Tweet
BULGARIA AND TURKEY MOVE TO SECURE ACCESSION TO THE EU
AZG Armenian Daily #046
15/03/2006
Some important diplomatic moves regarding further E.U. enlargement
are scheduled this week. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivaylo Kalfin
will officially meet his British counterpart today in London. Two
days later, on March 8, an E.U.-Turkey meeting will take place
in Vienna. The Austrian government, which took the helm of the
rotating E.U. presidency in January 2006, will be represented by
Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, who will meet Turkey's counterpart,
Abdullah Gul. E.U.
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn and Finnish Foreign Minister
Erkki Tuomioja will also be attending.
Both Sofia and Ankara are enhancing their diplomatic means to increase
their influence among E.U. decision makers. A faster tempo in bilateral
and multilateral negotiations concerning the new enlargement is an
expected result.
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey are all working to meet
E.U. demands (the so-called Acquis Communautaire) in order to join
the Community. They do so, however, at a time of crisis in European
politics.
Romania and Bulgaria will probably join in 2008 rather than 2007,
Croatia possibly in 2009, whereas the problem with Turkey is that
some key E.U. members, such as France, may stop its accession.
Political Analysis
The political elites in the Southwestern Balkans, both those of former
communist countries and of Turkey, are eager to join the European
Union. Such determination has not been stopped by Western Europe's
increasing dissatisfaction with the E.U.'s functioning or by French
and Dutch refusals of the proposed E.U.
Constitutional Treaty. [See: "Intelligence Brief: European
Constitution"]
The reasons for their pro-European stance are many.
First of all, accession to the E.U. is viewed as having achieved
Western standards in democracy and economic performance. This would
boost their prestige and political influence at home. Secondly, their
economic and financial interests are increasingly tied with European
and Euro-Atlantic networks; this makes integration the best way to
secure these interests.
Third, Bulgaria and Romania, especially, are searching for a double
security guarantee (N.A.T.O. plus Europe) against Russia's political
and strategic goals in Eastern Europe.
The main problem is that even though the whole area connecting the
Adriatic Sea with the Caucasus -- via the Black Sea -- is considered
to be unified by geoeconomic and security imperatives, the political
and cultural perceptions of its different regions differ significantly
among Western European public opinion and decision makers.
In fact, notwithstanding that the failure of the E.U.
Constitutional Treaty has cooled down enthusiasm about a larger Europe,
it is safe to say that most E.U.
elites are favorable to Croatia's, Bulgaria's and Romania's accession,
whereby they have much more complicated and ambiguous feelings
about Turkey.
In Western Europe, three primary different visions of Europe have
been competing for the past 15 years -- all of them are akin to
well-established, traditional concepts of continental integration.
The first one was the British preference for an enlarged Europe
marked by free market policies, loose political unity, and N.A.T.O.'s
unambiguous preponderance in security and defense matters. Such an
approach has been the most successful in the post-1991 international
context.
The second one was the French view of a European superpower. The
fundamental political and strategic orientation of this proposed
superpower would be to play an autonomous role in a multipolar world
by building up a continental security and defense policy coupled by
strong political unity. Friendship with the U.S., in this view, would
not mean U.S. strategic hegemony over the West. In the last decade,
Paris' approach has suffered various setbacks.
The third vision was the German goal of creating an enlarged European
federation marked by increased German economic and financial power,
in accordance with the United States, and strategically based on a
European defense policy embedded into N.A.T.O.
The real novelty since the 2004 enlargement is that even the "British
Model of Europe," that seemed to be triumphing, is in crisis. To begin
with, in the last few years, economic nationalism suddenly resurfaced
in France, Poland, and elsewhere. In addition, European elites and
the public are beginning to perceive European integration as a source
of troubles, instead of as a power and interest multiplier. [See:
"Economic Brief: French Protectionism"]
At the moment, the political context cannot ignore the end of
"Euro-enthusiasm." As a consequence, the new E.U. candidates are
working in a difficult environment. The crucial issue is that in
all E.U.
states, parliaments must approve of the new member's accession treaty
in order for it to become effective.
Western elites, however, are divided over the next enlargement. Such
divisions are a window of opportunity for a charm offensive by
E.U. candidates.
Bulgaria , which already expressed its nervousness about a possible
delay of its E.U. membership, launched a public initiative and began
to hire consultants. The consultants are being asked to identify
parliamentarians and opinion-makers in E.U.
states where the ratification of the Bulgarian Accession Treaty
is considered more problematic, such as in Germany, France, the
Netherlands and Denmark.
The European Commission will issue its report on Bulgaria and Romania
in May 2006, and a negative assessment of the countries' political,
juridical and financial fundamentals may cause national parliaments
to postpone ratification procedures.
Geopolitical Analysis
>>From a geopolitical point of view, the significance of the
proposed new enlargement lays in the restructuring of political
and security contexts in the Southwestern Balkans and in the Black
Sea region. Eastern Europe remains a decisive region, spanning west
from the Eurasian block dominated by Russia. The United States and
its closest allies, such as the U.K., are striving to reshape this
once Soviet-dominated area into a liberal, free-market oriented,
pro-N.A.T.O. (or N.A.T.O.-embedded) macro-region.
>>From North to South, the inclusion of Bulgaria, Romania, and
Turkey will mean the construction of a political and strategic
unified theater from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and Eastern
Mediterranean Sea. This has tremendous implications for post-Cold
War geostrategy. N.A.T.O. and the U.S. are actually trying to secure
the Black Sea regions for their security goals, as confrontation
with Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries (see Iran, Iraq, Syria
Afghanistan) is now at the center of their preoccupations.
Also, in spite of new, post-Soviet relations with Russia,
energy-related and strategic matters will continue to cause friction
between Washington and Moscow. The area from the Adriatic Sea to
the South Caucasus will, therefore, acquire even more importance
in light of the E.U.'s quest for energy security and new investment
opportunities in the former communist world.
Additionally, by letting Turkey, Bosnia, and Kosovo into the E.U.,
Washington and Brussels hope to provide a model of democratic
integration of Muslim countries into the West, which could, in the
coming decades, ease the struggle against Islamist militants and
religious-inspired terrorism.
Nevertheless, perceptions of such an issue are various. Many in the
West hold the view that integrating Turkey will definitively destroy
all hopes to create a coherent political entity in Europe because of
the huge cultural differences and Turkey's expanding demography. There
are, nonetheless, other perceived geopolitical hindrances to Turkey's
integration. For instance, Turkey borders Middle Eastern countries
such as Iraq, Syria and Iran, widely perceived as unreliable actors
in the West.
There is also the Kurdish question, which is directly related to the
thorny issue of Ankara's human rights policy. Another major issue is
Cyprus, whose situation is still unsettled. Finally, Turkey's accession
could open the way to further enlargements (for instance, Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia). Even though the rationale for such ulterior
integrations might be obvious for geopoliticians and decision makers,
it is not the same for European citizens, which makes the cultural
issue increasingly complicated.
The bottom line is that the possible role of Turkey's accession for
the improvement of Western relations with Islam and for Europe's energy
security does not appear convincing to all key players in Europe.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the recent disillusionment with E.U.
integration and enlargement, it is to be expected that Bulgaria
and Romania will join the Community in the next two years, although
accession in 2007 appears to be slightly more difficult than only 12
months ago.
Croatia and other Balkan countries will see their chances to join
enhanced by such an event.
However, the Austrian E.U. presidency will very likely avoid to
accelerate decisively the process of Turkey's accession. It is typical
for European decision makers to keep good relations with Ankara while
passing the buck of Turkey's issues to their successors, and there
are few concrete signs that Vienna will act otherwise.
A crucial moment in the Turkish issue will be the French presidential
election of 2007. Some candidates, like Nicolas Sarkozy, have expressed
negative views on Turkey's accession. As it often happens, Paris will
hold the key to determine the new European political landscape.
