Tweet
WHO WILL "DETERMINE" NAGORNO KARABAKH DE JURE?
Alexander Grigorian
Azat Artsakh, Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
20 March 2006
It took the Azerbaijanis and us many years to realize the declarative
nature of the two basic principles - the right for self-determination
and territorial integrity - set down in the UN and OSCE documents. More
exactly, our neighbours and we realized that the real correlation of
these two tenets of the international law depend on the political
reality, determined by the upholding of one of these tenets by the
international community or juggling of these two principles to solve
geopolitical problems. However, better late than never.
With regard to this the words of Movladi Udugov, the chief ideologist
of Maskhadov Ichkeria, which does not exist any more, come to my mind,
which he pronounced in his interview with the Yerevan-based news
agency. Movladi Udugov gave, in my opinion, an absolutely definite
and correct answer to the question what his vision of the solution
of the eternal dilemma between the right for self-determination
and territorial integrity was. "Famous dilemmas are the result
of a question that was originally put falsely," said number one
ideologist of Ichkeria. "We (Ichkerian leaders - A.G.) are little
interested in a so-called international recognition. This recognition
would not guarantee peace. The international politics acts with a
consideration of real forces and interests." And what do we have with
regard to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, if the OSCE, under the
auspices of which the peace settlement is carried on, recognized all
the parties of the conflict to have reason? In this connection the
announcement of the former OSCE Chairman-in-Office Flavio Kotti on the
principles of settlement at the OSCE summit in Lisbon is notable. As
the second principle of settlement he mentioned the legal status
of Nagorno Karabakh on the basis of self-determination, which would
give the highest degree of self-governance to Nagorno Karabakh within
Azerbaijan. In other words, on the one hand, the right of the Armenians
of Karabakh was recognized, but on the other hand, to a degree that
would be determined by Azerbaijan. Stepanakert and Yerevan rejected
the principles of the summit in Lisbon. Baku (which was at the same
time the author of these principles) accepted them, because under
these principles Azerbaijan would maintain its territorial integrity,
and would, in addition, determine the degree of "self-determination"
of the Armenians of Karabakh. Then the concept of the "common state"
emerged as a way of settlement based on compromise. However, this
proposal was rejected by Baku, because this concept would take away
from Azerbaijan the right to "determine" the Armenian population
of Nagorno Karabakh, although Azerbaijan would still maintain its
territorial integrity. And the international community, namely the
OSCE Minsk Group (more exactly the three co-chairmen), is seeking for
combining these two principles, offering a "draw" to the conflict
parties. For its part, this means that in this stage of historical
development of the region the international community (i.e. the West
plus Russia) is interested in having the Armenian population live in
Nagorno Karabakh, as well as in preventing the secession of ethnic
formations in Azerbaijan, which would destabilize the situation in the
region. And in case of defending one of the two basic principles of
the international law by the West and Russia they would not achieve
this aim. For instance, if the issue were resolved on the basis of
the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh for self-determination,
Azerbaijan would either be divided into two independent states or
would have to cede part of its territory to Armenia. And if the
resolution were based on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,
no Armenians would stay to live in Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, the
application of the formula "self-determination minus territorial
integrity" to the settlement of the ethnic conflicts in the South
Caucasus would divide the country into independent ethnic states, and
the formula " inviolability of frontiers minus self-determination"
would result in ethnic clearing. However, I think, the application
of the formula "self-determination plus territorial integrity"
in resolving ethnic political and ethnic territorial conflicts
is not free of risk either. The point is that the attempts at
combining these two principles might cause a "short circuit". And
the consequences of this short circuit might be much more tragic
than the dissolution of the state or ethnic clearing. For instance,
if there were not for the Belovezh agreements which prepared the legal
basis for the division of the former USSR into 15 independent states,
and the leadership headed by Gorbachov sought for the resolution of
ethnic conflicts by way of combining these two principles, an ethnic
explosion would happen on the one sixth of the Earth, which could
cause a nuclear threat. Therefore, the fear of such a "circuit"
compels one of the conflict parties to yield. This was the case in
the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, which "divorced on good
faith." The situation was right the opposite in former Yugoslavia. As
a result even the Serbian state may soon lose Kosovo, as well as
