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MAKING RUSSIA A BETTER NEIGHBOR
By Mark Brezezinski
The Boston Globe
March 08, 2006 Wednesday
Third Edition
LAST SUMMER, the Council of Europe issued a report urging Russia to
cease treating "neighboring and other countries in the region as zones
of special influence." The report urges Russia to "constructively
contribute to resolution of open issues and cease with activities
. . . which undermine the countries' sovereignty and territorial
integrity."
A key message from President Bush to President Vladimir Putin should
be that Russia's own integration into the world, a highly desirable
objective, is jeopardized if at the same time the Kremlin has a policy
of undercutting democratic development along its borders.
It's unlikely that there's a Kremlin master plan guiding Russia's
actions toward her neighbors. Instead, Russia's actions are driven
variably by ambition and nostalgia, confusion or misinterpretation,
irritation or resentment.
And Russia's policy toward the former Soviet republics varies it's
manifested in different ways and it produces different results. The
Baltic States today are confident of their independence and
sovereignty, but they remain afraid of Russia. Baltic leaders and
Ukraine claim that Russia uses energy to assert leverage, by having
Russian concerns acquire key elements of their energy sectors.
Ukraine and Belarus are themselves contrasts between striving for
independence and extreme dependency. Ukrainian President Viktor
Yuschenko has been clear about the goal of Ukraine's membership in the
European Union. But he realizes the vital importance of not estranging
Russia and has taken steps to develop dialogue with the Kremlin, even
after Russia shut off gas supplies on Jan. 1. By contrast, Belarus
remains a dependency where democracy demonstrations in the lead-up
to the March 19 presidential election have been brutally crushed.
In the Caucasus and Moldova, Russia has tried to readjust the
orientation of her neighbors, with little success. In 2002, Russia
told Georgia to end its political and security relationship with
NATO, and urged Georgia to accept Russian bases for the long-term. In
Central Asia, dictators who previously resisted closer cooperation with
Moscow have been encouraged by the Kremlin's urging to be heavy-handed
with any signs of religious revival. Only Russia and China endorsed
the Uzbekistan government's killing of hundreds of demonstrators in
Andijon last summer.
There are signs that Russia is adjusting to new realities. In Georgia,
Russia accommodated itself to Georgian central control over Ajaria
and helped with the removal from Georgia of separatist leader Aslan
Abashidze. In 2005, Russian and Georgian authorities agreed to troop
withdrawal with a timetable and benchmarks, and ended their demand
for financial compensation. But there are potential loopholes through
follow-on pacts, and Russian troops and arsenals in Georgia may be
redeployed to Armenia alarming Azerbaijan.
It's in Russia's interest, and in America's, for there to be greater
trust and cooperation between Russia and her neighbors. The United
States should strive to get Russia to understand that it is not
pursuing a policy to transform the region into a zone of American
control through "color revolutions." Instead, what's been happening
there is part of a process of what's been happening in Europe for
more than 50 years.
At the same time, countries in Russia's neighborhood need reassurance
that the United States is committed to their independence, integrity,
and stability. The lack of Western reaction to Russian meddling
made some new democracies worry that their sovereignty is entirely
subordinate to other key US interests with Russia.
In the near-term, the upcoming Belarus presidential election provides
an important test. Today Belarus is one of the most repressive former
Soviet republics. Last week, police beat and detained Alexander
Kozulin, an opposition presidential candidate. A new law pushed
through Parliament last year makes organizing a public protest or
making statements that discredit the state punishable by three to
five years in prison.
Symbolizing solidarity with the opposition, Bush met recently with
the widows of two Belarusan leaders who were murdered by Alexander
Lukashenko's government. But as Western governments develop a strategy
in the event that international monitors report electoral fraud on
March 19, it must be remembered that Lukashenko's major financial
and political sponsor is Putin.
In the long term, the West might consider a more dynamic vision of
its relationship with a democratic Russia. As the Russia task force
of the Council on Foreign Relations recommends: "Western leaders
should also diversify their political contacts within Russia. It's
not enough to meet with representatives of `civil society.' Open and
routine contact with opposition political figures and organizations
carry a more potent message." Doing so would give credibility and
consistency to Bush's freedom agenda.
NOTES: MARK BRZEZINSKI Mark Brzezinski, a Washington attorney, was
director of Russian and Eurasian affairs on the National Security
Council in the Clinton administration.
By Mark Brezezinski
The Boston Globe
March 08, 2006 Wednesday
Third Edition
LAST SUMMER, the Council of Europe issued a report urging Russia to
cease treating "neighboring and other countries in the region as zones
of special influence." The report urges Russia to "constructively
contribute to resolution of open issues and cease with activities
. . . which undermine the countries' sovereignty and territorial
integrity."
A key message from President Bush to President Vladimir Putin should
be that Russia's own integration into the world, a highly desirable
objective, is jeopardized if at the same time the Kremlin has a policy
of undercutting democratic development along its borders.
It's unlikely that there's a Kremlin master plan guiding Russia's
actions toward her neighbors. Instead, Russia's actions are driven
variably by ambition and nostalgia, confusion or misinterpretation,
irritation or resentment.
And Russia's policy toward the former Soviet republics varies it's
manifested in different ways and it produces different results. The
Baltic States today are confident of their independence and
sovereignty, but they remain afraid of Russia. Baltic leaders and
Ukraine claim that Russia uses energy to assert leverage, by having
Russian concerns acquire key elements of their energy sectors.
Ukraine and Belarus are themselves contrasts between striving for
independence and extreme dependency. Ukrainian President Viktor
Yuschenko has been clear about the goal of Ukraine's membership in the
European Union. But he realizes the vital importance of not estranging
Russia and has taken steps to develop dialogue with the Kremlin, even
after Russia shut off gas supplies on Jan. 1. By contrast, Belarus
remains a dependency where democracy demonstrations in the lead-up
to the March 19 presidential election have been brutally crushed.
In the Caucasus and Moldova, Russia has tried to readjust the
orientation of her neighbors, with little success. In 2002, Russia
told Georgia to end its political and security relationship with
NATO, and urged Georgia to accept Russian bases for the long-term. In
Central Asia, dictators who previously resisted closer cooperation with
Moscow have been encouraged by the Kremlin's urging to be heavy-handed
with any signs of religious revival. Only Russia and China endorsed
the Uzbekistan government's killing of hundreds of demonstrators in
Andijon last summer.
There are signs that Russia is adjusting to new realities. In Georgia,
Russia accommodated itself to Georgian central control over Ajaria
and helped with the removal from Georgia of separatist leader Aslan
Abashidze. In 2005, Russian and Georgian authorities agreed to troop
withdrawal with a timetable and benchmarks, and ended their demand
for financial compensation. But there are potential loopholes through
follow-on pacts, and Russian troops and arsenals in Georgia may be
redeployed to Armenia alarming Azerbaijan.
It's in Russia's interest, and in America's, for there to be greater
trust and cooperation between Russia and her neighbors. The United
States should strive to get Russia to understand that it is not
pursuing a policy to transform the region into a zone of American
control through "color revolutions." Instead, what's been happening
there is part of a process of what's been happening in Europe for
more than 50 years.
At the same time, countries in Russia's neighborhood need reassurance
that the United States is committed to their independence, integrity,
and stability. The lack of Western reaction to Russian meddling
made some new democracies worry that their sovereignty is entirely
subordinate to other key US interests with Russia.
In the near-term, the upcoming Belarus presidential election provides
an important test. Today Belarus is one of the most repressive former
Soviet republics. Last week, police beat and detained Alexander
Kozulin, an opposition presidential candidate. A new law pushed
through Parliament last year makes organizing a public protest or
making statements that discredit the state punishable by three to
five years in prison.
Symbolizing solidarity with the opposition, Bush met recently with
the widows of two Belarusan leaders who were murdered by Alexander
Lukashenko's government. But as Western governments develop a strategy
in the event that international monitors report electoral fraud on
March 19, it must be remembered that Lukashenko's major financial
and political sponsor is Putin.
In the long term, the West might consider a more dynamic vision of
its relationship with a democratic Russia. As the Russia task force
of the Council on Foreign Relations recommends: "Western leaders
should also diversify their political contacts within Russia. It's
not enough to meet with representatives of `civil society.' Open and
routine contact with opposition political figures and organizations
carry a more potent message." Doing so would give credibility and
consistency to Bush's freedom agenda.
NOTES: MARK BRZEZINSKI Mark Brzezinski, a Washington attorney, was
director of Russian and Eurasian affairs on the National Security
Council in the Clinton administration.