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MONTENEGRO: THE INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM'S REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS
Stratfor
May 19 2006
Summary
Montenegro holds its independence referendum May 21. The result,
which will give the European Union a growing headache, will have
widespread repercussions. And the impact will resonate more strongly
the further from Montenegro one goes.
Analysis
Montenegro will finally vote on its referendum for independence from
Serbia on May 21. Serbia and Montenegro is the last component of the
five provinces once comprising Yugoslavia, though Montenegro has acted
as a de facto independent entity since 1997. Its tiny population of
612,000 -- made up of a mix religions and ethnicities with no one
group forming a majority -- is dwarfed by Serbia's 11 million. A vote
for independence would mean that Serbia and Montenegro would exist
separately for the first time since 1918.
With tensions in Montenegro rising, the population is almost evenly
split on how it will vote. Recent polls show that from 46 percent
to 49 percent of voters support independence while 40 percent to 45
percent oppose independence.
The split has led to outbreaks of violence, though only within
Montenegro. Fights have broken out at rallies for both sides. For
example, hundreds of police were deployed to a May 15 rally in the
central town of Niksic where pro-independence activists wearing
shirts emblazoned with the word "da," Serbo-Croatian for "yes,"
were attacked by pro-unionists.
The final decision on independence, however, belongs not exactly to
Montenegrins, but to the European Union, the power that exercises de
facto control over Montenegro's future after intervening repeatedly in
the past to prevent the Balkan republic from seceding. The European
Union set a rule that Montenegro can have its vote of independence,
but that a simple majority is insufficient, and a pro-independence vote
must have above 55 percent. This condition has been blasted repeatedly
by pro-independence forces, which have asked what the European Union
will decide if the vote falls somewhere between 50-55 percent. Such
a result is precisely what is likely to happen, meaning Montenegro
will remain politically polarized in the post-referendum period --
and the problem of what to do will be left squarely in the European
Union's lap.
A clear vote for independence means Montenegro will become an
EU protectorate on a possible route to EU membership. A vote
against independence or a vote failing to hit 55 percent will mean
Montenegro will become an EU protectorate existing under a painful
legal fiction. Though this status might include a possible route to
EU membership, Montenegro would still officially be linked to Serbia.
Either way, EU intervention has ensured Montenegro will continue to
be an EU problem.
The most obvious beneficiary of Montenegrin independence is Kosovo,
Serbia's other secessionist region. Kosovo is already in talks -- also
with the European Union -- to win its own independence referendum. The
European Union, however, is stalling on a final decision, just like
it did with Montenegro. But while Montenegro's vote is in question,
Kosovo's is not. As the province's population is 90 percent Albanian
Muslim, independence there is a certainty, with only the specific
terms left to be worked out. Kosovo's identity, unlike Montenegro,
is thus not torn over the issue.
If Montenegro gains independence, loud cries for secession can be
anticipated as far away as the Caucasus, with the disputed territories
of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia being the most likely
to initiate this clamor. All broke away from their parent states --
Azerbaijan in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia for the other
two -- in the early days of the post-Soviet period, and all three
have enjoyed de facto independence for over a decade. Bear in mind
that all three already claim independence; at issue is whether they
will seek to use international institutions to formalize this claim.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the most likely to move in this direction, in
that it holds easily defensible mountainous territory affording more
direct access to its most important ally, Armenia, than to its foe,
Azerbaijan. The second-most-likely territory to follow this path
is Abkhazia, which has soundly defeated the Georgian military on
multiple occasions. Abkhazia's reputation for fielding fierce and
competent fighters is as strong as the Georgian military's reputation
for ineffectiveness.
South Ossetia, however, is unlikely to prove as successful. It lacks
Nagorno-Karabakh's geography and the martial skills of Abkhazia. Its
biggest advantage used to be the assistance it could count on from
its cousins in North Ossetia, who formerly could be expected to swarm
across the border to help in the event of Georgian-South Ossetian
hostilities. But since the atrocity at Beslan, the North Ossetians are
more concerned with protecting their own at home than with helping
relatives abroad fight a secessionist struggle. Only Russia could
help South Ossetia win its struggle, but such aid could well cost
Russia dearly in its own international relations.
Other secessionist regions and groups potentially seeking to take
advantage of any Montenegrin precedent include the Transdniestria
region of Moldova and the Bosnian Serbs or the Albanians of
Macedonia, but none of these three are likely to get much traction
from Montenegro's potential split. Unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Transdniestria is sandwiched between Moldova,
which wants the territory back, and Ukraine, which wants Moldova to
get the territory back. Both states bear hostility to Russia, the
one state which indirectly backs Transdniestria's independence drive.
Without at least tacit approval from Ukraine, Transdniestria's days
as a quasi-state are numbered.
The Serbs of Bosnia and Albanians of Macedonia face even more
obstacles. Both regions have European forces stationed on their
territory, specifically tasked with preventing any secessionist efforts
from manifesting. Moreover, Serbia, the entity most likely to lend
the Bosnian Serbs a hand, is emotionally, financially and militarily
exhausted -- and certainly does not want to risk another military
confrontation with NATO, the power enforcing the peace in Bosnia.
for maps check:
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/re ad_article.php?id=266430
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Stratfor
May 19 2006
Summary
Montenegro holds its independence referendum May 21. The result,
which will give the European Union a growing headache, will have
widespread repercussions. And the impact will resonate more strongly
the further from Montenegro one goes.
