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THE ARMENIAN SOCIETY AND RUSSIA NEED A NEW MEDIATOR
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 1 2006
All this fuss about the Iran-Armenia pipeline has two underlying
components, and both have a core strategic importance for Armenia.
And perhaps we can say the second remains outside the attention
focused on the first, whereas it is more important than the first.
Certainly, by entitling Russia to the gas pipeline, which is already
a fact, the Armenian government makes a major strategic mistake.
There has been a lot of consideration on this, although this
consideration cannot be too much when the security and development
of a country is concerned. However, I think, there is another thing
in all this story, which refers to and threatens the security and
development of the state but does not get sufficient attention.
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan stated during his meeting with
Putin on October 30 in Moscow that "the serious arrangements with
Gazprom are already brought into being." In fact, Armenia confesses
on a presidential level that no negotations were conducted with
Gazprom, though the prime minister and the defense minister assured
the contrary, for months on, but there were "serious arrangements".
Consequently, it is already clear that the Armenian government has
cheated its citizens for several months on. And when the government
cheats its citizens, this is a more serious and bigger threat than
giving or not giving something to another country. After all this
giving or not giving is also a consequence of the lie in the relations
of the government and the public. Consequently, the government is
first accountable for denying information to the public than for
giving the gas pipeline to the Russians.
And if the society ever makes up its mind to restore the national
property, which already belongs to another country, even though a
friendly country and a strategic partner, it first needs to solve the
problem of honesty of the government. Otherwise, we are sure to lose
whatever we get back.
It is also interesting why the government hides the truth if sooner
or later it will inevitably float, especially that the talks are
conducted with a friendly country the Armenian society definitely
sympathizes with, still even more than with France. Why does the
Armenian government hide these negotiations and the arrangements
made in these negotiations until these are brought into being? The
reason is perhaps to be sought in the same policy of lie. Official
Yerevan perhaps also cheats official Moscow. It is clear that if the
negotiations with Russians were conducted openly, they would get a
strong backlash from the society. At least, if the Armenian society
does not consist of "hopelessly grateful people" mainly, who are
ready to spend the rest of their conscious life ragging their knees
or the ground in front of one embassy or another, giving away objects,
which are connected with the national security, to even the strategic
partner should arouse dissatisfaction among this society.
And if the partner is truly strategic, and its Caucasian policy is
based on serious calculations and analyses rather than "serious
arrangements with Armenia", it is simply obliged to take into
consideration the public moods and opinion, especially regarding
the issues it is directly concerned with. After all, the meaning of
taking something should be the belief of the majority that it is the
best solution for the fate of that object. Otherwise, the obtained
object may serve as a truncheon which can demolish but never create,
perhaps only demolish creatively. And a policy, which is based on
the principle of demolition does not have a chance to succeed. Does
Russia realize this? It appears to be highly simple, and it would
be surprising if it did not. And the fact that the Kremlin regularly
tossed pieces of information on the acquisition of the gas pipeline,
whereas the Armenian government tenaciously denied, means that the
Russians, nevertheless, realized the nuances of the situation and
gave direct messages to the Armenian society.
In fact, these messages did not get a response, or it was not
sufficient. Or the government managed to shift the problem of lie
into the problem of giving or not giving, and would announce easily
that we won't give away anything, and everything would be forgotten.
The Russians would raise the issue again, and the Armenians would
settle the problem again. The two main victims of this deal in
perspective should draw conclusions: the Armenian society, which is
losing almost the sole guarantee of its energy security, and Russia,
whose reputation is diminishing like a geometric progression in already
the third country of the Caucasus. Consequently, the "victims" should
seriously consider finding a new mediator for their relations because
it is evident that the existing mediator, the Armenian government
cheats both parties. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should
consider changing the government of Armenia.
This is the problem of the Armenian society. Russia had better not
disturb. Especially that it has a lot of other work to do in Armenia.
The Kremlin had better attend to its "emissaries" supplying information
from Armenia in order to have them be closer to the public than one
government official or another.
It is possible that Russia is not interested in all this. It is
possible that this is so, but this is politics, and if you do not
attend to this, it will attend to you. Of course, it is also possible
that the Armenian society and Russia do not need a new mediator but
a new Armenian society and a new Russia.
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 1 2006
All this fuss about the Iran-Armenia pipeline has two underlying
components, and both have a core strategic importance for Armenia.
And perhaps we can say the second remains outside the attention
focused on the first, whereas it is more important than the first.
Certainly, by entitling Russia to the gas pipeline, which is already
a fact, the Armenian government makes a major strategic mistake.
There has been a lot of consideration on this, although this
consideration cannot be too much when the security and development
of a country is concerned. However, I think, there is another thing
in all this story, which refers to and threatens the security and
development of the state but does not get sufficient attention.
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan stated during his meeting with
Putin on October 30 in Moscow that "the serious arrangements with
Gazprom are already brought into being." In fact, Armenia confesses
on a presidential level that no negotations were conducted with
Gazprom, though the prime minister and the defense minister assured
the contrary, for months on, but there were "serious arrangements".
Consequently, it is already clear that the Armenian government has
cheated its citizens for several months on. And when the government
cheats its citizens, this is a more serious and bigger threat than
giving or not giving something to another country. After all this
giving or not giving is also a consequence of the lie in the relations
of the government and the public. Consequently, the government is
first accountable for denying information to the public than for
giving the gas pipeline to the Russians.
And if the society ever makes up its mind to restore the national
property, which already belongs to another country, even though a
friendly country and a strategic partner, it first needs to solve the
problem of honesty of the government. Otherwise, we are sure to lose
whatever we get back.
It is also interesting why the government hides the truth if sooner
or later it will inevitably float, especially that the talks are
conducted with a friendly country the Armenian society definitely
sympathizes with, still even more than with France. Why does the
Armenian government hide these negotiations and the arrangements
made in these negotiations until these are brought into being? The
reason is perhaps to be sought in the same policy of lie. Official
Yerevan perhaps also cheats official Moscow. It is clear that if the
negotiations with Russians were conducted openly, they would get a
strong backlash from the society. At least, if the Armenian society
does not consist of "hopelessly grateful people" mainly, who are
ready to spend the rest of their conscious life ragging their knees
or the ground in front of one embassy or another, giving away objects,
which are connected with the national security, to even the strategic
partner should arouse dissatisfaction among this society.
And if the partner is truly strategic, and its Caucasian policy is
based on serious calculations and analyses rather than "serious
arrangements with Armenia", it is simply obliged to take into
consideration the public moods and opinion, especially regarding
the issues it is directly concerned with. After all, the meaning of
taking something should be the belief of the majority that it is the
best solution for the fate of that object. Otherwise, the obtained
object may serve as a truncheon which can demolish but never create,
perhaps only demolish creatively. And a policy, which is based on
the principle of demolition does not have a chance to succeed. Does
Russia realize this? It appears to be highly simple, and it would
be surprising if it did not. And the fact that the Kremlin regularly
tossed pieces of information on the acquisition of the gas pipeline,
whereas the Armenian government tenaciously denied, means that the
Russians, nevertheless, realized the nuances of the situation and
gave direct messages to the Armenian society.
In fact, these messages did not get a response, or it was not
sufficient. Or the government managed to shift the problem of lie
into the problem of giving or not giving, and would announce easily
that we won't give away anything, and everything would be forgotten.
The Russians would raise the issue again, and the Armenians would
settle the problem again. The two main victims of this deal in
perspective should draw conclusions: the Armenian society, which is
losing almost the sole guarantee of its energy security, and Russia,
whose reputation is diminishing like a geometric progression in already
the third country of the Caucasus. Consequently, the "victims" should
seriously consider finding a new mediator for their relations because
it is evident that the existing mediator, the Armenian government
cheats both parties. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should
consider changing the government of Armenia.
This is the problem of the Armenian society. Russia had better not
disturb. Especially that it has a lot of other work to do in Armenia.
The Kremlin had better attend to its "emissaries" supplying information
from Armenia in order to have them be closer to the public than one
government official or another.
It is possible that Russia is not interested in all this. It is
possible that this is so, but this is politics, and if you do not
attend to this, it will attend to you. Of course, it is also possible
that the Armenian society and Russia do not need a new mediator but
a new Armenian society and a new Russia.