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What the Papers Say Part B (Russia)
May 12, 2006 Friday
WORSE THAN THE COLD WAR
by Nikolai Zlobin, World Security Institute (US)
Moscow and Washington don't share the same visions of the future; The
situation in US-Russian relations is not another Cold War. It is
worse than that, because the crisis we see unfolding now is not
ideological. This is a conflict between the world's strongest
democracy and the world's largest authoritarian country.
Viewed from Washington, Russia's policy appears to be more and more
odd and counterproductive. Washington is already used to Moscow's
reaction to any criticism which it treats with minimum of imagination
involved. In fact, Moscow has two explanations of criticism it
applies in turns. Explanation one: lack of understanding of what is
"really" happening in Russia on the part of Western leaders or their
advisors (as far as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is concerned, for
example, US Vice President Dick Cheney was let down by his
subordinates and advisors or he would have spoken differently at the
Vilnius conference earlier this months). Explanation two: the good
old anti-Russian campaign. Dismissing everything as hostile
propaganda was a Soviet technique of the late 1940s. Oddly enough, it
still works.
At first sight, one would be hard pressed to find a better
opportunity than G8 presidency to win sympathies and present oneself
in the best possible light. Leadership in the club of the most
democratic, economically advanced, and military strong world powers
is objectively an unparalleled chance to boost one's respect with the
international community, to improve the image of the country itself
and its regime. Last time Moscow wielded such strong leverage with
the general public worldwide was when it launched Sputnik and then
sent Yuri Gagarin into space. The USSR became a symbol of success
then. It was studied, it was emulated - even in the countries on the
other side of the front line of the Cold War.
The situation nowadays is different. Russia is setting a definitely
repellent example. Whenever others study Russia's example, it's only
in order to avoid becoming like Russia. Anything but a symbol of
success, Russia is even on the list of 60 failed states compiled by
Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, where it ranks 43rd -
one slot above Tajikistan but below Nigeria, Turkmenistan, Guinea
Bissau, or even Moldova and Georgia. Moscow's international influence
has diminished in the months of its G8 presidency, and the respect it
commands is fading fast. Trying to come up with at least something
positive, US leaders point out that Russia is not the USSR, of
course; though it's hard to understand exactly what they mean by
that. If this is Russia's major achievement, it's modest indeed,
since this is also the major achievement of Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and
even Belarus.
Neither can we ascribe Russia's troubles to economic stagnation.
These days, Russia is exporting more oil and gas than the Soviet
Union ever did and at the prices the Politburo of old could not even
imagine possible. Russian gold and hard currency reserves set an
all-time record, and flow of hard currency into the country makes
even bankers in the Persian Gulf envious. Russia's international
economic capacities are much better than the Soviet Union's. Military
inadequacy cannot be cited either. Russia has retained nuclear parity
with the United States. It is the only country in the world capable
of challenging the United States in the military sphere. Like the
USSR its predecessor, Russia is the second largest arms merchant in
the world. Russia abandoned communism. It is clear nevertheless that
Russia nowadays is undeniably less respected, sympathized with, or
backed than the Soviet Union was. The way Moscow achieved it - and so
fast - cannot help generating some morbid interest in the United
States.
The blame cannot be pinned on the West. The last decade was ideal for
Russia because the world powers were ruled by the politicians
sympathizing with Russia. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have been
more pro-Russian than any presidents the United States has had in the
past or is likely to have in the future. The same goes for the
leaders of Germany, Italy, France, and so on. It is next to
impossible to imagine more favorable external subjective factors,
particularly since their pro-Russian stand and sympathies with Moscow
cost lots of foreign politicians their reputation.
The idea of an anti-Russian campaign that is so popular in Moscow is
actually misleading. The concept only flatters the egos of the
Russian political establishment. There are people in Washington who
dislike Russia, and they cannot be silenced. Yet they are greatly
outnumbered by people who like Russia and find it interesting.
Practically all of them, however, agree that Russia is not playing
any substantial role in American policy nowadays, and it's not a
factor deserving a great deal of attention - let alone the effort of
anti-Russian campaigns.
Russia's problems are direct corollaries of Russian policy. Once
Russia ceased to be a democracy, Washington saw this as fundamentally
changing the general trend of global development and Russia's own
role in it. Once it ceased to be a democracy, Russia made a strategic
partnership with the United States impossible. For Washington,
cooperation with Russia is becoming more and more difficult - even in
areas where their interests actually coincide - because the deepening
discord over perception of values prevent Moscow and Washington from
sharing visions of the future. Sure, Russia is a sovereign state and
therefore entitled to the right to choose its own path. Yet it's the
height of folly to believe that the West will tolerate every twist of
Russia's foreign policy, just because everyone needs oil, gas, and
international security. Anyone who doubts that ought to look back at
Brezhnev and his era.
The hopes that Washington needs Russia so much that it would overlook
Russia's evolution had better be abandoned. In fact, the Bush
Administration has been sending precisely this message to the Kremlin
for several years. It was and is a mistake, a political fallacy which
the White House is trying now to correct. This is what Cheney said in
Vilnius, and some advisors tried to smooth it out (that's for you,
Mr. Lavrov!). The United States became convinced that the
authoritarian trend in Russia directly affects its foreign policy.
The more authoritarian Russia becomes, the less constructive its
foreign policy gets. As a result, Washington itself is making a
transition now from the policy of limited cooperation with Russia to
the policy of its limited deterrent. This is Washington's reaction to
the policy Moscow has pursued with regard to the United States these
last three years. This state of affairs affects both countries and
the international community as such, and only benefits (of that is
what it is) the national elites in the two countries providing them
with an excuse to be used to explain their own foreign policy
failures.
It seems that Washington means business now and the American-Russian
relations will only sour in the foreseeable future. The policy of
limited in Eurasia is already balancing on the verge of a limited
confrontation between the two countries, a conflict between them
currently defined by certain geographic margins. The boundaries of
the limited confrontation will expand into new and new regions in
Eurasia and beyond it. American policy on Russia is largely a
reaction to Russia's own actions. This is a more appropriate concept
than limited cooperation ever was - much less the attempts to
establish partnership.
Despite the opinion held by some specialists, this is not another
Cold War. It is worse than that, because the crisis we see unfolding
now is not ideological. This is a conflict between the world's
strongest democracy and the world's largest authoritarian country -
intensified by the fundamental difference in their geopolitical
views, preferences, and objectives, and intensified again by the
mutual dislike between the elites, distrust, the inertia of
hostility, and colossal ambitions on the part of both countries.
The Cold War was simpler than that. There could be a winner in it,
and there was. There was the concept of peaceful co-existence and
there was understanding of what essentially the warring sides were
after. The United States is no longer an enemy of Russia, and victory
over Russia is not what Washington is after. Neither does Moscow
aspire to see America destroyed. More complicated instruments are
needed. What is needed is a strategy more intricate that the
straightforwardness of the Cold War. What is needed is an entirely
different level of responsibility for national leaders. Neither the
United States nor Russia can hope to win in this conflict, but both
may lose. Moreover, Russia may lose much more than it hopes to gain
nowadays with its deterrent policy.
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 12, 2006, p. 11
Translated by A. Ignatkin
What the Papers Say Part B (Russia)
May 12, 2006 Friday
WORSE THAN THE COLD WAR
by Nikolai Zlobin, World Security Institute (US)
Moscow and Washington don't share the same visions of the future; The
situation in US-Russian relations is not another Cold War. It is
worse than that, because the crisis we see unfolding now is not
ideological. This is a conflict between the world's strongest
democracy and the world's largest authoritarian country.
Viewed from Washington, Russia's policy appears to be more and more
odd and counterproductive. Washington is already used to Moscow's
reaction to any criticism which it treats with minimum of imagination
involved. In fact, Moscow has two explanations of criticism it
applies in turns. Explanation one: lack of understanding of what is
"really" happening in Russia on the part of Western leaders or their
advisors (as far as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is concerned, for
example, US Vice President Dick Cheney was let down by his
subordinates and advisors or he would have spoken differently at the
Vilnius conference earlier this months). Explanation two: the good
old anti-Russian campaign. Dismissing everything as hostile
propaganda was a Soviet technique of the late 1940s. Oddly enough, it
still works.
At first sight, one would be hard pressed to find a better
opportunity than G8 presidency to win sympathies and present oneself
in the best possible light. Leadership in the club of the most
democratic, economically advanced, and military strong world powers
is objectively an unparalleled chance to boost one's respect with the
international community, to improve the image of the country itself
and its regime. Last time Moscow wielded such strong leverage with
the general public worldwide was when it launched Sputnik and then
sent Yuri Gagarin into space. The USSR became a symbol of success
then. It was studied, it was emulated - even in the countries on the
other side of the front line of the Cold War.
The situation nowadays is different. Russia is setting a definitely
repellent example. Whenever others study Russia's example, it's only
in order to avoid becoming like Russia. Anything but a symbol of
success, Russia is even on the list of 60 failed states compiled by
Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, where it ranks 43rd -
one slot above Tajikistan but below Nigeria, Turkmenistan, Guinea
Bissau, or even Moldova and Georgia. Moscow's international influence
has diminished in the months of its G8 presidency, and the respect it
commands is fading fast. Trying to come up with at least something
positive, US leaders point out that Russia is not the USSR, of
course; though it's hard to understand exactly what they mean by
that. If this is Russia's major achievement, it's modest indeed,
since this is also the major achievement of Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and
even Belarus.
Neither can we ascribe Russia's troubles to economic stagnation.
These days, Russia is exporting more oil and gas than the Soviet
Union ever did and at the prices the Politburo of old could not even
imagine possible. Russian gold and hard currency reserves set an
all-time record, and flow of hard currency into the country makes
even bankers in the Persian Gulf envious. Russia's international
economic capacities are much better than the Soviet Union's. Military
inadequacy cannot be cited either. Russia has retained nuclear parity
with the United States. It is the only country in the world capable
of challenging the United States in the military sphere. Like the
USSR its predecessor, Russia is the second largest arms merchant in
the world. Russia abandoned communism. It is clear nevertheless that
Russia nowadays is undeniably less respected, sympathized with, or
backed than the Soviet Union was. The way Moscow achieved it - and so
fast - cannot help generating some morbid interest in the United
States.
The blame cannot be pinned on the West. The last decade was ideal for
Russia because the world powers were ruled by the politicians
sympathizing with Russia. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have been
more pro-Russian than any presidents the United States has had in the
past or is likely to have in the future. The same goes for the
leaders of Germany, Italy, France, and so on. It is next to
impossible to imagine more favorable external subjective factors,
particularly since their pro-Russian stand and sympathies with Moscow
cost lots of foreign politicians their reputation.
The idea of an anti-Russian campaign that is so popular in Moscow is
actually misleading. The concept only flatters the egos of the
Russian political establishment. There are people in Washington who
dislike Russia, and they cannot be silenced. Yet they are greatly
outnumbered by people who like Russia and find it interesting.
Practically all of them, however, agree that Russia is not playing
any substantial role in American policy nowadays, and it's not a
factor deserving a great deal of attention - let alone the effort of
anti-Russian campaigns.
Russia's problems are direct corollaries of Russian policy. Once
Russia ceased to be a democracy, Washington saw this as fundamentally
changing the general trend of global development and Russia's own
role in it. Once it ceased to be a democracy, Russia made a strategic
partnership with the United States impossible. For Washington,
cooperation with Russia is becoming more and more difficult - even in
areas where their interests actually coincide - because the deepening
discord over perception of values prevent Moscow and Washington from
sharing visions of the future. Sure, Russia is a sovereign state and
therefore entitled to the right to choose its own path. Yet it's the
height of folly to believe that the West will tolerate every twist of
Russia's foreign policy, just because everyone needs oil, gas, and
international security. Anyone who doubts that ought to look back at
Brezhnev and his era.
The hopes that Washington needs Russia so much that it would overlook
Russia's evolution had better be abandoned. In fact, the Bush
Administration has been sending precisely this message to the Kremlin
for several years. It was and is a mistake, a political fallacy which
the White House is trying now to correct. This is what Cheney said in
Vilnius, and some advisors tried to smooth it out (that's for you,
Mr. Lavrov!). The United States became convinced that the
authoritarian trend in Russia directly affects its foreign policy.
The more authoritarian Russia becomes, the less constructive its
foreign policy gets. As a result, Washington itself is making a
transition now from the policy of limited cooperation with Russia to
the policy of its limited deterrent. This is Washington's reaction to
the policy Moscow has pursued with regard to the United States these
last three years. This state of affairs affects both countries and
the international community as such, and only benefits (of that is
what it is) the national elites in the two countries providing them
with an excuse to be used to explain their own foreign policy
failures.
It seems that Washington means business now and the American-Russian
relations will only sour in the foreseeable future. The policy of
limited in Eurasia is already balancing on the verge of a limited
confrontation between the two countries, a conflict between them
currently defined by certain geographic margins. The boundaries of
the limited confrontation will expand into new and new regions in
Eurasia and beyond it. American policy on Russia is largely a
reaction to Russia's own actions. This is a more appropriate concept
than limited cooperation ever was - much less the attempts to
establish partnership.
Despite the opinion held by some specialists, this is not another
Cold War. It is worse than that, because the crisis we see unfolding
now is not ideological. This is a conflict between the world's
strongest democracy and the world's largest authoritarian country -
intensified by the fundamental difference in their geopolitical
views, preferences, and objectives, and intensified again by the
mutual dislike between the elites, distrust, the inertia of
hostility, and colossal ambitions on the part of both countries.
The Cold War was simpler than that. There could be a winner in it,
and there was. There was the concept of peaceful co-existence and
there was understanding of what essentially the warring sides were
after. The United States is no longer an enemy of Russia, and victory
over Russia is not what Washington is after. Neither does Moscow
aspire to see America destroyed. More complicated instruments are
needed. What is needed is a strategy more intricate that the
straightforwardness of the Cold War. What is needed is an entirely
different level of responsibility for national leaders. Neither the
United States nor Russia can hope to win in this conflict, but both
may lose. Moreover, Russia may lose much more than it hopes to gain
nowadays with its deterrent policy.
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 12, 2006, p. 11
Translated by A. Ignatkin