Analysis
Montenegro will finally vote on its referendum for independence from
Serbia on May 21. Serbia and Montenegro is the last component of the
five provinces once comprising Yugoslavia, though Montenegro has acted
as a de facto independent entity since 1997. Its tiny population of
612,000 -- made up of a mix religions and ethnicities with no one
group forming a majority -- is dwarfed by Serbia's 11 million. A vote
for independence would mean that Serbia and Montenegro would exist
separately for the first time since 1918.
With tensions in Montenegro rising, the population is almost evenly
split on how it will vote. Recent polls show that from 46 percent
to 49 percent of voters support independence while 40 percent to 45
percent oppose independence.
The split has led to outbreaks of violence, though only within
Montenegro. Fights have broken out at rallies for both sides. For
example, hundreds of police were deployed to a May 15 rally in the
central town of Niksic where pro-independence activists wearing
shirts emblazoned with the word "da," Serbo-Croatian for "yes,"
were attacked by pro-unionists.
The final decision on independence, however, belongs not exactly to
Montenegrins, but to the European Union, the power that exercises de
facto control over Montenegro's future after intervening repeatedly in
the past to prevent the Balkan republic from seceding. The European
Union set a rule that Montenegro can have its vote of independence,
but that a simple majority is insufficient, and a pro-independence vote
must have above 55 percent. This condition has been blasted repeatedly
by pro-independence forces, which have asked what the European Union
will decide if the vote falls somewhere between 50-55 percent. Such
a result is precisely what is likely to happen, meaning Montenegro
will remain politically polarized in the post-referendum period --
and the problem of what to do will be left squarely in the European
Union's lap.
A clear vote for independence means Montenegro will become an
EU protectorate on a possible route to EU membership. A vote
against independence or a vote failing to hit 55 percent will mean
Montenegro will become an EU protectorate existing under a painful
legal fiction. Though this status might include a possible route to
EU membership, Montenegro would still officially be linked to Serbia.
Either way, EU intervention has ensured Montenegro will continue to
be an EU problem.
The most obvious beneficiary of Montenegrin independence is Kosovo,
Serbia's other secessionist region. Kosovo is already in talks -- also
with the European Union -- to win its own independence referendum. The
European Union, however, is stalling on a final decision, just like
it did with Montenegro. But while Montenegro's vote is in question,
Kosovo's is not. As the province's population is 90 percent Albanian
Muslim, independence there is a certainty, with only the specific
terms left to be worked out. Kosovo's identity, unlike Montenegro,
is thus not torn over the issue.
If Montenegro gains independence, loud cries for secession can be
anticipated as far away as the Caucasus, with the disputed territories
of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia being the most likely
to initiate this clamor. All broke away from their parent states --
Azerbaijan in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia for the other
two -- in the early days of the post-Soviet period, and all three
have enjoyed de facto independence for over a decade. Bear in mind
that all three already claim independence; at issue is whether they
will seek to use international institutions to formalize this claim.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the most likely to move in this direction, in
that it holds easily defensible mountainous territory affording more
direct access to its most important ally, Armenia, than to its foe,
Azerbaijan. The second-most-likely territory to follow this path
is Abkhazia, which has soundly defeated the Georgian military on
multiple occasions. Abkhazia's reputation for fielding fierce and
competent fighters is as strong as the Georgian military's reputation
for ineffectiveness.
South Ossetia, however, is unlikely to prove as successful. It lacks
Nagorno-Karabakh's geography and the martial skills of Abkhazia. Its
biggest advantage used to be the assistance it could count on from
its cousins in North Ossetia, who formerly could be expected to swarm
across the border to help in the event of Georgian-South Ossetian
hostilities. But since the atrocity at Beslan, the North Ossetians are
more concerned with protecting their own at home than with helping
relatives abroad fight a secessionist struggle. Only Russia could
help South Ossetia win its struggle, but such aid could well cost
Russia dearly in its own international relations.
Other secessionist regions and groups potentially seeking to take
advantage of any Montenegrin precedent include the Transdniestria
region of Moldova and the Bosnian Serbs or the Albanians of
Macedonia, but none of these three are likely to get much traction
from Montenegro's potential split. Unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Transdniestria is sandwiched between Moldova,
which wants the territory back, and Ukraine, which wants Moldova to
get the territory back. Both states bear hostility to Russia, the
one state which indirectly backs Transdniestria's independence drive.
Without at least tacit approval from Ukraine, Transdniestria's days
as a quasi-state are numbered.
The Serbs of Bosnia and Albanians of Macedonia face even more
obstacles. Both regions have European forces stationed on their
territory, specifically tasked with preventing any secessionist efforts
from manifesting. Moreover, Serbia, the entity most likely to lend
the Bosnian Serbs a hand, is emotionally, financially and militarily
exhausted -- and certainly does not want to risk another military
confrontation with NATO, the power enforcing the peace in Bosnia.
for maps check:
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/re ad_article.php?id=266430
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress