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Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, March 6, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 44
IN THIS ISSUE:
*U.S. Ambassador in Baku regrets Kocharian's statement on Karabakh
*Putin uses gas to warm relations with Hungary, but Czechs remain chilly
*EU high representative cancels planned visits to Chisinau, Kyiv
KOCHARIAN'S WARNING TO RECOGNIZE KARABAKH IS UNCONVINCING
Armenian President Robert Kocharian's warning that Yerevan might
officially recognize Karabakh as a state and sign a military alliance
with it is being treated by Azerbaijan with composure. Despite that
warning, Baku's priority is to maintain an atmosphere conducive to the
resumption of negotiations, following last month's inconclusive meeting
of the presidents in Rambouillet.
Kocharian launched that warning in a wide-ranging interview with
Armenian and Karabakh television channels (Armenian Public TV, Arminfo,
March 2). Commenting on the possibility of failure at follow-up rounds
of negotiations, he outlined a three-step "worst-case scenario that the
Armenian side should be ready for": First, Armenia would recognize
Karabakh de jure; second, sign a package of defense agreements whereby
an attack on Karabakh would amount to an attack on Armenia; and, third,
reinforce the "security zone [ethnically cleansed Azeri areas around
Karabakh proper] with absolutely new approaches … and certainly
more active processes in defense integration" of Karabakh with Armenia.
Significantly, Kocharian declined to invoke the probable international
recognition of Kosovo's independence as a "precedent" or "model" for
resolving the Karabakh conflict. Rather than Kosovo, he put the
international recognition of Eritrea's and East Timor's independence
(through secession from Ethiopia and Indonesia, respectively) at the top
of his list of "parallel cases," followed by the scheduled referendum on
Montenegro's independence from Serbia and the prospect for Palestinian
statehood, and listing Kosovo only in fifth place.
Authorities in Yerevan and Stepanakert (in common with Sukhumi,
Tskhinvali, and Tiraspol) do not wish to tie their hands too closely
with a Kosovo "precedent." They realize that their main ally, Russia --
supporting its other ally, Serbia -- may block Kosovo's outright
independence, at the very least dragging out the negotiations and
delaying the emergence of any "Kosovo precedent" for a long time to
come. The Kremlin calls for a "universal model" of conflict-resolution
to be established in Kosovo and applied to post-Soviet conflicts, but it
deliberately maintains complete ambiguity as to what the model should
entail. Moscow uses this situation to maximize its bargaining power in
all these conflicts, having its cake and eating it too during protracted
negotiations (see EDM, February 2, 6, 8).
Consequently, Yerevan and Stepanakert avoid using the terms "model" or
"precedent," preferring to speak of "parallels" with cases of "national
self-determination" from any corner of the world. In Kocharian's view,
the "principle of national self-determination is gaining ground in the
world" as a principle for conflict-resolution, and will continue to
advance in the coming years. "All those settlements are based on the
self-determination principle, and so our positions in the Karabakh
negotiating process are getting stronger every year" (Armenian Public
TV, Arminfo, March 2).
As Kocharian's interview makes clear, claiming that a worldwide trend
works long-term in the Armenian side's favor and that time is on its
side has become the retort to Azerbaijan's argument that time works in
its favor through superior economic development. That presumed worldwide
"trend," however, seems distant and imponderable, whereas the growing
disparity of economic strength between Azerbaijan and Armenia is local
and tangible. Nevertheless, the leaders of the parties in Armenia's
governing coalition (Republican, Dashnaktsutiun, and Orinats Yerkir)
endorsed Kocharian's warnings about recognition of Karabakh as a
commensurate response to recent "threats" from Azerbaijan's President
Ilham Aliyev (Noyan Tapan, Mediamax, March 3).
