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EUROPEAN PEACEKEEPERS: THE CAUCASUS UNDER ME?
by Sergei Markedonov, Political and Military Analysis Institute
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Izvestia, June 21, 2006, p. 6
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
June 21, 2006 Wednesday
What does the European Union really want in the Caucasus?; The
Europeans are saying that Russia should not only abandon its exclusive
political role in the South Caucasus, but also open up the gates to
European peacekeeping in the North Caucasus. For Russia, such an
approach would be tantamount to admitting its own incompetence as
a state.
Europe has come to the Caucasus. "The Caucasus and Central Asia region
will be among the most important issue for Germany's forthcoming
period of chairing the European Union. The Caucasus is being called a
'special region' which has been overlooked by Europe for some time,"
says Roland Goetz, head of the Russia and CIS group at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (an influential
think-tank consulted by the German government).
What kind of significance do the Europeans attach to the Caucasus
region? Its unique natural and geographic significance isn't the only
reason for their interest. "The Caucasus, with its fairly limited
natural resources, is not a key region," says Roland Goetz. The
Americans regard the Caucasus as important primarily as a bridge for
their sweeping geopolitical combinations (Iran, the Middle East).
Europe, which is building a "good neighbor" policy, regards the
Caucasus as a political patient suffering an illness known as "ethnic
conflicts." For European politicians, the priority in the Caucasus
is to overcome ethnic conflicts and disseminate the "European" system
of values.
But the Europeanization of the Caucasus goes back before 2006. The
"special region" has been a focus of attention for European politicians
since the early 1990s. In contrast to the United States, the European
Union's approach to Caucasus policy emphasizes socio-economic issues,
not military-political issues. The EU's second priority direction is
promoting stability in the region, as well as striving to ensure that
"European standards" in human rights and democratic liberties are
respected and observed. The common policy plan on South Caucasus
states, adopted by the EU Council in 1995, emphasizes the need
for assisting the former Soviet republics in the Trans-Caucasus
to establish democratic institutions. However, while the EU claims
to uphold universal democratic values, it frequently fails to take
account of ethnic and cultural differences and traditions in Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
Russia plays a special role in the "great game" of the Caucasus
region. Firstly, part of Russia's own territory is in the Caucasus.
Secondly, Russia is extremely active in the South Caucasus, and its
role in regulating the "frozen conflicts" can hardly be disregarded.
It seems that European experts are now prepared to see the Caucasus as
an integrated region, not isolating the problems of the "independent"
South Caucasus from those of the Russian North Caucasus. But this
approach, which is shared by most Russian politicians and analysts,
is interpreted differently in Europe. The Europeans are saying that
Russia should not only abandon its exclusive political role in the
South Caucasus, but also open up the gates to European peacekeeping
in the North Caucasus.
For Russia, such an approach would be tantamount to admitting its own
incompetence as a state and in government. It isn't clear exactly
what kind of solutions the countries of Europe are proposing to
Russia. Negotiations with the separatists? In the wake of the Beslan
school hostage siege and the death of Aslan Maskhadov, the "Ichkerian
movement" itself has experienced a severe crisis, becoming fragmented
and essentially giving up calls for secession from Russia. Even when
"Ichkerian President" Maskhadov was still alive, negotiating with him
was no more than a sweetly utopian European idea, since the reality
of Chechnya is such that no separatist leader had his authority
recognized by all the others. These days, the European view of the
Caucasus is a combination of obsolete impressions from the mid-1990s
(that is, the period of active military confrontation between the
federal government and the separatists).
All the same, Europeanization of the Caucasus region is a political
reality that we must learn to live with. We need to be able to defend
our vital national interests in language that is comprehensible in
terms of European political and legal thinking. We need to initiate
not only conservation, but also progressive development of the South
Caucasus countries, recognizing that stability in itself, without
progress, is impossible. Russia is the country that can teach the
Europeans to combine the schemes and formulas of legal theory with
Realpolitik in a rational way. Without that, long-lasting pacification
of the Caucasus is impossible.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Sergei Markedonov, Political and Military Analysis Institute
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Izvestia, June 21, 2006, p. 6
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
June 21, 2006 Wednesday
What does the European Union really want in the Caucasus?; The
Europeans are saying that Russia should not only abandon its exclusive
political role in the South Caucasus, but also open up the gates to
European peacekeeping in the North Caucasus. For Russia, such an
approach would be tantamount to admitting its own incompetence as
a state.
Europe has come to the Caucasus. "The Caucasus and Central Asia region
will be among the most important issue for Germany's forthcoming
period of chairing the European Union. The Caucasus is being called a
'special region' which has been overlooked by Europe for some time,"
says Roland Goetz, head of the Russia and CIS group at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (an influential
think-tank consulted by the German government).
What kind of significance do the Europeans attach to the Caucasus
region? Its unique natural and geographic significance isn't the only
reason for their interest. "The Caucasus, with its fairly limited
natural resources, is not a key region," says Roland Goetz. The
Americans regard the Caucasus as important primarily as a bridge for
their sweeping geopolitical combinations (Iran, the Middle East).
Europe, which is building a "good neighbor" policy, regards the
Caucasus as a political patient suffering an illness known as "ethnic
conflicts." For European politicians, the priority in the Caucasus
is to overcome ethnic conflicts and disseminate the "European" system
of values.
But the Europeanization of the Caucasus goes back before 2006. The
"special region" has been a focus of attention for European politicians
since the early 1990s. In contrast to the United States, the European
Union's approach to Caucasus policy emphasizes socio-economic issues,
not military-political issues. The EU's second priority direction is
promoting stability in the region, as well as striving to ensure that
"European standards" in human rights and democratic liberties are
respected and observed. The common policy plan on South Caucasus
states, adopted by the EU Council in 1995, emphasizes the need
for assisting the former Soviet republics in the Trans-Caucasus
to establish democratic institutions. However, while the EU claims
to uphold universal democratic values, it frequently fails to take
account of ethnic and cultural differences and traditions in Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
Russia plays a special role in the "great game" of the Caucasus
region. Firstly, part of Russia's own territory is in the Caucasus.
Secondly, Russia is extremely active in the South Caucasus, and its
role in regulating the "frozen conflicts" can hardly be disregarded.
It seems that European experts are now prepared to see the Caucasus as
an integrated region, not isolating the problems of the "independent"
South Caucasus from those of the Russian North Caucasus. But this
approach, which is shared by most Russian politicians and analysts,
is interpreted differently in Europe. The Europeans are saying that
Russia should not only abandon its exclusive political role in the
South Caucasus, but also open up the gates to European peacekeeping
in the North Caucasus.
For Russia, such an approach would be tantamount to admitting its own
incompetence as a state and in government. It isn't clear exactly
what kind of solutions the countries of Europe are proposing to
Russia. Negotiations with the separatists? In the wake of the Beslan
school hostage siege and the death of Aslan Maskhadov, the "Ichkerian
movement" itself has experienced a severe crisis, becoming fragmented
and essentially giving up calls for secession from Russia. Even when
"Ichkerian President" Maskhadov was still alive, negotiating with him
was no more than a sweetly utopian European idea, since the reality
of Chechnya is such that no separatist leader had his authority
recognized by all the others. These days, the European view of the
Caucasus is a combination of obsolete impressions from the mid-1990s
(that is, the period of active military confrontation between the
federal government and the separatists).
All the same, Europeanization of the Caucasus region is a political
reality that we must learn to live with. We need to be able to defend
our vital national interests in language that is comprehensible in
terms of European political and legal thinking. We need to initiate
not only conservation, but also progressive development of the South
Caucasus countries, recognizing that stability in itself, without
progress, is impossible. Russia is the country that can teach the
Europeans to combine the schemes and formulas of legal theory with
Realpolitik in a rational way. Without that, long-lasting pacification
of the Caucasus is impossible.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress