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Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union, DC
May 8 2006
Window on Eurasia: Aggressiveness on the Rise in Russia, Soviet-Era
Dissident Says
(May 8, 2006)
Paul Goble
Tallinn, May 8 - Grigoriy Pomerants, one of the oldest and most
prominent of surviving Soviet-era dissidents, says that hostility and
agression toward members of other groups is now on the rise in
Russian society, the combined product of the Soviet past, the Russian
present, and certain international trends as well.
In an interview published in last week's „Kul'tura,' Pomerants, who
was born shortly after the 1917 revolution and who experienced both
the horrors of Stalinism and the struggles of the samizdat movement,
said that „the roots of xenophobia and national intolerance go back a
long way'
(http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?ac t=news&id=42789 ).
Asked how it was possible that fascism could re-emerge in a country
„which had defeated fascism more than 60 years ago,' Pomeryants
pointed out that while Stalin fought fascism, the Soviet dictator
also had „carried out [his own] racial policy,' one that led not only
to the deportation of whole peoples but to the anti-Semitic Doctors'
plot.
Unfortunately, he continued, „these actions of Stalin found a
response in the people' just as did his war against Hitler. But the
real reason that extremists in Russia employ Nazi symbols, Pomeryants
aid, is that Aleksandr Barkashov, thee leader of Russian National
Unity (RNE) is „too stupid to be able to think up something new.'
The RNE leader simply picked up „'Mein Kampf' and said: ‚Hitler's
only mistake is that he underrated the Slavs. In everything else, he
was right.' But now this is being applied more broadly: They beat the
Tajiks, who never bothered anythong, they beat peaceful Senegalese,
and they beat Vietnamese.'
But if the symbols of this new aggressiveness are very much on public
view, Pomeryants argued, the sources of this aggression are less
obvious at least to most observers. And in his interview, the former
dissident identifies three developments that he suggests have played
the greatest role.
The first reason, he suggests, is the collapse of hope and the rise
of radical income differentiation in post-Soviet Russia. Twenty years
ago, Pomeryants said, people in the Soviet Union were filled with
hope that they could overcome the past and build a bright future
easily and quickly.
But in the intervening period, these hopes have perished. Many of the
old cadres occupy senior positions. Income differential is
increasing. And many Russians now look with envy at those newly rich
people who travel about in Mercedes cars and „cover them with dirt'
in the process.
Not in a position to strike back at those in power, Pomeryants
continued, many Russians and especially the young have transferred
their anger to and taken out their aggression on those who are the
most defenseless in Russian society -- non-Russians and foreigners.
The second was the failure of former Soviet president Mikhail
Gorbachev and other reformers to address ethnic issues on the
assumption that economic change would solve all of them. Indeed,
Pomeryants argued, much of what is going on now reflects the decision
of those people to „look through their fingers at the [February 1988]
pogrom in Sumgait.'
„Gorbachev naively thought that it would be possible to carry out
social reforms while leaving national ones for latter. The tension of
nationality relations was then hidden, and no one in the Politburo
was dealing with the extraordinarily ramified set of nationality
relations' in the country.
When Azerbaijanis massacred Armenians in Sumgait in response to
Armenian demands that Nagorono-Karabakh be transferred from
Azerbaijani to Armenian control, Pomeryants noted, Moscow sent
soldiers „without bullets' in their guns who were rapidly driven off
by a local population armed with „stones.'
„That was the signal,' Pomeryants said, „whoever could, should go
ahead.' And as a result, he continued, „'the Chechen project' arose.
Had Sumgait not taken place [or had Moscow responded differently],
the Chechens would not have begun anything. They are not madmen.'
„But the signal was given,' Pomeryants noted, „and [the Chechens
along with many other people] saw that power was lying in the
streets. The Chechen war with its horrific losses also unleashed the
beast in men. This too unleashed passions.'
And the third and especially dispiriting source of this trend,
Pomeryants said, is „a general crisis of civilization' around the
world which he argued is connected with „a loss of values.' As long
as force or the threat of an attack from outside was around, this
crisis was not much in evidence, he continued.
But now, in many cases, and especially in Russia, „there are no
values in the name of which people should life except for those
calling for immediate satisfaction' - and such „values,' if they are
indeed worthy of the name, do little to rein in human passios of even
the basest kind.
Asked why Russia might be especially vulnerable to what he described
as a worldwide trend, Pomeryants pointed to three reasons: the Soviet
past in which so many of Russia's traditional values were destroyed,
the various cataclysms the Russian people have experienced over the
last century, and even the country's enormous size.
Concerning this last point, Pomeryants noted that „after Ivan the
Teriblee, Russia was not able to return to normal for the entire 17th
century. [But over the same period] small Preotestan countries even
when they lived badly were more peaceful. And now they live very well
- in Norway, they do not [even] steal the profits from oil.'
May 8 2006
Window on Eurasia: Aggressiveness on the Rise in Russia, Soviet-Era
Dissident Says
(May 8, 2006)
Paul Goble
Tallinn, May 8 - Grigoriy Pomerants, one of the oldest and most
prominent of surviving Soviet-era dissidents, says that hostility and
agression toward members of other groups is now on the rise in
Russian society, the combined product of the Soviet past, the Russian
present, and certain international trends as well.
In an interview published in last week's „Kul'tura,' Pomerants, who
was born shortly after the 1917 revolution and who experienced both
the horrors of Stalinism and the struggles of the samizdat movement,
said that „the roots of xenophobia and national intolerance go back a
long way'
(http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?ac t=news&id=42789 ).
Asked how it was possible that fascism could re-emerge in a country
„which had defeated fascism more than 60 years ago,' Pomeryants
pointed out that while Stalin fought fascism, the Soviet dictator
also had „carried out [his own] racial policy,' one that led not only
to the deportation of whole peoples but to the anti-Semitic Doctors'
plot.
Unfortunately, he continued, „these actions of Stalin found a
response in the people' just as did his war against Hitler. But the
real reason that extremists in Russia employ Nazi symbols, Pomeryants
aid, is that Aleksandr Barkashov, thee leader of Russian National
Unity (RNE) is „too stupid to be able to think up something new.'
The RNE leader simply picked up „'Mein Kampf' and said: ‚Hitler's
only mistake is that he underrated the Slavs. In everything else, he
was right.' But now this is being applied more broadly: They beat the
Tajiks, who never bothered anythong, they beat peaceful Senegalese,
and they beat Vietnamese.'
But if the symbols of this new aggressiveness are very much on public
view, Pomeryants argued, the sources of this aggression are less
obvious at least to most observers. And in his interview, the former
dissident identifies three developments that he suggests have played
the greatest role.
The first reason, he suggests, is the collapse of hope and the rise
of radical income differentiation in post-Soviet Russia. Twenty years
ago, Pomeryants said, people in the Soviet Union were filled with
hope that they could overcome the past and build a bright future
easily and quickly.
But in the intervening period, these hopes have perished. Many of the
old cadres occupy senior positions. Income differential is
increasing. And many Russians now look with envy at those newly rich
people who travel about in Mercedes cars and „cover them with dirt'
in the process.
Not in a position to strike back at those in power, Pomeryants
continued, many Russians and especially the young have transferred
their anger to and taken out their aggression on those who are the
most defenseless in Russian society -- non-Russians and foreigners.
The second was the failure of former Soviet president Mikhail
Gorbachev and other reformers to address ethnic issues on the
assumption that economic change would solve all of them. Indeed,
Pomeryants argued, much of what is going on now reflects the decision
of those people to „look through their fingers at the [February 1988]
pogrom in Sumgait.'
„Gorbachev naively thought that it would be possible to carry out
social reforms while leaving national ones for latter. The tension of
nationality relations was then hidden, and no one in the Politburo
was dealing with the extraordinarily ramified set of nationality
relations' in the country.
When Azerbaijanis massacred Armenians in Sumgait in response to
Armenian demands that Nagorono-Karabakh be transferred from
Azerbaijani to Armenian control, Pomeryants noted, Moscow sent
soldiers „without bullets' in their guns who were rapidly driven off
by a local population armed with „stones.'
„That was the signal,' Pomeryants said, „whoever could, should go
ahead.' And as a result, he continued, „'the Chechen project' arose.
Had Sumgait not taken place [or had Moscow responded differently],
the Chechens would not have begun anything. They are not madmen.'
„But the signal was given,' Pomeryants noted, „and [the Chechens
along with many other people] saw that power was lying in the
streets. The Chechen war with its horrific losses also unleashed the
beast in men. This too unleashed passions.'
And the third and especially dispiriting source of this trend,
Pomeryants said, is „a general crisis of civilization' around the
world which he argued is connected with „a loss of values.' As long
as force or the threat of an attack from outside was around, this
crisis was not much in evidence, he continued.
But now, in many cases, and especially in Russia, „there are no
values in the name of which people should life except for those
calling for immediate satisfaction' - and such „values,' if they are
indeed worthy of the name, do little to rein in human passios of even
the basest kind.
Asked why Russia might be especially vulnerable to what he described
as a worldwide trend, Pomeryants pointed to three reasons: the Soviet
past in which so many of Russia's traditional values were destroyed,
the various cataclysms the Russian people have experienced over the
last century, and even the country's enormous size.
Concerning this last point, Pomeryants noted that „after Ivan the
Teriblee, Russia was not able to return to normal for the entire 17th
century. [But over the same period] small Preotestan countries even
when they lived badly were more peaceful. And now they live very well
- in Norway, they do not [even] steal the profits from oil.'