While Aliyev had mentioned the military option during meetings with
Azeri refugees and soldiers on the Karabakh contact line on March 1-2,
he made clear that it would be an option of last resort, if negotiations
and other non-military options ultimately fail. In Baku, officials
downplayed Kocharian's warning and avoided polemics. Presidential
foreign policy adviser Novruz Mamedov, Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar
Mammadyarov, and other officials briefly characterized Kocharian's move
as intended for domestic consumption, expressed hope that it would not
hinder the process of negotiations, and reaffirmed Baku's determination
to persevere in that process The U.S. Ambassador in Baku, Reno Harnish,
publicly cautioned that "war would be a tragedy for the Caucasus" and
regretted Kocharian's statement as one that "increases the temperature
and inflames passions" (ANS, Trend, Turan, March 3).
Contrary to a plethora of deeply pessimistic assessments
post-Rambouillet, that meeting marked neither deadlock nor a time crisis
for the negotiations. That inconclusive meeting was merely the first in
a planned process that has at least until the end of 2006 to be
consummated, before the 2007-2008 election cycle in Armenia may freeze
the negotiating process again. The window of opportunity remains a
considerable one.
--Vladimir Socor
SELLING "ENERGY SECURITY" IN BUDAPEST AND PRAGUE
For many years Russia's European policy neglected the group of states
from Slovenia to Poland that are now new EU members. These former
"satellites" were perceived as intrinsically "Russia-phobic." Russian
President Vladimir Putin's visits to Hungary and the Czech Republic last
week were intended to disperse the emerging anti-Russia front in
Brussels and secure a "safe passage" towards the countries that really
matter in Moscow's opinion, like Germany or Italy. Budapest and Prague
had not seen Russian leaders since Boris Yeltsin's respective visits in
1992 and 1993, when the first Russian president apologized for the
Soviet tanks on their streets in 1956 and 1968. In both capitals,
reflections on these historically recent tragedies are very strong, but
Putin preferred to say as little as possible on this topic (Nezavisimaya
gazeta, Globalrus, March 2).
Dismissing the remnants of "camp mentality," he concentrated on the new
foundation for bilateral relations that is also the key issue in his
European affairs: energy (International Herald Tribune, March 1). Both
countries are heavily dependent upon energy imports from Russia with
Gazprom supplying up to 90% of their demand for natural gas. Doubts and
worries about this dependency sharply increased during the "gas war"
between Russia and Ukraine in the first days of this year, and the
temporary "ceasefire" in this conflict cannot alleviate them. The group
of nine Central European states led by Austria and Poland took the issue
to Brussels, insisting that the EU had to revise its energy strategy and
ensure diversification of sources and imports. Moscow is quite alarmed
by this initiative as it watches with keen interest the ongoing battles
on the European energy markets, like the merger
between Suez and Gaz de France, driven in no small measure by the
unresolved problems of the EU enlargement (Vedomosti, February 3). A
small sign of Gazprom's irritation appeared at Putin's press conference
in Prague when an innocent question from a Russian journalist triggered
an angry response that if the EU was so keen about diversification,
Russia would also think about diversifying its energy exports
(Moskovskie novosti, February 3).
Moscow is step-by-step advancing a plan for consolidating its position
on the European energy market. Hungary has a more prominent place than
the Czech Republic in this plan; hence the visible difference in the
content of the two visits. Russia intends to substantially reducing gas
transit through Ukraine, and while the Baltic pipeline is one part of
the plan, the second line of the "Blue Stream" pipeline to Turkey is
another. The first two years of exploitation of this pipeline were quite
disappointing, but now Gazprom wants to extend this "corridor" towards
the market in Italy and to acquire all the distribution networks
(Gazeta.ru, March 2). Hungary then becomes a hub where the flows of gas
are channeled into several pipelines. The government of Prime Minister
Peter Medgyessy is quite keen about the benefits of this plan, so Putin
gave it every decently possible support before the
parliamentary elections in April (Polit.ru, March 3). The importance of
symbolic gestures was not forgotten, so a cemetery for the Hungarians
killed in World War II was opened in Voronezh oblast and the medieval
books from the Sarospakat College captured by the Soviet Army in 1945
were returned from Nizhny Novgorod (Vremya novostei, February 28).