GlobalHye Information Services, visit us at www.GlobalHye.com
AZG Armenian Daily #046
15/03/2006
Some important diplomatic moves regarding further E.U. enlargement
are scheduled this week. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivaylo Kalfin
will officially meet his British counterpart today in London. Two
days later, on March 8, an E.U.-Turkey meeting will take place
in Vienna. The Austrian government, which took the helm of the
rotating E.U. presidency in January 2006, will be represented by
Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, who will meet Turkey's counterpart,
Abdullah Gul. E.U.
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn and Finnish Foreign Minister
Erkki Tuomioja will also be attending.
Both Sofia and Ankara are enhancing their diplomatic means to increase
their influence among E.U. decision makers. A faster tempo in bilateral
and multilateral negotiations concerning the new enlargement is an
expected result.
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey are all working to meet
E.U. demands (the so-called Acquis Communautaire) in order to join
the Community. They do so, however, at a time of crisis in European
politics.
Romania and Bulgaria will probably join in 2008 rather than 2007,
Croatia possibly in 2009, whereas the problem with Turkey is that
some key E.U. members, such as France, may stop its accession.
Political Analysis
The political elites in the Southwestern Balkans, both those of former
communist countries and of Turkey, are eager to join the European
Union. Such determination has not been stopped by Western Europe's
increasing dissatisfaction with the E.U.'s functioning or by French
and Dutch refusals of the proposed E.U.
Constitutional Treaty. [See: "Intelligence Brief: European
Constitution"]
The reasons for their pro-European stance are many.
First of all, accession to the E.U. is viewed as having achieved
Western standards in democracy and economic performance. This would
boost their prestige and political influence at home. Secondly, their
economic and financial interests are increasingly tied with European
and Euro-Atlantic networks; this makes integration the best way to
secure these interests.
Third, Bulgaria and Romania, especially, are searching for a double
security guarantee (N.A.T.O. plus Europe) against Russia's political
and strategic goals in Eastern Europe.
The main problem is that even though the whole area connecting the
Adriatic Sea with the Caucasus -- via the Black Sea -- is considered
to be unified by geoeconomic and security imperatives, the political
and cultural perceptions of its different regions differ significantly
among Western European public opinion and decision makers.
In fact, notwithstanding that the failure of the E.U.
Constitutional Treaty has cooled down enthusiasm about a larger Europe,
it is safe to say that most E.U.
elites are favorable to Croatia's, Bulgaria's and Romania's accession,
whereby they have much more complicated and ambiguous feelings
about Turkey.
In Western Europe, three primary different visions of Europe have
been competing for the past 15 years -- all of them are akin to
well-established, traditional concepts of continental integration.
The first one was the British preference for an enlarged Europe
marked by free market policies, loose political unity, and N.A.T.O.'s
unambiguous preponderance in security and defense matters. Such an
approach has been the most successful in the post-1991 international
context.
The second one was the French view of a European superpower. The
fundamental political and strategic orientation of this proposed
superpower would be to play an autonomous role in a multipolar world
by building up a continental security and defense policy coupled by
strong political unity. Friendship with the U.S., in this view, would
not mean U.S. strategic hegemony over the West. In the last decade,
Paris' approach has suffered various setbacks.
The third vision was the German goal of creating an enlarged European
federation marked by increased German economic and financial power,
in accordance with the United States, and strategically based on a
European defense policy embedded into N.A.T.O.
The real novelty since the 2004 enlargement is that even the "British
Model of Europe," that seemed to be triumphing, is in crisis. To begin
with, in the last few years, economic nationalism suddenly resurfaced
in France, Poland, and elsewhere. In addition, European elites and
the public are beginning to perceive European integration as a source
of troubles, instead of as a power and interest multiplier. [See:
"Economic Brief: French Protectionism"]
At the moment, the political context cannot ignore the end of
"Euro-enthusiasm." As a consequence, the new E.U. candidates are
working in a difficult environment. The crucial issue is that in
all E.U.
states, parliaments must approve of the new member's accession treaty
in order for it to become effective.
