidate.

    III. Draft amendments which need to be clarified or proved in practice

    24. Deadline for publishing information on voter turnout (Article 7,
    Paragraph 6, of the Electoral Code): Article 4 of the draft amendments,
    besides minor clarifications and modifications, shortens the CEC's
    deadline for publishing the final information about voter turnout
    in national elections from 12:00 to 1:00 on the following day (it
    is assumed that this is 1:00 a.m.). While quick turnout information
    is helpful, it remains to be seen whether the deadline is realistic
    in practice.

    25. Conditions for voter registration (Article 10 of the Electoral
    Code): Article 6 of the draft amendments introduces more rigid
    conditions for voter registration. It establishes the registered
    address as the only basis for voter lists. Furthermore, citizens who
    reside or travel outside the country have to submit an application for
    out-of-country registration and voting. Finally, the amendments also
    specify the conditions for the registration of military servicemen
    and their family members. In order to improve voter registration,
    in principle the amendments are useful. However, due to the lack of
    absentee voting procedures inside the country (see below), voters
    who reside temporarily or permanently in a community without being
    registered, have to vote in the place of their last registration. It
    remains to be seen how the system will work in practice.

    26. Proper furnishing of electoral precincts (Article 16, Paragraph 2
    of the Electoral Code): Article 12 of the draft amendments provides
    that community leaders shall be responsible for "proper furnishing
    of the precinct centers located in their particular communities". It
    should be clarified in the article what materials, fixtures, and
    services constitute "proper furnishing".

    27. Observation missions (Article 29, Paragraph 4 of the Electoral
    Code): Article 21 of the draft amendments revokes Paragraph 4. This
    paragraph provides that, if the number of organisations that have
    applied to carrying out an observation mission is so large that it
    may cause technical difficulties for voting and vote counting, then
    priority shall be given to organisations which guarantee that their
    observation mission will cover the entire territory of the Republic
    of Armenia. Revocation of this provision is welcomed. It should be
    ensured that no bureaucratic barriers and restrictions are created
    for electoral observation missions.

    28. Authority of persons carrying through observation missions (Article
    29, Paragraph 6 of the Electoral Code): According to Article 21 of the
    draft amendments, the authority of persons carrying out observation
    missions shall be terminated 20 days after the end of elections (up to
    now: 10 days). Although the extension of the observers' accreditation
    period is welcomed, it would be preferable to extend the possibility
    for observation until the announcement of the final results and
    adjudication of all election complaints and appeals. The electoral
    law should specify that observers have a role and a right to observe
    the post-election period and have a right of access to electoral
    commissions and documents until all the electoral tasks are completed.

    29. Precinct electoral commissions in diplomatic delegations (Article
    34, Paragraph 1 of the Code): Adding the words of Article 24 of the
    draft amendments to Article 34, Paragraph 1 of the Code, the wording of
    the English translation of the Article is grammatically not entirely
    clear. It is assumed that judges and members of Precinct Electoral
    Commissions formed in diplomatic or consular missions abroad are not
    required to undertake electoral training. If this is not an issue of
    translation, then the wording of the article might be clarified as
    the article could be interpreted to apply only to Precinct Electoral
    Commissions formed abroad.

    30. President powers for approving the composition of the Central
    Electoral Commission (Article 35, Paragraph 3 of the Electoral
    Code): Article 25 of the draft amendments sets the President of the
    Republic a 10-day deadline for approving the composition of the Central
    Electoral Commission on the basis of nominations made by the entities
    responsible for forming the Central Electoral Commissions. However,
    it has still not been specified whether the Presidential decree
    is merely a formality and that the President has no power to veto,
    negate, or prevent an appointment by reason of this formality (see also
    CDL-AD(2005)027, Paragraph 13). This concern also applies to Article
    38, sub-Paragraph 4 of Paragraph 31 added by Article 28 of the draft
    amendments, which requires a Presidential decree for filling a vacancy.

    31. Staff of the Central Electoral Commission (Article 39, Paragraph
    3 of the Electoral Code): Article 29 of the draft amendments revokes
    Paragraph 3, which stipulates that the chairman of the Central
    Electoral Commission shall form a staff working on a permanent basis.

    By revoking such a provision it is not quite clear how permanent
    staff activities are organised.