There were none of these goodwill gestures in Prague, since the Czech
Republic does not have a high value for Gazprom. The atmosphere,
accordingly, was not that cloudless and there were more "unpleasant"
questions for Putin at that press conference (Moskovskie novosti,
February 3). The official negotiations were reasonably smooth, but the
attention was stolen by the controversial letter condemning Russia's war
in Chechnya and urging the members of the G-8 to raise this issue at the
upcoming St. Petersburg summit. Published in a local newspaper, it was
written by Vaclav Havel and signed by several distinguished
opinion-makers, such as Mary Robinson, Desmond Tutu, and Prince Hasan
bin Talal (Grani.ru, February 1). For any Russian, a visit to Prague
would be incomplete without a glass of beer, and back in 1993, Yeltsin
shared this easy moment with Havel. This time, President Vaclav Klaus
refrained from such bonding rituals, and Putin enjoyed his Prazdroj
accompanied only by the members of the Russian delegation (Nezavisimaya
gazeta, March 3).
He was probably not too upset about it, since his sights were set on
higher targets. Sipping the beer he might have contemplated the effect
of the subtle warning he had sent to his key counterparts a few days
prior in the op-ed piece he submitted to the Wall Street Journal
(February 28). The article was entitled, "Energy egotism is a road to
nowhere," and while many Europeans could say exactly that about Russia's
policy, Putin put the blame for the unevenness on the energy market
squarely on the major consumers, who happen to be G-8 members
(Kommersant, March 1). Moralizing aside, Putin asserted that price
volatility was a threat that had to be addressed by common efforts aimed
at securing a guaranteed long-term supply at fair prices. The catch in
this apparently politically correct argument is that "volatility" in the
period of record high prices, which Moscow obviously perceives as
"fair," means the possibility of their decline, and among G-8 members
only Russia defines that as a "threat" (Ezhednevny zhurnal, March 1).
A larger conclusion stemming from Putin's argument is that the
liberalization of the European gas market strongly pushed by the EU
Commission is obviously a bad idea. Gazprom is busy building ties with
giants like E.ON or Gaz de France and does not want any competition that
could break the clearly artificial link between the prices of oil and of
natural gas. This vision of tightly controlled and essentially
monopolized "energy security" has its supporters in Europe, and Putin is
trying to recruit new "agents of influence." Havel is certainly a
hopeless idealist, but his words remind that the European values of
human rights and economic freedoms are deeply interlinked – and
significantly differ from the values of Mr. Putin.
--Pavel K. Baev
SOLANA GAFFE OVERSHADOWS FAILURE OF 5+2 NEGOTIATIONS
The European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Javier Solana, has unexpectedly redefined the nature of the
conflict in Transnistria with a single phrase. Interviewed in the
Chisinau daily Moldova Suverana, on the eve of a scheduled visit to
Moldova, Solana opines: "I am convinced that the Transnistria conflict
is a conflict of economic nature, involving the economic elites. It
cannot last forever, there is no place for such conflicts in the 21st
century." Solana is urging "both sides involved," Chisinau and
Tiraspol, to "sincerely commit themselves" to devising a political
settlement and to "agree with each other about the division of
competencies between Chisinau and Tiraspol" (Moldova Suverana, March 2).
Solana passed over in silence the fact that Russian forces and
Russia-led Transnistria troops have occupied that part of Moldova since
the 1992 Russian military intervention, and that the political leaders
in Tiraspol are Russia's appointees, seconded by Moscow on a mission in
Transnistria. This situation defines the conflict as an interstate
conflict, not an internal Moldovan one. The EU itself from time to time
calls for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova, albeit
indecisively, but the request at least recognizes this fundamental
problem.
Although Western governments and organizations do not officially
characterize the conflict as a Russian-Moldovan issue, they tend to
treat it as an interstate conflict in practice when insisting on the
withdrawal of Russian forces and restoration of Moldova's sovereignty
and integrity. No known Western authority has thus far attempted to
excuse Russia's policy by pretending that the conflict is internal to
Moldova and "of an economic nature," rather than geopolitical.
By the same token, Western governments and organizations have
consistently characterized Transnistria's authorities as thriving on
organized crime and smuggling. No international authority has ever
attempted to equate the level of corruption that exists in right-bank
Moldova and the rampant economic crime that (along with Russian
handouts) sustains Transnistria's authorities. While perpetuation of the
unresolved conflict is generally recognized to be the basis of
Tiraspol's (and, behind it, Moscow's) negotiating tactics, no known
international observer before Solana has suggested that Chisinau has a
similar interest; and no Western authority including Solana could
possibly identify groups at any level of the Moldovan authorities that
are interested in prolonging the conflict, as Solana now claims.
Solana's comments read like an attempt to rationalize his or the EU's
lack of ability -- or desire -- to sustain a European policy on this EU
border. Directly or indirectly, he basically conveys three idea: a)
Russia's role is to be tacitly tolerated; b) Moldova and Transnistria
are equally responsible for the deadlock; and c) any idea of "a
democratic Transnistria in a democratic Moldova" reduces itself to
"delimitation of competencies" between Moldova's freely elected,
EU-aspirant government and Tiraspol's Russian-installed, anti-Western
authorities.
Internationally, the interview appears designed to signal to Russia that
the EU will not raise this issue at any major levels or with any
emphasis in upcoming EU-Russia meetings. Locally, Solana's choice of a
Moldovan newspaper to convey this message can only undermine confidence
in the EU; provoke Sovietophile elements to criticize the
Western-oriented President Vladimir Voronin from within his own party;
and embolden Tiraspol to fortify its intransigence.
With this move, Solana has undercut his own Special Representative (SR)
for conflict-resolution in Moldova, Dutch diplomat Adriaan Jacobovits de
Szeged. The SR's public discourse and his attitude in the 5+2
negotiations had shown a far better-informed, more accurate assessment
of the situation in Moldova in recent months, compared to the same
diplomat's 2003 performance, let alone Solana's speech. The EU's foreign
policy chief further embarrassed his envoy by claiming that his --
Solana's -- understanding of Moldova has improved since the SR's
appointment.
On the whole, the EU's foreign policy chief seems inadequately briefed
on the frozen conflicts. Last year, he seemed ill-prepared during a
mishap-filled meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi.
Putin trapped Solana into meeting with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
secessionist leaders, Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoiti, without
Solana's realizing it until it was too late (see EDM, April 11, 15).
Solana was scheduled to arrive on March 2 on a visit to Chisinau, attend
a working dinner with Voronin, and proceed on the following day to Kyiv.
During the night of March 1-2, however, Solana's office announced that
he has postponed both parts of his visit because of "changes in his
schedule." Also on March 2, the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office, Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel de Gucht, postponed his visit to
Moldova scheduled for March 6-8 "for family reasons" (Moldpres, March
2). No substitute dates have been announced for either Solana or de
Gucht's visit.
By fortuitous coincidence, on March 2 the Council of Europe's Committee
of Ministers in Strasbourg passed a resolution, reaffirming for the
third time the need for enforcement of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) verdict of 2004-2005 in favor of two political detainees
in Tiraspol. In that verdict (from which only the Russian judge had
dissented), the ECHR found that the Russian Federation's armed forces
had unlawfully seized Transnistria from Moldova, characterized the
situation in Transnistria as an occupation regime, and described those
authorities as "agents" of the Russian Federation. The verdict and
resolutions in Strasbourg seem to be discounted in Brussels, at least by
the EU's foreign policy chief.
These developments overshadow the routine failure of the February 27-28
round of negotiations in the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, Moldova,
Transnistria, plus the United States and the EU as observers) in
Chisinau and Tiraspol. The U.S. envoy to the negotiations, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, held separate talks with
Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time. The Moldovan
Ministry's official communiqué on the talks said, "The United States
is the reliable partner of Moldova regarding conflict-resolution in
Transnistria and European integration" (Moldpres, February 28). Using
the definite article "the" lends this statement in the original language
a special emphasis; and it seems accurate to say that Washington at
present supports Moldova's European aspirations more consistently than
does Brussels.
--Vladimir Socor
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
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Monday, March 6, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 44
IN THIS ISSUE:
*U.S. Ambassador in Baku regrets Kocharian's statement on Karabakh
*Putin uses gas to warm relations with Hungary, but Czechs remain chilly
*EU high representative cancels planned visits to Chisinau, Kyiv
KOCHARIAN'S WARNING TO RECOGNIZE KARABAKH IS UNCONVINCING
Armenian President Robert Kocharian's warning that Yerevan might
officially recognize Karabakh as a state and sign a military alliance
with it is being treated by Azerbaijan with composure. Despite that
warning, Baku's priority is to maintain an atmosphere conducive to the
resumption of negotiations, following last month's inconclusive meeting
of the presidents in Rambouillet.
Kocharian launched that warning in a wide-ranging interview with
Armenian and Karabakh television channels (Armenian Public TV, Arminfo,
March 2). Commenting on the possibility of failure at follow-up rounds
of negotiations, he outlined a three-step "worst-case scenario that the
Armenian side should be ready for": First, Armenia would recognize
Karabakh de jure; second, sign a package of defense agreements whereby
an attack on Karabakh would amount to an attack on Armenia; and, third,
reinforce the "security zone [ethnically cleansed Azeri areas around
Karabakh proper] with absolutely new approaches … and certainly
more active processes in defense integration" of Karabakh with Armenia.
Significantly, Kocharian declined to invoke the probable international
recognition of Kosovo's independence as a "precedent" or "model" for
resolving the Karabakh conflict. Rather than Kosovo, he put the
international recognition of Eritrea's and East Timor's independence
(through secession from Ethiopia and Indonesia, respectively) at the top
of his list of "parallel cases," followed by the scheduled referendum on
Montenegro's independence from Serbia and the prospect for Palestinian
statehood, and listing Kosovo only in fifth place.
Authorities in Yerevan and Stepanakert (in common with Sukhumi,
Tskhinvali, and Tiraspol) do not wish to tie their hands too closely
with a Kosovo "precedent." They realize that their main ally, Russia --
supporting its other ally, Serbia -- may block Kosovo's outright
independence, at the very least dragging out the negotiations and
delaying the emergence of any "Kosovo precedent" for a long time to
come. The Kremlin calls for a "universal model" of conflict-resolution
to be established in Kosovo and applied to post-Soviet conflicts, but it
deliberately maintains complete ambiguity as to what the model should
entail. Moscow uses this situation to maximize its bargaining power in
all these conflicts, having its cake and eating it too during protracted
negotiations (see EDM, February 2, 6, 8).
Consequently, Yerevan and Stepanakert avoid using the terms "model" or
"precedent," preferring to speak of "parallels" with cases of "national
self-determination" from any corner of the world. In Kocharian's view,
the "principle of national self-determination is gaining ground in the
world" as a principle for conflict-resolution, and will continue to
advance in the coming years. "All those settlements are based on the
self-determination principle, and so our positions in the Karabakh
negotiating process are getting stronger every year" (Armenian Public
TV, Arminfo, March 2).
As Kocharian's interview makes clear, claiming that a worldwide trend
works long-term in the Armenian side's favor and that time is on its
side has become the retort to Azerbaijan's argument that time works in
its favor through superior economic development. That presumed worldwide
"trend," however, seems distant and imponderable, whereas the growing
disparity of economic strength between Azerbaijan and Armenia is local
and tangible. Nevertheless, the leaders of the parties in Armenia's
governing coalition (Republican, Dashnaktsutiun, and Orinats Yerkir)
endorsed Kocharian's warnings about recognition of Karabakh as a
commensurate response to recent "threats" from Azerbaijan's President
Ilham Aliyev (Noyan Tapan, Mediamax, March 3).
While Aliyev had mentioned the military option during meetings with
Azeri refugees and soldiers on the Karabakh contact line on March 1-2,
he made clear that it would be an option of last resort, if negotiations
and other non-military options ultimately fail. In Baku, officials
downplayed Kocharian's warning and avoided polemics. Presidential
foreign policy adviser Novruz Mamedov, Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar
Mammadyarov, and other officials briefly characterized Kocharian's move
as intended for domestic consumption, expressed hope that it would not
hinder the process of negotiations, and reaffirmed Baku's determination
to persevere in that process The U.S. Ambassador in Baku, Reno Harnish,
publicly cautioned that "war would be a tragedy for the Caucasus" and
regretted Kocharian's statement as one that "increases the temperature
and inflames passions" (ANS, Trend, Turan, March 3).
Contrary to a plethora of deeply pessimistic assessments
post-Rambouillet, that meeting marked neither deadlock nor a time crisis
for the negotiations. That inconclusive meeting was merely the first in
a planned process that has at least until the end of 2006 to be
consummated, before the 2007-2008 election cycle in Armenia may freeze
the negotiating process again. The window of opportunity remains a
considerable one.
--Vladimir Socor
SELLING "ENERGY SECURITY" IN BUDAPEST AND PRAGUE
For many years Russia's European policy neglected the group of states
from Slovenia to Poland that are now new EU members. These former
"satellites" were perceived as intrinsically "Russia-phobic." Russian
President Vladimir Putin's visits to Hungary and the Czech Republic last
week were intended to disperse the emerging anti-Russia front in
Brussels and secure a "safe passage" towards the countries that really
matter in Moscow's opinion, like Germany or Italy. Budapest and Prague
had not seen Russian leaders since Boris Yeltsin's respective visits in
1992 and 1993, when the first Russian president apologized for the
Soviet tanks on their streets in 1956 and 1968. In both capitals,
reflections on these historically recent tragedies are very strong, but
Putin preferred to say as little as possible on this topic (Nezavisimaya
gazeta, Globalrus, March 2).
Dismissing the remnants of "camp mentality," he concentrated on the new
foundation for bilateral relations that is also the key issue in his
European affairs: energy (International Herald Tribune, March 1). Both
countries are heavily dependent upon energy imports from Russia with
Gazprom supplying up to 90% of their demand for natural gas. Doubts and
worries about this dependency sharply increased during the "gas war"
between Russia and Ukraine in the first days of this year, and the
temporary "ceasefire" in this conflict cannot alleviate them. The group
of nine Central European states led by Austria and Poland took the issue
to Brussels, insisting that the EU had to revise its energy strategy and
ensure diversification of sources and imports. Moscow is quite alarmed
by this initiative as it watches with keen interest the ongoing battles
on the European energy markets, like the merger
between Suez and Gaz de France, driven in no small measure by the
unresolved problems of the EU enlargement (Vedomosti, February 3). A
small sign of Gazprom's irritation appeared at Putin's press conference
in Prague when an innocent question from a Russian journalist triggered
an angry response that if the EU was so keen about diversification,
Russia would also think about diversifying its energy exports
(Moskovskie novosti, February 3).
Moscow is step-by-step advancing a plan for consolidating its position
on the European energy market. Hungary has a more prominent place than
the Czech Republic in this plan; hence the visible difference in the
content of the two visits. Russia intends to substantially reducing gas
transit through Ukraine, and while the Baltic pipeline is one part of
the plan, the second line of the "Blue Stream" pipeline to Turkey is
another. The first two years of exploitation of this pipeline were quite
disappointing, but now Gazprom wants to extend this "corridor" towards
the market in Italy and to acquire all the distribution networks
(Gazeta.ru, March 2). Hungary then becomes a hub where the flows of gas
are channeled into several pipelines. The government of Prime Minister
Peter Medgyessy is quite keen about the benefits of this plan, so Putin
gave it every decently possible support before the
parliamentary elections in April (Polit.ru, March 3). The importance of
symbolic gestures was not forgotten, so a cemetery for the Hungarians
killed in World War II was opened in Voronezh oblast and the medieval
books from the Sarospakat College captured by the Soviet Army in 1945
were returned from Nizhny Novgorod (Vremya novostei, February 28).