Montenegro, which may become independent states. This is the reality
that needs to be taken into account by both the conflict parties and
the mediators. This, however, does not mean that any of the conflict
parties (Nagorno Karabakh, or Azerbaijan, for instance) should make
a unilateral compromise. The art of politics is to tune external
interests to its own interests. For this aim Azerbaijan applied the
factor of oil, which brought it significant political dividends at
the OSCE summit in Lisbon. And the overestimation of this factor by
the Baku authorities is the misunderstanding that Azerbaijan keeps
the international community under its thumb and not vice versa, which
did not allow them to achieve a settlement of the Karabakh conflict,
favourable for them. By the way, the former leadership of Armenia
also believed the "almightiness" of the factor of oil, and fearing
international isolation of the republic, accepted the principles of
resolution of the Karabakh conflict, that favoured Azerbaijan. However,
the Western community and Russia appear to be interested in having
Armenian population living in Nagorno Karabakh. Considering this,
we have to carry on persuading the international mediators, as well
as the entire civilized world, that with a vertical relationship
between Baku and Azerbaijan no Armenians would continue to live in
Nagorno Karabakh. The impression is that the international mediators
can now better imagine the consequences of returning Nagorno Karabakh
to the constitutional hug of Azerbaijan. It is not accidental that
the concept of a common state proposed by them earlier, as well as
the plan to hold a referendum on the status of Nagorno Karabakh in
the present territory of Nagorno Karabakh are efforts to give the
people of NKR an opportunity of de jure self-determination. This is the
reason of the negative reaction of official Baku, which was once again
confirmed during the negotiations between the presidents of Armenia
and Azerbaijan in Rambouillet, France. In 1997 the chairman of the
Committee of External Relations of the National Assembly of Armenia
Hovanes Igitian told the reporter of the Respublika Armenia Newspaper:
"I would point out some methodological shortcomings. Unfortunately,
I think, the dispute on the existence of NKR, its population, the
problems of development of Nagorno Karabakh has been shifted to a
theoretical plane: territorial integrity or self-determination. On
the one hand, this complicates the issue, on the other hand, makes
it primitive. The issue is much more complicated..." The security
of the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh should underlie the
settlement. This security, however, is impossible if Nagorno Karabakh
is joined to Azerbaijan.
And if the West and Russia are interested in having the Armenian
population of Karabakh live in Karabakh, they are simply obliged
to prevent a return to a vertical relationship between Baku and
Stepanakert. However, another question might occur. How long will
the West and Russia be interested in having the Armenian population
in Nagorno Karabakh? The answer of this question greatly depends on
NKR and certainly Armenia. The two Armenian states should interest the
international community by their actions and manner of existence. This
can be achieved in two ways. First, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh need
to adopt the values and lifestyle of Western democracies. Second,
they should seek to benefit the realization of interests of the
world and regional leaders in their external policies. The latter is
more important than the former, because the world is not interested
in Armenia both in terms of its energy resources and geographical
position. Consequently, Armenia needs to manipulate the interests of
other states that influence the security and prospects of development
of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh in one way or another. Non-standard
steps should be taken, which might not correspond to our former ideas
of friends and foes. In politics there are no friends and foes forever,
only interests are constant. If our main purpose is to prevent the
return of Nagorno Karabakh to the constitutional field of Azerbaijan,
providing the security of Armenia and NKR, the foreign policies of
the two Armenian states should be defined accordingly. Emotions
and counterarguments emanating from the Armenian mentalities, as
well as militaristic threats would not only be impertinent but also
prejudicial. The point is that realities may change as life goes
on. For instance, in the present stage of settlement of the Karabakh
conflict the official stance of the Baku authorities is directed at
changing the existing reality, which is, on the whole, beneficial
for the Armenian parties. It is a challenge that we should cope with
duly, using all our potential. A pragmatic foreign policy and full
correspondence with the standards of Western democratic societies
with an increasing military potential might be a way. No alternatives
to this can be seen. We may reach international recognition of NKR by
becoming part of the interests of the world and regional powers through
our pragmatic actions. Consequently, with a de facto self-determination
we should seek for a de jure self-determination all by ourselves. In
other words, everything depends on us, and not Moscow, Washington,
Paris or Ankara, which do not have constant friends and constant foes,
as it is accepted in big politics.