Western elites, however, are divided over the next enlargement. Such
divisions are a window of opportunity for a charm offensive by
E.U. candidates.
Bulgaria , which already expressed its nervousness about a possible
delay of its E.U. membership, launched a public initiative and began
to hire consultants. The consultants are being asked to identify
parliamentarians and opinion-makers in E.U.
states where the ratification of the Bulgarian Accession Treaty
is considered more problematic, such as in Germany, France, the
Netherlands and Denmark.
The European Commission will issue its report on Bulgaria and Romania
in May 2006, and a negative assessment of the countries' political,
juridical and financial fundamentals may cause national parliaments
to postpone ratification procedures.
Geopolitical Analysis
>>From a geopolitical point of view, the significance of the
proposed new enlargement lays in the restructuring of political
and security contexts in the Southwestern Balkans and in the Black
Sea region. Eastern Europe remains a decisive region, spanning west
from the Eurasian block dominated by Russia. The United States and
its closest allies, such as the U.K., are striving to reshape this
once Soviet-dominated area into a liberal, free-market oriented,
pro-N.A.T.O. (or N.A.T.O.-embedded) macro-region.
>>From North to South, the inclusion of Bulgaria, Romania, and
Turkey will mean the construction of a political and strategic
unified theater from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and Eastern
Mediterranean Sea. This has tremendous implications for post-Cold
War geostrategy. N.A.T.O. and the U.S. are actually trying to secure
the Black Sea regions for their security goals, as confrontation
with Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries (see Iran, Iraq, Syria
Afghanistan) is now at the center of their preoccupations.
Also, in spite of new, post-Soviet relations with Russia,
energy-related and strategic matters will continue to cause friction
between Washington and Moscow. The area from the Adriatic Sea to
the South Caucasus will, therefore, acquire even more importance
in light of the E.U.'s quest for energy security and new investment
opportunities in the former communist world.
Additionally, by letting Turkey, Bosnia, and Kosovo into the E.U.,
Washington and Brussels hope to provide a model of democratic
integration of Muslim countries into the West, which could, in the
coming decades, ease the struggle against Islamist militants and
religious-inspired terrorism.
Nevertheless, perceptions of such an issue are various. Many in the
West hold the view that integrating Turkey will definitively destroy
all hopes to create a coherent political entity in Europe because of
the huge cultural differences and Turkey's expanding demography. There
are, nonetheless, other perceived geopolitical hindrances to Turkey's
integration. For instance, Turkey borders Middle Eastern countries
such as Iraq, Syria and Iran, widely perceived as unreliable actors
in the West.
There is also the Kurdish question, which is directly related to the
thorny issue of Ankara's human rights policy. Another major issue is
Cyprus, whose situation is still unsettled. Finally, Turkey's accession
could open the way to further enlargements (for instance, Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia). Even though the rationale for such ulterior
integrations might be obvious for geopoliticians and decision makers,
it is not the same for European citizens, which makes the cultural
issue increasingly complicated.
The bottom line is that the possible role of Turkey's accession for
the improvement of Western relations with Islam and for Europe's energy
security does not appear convincing to all key players in Europe.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the recent disillusionment with E.U.
integration and enlargement, it is to be expected that Bulgaria
and Romania will join the Community in the next two years, although
accession in 2007 appears to be slightly more difficult than only 12
months ago.
Croatia and other Balkan countries will see their chances to join
enhanced by such an event.
However, the Austrian E.U. presidency will very likely avoid to
accelerate decisively the process of Turkey's accession. It is typical
for European decision makers to keep good relations with Ankara while
passing the buck of Turkey's issues to their successors, and there
are few concrete signs that Vienna will act otherwise.
A crucial moment in the Turkish issue will be the French presidential
election of 2007. Some candidates, like Nicolas Sarkozy, have expressed
negative views on Turkey's accession. As it often happens, Paris will
hold the key to determine the new European political landscape.
GlobalHye Information Services, visit us at www.GlobalHye.com