There were none of these goodwill gestures in Prague, since the Czech
Republic does not have a high value for Gazprom. The atmosphere,
accordingly, was not that cloudless and there were more "unpleasant"
questions for Putin at that press conference (Moskovskie novosti,
February 3). The official negotiations were reasonably smooth, but the
attention was stolen by the controversial letter condemning Russia's war
in Chechnya and urging the members of the G-8 to raise this issue at the
upcoming St. Petersburg summit. Published in a local newspaper, it was
written by Vaclav Havel and signed by several distinguished
opinion-makers, such as Mary Robinson, Desmond Tutu, and Prince Hasan
bin Talal (Grani.ru, February 1). For any Russian, a visit to Prague
would be incomplete without a glass of beer, and back in 1993, Yeltsin
shared this easy moment with Havel. This time, President Vaclav Klaus
refrained from such bonding rituals, and Putin enjoyed his Prazdroj
accompanied only by the members of the Russian delegation (Nezavisimaya
gazeta, March 3).
He was probably not too upset about it, since his sights were set on
higher targets. Sipping the beer he might have contemplated the effect
of the subtle warning he had sent to his key counterparts a few days
prior in the op-ed piece he submitted to the Wall Street Journal
(February 28). The article was entitled, "Energy egotism is a road to
nowhere," and while many Europeans could say exactly that about Russia's
policy, Putin put the blame for the unevenness on the energy market
squarely on the major consumers, who happen to be G-8 members
(Kommersant, March 1). Moralizing aside, Putin asserted that price
volatility was a threat that had to be addressed by common efforts aimed
at securing a guaranteed long-term supply at fair prices. The catch in
this apparently politically correct argument is that "volatility" in the
period of record high prices, which Moscow obviously perceives as
"fair," means the possibility of their decline, and among G-8 members
only Russia defines that as a "threat" (Ezhednevny zhurnal, March 1).
A larger conclusion stemming from Putin's argument is that the
liberalization of the European gas market strongly pushed by the EU
Commission is obviously a bad idea. Gazprom is busy building ties with
giants like E.ON or Gaz de France and does not want any competition that
could break the clearly artificial link between the prices of oil and of
natural gas. This vision of tightly controlled and essentially
monopolized "energy security" has its supporters in Europe, and Putin is
trying to recruit new "agents of influence." Havel is certainly a
hopeless idealist, but his words remind that the European values of
human rights and economic freedoms are deeply interlinked – and
significantly differ from the values of Mr. Putin.
--Pavel K. Baev
SOLANA GAFFE OVERSHADOWS FAILURE OF 5+2 NEGOTIATIONS
The European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Javier Solana, has unexpectedly redefined the nature of the
conflict in Transnistria with a single phrase. Interviewed in the
Chisinau daily Moldova Suverana, on the eve of a scheduled visit to
Moldova, Solana opines: "I am convinced that the Transnistria conflict
is a conflict of economic nature, involving the economic elites. It
cannot last forever, there is no place for such conflicts in the 21st
century." Solana is urging "both sides involved," Chisinau and
Tiraspol, to "sincerely commit themselves" to devising a political
settlement and to "agree with each other about the division of
competencies between Chisinau and Tiraspol" (Moldova Suverana, March 2).
Solana passed over in silence the fact that Russian forces and
Russia-led Transnistria troops have occupied that part of Moldova since
the 1992 Russian military intervention, and that the political leaders
in Tiraspol are Russia's appointees, seconded by Moscow on a mission in
Transnistria. This situation defines the conflict as an interstate
conflict, not an internal Moldovan one. The EU itself from time to time
calls for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova, albeit
indecisively, but the request at least recognizes this fundamental
problem.
Although Western governments and organizations do not officially
characterize the conflict as a Russian-Moldovan issue, they tend to
treat it as an interstate conflict in practice when insisting on the
withdrawal of Russian forces and restoration of Moldova's sovereignty
and integrity. No known Western authority has thus far attempted to
excuse Russia's policy by pretending that the conflict is internal to
Moldova and "of an economic nature," rather than geopolitical.