Alexander Grigorian
Azat Artsakh, Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
20 March 2006
It took the Azerbaijanis and us many years to realize the declarative
nature of the two basic principles - the right for self-determination
and territorial integrity - set down in the UN and OSCE documents. More
exactly, our neighbours and we realized that the real correlation of
these two tenets of the international law depend on the political
reality, determined by the upholding of one of these tenets by the
international community or juggling of these two principles to solve
geopolitical problems. However, better late than never.
With regard to this the words of Movladi Udugov, the chief ideologist
of Maskhadov Ichkeria, which does not exist any more, come to my mind,
which he pronounced in his interview with the Yerevan-based news
agency. Movladi Udugov gave, in my opinion, an absolutely definite
and correct answer to the question what his vision of the solution
of the eternal dilemma between the right for self-determination
and territorial integrity was. "Famous dilemmas are the result
of a question that was originally put falsely," said number one
ideologist of Ichkeria. "We (Ichkerian leaders - A.G.) are little
interested in a so-called international recognition. This recognition
would not guarantee peace. The international politics acts with a
consideration of real forces and interests." And what do we have with
regard to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, if the OSCE, under the
auspices of which the peace settlement is carried on, recognized all
the parties of the conflict to have reason? In this connection the
announcement of the former OSCE Chairman-in-Office Flavio Kotti on the
principles of settlement at the OSCE summit in Lisbon is notable. As
the second principle of settlement he mentioned the legal status
of Nagorno Karabakh on the basis of self-determination, which would
give the highest degree of self-governance to Nagorno Karabakh within
Azerbaijan. In other words, on the one hand, the right of the Armenians
of Karabakh was recognized, but on the other hand, to a degree that
would be determined by Azerbaijan. Stepanakert and Yerevan rejected
the principles of the summit in Lisbon. Baku (which was at the same
time the author of these principles) accepted them, because under
these principles Azerbaijan would maintain its territorial integrity,
and would, in addition, determine the degree of "self-determination"
of the Armenians of Karabakh. Then the concept of the "common state"
emerged as a way of settlement based on compromise. However, this
proposal was rejected by Baku, because this concept would take away
from Azerbaijan the right to "determine" the Armenian population
of Nagorno Karabakh, although Azerbaijan would still maintain its
territorial integrity. And the international community, namely the
OSCE Minsk Group (more exactly the three co-chairmen), is seeking for
combining these two principles, offering a "draw" to the conflict
parties. For its part, this means that in this stage of historical
development of the region the international community (i.e. the West
plus Russia) is interested in having the Armenian population live in
Nagorno Karabakh, as well as in preventing the secession of ethnic
formations in Azerbaijan, which would destabilize the situation in the
region. And in case of defending one of the two basic principles of
the international law by the West and Russia they would not achieve
this aim. For instance, if the issue were resolved on the basis of
the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh for self-determination,
Azerbaijan would either be divided into two independent states or
would have to cede part of its territory to Armenia. And if the
resolution were based on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,
no Armenians would stay to live in Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, the
application of the formula "self-determination minus territorial
integrity" to the settlement of the ethnic conflicts in the South
Caucasus would divide the country into independent ethnic states, and
the formula " inviolability of frontiers minus self-determination"
would result in ethnic clearing. However, I think, the application
of the formula "self-determination plus territorial integrity"
in resolving ethnic political and ethnic territorial conflicts
is not free of risk either. The point is that the attempts at
combining these two principles might cause a "short circuit". And
the consequences of this short circuit might be much more tragic
than the dissolution of the state or ethnic clearing. For instance,
if there were not for the Belovezh agreements which prepared the legal
basis for the division of the former USSR into 15 independent states,
and the leadership headed by Gorbachov sought for the resolution of
ethnic conflicts by way of combining these two principles, an ethnic
explosion would happen on the one sixth of the Earth, which could
cause a nuclear threat. Therefore, the fear of such a "circuit"
compels one of the conflict parties to yield. This was the case in
the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, which "divorced on good
faith." The situation was right the opposite in former Yugoslavia. As
a result even the Serbian state may soon lose Kosovo, as well as
Montenegro, which may become independent states. This is the reality
that needs to be taken into account by both the conflict parties and
the mediators. This, however, does not mean that any of the conflict
parties (Nagorno Karabakh, or Azerbaijan, for instance) should make
a unilateral compromise. The art of politics is to tune external
interests to its own interests. For this aim Azerbaijan applied the
factor of oil, which brought it significant political dividends at
the OSCE summit in Lisbon. And the overestimation of this factor by
the Baku authorities is the misunderstanding that Azerbaijan keeps
the international community under its thumb and not vice versa, which
did not allow them to achieve a settlement of the Karabakh conflict,
favourable for them. By the way, the former leadership of Armenia
also believed the "almightiness" of the factor of oil, and fearing
international isolation of the republic, accepted the principles of
resolution of the Karabakh conflict, that favoured Azerbaijan. However,
the Western community and Russia appear to be interested in having
Armenian population living in Nagorno Karabakh. Considering this,
we have to carry on persuading the international mediators, as well
as the entire civilized world, that with a vertical relationship
between Baku and Azerbaijan no Armenians would continue to live in
Nagorno Karabakh. The impression is that the international mediators
can now better imagine the consequences of returning Nagorno Karabakh
to the constitutional hug of Azerbaijan. It is not accidental that
the concept of a common state proposed by them earlier, as well as
the plan to hold a referendum on the status of Nagorno Karabakh in
the present territory of Nagorno Karabakh are efforts to give the
people of NKR an opportunity of de jure self-determination. This is the
reason of the negative reaction of official Baku, which was once again
confirmed during the negotiations between the presidents of Armenia
and Azerbaijan in Rambouillet, France. In 1997 the chairman of the
Committee of External Relations of the National Assembly of Armenia
Hovanes Igitian told the reporter of the Respublika Armenia Newspaper:
"I would point out some methodological shortcomings. Unfortunately,
I think, the dispute on the existence of NKR, its population, the
problems of development of Nagorno Karabakh has been shifted to a
theoretical plane: territorial integrity or self-determination. On
the one hand, this complicates the issue, on the other hand, makes
it primitive. The issue is much more complicated..." The security
of the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh should underlie the
settlement. This security, however, is impossible if Nagorno Karabakh
is joined to Azerbaijan.
And if the West and Russia are interested in having the Armenian
population of Karabakh live in Karabakh, they are simply obliged
to prevent a return to a vertical relationship between Baku and
Stepanakert. However, another question might occur. How long will
the West and Russia be interested in having the Armenian population
in Nagorno Karabakh? The answer of this question greatly depends on
NKR and certainly Armenia. The two Armenian states should interest the
international community by their actions and manner of existence. This
can be achieved in two ways. First, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh need
to adopt the values and lifestyle of Western democracies. Second,
they should seek to benefit the realization of interests of the
world and regional leaders in their external policies. The latter is
more important than the former, because the world is not interested
in Armenia both in terms of its energy resources and geographical
position. Consequently, Armenia needs to manipulate the interests of
other states that influence the security and prospects of development
of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh in one way or another. Non-standard
steps should be taken, which might not correspond to our former ideas
of friends and foes. In politics there are no friends and foes forever,
only interests are constant. If our main purpose is to prevent the
return of Nagorno Karabakh to the constitutional field of Azerbaijan,
providing the security of Armenia and NKR, the foreign policies of
the two Armenian states should be defined accordingly. Emotions
and counterarguments emanating from the Armenian mentalities, as
well as militaristic threats would not only be impertinent but also
prejudicial. The point is that realities may change as life goes
on. For instance, in the present stage of settlement of the Karabakh
conflict the official stance of the Baku authorities is directed at
changing the existing reality, which is, on the whole, beneficial
for the Armenian parties. It is a challenge that we should cope with
duly, using all our potential. A pragmatic foreign policy and full
correspondence with the standards of Western democratic societies
with an increasing military potential might be a way. No alternatives
to this can be seen. We may reach international recognition of NKR by
becoming part of the interests of the world and regional powers through
our pragmatic actions. Consequently, with a de facto self-determination
we should seek for a de jure self-determination all by ourselves. In
other words, everything depends on us, and not Moscow, Washington,
Paris or Ankara, which do not have constant friends and constant foes,
as it is accepted in big politics.