    32. Signature of ballots (Article 491, Paragraph 4, and Article 56,
    Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code): According to Articles 35 and 40
    of the draft amendments, both the voter and the responsible electoral
    commission member have to sign the stub of the ballot before the
    bottom part of the ballot is given to the voter. Such a signature
    requirement might be an adequate measure to improve the integrity of
    the process (and to provide evidence in the case of violations of the
    electoral law). However, it must be assured that this procedure does
    not permit any attribution of ballots to voters and that the bottom
    part of the ballot, which is given to the voter, does not permit any
    ex-post voter identification.

    33. Electoral documents to be signed (Article 53, Paragraph 1 of
    the Electoral Code): the new wording of this Paragraph modified by
    Article 38 of the draft amendments is not consistent with regard to
    the electoral documents which have to be signed by the members of the
    Precinct Electoral Commission. Sometimes only ballots and voter lists
    are mentioned. At other times envelopes are also listed. This article
    should be reviewed carefully in order to ensure that it describes
    precisely the intent of the legislator for regulating this aspect of
    the voting process.

    34. Replacement of precinct electoral commissions' members (Article
    53, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code): According to Article 38
    of the draft amendments, the Precinct Electoral Commissions shall
    decide on the procedures for replacing the commission members in their
    aforementioned functions with other commission members. It remains to
    be seen how this rotation system works in practice, and if it creates
    additional problems.

    35. Request to change the colour of the ink for signing ballots
    (Article 53, Paragraph 3 of the Electoral Code): Article 38 of
    the draft amendments adds a new sentence in Paragraph 3, which
    permits a member of the Precinct Electoral Commission or a proxy
    to request a change in the colour of ink used for stamping the
    ballots and envelopes. However, the article requires a decision on
    a request only "if there are different suggestions" on the colour of
    the ink. This suggests that a single request must be granted by the
    Precinct Electoral Commission. If this is the intent, then it should
    be clearly stated in the article. It should also be clearly stated
    whether there is any limit on the number of requests that can be made
    by a single member of the Precinct Electoral Commission or a proxy.

    36. Procedures for counting and summarising votes and preparing
    protocols (Articles 60, 601, 61 and 62 of the Electoral Code):
    Articles 45, 46, 47 and 48 of the draft amendments provide for a
    complex procedure of vote counting, summarising of voting results and
    preparing election protocols, which may not be easy to implement by
    Precinct Electoral Commissions. This is partly due to the fact that
    both the ballot envelopes and the ballot papers have to be checked
    separately whether they are established specimen. Furthermore,
    intermediate protocols on voting results in intermediate batches are
    provided for. Even if the amendments aim at improving the integrity
    of the procedure, it remains to be seen whether the procedure works
    without difficulties and time delays in practice. Complex procedures
    as the one introduced by the draft amendments increase the possibility
    for errors and require additional training efforts for members of
    PECs. More troublesome, however, is that this undue complexity could
    create disruptions in the election processes so serious that some
    voters may not have their votes accurately counted and the legitimacy
    of an election is placed at risk.

    37. Deadline for announcing preliminary results (Article 632, Paragraph
    1 of the Electoral Code): Article 51 of the draft amendments shortens
    the CEC's deadline for announcing the preliminary results of national
    elections from 28 hours to 24 hours after the end of the voting. While
    an early announcement of provisional results is desirable, it remains
    to be seen if the deadline is realistic in practice. It should be
    clear that there is not only a need for an early announcement but
    also for a reliable consolidation of provisional results.

    38. Election of single candidates standing for a seat (Article 84,
    Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code): Article 67 of the draft amendments
    states that "if only one candidate was running, then he/she shall be
    considered elected if more than half of the people who participated in
    the election voted for him/her." This article does not state how the
    number of voters "who participated in the election" is determined. This
    could be based on the number of persons who have signed the voters'
    lists in the polling stations or it could be based on the number of
    ballots found in ballot boxes. It is not uncommon for these numbers
    to be different in an election should voters fail to sign the voters
    lists or to place a ballot in the ballot box. This article should
    provide additional text stating how this number is determined. This
    concern also applies to Article 133, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code
    (Article 96 of the draft amendments). However, to provide voters with
    a genuine choice between different candidates, it would be desirable
    to have more than one candidate standing in any particular election.