By the same token, Western governments and organizations have
consistently characterized Transnistria's authorities as thriving on
organized crime and smuggling. No international authority has ever
attempted to equate the level of corruption that exists in right-bank
Moldova and the rampant economic crime that (along with Russian
handouts) sustains Transnistria's authorities. While perpetuation of the
unresolved conflict is generally recognized to be the basis of
Tiraspol's (and, behind it, Moscow's) negotiating tactics, no known
international observer before Solana has suggested that Chisinau has a
similar interest; and no Western authority including Solana could
possibly identify groups at any level of the Moldovan authorities that
are interested in prolonging the conflict, as Solana now claims.
Solana's comments read like an attempt to rationalize his or the EU's
lack of ability -- or desire -- to sustain a European policy on this EU
border. Directly or indirectly, he basically conveys three idea: a)
Russia's role is to be tacitly tolerated; b) Moldova and Transnistria
are equally responsible for the deadlock; and c) any idea of "a
democratic Transnistria in a democratic Moldova" reduces itself to
"delimitation of competencies" between Moldova's freely elected,
EU-aspirant government and Tiraspol's Russian-installed, anti-Western
authorities.
Internationally, the interview appears designed to signal to Russia that
the EU will not raise this issue at any major levels or with any
emphasis in upcoming EU-Russia meetings. Locally, Solana's choice of a
Moldovan newspaper to convey this message can only undermine confidence
in the EU; provoke Sovietophile elements to criticize the
Western-oriented President Vladimir Voronin from within his own party;
and embolden Tiraspol to fortify its intransigence.
With this move, Solana has undercut his own Special Representative (SR)
for conflict-resolution in Moldova, Dutch diplomat Adriaan Jacobovits de
Szeged. The SR's public discourse and his attitude in the 5+2
negotiations had shown a far better-informed, more accurate assessment
of the situation in Moldova in recent months, compared to the same
diplomat's 2003 performance, let alone Solana's speech. The EU's foreign
policy chief further embarrassed his envoy by claiming that his --
Solana's -- understanding of Moldova has improved since the SR's
appointment.
On the whole, the EU's foreign policy chief seems inadequately briefed
on the frozen conflicts. Last year, he seemed ill-prepared during a
mishap-filled meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi.
Putin trapped Solana into meeting with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
secessionist leaders, Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoiti, without
Solana's realizing it until it was too late (see EDM, April 11, 15).
Solana was scheduled to arrive on March 2 on a visit to Chisinau, attend
a working dinner with Voronin, and proceed on the following day to Kyiv.
During the night of March 1-2, however, Solana's office announced that
he has postponed both parts of his visit because of "changes in his
schedule." Also on March 2, the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office, Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel de Gucht, postponed his visit to
Moldova scheduled for March 6-8 "for family reasons" (Moldpres, March
2). No substitute dates have been announced for either Solana or de
Gucht's visit.
By fortuitous coincidence, on March 2 the Council of Europe's Committee
of Ministers in Strasbourg passed a resolution, reaffirming for the
third time the need for enforcement of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) verdict of 2004-2005 in favor of two political detainees
in Tiraspol. In that verdict (from which only the Russian judge had
dissented), the ECHR found that the Russian Federation's armed forces
had unlawfully seized Transnistria from Moldova, characterized the
situation in Transnistria as an occupation regime, and described those
authorities as "agents" of the Russian Federation. The verdict and
resolutions in Strasbourg seem to be discounted in Brussels, at least by
the EU's foreign policy chief.
These developments overshadow the routine failure of the February 27-28
round of negotiations in the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, Moldova,
Transnistria, plus the United States and the EU as observers) in
Chisinau and Tiraspol. The U.S. envoy to the negotiations, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, held separate talks with
Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time. The Moldovan
Ministry's official communiqué on the talks said, "The United States
is the reliable partner of Moldova regarding conflict-resolution in
Transnistria and European integration" (Moldpres, February 28). Using
the definite article "the" lends this statement in the original language
a special emphasis; and it seems accurate to say that Washington at
present supports Moldova's European aspirations more consistently than
does Brussels.
--Vladimir Socor
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