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PROSPECTS OF AZERBAIJAN'S MILITARY DOCTRINE: PROBLEMS AND GOALS: INTERVIEW WITH RAUF RAJABOV
Regnum, Russia
June 15 2006
Rauf Rajabov - military expert, director of the Peace, Democracy and
Culture Research Analytical Center (Baku)
REGNUM: For many years already people in Azerbaijan have been talking
about early adoption of a military doctrine. Some local media even
said this would happen during the spring parliamentary session, but
"the cart is still there." Obviously, they are also having problems
with the declared formation of the Defense-Industrial Complex...
Now we have specific deadlines: the military advisor of the Azeri
president, Gen. Vahid Aliyev has said that by the end of 2006 Milli
Mejlis will adopt the long-awaited Military Doctrine. One must not
dawdle with military doctrine for years. For example, Azerbaijan's
strategic partner Georgia was very quick in adopting a military
doctrine - a document mentioning both possible enemy (it almost names
it - "northern country") and strategic partners as well as clearly
defining goals - integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Of course,
we need a different military doctrine but we can't but envy Georgia's
quickness.
One of the priorities of the Azeri president's policy is to form
defense industry. For example, why buy arms and equipment abroad if
one can arrange their licensed production at home? It is also time
to decide what defense-industrial sphere will be given what priority
depending on the long-term needs of the army and the mobilization needs
of the state. The formation of Defense-Industrial Complex will allow
local defense companies to transit from just surviving to developing,
and the key prerequisite for this is the substantial increasse in
military expenses due to high oil prices.
Quite recently the Ukrainian president decreed to increase
the country's military expenses to $650 mln. Certainly, the
formation of DIC will be good for the country's defense capacity
and military security. Besides, as military challenges and the
general geo-political situation in the "Big Caucasus" are getting
increasingly specific, Azerbaijan is beginning to feel growing need
for tougher requirements to the economic security parameters of its
defense sector and for certain changes in its military-technical
cooperation policies. However, in order to attain qualitative results
in the military, the country needs a long-term program of reforms.
REGNUM: What is the idea of the military reform the country has been
planning for already a decade?
The idea is that it should embrace the whole defense system with
the army reforms being just a part of it. The strategic plan of
Azerbaijan's military reforms might have the following priorities: to
urgently adopt a military doctrine - as even a lieutenant knows that
military doctrine is a military constitution; to provide fundamental
knowledge at military higher schools; to form a mobile regular
organizational structure; to improve army technique and logistics;
to recruit and train personnel; to democratize the military life;
to ensure the social and legal security of military men and their
families; to adapt military reforms to market economy conditions;
to build the army with due regard for existing and possible military
threats.
The military reform should consider the economic situation in the
country, the acting legislation, the military budget, the forming
military-industrial complex and the army strength. The strength and
structure of the Azeri army should conform to the country's political,
economic and other capabilities and, most importantly, with its foreign
political priorities. The strategic objective of the military reform is
to bring the Azeri army into conformity with the new Azeri statehood,
political system and economy, with the content and the nature of the
wars of XXI, with real and potential challenges to the national and
regional interests and security of Azerbaijan.
The concept of military reform should have the status of state program
or, even, of law.
REGNUM: I suppose, like in the case of other bills, the military reform
concept will be unofficially presented by the concerned department,
i.e. the defense ministry?
By no means. We must not allow the defense ministry to draft the
concept "the way it likes." We won't be able to speak about any
military reform until we decide our key problems: approve the concept
of national security, specify key external and internal treats,
create optimal system of army financing and re-equipment, draft
new conscription law, overhaul the ruined system of reserve officer
retraining and mobilization infrastructure, restore the system of
sport-patriotic education of the youth.
Unless we resolve the above problems, all our good intentions
to drastically reform the army will remain just good intentions,
which, as you know, are a road to hell. We must stop demagogy about
contract army. In the US this process took over 15 years and was fed
by constantly growing military budget. Before launching military
reforms we must, first and foremost, decide what functions the
Defense Ministry and the General Staff should have, in what kind of
subordination they should be to the president-the commander-in-chief,
what specific forms of control the society and the parliament should
exercise over the army. The military reform concept should fully
comply with all acting laws and the military doctrine of Azerbaijan.
Neither reforms nor other political, social or economic reasons can or
must prevent the country from fulfilling its duty to protect its own
sovereignty and to keep high the fighting readiness of its soldiers
and officers. The army has had and continues to have problems, but
they are though slowly but being resolved due mostly to the officers
for whom the concept "there is a profession to protect Homeland"
has not lost its genuine meaning.
REGNUM: The re-equipment of the Azeri army is a problem that can be
easily solved if there is necessary money, but this medal has the
other side. As the well-known author of Marxism-Leninism would say:
personnel decide everything. Have they replaced the dismissed old
commanders with people who can form really up-to-date units?
Some soldiers show much lower moral than military-technical
development. The actions of some officers require moral
consciousness, relations and practice as they are part of military
policy. Indifference and passiveness lead to inertness and degradation,
while low morality to deterioration of the military art.
Rudeness and low professionalism are a big threat for the army -
during war this results in big losses, during peace the incompetence,
subservience and careerism of such soldiers cripple the fighting
capacity of the army and damage its prestige. Many such officers go up
very quickly and the higher ranks they get the more damage they cause
to the army. Their injustice stains military prestige and spoils the
health of their soldiers. The military policy cannot be effective if
the rights of soldiers are violated. In order to make the military
policy moral, the government, the parliament and the society should
approach, analyze and control policies of the defense ministry from
the viewpoint of morality.
Azerbaijan needs a fair mechanism of commander selection so as to
have intellectual, professional and morally and psychologically
prepared officers. One of the key criteria of selection, especially
into headquarters, should be their fighting experience. As a rule,
any defense reform should start from revision of officer recruitment,
training and distribution tasks. These tasks cannot be solved without
developing military and professional skills of young officers, but,
at the same time, we should not "lose" experienced officers. We
should improve the service conditions and order, prevent the untimely
dismissal of experienced officers. Unfortunately, there are still very
many examples: Generals Talyb Mamedov and Yashar Aydamirov. It will
take us many years ahead to examine the lessons of the Karabakh war,
with all its achievements and failures. The fighting experience of
many our officers should be fully used in our army and for our army,
in the system of military and civil education, in military governance
and personnel training.
Regnum, Russia
June 15 2006
Rauf Rajabov - military expert, director of the Peace, Democracy and
Culture Research Analytical Center (Baku)
REGNUM: For many years already people in Azerbaijan have been talking
about early adoption of a military doctrine. Some local media even
said this would happen during the spring parliamentary session, but
"the cart is still there." Obviously, they are also having problems
with the declared formation of the Defense-Industrial Complex...
Now we have specific deadlines: the military advisor of the Azeri
president, Gen. Vahid Aliyev has said that by the end of 2006 Milli
Mejlis will adopt the long-awaited Military Doctrine. One must not
dawdle with military doctrine for years. For example, Azerbaijan's
strategic partner Georgia was very quick in adopting a military
doctrine - a document mentioning both possible enemy (it almost names
it - "northern country") and strategic partners as well as clearly
defining goals - integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Of course,
we need a different military doctrine but we can't but envy Georgia's
quickness.
One of the priorities of the Azeri president's policy is to form
defense industry. For example, why buy arms and equipment abroad if
one can arrange their licensed production at home? It is also time
to decide what defense-industrial sphere will be given what priority
depending on the long-term needs of the army and the mobilization needs
of the state. The formation of Defense-Industrial Complex will allow
local defense companies to transit from just surviving to developing,
and the key prerequisite for this is the substantial increasse in
military expenses due to high oil prices.
Quite recently the Ukrainian president decreed to increase
the country's military expenses to $650 mln. Certainly, the
formation of DIC will be good for the country's defense capacity
and military security. Besides, as military challenges and the
general geo-political situation in the "Big Caucasus" are getting
increasingly specific, Azerbaijan is beginning to feel growing need
for tougher requirements to the economic security parameters of its
defense sector and for certain changes in its military-technical
cooperation policies. However, in order to attain qualitative results
in the military, the country needs a long-term program of reforms.
REGNUM: What is the idea of the military reform the country has been
planning for already a decade?
The idea is that it should embrace the whole defense system with
the army reforms being just a part of it. The strategic plan of
Azerbaijan's military reforms might have the following priorities: to
urgently adopt a military doctrine - as even a lieutenant knows that
military doctrine is a military constitution; to provide fundamental
knowledge at military higher schools; to form a mobile regular
organizational structure; to improve army technique and logistics;
to recruit and train personnel; to democratize the military life;
to ensure the social and legal security of military men and their
families; to adapt military reforms to market economy conditions;
to build the army with due regard for existing and possible military
threats.
The military reform should consider the economic situation in the
country, the acting legislation, the military budget, the forming
military-industrial complex and the army strength. The strength and
structure of the Azeri army should conform to the country's political,
economic and other capabilities and, most importantly, with its foreign
political priorities. The strategic objective of the military reform is
to bring the Azeri army into conformity with the new Azeri statehood,
political system and economy, with the content and the nature of the
wars of XXI, with real and potential challenges to the national and
regional interests and security of Azerbaijan.
The concept of military reform should have the status of state program
or, even, of law.
REGNUM: I suppose, like in the case of other bills, the military reform
concept will be unofficially presented by the concerned department,
i.e. the defense ministry?
By no means. We must not allow the defense ministry to draft the
concept "the way it likes." We won't be able to speak about any
military reform until we decide our key problems: approve the concept
of national security, specify key external and internal treats,
create optimal system of army financing and re-equipment, draft
new conscription law, overhaul the ruined system of reserve officer
retraining and mobilization infrastructure, restore the system of
sport-patriotic education of the youth.
Unless we resolve the above problems, all our good intentions
to drastically reform the army will remain just good intentions,
which, as you know, are a road to hell. We must stop demagogy about
contract army. In the US this process took over 15 years and was fed
by constantly growing military budget. Before launching military
reforms we must, first and foremost, decide what functions the
Defense Ministry and the General Staff should have, in what kind of
subordination they should be to the president-the commander-in-chief,
what specific forms of control the society and the parliament should
exercise over the army. The military reform concept should fully
comply with all acting laws and the military doctrine of Azerbaijan.
Neither reforms nor other political, social or economic reasons can or
must prevent the country from fulfilling its duty to protect its own
sovereignty and to keep high the fighting readiness of its soldiers
and officers. The army has had and continues to have problems, but
they are though slowly but being resolved due mostly to the officers
for whom the concept "there is a profession to protect Homeland"
has not lost its genuine meaning.
REGNUM: The re-equipment of the Azeri army is a problem that can be
easily solved if there is necessary money, but this medal has the
other side. As the well-known author of Marxism-Leninism would say:
personnel decide everything. Have they replaced the dismissed old
commanders with people who can form really up-to-date units?
Some soldiers show much lower moral than military-technical
development. The actions of some officers require moral
consciousness, relations and practice as they are part of military
policy. Indifference and passiveness lead to inertness and degradation,
while low morality to deterioration of the military art.
Rudeness and low professionalism are a big threat for the army -
during war this results in big losses, during peace the incompetence,
subservience and careerism of such soldiers cripple the fighting
capacity of the army and damage its prestige. Many such officers go up
very quickly and the higher ranks they get the more damage they cause
to the army. Their injustice stains military prestige and spoils the
health of their soldiers. The military policy cannot be effective if
the rights of soldiers are violated. In order to make the military
policy moral, the government, the parliament and the society should
approach, analyze and control policies of the defense ministry from
the viewpoint of morality.
Azerbaijan needs a fair mechanism of commander selection so as to
have intellectual, professional and morally and psychologically
prepared officers. One of the key criteria of selection, especially
into headquarters, should be their fighting experience. As a rule,
any defense reform should start from revision of officer recruitment,
training and distribution tasks. These tasks cannot be solved without
developing military and professional skills of young officers, but,
at the same time, we should not "lose" experienced officers. We
should improve the service conditions and order, prevent the untimely
dismissal of experienced officers. Unfortunately, there are still very
many examples: Generals Talyb Mamedov and Yashar Aydamirov. It will
take us many years ahead to examine the lessons of the Karabakh war,
with all its achievements and failures. The fighting experience of
many our officers should be fully used in our army and for our army,
in the system of military and civil education, in military governance
and personnel training.