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THREE MYTHS UNDERMINED BY TWO REVOLUTIONS
By Celia CHAUFFOUR in Warsaw
Translated by Simone KOSHIMIZU (Proofread by Lili DI PUPPO)
Caucaz, Georgia
June 21 2006
Georgian "Rose Revolution" in 2003 and Ukrainian "Orange Revolution"
in 2004 have undermined some of the preconceptions or even myths on
the region. Interview with Dov Lynch, researcher at the Institute
for Security Studies (ISS-EU) and specialist on Russia-EU relations
and on security issues in Russia and in the ex-USSR.
What were these preconceptions about?
I will mention three of them. The first one was based on Georgia
itself. In 2002-2003, it was said that the country was a hopeless
case. At that time, reports from the American State Department,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission
(September 2003) concluded that Georgia was a country in failure,
less and less capable of following one public direction. The country
had been so much corrupted and torn within, that the notion of public
estate barely existed. Not to mention that the country did not control
either its territory or its frontiers. It was and it is still known
that if there is illicit traffic, it is not restricted to Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
It was hence observed that the country was dysfunctional.
Organisations and international authorities concluded that they needed
to react. And reaction came through financial aids for the country,
but which were largely stolen away.
The second one was based on the region. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia
and more generally, South Caucasus had fallen into a post soviet
stagnation apparently characterised by a deep social apathy, by
intense poverty at economic level and by deindustrialisation. In the
beginning of the year 2000, none of these countries had reached their
GDP of 1992. Politically, they were marked by an endemic corruption.
There was hence an impression of a post soviet order that had been
established, but which nobody wished for.
In the 1990's, economic and democratic transition was the paradigm used
to interpret this region. And yet, in the beginning of the year 2000,
it was observed that these countries had not taken the good direction
as Poland and Hungary had. Some very pessimistic analysis even stated
that there was no transition anymore, that these countries had reached
the end of the road and somewhere dark in Europe.
Did not anybody notice the wind of change in Georgia where a popular
democratic feeling had been deeply established?
What actually made a difference in Ukraine and Georgia was the fact
that there was a real civil society that had been developed and that
represented a diversity of opinion.
You have mentioned three preconceptions. You talked about the two
first, what about the third one?
It was a European perspective, where South Caucasus, a politically
and geographically distant region that, nonetheless, carries vital
and strategic interests in the European Union was treated with
disdain. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were not seen as direct
neighbours or as part of Europe yet. Also, the fact that South Caucasus
had not been part of the European Commission's first communication
on neighbouring (Wider Europe) is not surprising.
After 2003-2004, didn't these changes in perception concern more the
region of the Black Sea than South Caucasus?
For the moment, Armenia and Azerbaijan go their own way. There were
great expectations on the resolution of the High Karabakh conflict
this year. It has been confirmed that it will not happen - which is
a serious disillusionment.
For Georgia and the region of the Black Sea, the order has considerably
changed. First of all, it reassured us of what we used to think in the
1990's that the region was able to embark on an economic and democratic
transition. In 2003, Georgia reminded us that democracy can exist in
these countries and that it can be founded by the people. Today it
can be affirmed that even if problems are excessive -and inevitable
at the same time- Georgia has come back in the good direction.
The "Rose Revolution" has also reminded that Georgia was a European
country. Followed by the Ukrainian revolution, the Georgian revolution
proved that the united and free Europe who signed the "Final Act"
in Helsinki in 1975 was not a reality yet. After the enlargement of
Europe in 2004, it was thought that this bet had been won. Admittedly,
there were still the Balkans, but perspectives of membership were
open. And yet, the Georgian revolution and then the Ukrainian one
reminded us that there are other European countries and that the
frontiers of a united and free Europe are not complete yet.
So why keeping quiet about the consensus on Azerbaijan and its
political situation?
I think that European countries have very little time to think about
South Caucasus. And when they do, they think, first of all, about the
"opportunities". They start knocking doors that are already open.
Compared to other strategic dossiers such as the Balkans or Iran,
South Caucasus has minor importance in the ordinary everyday life of
decision makers of European foreign affairs.
Emphasis has lately been given to Azerbaijan and Armenia on the
High-Karabakh conflict. It was a door to be open so that others such
as those of human rights, party development or even stabilisation of
a national speech could also be open.
At the same time, as far as Europe is concerned, Armenia is a
horse that runs really fast. Yerevan is a good pupil concerning the
European Union's new neighbourhood policies. Compared to Georgians,
Armenians respond more easily to the demands established by the
European Commission. They are better pupils in terms of negotiation and
determination to adopt a Plan of Action. It is a dossier to be followed
closely. Possibly in two years, Armenia will take over Georgia in this
field. But it is also a matter of geopolitical option. Georgians are
obsessed by the NATO. Armenians are not.
By Celia CHAUFFOUR in Warsaw
Translated by Simone KOSHIMIZU (Proofread by Lili DI PUPPO)
Caucaz, Georgia
June 21 2006
Georgian "Rose Revolution" in 2003 and Ukrainian "Orange Revolution"
in 2004 have undermined some of the preconceptions or even myths on
the region. Interview with Dov Lynch, researcher at the Institute
for Security Studies (ISS-EU) and specialist on Russia-EU relations
and on security issues in Russia and in the ex-USSR.
What were these preconceptions about?
I will mention three of them. The first one was based on Georgia
itself. In 2002-2003, it was said that the country was a hopeless
case. At that time, reports from the American State Department,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission
(September 2003) concluded that Georgia was a country in failure,
less and less capable of following one public direction. The country
had been so much corrupted and torn within, that the notion of public
estate barely existed. Not to mention that the country did not control
either its territory or its frontiers. It was and it is still known
that if there is illicit traffic, it is not restricted to Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
It was hence observed that the country was dysfunctional.
Organisations and international authorities concluded that they needed
to react. And reaction came through financial aids for the country,
but which were largely stolen away.
The second one was based on the region. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia
and more generally, South Caucasus had fallen into a post soviet
stagnation apparently characterised by a deep social apathy, by
intense poverty at economic level and by deindustrialisation. In the
beginning of the year 2000, none of these countries had reached their
GDP of 1992. Politically, they were marked by an endemic corruption.
There was hence an impression of a post soviet order that had been
established, but which nobody wished for.
In the 1990's, economic and democratic transition was the paradigm used
to interpret this region. And yet, in the beginning of the year 2000,
it was observed that these countries had not taken the good direction
as Poland and Hungary had. Some very pessimistic analysis even stated
that there was no transition anymore, that these countries had reached
the end of the road and somewhere dark in Europe.
Did not anybody notice the wind of change in Georgia where a popular
democratic feeling had been deeply established?
What actually made a difference in Ukraine and Georgia was the fact
that there was a real civil society that had been developed and that
represented a diversity of opinion.
You have mentioned three preconceptions. You talked about the two
first, what about the third one?
It was a European perspective, where South Caucasus, a politically
and geographically distant region that, nonetheless, carries vital
and strategic interests in the European Union was treated with
disdain. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were not seen as direct
neighbours or as part of Europe yet. Also, the fact that South Caucasus
had not been part of the European Commission's first communication
on neighbouring (Wider Europe) is not surprising.
After 2003-2004, didn't these changes in perception concern more the
region of the Black Sea than South Caucasus?
For the moment, Armenia and Azerbaijan go their own way. There were
great expectations on the resolution of the High Karabakh conflict
this year. It has been confirmed that it will not happen - which is
a serious disillusionment.
For Georgia and the region of the Black Sea, the order has considerably
changed. First of all, it reassured us of what we used to think in the
1990's that the region was able to embark on an economic and democratic
transition. In 2003, Georgia reminded us that democracy can exist in
these countries and that it can be founded by the people. Today it
can be affirmed that even if problems are excessive -and inevitable
at the same time- Georgia has come back in the good direction.
The "Rose Revolution" has also reminded that Georgia was a European
country. Followed by the Ukrainian revolution, the Georgian revolution
proved that the united and free Europe who signed the "Final Act"
in Helsinki in 1975 was not a reality yet. After the enlargement of
Europe in 2004, it was thought that this bet had been won. Admittedly,
there were still the Balkans, but perspectives of membership were
open. And yet, the Georgian revolution and then the Ukrainian one
reminded us that there are other European countries and that the
frontiers of a united and free Europe are not complete yet.
So why keeping quiet about the consensus on Azerbaijan and its
political situation?
I think that European countries have very little time to think about
South Caucasus. And when they do, they think, first of all, about the
"opportunities". They start knocking doors that are already open.
Compared to other strategic dossiers such as the Balkans or Iran,
South Caucasus has minor importance in the ordinary everyday life of
decision makers of European foreign affairs.
Emphasis has lately been given to Azerbaijan and Armenia on the
High-Karabakh conflict. It was a door to be open so that others such
as those of human rights, party development or even stabilisation of
a national speech could also be open.
At the same time, as far as Europe is concerned, Armenia is a
horse that runs really fast. Yerevan is a good pupil concerning the
European Union's new neighbourhood policies. Compared to Georgians,
Armenians respond more easily to the demands established by the
European Commission. They are better pupils in terms of negotiation and
determination to adopt a Plan of Action. It is a dossier to be followed
closely. Possibly in two years, Armenia will take over Georgia in this
field. But it is also a matter of geopolitical option. Georgians are
obsessed by the NATO. Armenians are not.