    39. Time limits for announcing presidential elections (Article 90,
    Paragraph 1 of the Electoral Code): Article 71 of the draft amendments
    stipulates that the voting in new presidential elections according
    to Article 90 of the Electoral Code shall take place on the 40th day
    after the new election is announced (instead of "the 40th day after
    the voting day", as it is stipulated in the existing Code).

    However, the time limit for the announcement is not specified there.

    40. Electoral formula (Article 115, Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 of
    the Electoral Code): Article 84 of the draft amendments establishes
    proportional representation and legal thresholds for 90 of the
    mandates in the National Assembly. However, the English text does not
    precisely describe the mathematical formula for allocating mandates to
    and within candidate lists. The mathematical formula for allocating
    mandates should be clearly stated so that there is no question as to
    what constitutes the proper method of allocating mandates.

    41. Conditions for invalidating elections (Article 134, Paragraph 5
    of the Electoral Code): Article 97 of the draft amendments provides
    that community council member elections are invalid if "the amount
    of inaccuracies makes it impossible to determine the winners, whose
    number is at least half the number of community council members, as
    specified in Article 120, Paragraph 2, i.e. the difference between
    the number of ballots cast for the elected candidate and non-elected
    candidate is smaller than or equal to the difference between the amount
    of inaccuracies and the ratio of the number of community council
    member candidates." This text is vague and arbitrarily applies an
    "irregularity ratio" to all candidates based on the total number of
    irregularities in the election. Further, the invalidation principle in
    this text appears to conflict with the invalidation principle provided
    in the next sentence in Article 134, Paragraph 5, which requires
    invalidation if "such violations of this Code have occurred during
    the preparation and conduct of elections, which may have influenced
    the outcome of the election." This invalidation principle is based
    on potential "influence" regardless of whether the "influence" could
    have affected the determination of a winning candidate(s). Article
    134, Paragraph 5 should be stated in more precise language and the
    principles of invalidation, for both inaccuracies and violations of
    the Electoral Code, should be based on whether a determination of
    winning candidates may have been affected.

    42. Prosecution of electoral violations. Several articles of the
    Electoral Code (e.g. Article 6, Article 9, Paragraph 2; Article 12,
    Paragraph 2; Article 33, Paragraph 9; Article 63, Paragraph 2; Article
    631, Paragraph 10); several articles of the Criminal Code (Articles
    149 to 154) and a number of draft amendments to the Electoral Code
    (e.g. Articles 3, 5, 8, 23, 49) and to the Criminal Code (Articles 1
    to 12) provide for legal punishment, opening criminal cases or tougher
    penalties for electoral violations. Given the "culture of impunity"
    for election-related offences that has been observed in past elections
    in Armenia, in principle it is most welcome that electoral violators
    will be held accountable by law.

    However, it must be assured that unintended "genuine" errors, which
    are committed by relatively inexperienced election stake-holders,
    will not be inappropriately criminalised. Furthermore, it should be
    borne in mind that it is of little value to include severe penalties
    in the law unless illegal practices will in fact be investigated,
    prosecuted and punished. Thus, it remains to be seen how the new
    amendments will be enforced.

    IV. Draft amendments which should be re-considered

    43. Training of election commission members (Article 34, Paragraph
    1 of the Electoral Code): Article 24 of the draft amendments places
    organisation of the professional training of election commission
    members with the "bodies and officials who have the authority to
    form a Central Electoral Commission"..."together with the Central
    Electoral Commission". Further, the right to nominate persons to
    receive professional training on conducting elections "belongs
    to bodies and officials who have the authority to form a Central
    Electoral Commission". Thus, it appears that ordinary citizens
    who would like to participate in training and be qualified for
    public service in conducting elections for their country cannot
    do so without being nominated by an Article 35 benefactor. This is
    unfortunate as it politicises an educational process that should be
    open to all citizens. This amendment is a step back and makes election
    administration less inclusive and pluralistic.

