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SAAKASHVILI CONVENES COMMISSION ON CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWING FROM CIS
By Zaal Anjaparidze
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
May 18 2006
One consideration that may influence Georgia's planned departure from
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is whether Tbilisi will
find itself alone and vulnerable to retaliation by an angry Russia.
So far, the Georgian government seems confident of its future
prospects.
Following the recent Russian embargo on Georgian agricultural
products (see EDM, April 20), President Mikheil Saakashvili created
a governmental commission to explore the possible consequences of
Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS. This commission convened for its
first meeting on May 13 and is expected to submit its final report in
two months. This schedule coincides with the Georgian parliament's
plans to discuss the continued deployment of Russian peacekeeping
troops operating under CIS mandate in the breakaway region of Abkhazia.
However, after the commission's first session, Georgian Foreign
Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that, although the political decision
about Georgia's departure from the CIS is "clear," discussions
are underway "about when and how to do this" (Civil Georgia, TV
Rustavi-2, May 13). This tactful statement suggests that Tbilisi may
use its declared intention to leave the CIS as a tool to bargain with
Russia. In any case, Georgia's official exit from the CIS evidently
will not take place overnight; most estimates predict it will take
closer to one year to be completed.
But so far, the Georgian government has left little room for doubt.
On January 25, Georgia quit the CIS Council of Defense Ministers,
saying it was a natural development considering the new political
leadership's stance in favor of integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures. The decision to leave the Russia-dominated CIS is largely
perceived to be a component of this policy, although Saakashvili
regularly reiterates that Georgia's aspiration to join NATO and to
maintain friendly relations with Russia do not and must not contradict
each other. These days Saakashvili has attempted to smooth Moscow's
irritation with conciliatory statements such as, "We want to be
part of NATO. But still the closest friend we have is Russia, for
many natural reasons" (Financial Times, May 15; TV-Imedi, May 9;
Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 10). But it seems that Moscow no longer
takes seriously such statements when they are not accompanied by
proof and when they conflict with other statements by Saakashvili
and his associates. The attempt to mobilize the Western community
to counteract Russia's resurrected expansionism in the post-Soviet
space was easily seen in Saakashvili's address to the "Common Vision
for a Common Neighborhood" conference in Vilnius on May 3-4.
The Russian government has already warned Georgia that it will be
deprived of preferences within the CIS if it leaves. Other punitive
measures, including the deportation of Georgian illegal labor migrants
likely, are not far off. Citing Komsomolskaya pravda, Kavkaz Press
reports that Russian authorities might refuse to recognize diplomas
from Georgia universities if Georgia quits CIS. The move, if actually
taken, would automatically deprive many Georgians of the opportunity
to work in Russia (Kavkaz Press, May 17).
The harshest of the potential punitive measures would be the abolition
of multilateral free-trade agreements. Such agreements allow member
states to avoid double taxation and facilitate the free movement of
goods within the CIS without any customs duties. Pundits, however, say
that Georgia could compensate for these economic losses by concluding
bilateral agreements among individual CIS members.
Similar agreements already exist with Russia, Ukraine, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
Some Georgian politicians and pundits criticize the government for
challenging Russia and argue that the costs of leaving the CIS are not
the "price of freedom," as Saakashvili's government argues. They say
that Georgia's impulsive departure from the CIS without a blessing
from the West or Russia would achieve only a symbolic victory, and
Saakashvili's government might incur numerous problems, including
public disorder. The significant increase in consumer tariffs on
electricity and natural gas in May and last winter's price hike on
imported Russian natural gas have already triggered sharp discontent
among socially vulnerable groups. "I doubt that the Georgians can
rub through for a long time," said analyst Ramaz Sakvarelidze. The
opposition sees the hand of Russia-leaning interest groups in this move
(Akhali Taoba, May 6, 13; TV-Rustavi-2, TV-Imedi, May 11-12).
Meanwhile, as anti-Russian and anti-CIS rhetoric increases, several
strategic Georgian economic entities, including energy units, are
smoothly transferring to control of CIS-based companies reportedly
backed by Russia. On May 12, the Kazakh bank TuranAlem won the tender
for Georgia's largest telephone operator -- United Telecommunication
Company of Georgia (UTCG) -- beating the U.S. Metromedia International
Group, which already possesses 30% of UTCG's shares.
The Kazakh state-run company KazTransGaz won a tender on the
Tbilisi-based gas distribution company Tbilgazi, and Greenoak Group
-- reportedly tied to Russian political and business groups -- won
a tender to privatize the Batumi seaport in Ajaria (Civil Georgia,
May 12; Resonansi, May 13, 15).
Whether the expected Russian pressure on Georgia brings results
desirable for Moscow will depend on the adequacy of Tbilisi's
countermeasures and the degree of support Georgia receives from its
traditional allies in the CIS and the West. It will also depend on
the political and civic awareness of the Georgian establishment and
domestic economic performance. The already tense relations between
Saakashvili's government and local businesses, the continued stagnation
of the Georgian economy, the falling support for the ruling National
Movement party, and the growing internal opposition to Saakashvili's
policies all weaken Tbilisi's stance against Moscow.
During a meeting with Croatian President Stjepan Mesic on May
7-8, Saakashvili confidently noted that Georgia would not be left
face-to-face with Russia again (TV Imedi, May 8). Growing tension
between the United States and Russia and repeated statements by
high-ranking U.S. officials about Washington's "legitimate interests
and relationships" with former Soviet republics will encourage the
pro-Western line of Saakashvili's team, which naturally must rule
out strengthening the highly politicized Russian economic foothold
in Georgia.
Therefore, Tbilisi must pursue careful policies with all stakeholders
in order to emerge from the current confrontation with Russia with
minimal losses.
By Zaal Anjaparidze
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
May 18 2006
One consideration that may influence Georgia's planned departure from
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is whether Tbilisi will
find itself alone and vulnerable to retaliation by an angry Russia.
So far, the Georgian government seems confident of its future
prospects.
Following the recent Russian embargo on Georgian agricultural
products (see EDM, April 20), President Mikheil Saakashvili created
a governmental commission to explore the possible consequences of
Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS. This commission convened for its
first meeting on May 13 and is expected to submit its final report in
two months. This schedule coincides with the Georgian parliament's
plans to discuss the continued deployment of Russian peacekeeping
troops operating under CIS mandate in the breakaway region of Abkhazia.
However, after the commission's first session, Georgian Foreign
Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that, although the political decision
about Georgia's departure from the CIS is "clear," discussions
are underway "about when and how to do this" (Civil Georgia, TV
Rustavi-2, May 13). This tactful statement suggests that Tbilisi may
use its declared intention to leave the CIS as a tool to bargain with
Russia. In any case, Georgia's official exit from the CIS evidently
will not take place overnight; most estimates predict it will take
closer to one year to be completed.
But so far, the Georgian government has left little room for doubt.
On January 25, Georgia quit the CIS Council of Defense Ministers,
saying it was a natural development considering the new political
leadership's stance in favor of integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures. The decision to leave the Russia-dominated CIS is largely
perceived to be a component of this policy, although Saakashvili
regularly reiterates that Georgia's aspiration to join NATO and to
maintain friendly relations with Russia do not and must not contradict
each other. These days Saakashvili has attempted to smooth Moscow's
irritation with conciliatory statements such as, "We want to be
part of NATO. But still the closest friend we have is Russia, for
many natural reasons" (Financial Times, May 15; TV-Imedi, May 9;
Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 10). But it seems that Moscow no longer
takes seriously such statements when they are not accompanied by
proof and when they conflict with other statements by Saakashvili
and his associates. The attempt to mobilize the Western community
to counteract Russia's resurrected expansionism in the post-Soviet
space was easily seen in Saakashvili's address to the "Common Vision
for a Common Neighborhood" conference in Vilnius on May 3-4.
The Russian government has already warned Georgia that it will be
deprived of preferences within the CIS if it leaves. Other punitive
measures, including the deportation of Georgian illegal labor migrants
likely, are not far off. Citing Komsomolskaya pravda, Kavkaz Press
reports that Russian authorities might refuse to recognize diplomas
from Georgia universities if Georgia quits CIS. The move, if actually
taken, would automatically deprive many Georgians of the opportunity
to work in Russia (Kavkaz Press, May 17).
The harshest of the potential punitive measures would be the abolition
of multilateral free-trade agreements. Such agreements allow member
states to avoid double taxation and facilitate the free movement of
goods within the CIS without any customs duties. Pundits, however, say
that Georgia could compensate for these economic losses by concluding
bilateral agreements among individual CIS members.
Similar agreements already exist with Russia, Ukraine, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
Some Georgian politicians and pundits criticize the government for
challenging Russia and argue that the costs of leaving the CIS are not
the "price of freedom," as Saakashvili's government argues. They say
that Georgia's impulsive departure from the CIS without a blessing
from the West or Russia would achieve only a symbolic victory, and
Saakashvili's government might incur numerous problems, including
public disorder. The significant increase in consumer tariffs on
electricity and natural gas in May and last winter's price hike on
imported Russian natural gas have already triggered sharp discontent
among socially vulnerable groups. "I doubt that the Georgians can
rub through for a long time," said analyst Ramaz Sakvarelidze. The
opposition sees the hand of Russia-leaning interest groups in this move
(Akhali Taoba, May 6, 13; TV-Rustavi-2, TV-Imedi, May 11-12).
Meanwhile, as anti-Russian and anti-CIS rhetoric increases, several
strategic Georgian economic entities, including energy units, are
smoothly transferring to control of CIS-based companies reportedly
backed by Russia. On May 12, the Kazakh bank TuranAlem won the tender
for Georgia's largest telephone operator -- United Telecommunication
Company of Georgia (UTCG) -- beating the U.S. Metromedia International
Group, which already possesses 30% of UTCG's shares.
The Kazakh state-run company KazTransGaz won a tender on the
Tbilisi-based gas distribution company Tbilgazi, and Greenoak Group
-- reportedly tied to Russian political and business groups -- won
a tender to privatize the Batumi seaport in Ajaria (Civil Georgia,
May 12; Resonansi, May 13, 15).
Whether the expected Russian pressure on Georgia brings results
desirable for Moscow will depend on the adequacy of Tbilisi's
countermeasures and the degree of support Georgia receives from its
traditional allies in the CIS and the West. It will also depend on
the political and civic awareness of the Georgian establishment and
domestic economic performance. The already tense relations between
Saakashvili's government and local businesses, the continued stagnation
of the Georgian economy, the falling support for the ruling National
Movement party, and the growing internal opposition to Saakashvili's
policies all weaken Tbilisi's stance against Moscow.
During a meeting with Croatian President Stjepan Mesic on May
7-8, Saakashvili confidently noted that Georgia would not be left
face-to-face with Russia again (TV Imedi, May 8). Growing tension
between the United States and Russia and repeated statements by
high-ranking U.S. officials about Washington's "legitimate interests
and relationships" with former Soviet republics will encourage the
pro-Western line of Saakashvili's team, which naturally must rule
out strengthening the highly politicized Russian economic foothold
in Georgia.
Therefore, Tbilisi must pursue careful policies with all stakeholders
in order to emerge from the current confrontation with Russia with
minimal losses.