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OSKANIAN COMMENTS ON THE OSCE MINSK GROUP STATEMENT
A1+
[09:01 pm] 29 June, 2006
The co-chairs in their statement say that "our approach has been a
modified one: we have not tried to solve all aspects of the conflict
in one phase.
Instead our principles seek to achieve a major degree of progress but
defer some very difficult issues to the future and envision further
negotiations." What does this mean?
The actual negotiating document on the principles that is on the table
today is all-encompassing. It covers all the principles affecting the
resolution of the conflict. It includes the core issue of status of
Nagorno Karabakh, territories, refugees, security issues, peacekeeping
and every other conceivable issue that is necessary in order to arrive
at a lasting resolution of the conflict.
Only after full agreement on all these basic principles would the
parties, as the actual negotiating text says, "in cooperation with the
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group to begin work on the elaboration of
an agreement on the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict." In
other words, the agreement on principles will be comprehensive. The
final agreement may envision implementation over time.
In their report, the co-chairs say "the principles include the phased
redeployment of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territories around
Nagorno Karabakh, with special modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin
districts." What are these special modalities?
This formulation is indeed very broad, and for a reason. This issue has
two layers. One is the issue of Lachin, where the actual negotiating
text on principles provides clear language stating that there will be
"a corridor linking Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia." For Armenia, it's
very clear that this corridor must have the same status as Nagorno
Karabakh. The second layer is the issue of Kelbajar.
For Armenia, this also is clear: based on security concerns,
Kelbajar can be returned only after the referendum is conducted
and the final status of NK is determined. Azerbaijan's position is
different on Kelbajar. That's the disagreement that the co-chairs
are addressing in their statement. The co-chairs' language in the
actual negotiating text, with regard to this issue, is generally in
line with our approach.
The co-chairs say that there will be a referendum / popular vote
"to determine the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh," but they
don't say who will vote.
The actual negotiating text on principles clearly specifies that
"the final legal status will be determined through a referendum /
population vote by the population of Nagorno Karabakh."
The co-chairs also say "certain interim arrangements for Nagorno
Karabakh would allow for interaction with providers of international
assistance." What does this mean?
This is only one element of a much more detailed section in the
actual negotiating text which addresses interim status for Nagorno
Karabakh. We think the co-chairs have emphasized international
engagement, because that's a major problem for the people of
Nagorno Karabakh. Their current, unrecognized, de-facto status,
has not allowed them to benefit from the generosity of international
organizations. In the actual negotiating text, the provisions address
such rights as control over their political and economic viability
and security, upholding their personal privileges and freedoms, the
right to democratically elect officials to govern Nagorno Karabakh,
the authority to effectively legislate and administer the internal
affairs of Nagorno Karabakh.
What is Armenia's overall assessment of the content of the document
as it stands today?
This not a perfect document. For anyone. However, there are enough
solid and balanced provisions, with the right trade-offs on the main
issues - status, territories and security - that we are prepared to
continue to negotiate on the basis of these principles. In today's
context, Azerbaijan's rhetoric about autonomy and desperate calls
for militarization surprise us. We have at hand a real opportunity to
resolve all issues, including the much-maligned issue of refugees. But
Azerbaijan must revert to real situations and real opportunities,
rather than illusory maximalist hopes. Today, we hope that Azerbaijan
will realize that we have a chance to resolve the conflict and achieve
a lasting peace.
A1+
[09:01 pm] 29 June, 2006
The co-chairs in their statement say that "our approach has been a
modified one: we have not tried to solve all aspects of the conflict
in one phase.
Instead our principles seek to achieve a major degree of progress but
defer some very difficult issues to the future and envision further
negotiations." What does this mean?
The actual negotiating document on the principles that is on the table
today is all-encompassing. It covers all the principles affecting the
resolution of the conflict. It includes the core issue of status of
Nagorno Karabakh, territories, refugees, security issues, peacekeeping
and every other conceivable issue that is necessary in order to arrive
at a lasting resolution of the conflict.
Only after full agreement on all these basic principles would the
parties, as the actual negotiating text says, "in cooperation with the
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group to begin work on the elaboration of
an agreement on the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict." In
other words, the agreement on principles will be comprehensive. The
final agreement may envision implementation over time.
In their report, the co-chairs say "the principles include the phased
redeployment of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territories around
Nagorno Karabakh, with special modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin
districts." What are these special modalities?
This formulation is indeed very broad, and for a reason. This issue has
two layers. One is the issue of Lachin, where the actual negotiating
text on principles provides clear language stating that there will be
"a corridor linking Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia." For Armenia, it's
very clear that this corridor must have the same status as Nagorno
Karabakh. The second layer is the issue of Kelbajar.
For Armenia, this also is clear: based on security concerns,
Kelbajar can be returned only after the referendum is conducted
and the final status of NK is determined. Azerbaijan's position is
different on Kelbajar. That's the disagreement that the co-chairs
are addressing in their statement. The co-chairs' language in the
actual negotiating text, with regard to this issue, is generally in
line with our approach.
The co-chairs say that there will be a referendum / popular vote
"to determine the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh," but they
don't say who will vote.
The actual negotiating text on principles clearly specifies that
"the final legal status will be determined through a referendum /
population vote by the population of Nagorno Karabakh."
The co-chairs also say "certain interim arrangements for Nagorno
Karabakh would allow for interaction with providers of international
assistance." What does this mean?
This is only one element of a much more detailed section in the
actual negotiating text which addresses interim status for Nagorno
Karabakh. We think the co-chairs have emphasized international
engagement, because that's a major problem for the people of
Nagorno Karabakh. Their current, unrecognized, de-facto status,
has not allowed them to benefit from the generosity of international
organizations. In the actual negotiating text, the provisions address
such rights as control over their political and economic viability
and security, upholding their personal privileges and freedoms, the
right to democratically elect officials to govern Nagorno Karabakh,
the authority to effectively legislate and administer the internal
affairs of Nagorno Karabakh.
What is Armenia's overall assessment of the content of the document
as it stands today?
This not a perfect document. For anyone. However, there are enough
solid and balanced provisions, with the right trade-offs on the main
issues - status, territories and security - that we are prepared to
continue to negotiate on the basis of these principles. In today's
context, Azerbaijan's rhetoric about autonomy and desperate calls
for militarization surprise us. We have at hand a real opportunity to
resolve all issues, including the much-maligned issue of refugees. But
Azerbaijan must revert to real situations and real opportunities,
rather than illusory maximalist hopes. Today, we hope that Azerbaijan
will realize that we have a chance to resolve the conflict and achieve
a lasting peace.