    44. Recall of electoral commissions' members (Article 38, sub-paragraph
    9 to Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code): Article 28 of the draft
    amendments reintroduces the right to control the actions of nominated
    election commission members by allowing the "person or body that has
    the right to nominate" to recall the member. The possibility to recall,
    which has been previously criticised by the Venice Commission and
    OSCE/ODIHR, was removed in 2002. It is troublesome that recall is being
    reintroduced since it implies that the person recalled is politically
    accountable to the nominating institution. This casts serious doubts
    on their neutrality and their ability to perform independently. The
    Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters establishes that bodies that
    appoint members to electoral commissions should not be free to recall
    them, as it casts doubts on their independence. The reintroduction
    of the possibility to recall is a step back that makes the election
    administration more political and less independent.

    45. Video recording. (Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code):
    The authors of the draft amendments have suggested introducing
    video recording of voting and the summarising of voting results if
    appropriate financial means are available. If such means are not
    available, the draft's authors have suggested including a provision
    allowing proxies and observers to photograph and video the voting
    and summarising of the voting results. Both options are mentioned
    in Article 33 of the draft amendments. The use of video cameras
    should be carefully considered. Although they might be used to
    prevent or document electoral irregularities, they will certainly
    have an intimidating effect on voters and might violate the secrecy
    of the vote. In many countries, thus, video cameras are not (or only
    with special permission) allowed inside the polling station during
    the voting process. In the absence of evidence that such a measure
    is necessary to deter fraud and reassure voters of the legitimacy
    of election processes, the factor of voter intimidation should be
    considered as controlling on the issue .

    46. Approval of printing and preparation of ballots (Article 491,
    Paragraph 6 and 7 of the Electoral Code): Article 35 of the draft
    amendments provides that the Central Electoral Commission shall
    approve the ballot specimen and ensure the printing and preparation
    only of ballots for presidential and National Assembly elections under
    the proportional system. In the case of National Assembly elections
    under the majoritarian system and local elections, this should be
    the responsibility of the Territorial Electoral Commissions. However,
    it would constitute better practice if the CEC continued to approve
    and ensure the printing and preparation of ballots for all elections,
    especially for both the proportional and the majoritarian part of
    the National Assembly elections (see CDL-AD(2005) 027, Paragraph
    22). The overall responsibility for the production of ballots should
    preferably be placed in the hands of the CEC, as will be the case with
    the production of ballot envelopes (see new Article 491, Paragraph 11).

    47. Checks on voters' identity. (Article 55, Paragraph 2, Article 56,
    Paragraph 2, and Article 57, Paragraph 3 of the Electoral Code):
    Due to Articles 40 and 41 of the draft amendments, the voter's
    identity is being checked three times inside the polling station:
    the first time by the commission member who is responsible for voter
    registration (according to Article 55, Paragraph 2), the second time
    by the commission member who is responsible for stamping the ballot
    (according to the revised Article 56, Paragraph 2) and, finally,
    by the commission member who is responsible for stamping the ballot
    envelope (according to the revised Article 57, Paragraph 3). Although
    the proposed multiple voter identification check aims at ensuring the
    integrity of the process, it seems to be unnecessary and cumbersome.

    First, it is not completely clear on which basis and through which
    documents the voter's identity is checked by the commission members
    who are responsible for stamping the ballots or the ballot envelopes.

    Second, checking voter identity three times inside the polling station
    is a very complex and time-consuming process. With an appropriate
    layout of polling stations, an effective management of voter flow and a
    clear overview of all staff and voter activity by commission members,
    proxies and observers, it should be sufficient to check the voter's
    identity once.

    48. Stamping the ballot (Article 56, Paragraph 2, and Article 57,
    Paragraph 3 of the Electoral Code): Articles 40 and 41 of the draft
    amendments also provide for stamping both the ballot and the ballot
    envelope. Obviously, this double stamping procedure aims at ensuring
    the integrity of the electoral documents and the voting process.

    However, the way in which the procedure will be conducted is unusually
    complex and could be problematic with regard to the secrecy of the
    vote. According to the amendments, the voter is first given the ballot
    paper by the commission member responsible; then he or she proceeds
    to another commission member who stamps the ballot paper and returns
    it to the voter together with a ballot envelope; the voter proceeds to
    the voting booth, where he or she marks the ballot and puts it into the
    ballot envelope; finally, the envelope is stamped by another commission
    member, before the voter is allowed to drop the ballot envelope into
    the ballot box. Two objections can be raised against such a procedure:
    first, according to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters,
    the stamping of ballot papers should not take place at the point at
    which the ballot is presented to the voter because, theoretically,
    the stamp or the signature might mark the ballot in such a way that
    the voter could be identified during the count. The second objection
    is even more important: after the voter has received the ballot,
    as a rule, no one else should touch the ballot from that point on
    (see also CDL-AD(2002)023rev, Paragraphs 34-35). Both principles,
    which aim at ensuring the secrecy of the vote, are not fully respected
    by the draft amendments.

    49. Secrecy of vote (Article 56, Paragraph 4 of the Electoral Code):
    According to Article 40 of the draft amendments, citizens who are
    unable to mark the ballots on their own, shall have the right to invite
    two members of the Precinct Electoral Commission or two proxies into
    the voting booth with them. Up to now such a voter has the right to
    invite "another person (but never a proxy) into the voting booth". At
    a first glance, it seems to be an improvement that not only one, but
    two persons, who may observe each other, will be allowed to accompany
    the voter. However, on closer inspection, the amendment makes it more
    difficult for the respective voter to be accompanied by a person of
    his/her confidence and to ensure the secrecy of his/her vote. It also
    creates the situation where political pressure may be exerted on the
    voter in the voting booth.

    Permitting a proxy (that is party observer) to enter the voting booth
    is unacceptable. Furthermore, the article should describe the process
    for voters who are not able to mark the ballots due to blindness or a
    condition that requires that information on the ballot be communicated
    to the voter.

    50. Extraordinary presidential elections during military and emergency
    situations. Article 72 of the draft amendments introduces a paragraph
    to Article 91 of the Code which prohibits extraordinary presidential
    elections during military and emergency situations.

    Extraordinary presidential elections shall take place on the 40th
    day after the end of the military or emergency situation. While
    it can be regarded as appropriate not to conduct elections in the
    context of military and emergency situations, there is the danger
    that such situations might be provoked or abused in order to prevent
    the realisation of extraordinary elections by constitutional means.

    51. Payment of election deposits (Article 128, Paragraph 1 of the
    Electoral Code): Article 93 of the draft amendments removes the text
    "The community leader or council member candidates shall have the right
    to use the resources in the pre-election fund to pay their electoral
    deposits". This amendment will only make it more difficult for some
    citizens to seek candidacy and should be reconsidered.

    52. Liquidation of political parties (Article 31, Part 2 of the Law
    on Political Parties; Article 2 of the draft amendments) increases
    the percentage of votes a political party must receive in order to
    avoid liquidation. As recognised by the Constitution and the Law on
    Political Parties, a political party can have a role in a democratic
    society even when not participating in elections. Liquidation of a
    political party should not be based on its performance in the last
    two national elections. This concern also applies to Article 31, Part
    21 of the Law on Political Parties (Article 3 of the draft amendments).

    V. Non-addressed recommendations

    53. Various points and recommendations expressed in the previous Joint
    Opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR (CDL-AD(2005)027)
    remain fully valid in so far as they are not addressed by the
    amendments.

    54. Of particular concern are the provisions for filing election
    complaints and appeals, which fail to create a sound legal framework
    for the adjudication of election disputes and protection of suffrage
    rights (see CDL-AD(2005)027, Paragraphs 4 and 27-35). The respective
    Articles 40, 401 and 402 of the Election Code have not been modified by
    the proposed draft amendments. However, it is of paramount importance
    that appeal procedures should be clear, transparent, and easily
    understandable. Especially with dual complaint and appeal procedures,
    which involve electoral commissions and ordinary courts, the electoral
    law should clearly regulate the respective powers and responsibilities
    of commissions and courts. Thus, the provisions regarding election
    complaints and appeals should be carefully re-considered, taking into
    account the suggestions of the previous Joint opinion.

    55. The amendments still do not include previous recommendations that
    provisions be made for those voters to vote who are unable to attend
    their polling station. The lack of absentee voting procedures may
    de facto disenfranchise a substantial part of the voters who are not
    able to vote in their respective polling station on the election day.

    In the case of Armenia, paradoxically, citizens abroad are able
    to vote for national elections but not citizens within the country
    who are unable to go to their polling station. Such special voting
    procedures were omitted from electoral legislation when the original
    Election Code was adopted in 1999 in an attempt to reduce fraud.

    However, the argument of "unpreventable" fraud is not sufficient
    to justify the denial of the voting rights of these citizens. The
    suffrage is such a fundamental right that all possible measures should
    be taken to uphold it (see CDL-AD(2005)027, Paragraph 19). Of course,
    it must be clear that with absentee voting strict conditions should
    be imposed to prevent fraud. Alternatively, additional registration
    could be introduced on the basis of current or temporary address with
    voters having the choice to register this address.

    However, the voter register should remain based on the permanent
    registered address.

    56. In addition to using accurate voters' lists and carefully checking
    voters' identities, an effective method to diminish the risk of
    "multiple voting" is to mark the voter's finger with indelible
    (visible or invisible) ink to indicate that he or she has voted. The
    inking of voters' fingers is used in several countries and recommended
    for emerging and new democracies. Despite the fact that inking was
    repeatedly recommended by Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR experts
    and was included in previous draft amendments to the Election Code,
    both the existing Code and the proposed draft amendments do not provide
    for this procedure in Armenia. It is strongly recommended to introduce
    such an inking procedure (see also CDL-AD(2005)027, Paragraph 25).

    57. The proposed amendments do not address the concern voiced in
    the previous joint opinion (CDL-AD(2005)027, Paragraph 12) on who
    has the authority to appoint members of the CEC should a coalition or
    party alliance break apart. Subsequently, factions (i.e. parliamentary
    groups) may carry through this function however based on the Electoral
    Code it is not clear whether a "respective faction" can be identified
    as a party alliance. Good faith implementation of the provisions on
    formation of electoral commissions remains crucial.

    58. The previous Joint Opinion (CDL-AD(2005)027, Paragraph 11)
    expressed concern relating to the appointment powers of the
    President of Armenia over vacancies on the CEC and TECs in emergency
    situations. The proposed amendments do not introduce improvements to
    these limitations.

    59. The election of the Chairperson of the CEC presents some
    asymmetries: if there are one or more than two candidates, the
    chairperson is elected by absolute majority (50% of the votes plus
    one). If there are two candidates, then the one that receives more
    votes (a plurality) is elected. For the sake of consistency, the
    same requirement should be introduced in the case of two candidates
    (this implies a reform of Article 35.9).

    VI. Concluding Remarks

    60. The proposed amendments to the Electoral Code of Armenia contain
    a number of improvements in the legal framework for elections.

    Besides many minor clarifying provisions, positive draft amendments
    refer, for example, to voting rights for non-citizens in local
    elections, the characterisation of the secrecy of the vote as both a
    right and an obligation, stricter signature requirements for electoral
    documents, smaller sizes of electoral precincts, the improved status
    of proxies and the remuneration of election commission members.

    61. Some, in principle positive draft amendments may need further
    clarification or must be proved in practice. There are still some
    unanswered questions with regard to, for example, voter registration,
    the presidential role in approving the composition of the Central
    Election Commission, the complexity of vote counting, some modified
    deadlines, as well as the prosecution of electoral violations.

    62. Furthermore there are some draft amendments which might have
    ambivalent or negative effects and should be re-considered. Further
    discussion might be necessary with regard to, for example,
    politicisation of the training process for election commission
    members, the right to recall election commission members, the issue
    of video-recording voting day procedures inside the polling stations,
    the responsibilities for approving the ballot specimen, the multiple
    voter identity check, the procedure of stamping ballots and ballot
    envelopes, and the assistance to voters who are unable to mark the
    ballots on their own.

    63. Most important, however, is the fact that some important
    recommendations in previous opinions have not been addressed by the
    authorities. Of particular concern are the unsatisfactory provisions
    for filing election complaints and appeals. Additional recommendations
    that remain to be addressed include shortcomings related to the lack
    of absentee voting procedures inside the country, the issue of inking,
    as well as the ballot option to vote "against all".

    64. However, it must also be noted that a major shortcoming in the
    conduct of the elections in Armenia has been in the implementation of
    the electoral legislation. Good faith implementation of the electoral
    legislation remains crucial for the conduct of genuinely democratic
    elections.
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