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THEY DRANK TO VICTORY IN ADVANCE
James Hakobyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
Javakheti is a country of lakes. In this territory with a population
of about 70 thousand there are about 20 big and small lakes. The
most famous, the biggest and the "water symbol" of Javakheti is
Lake Parvana. It is difficult to say what the minister of defense
hinted when he invited the foreign minister of Georgia and his
Armenian counterpart to dine at the Parvana Restaurant. Perhaps
he had calculated that even if Bejuashvili were reluctant to speak
about Javakheti, the name of the restaurant would constantly remind
him of it. On the other hand, it is possible that Bejuashvili had
greater interest to speak about Javakheti. And it is possible that
he considered this in choosing the Parvana for dinner. Perhaps it
was a hint that the Armenians are the host in Parvana. However, it is
hardly possible that Georgia does not know this and needs additional
remarks. Otherwise, official Tbilisi would not try its best to replace
the hosting side in Javakheti and would not visit Armenia on the eve
of the local election there. Meanwhile, in this context the relation
with Armenia has a definite purpose. Georgia realizes that at least
in the upcoming few years the demographic pattern in Javakheti will
be in favor of the Armenians. Radical actions are required to change
it quickly. But radical actions would lead to an adequate reaction of
the population and instability. This is not favorable for Georgia at
the moment. Therefore, Tbilisi does not make radical moves in Javakheti
like in the case of the Azerbaijanis of Marneuli. Sahakashvili started
a real chase there and made it clear in this relation that the power
would belong to Tbilisi.
Georgia has chosen a different tactics with regard to the issue of
Javakheti, and thinking and considering that for the time being
they can have little influence on the Armenians of Javakheti,
Tbilisi tries to set up relations with the Javakheti Armenians
via the Armenian government or influential figures of the Armenian
government. In other words, if the Armenians of Javakheti are not
subject to Tbilisi, they must make efforts to make them subject to
Yerevan. And perhaps Bejuashvili was trying to settle this problem by
having a meal in Armenia before the local election. On the other hand,
it is a rather dangerous game for Georgia because if the Armenian
government establishes its influence in Javakheti, it may "take away"
this region from the Georgians. Apparently, however, Tbilisi has
thought about this. Before coming to dinner in Armenia Georgia hinted
at its reluctance to pay for anything and stated that Armenia should
do. It was not accidental that when the Russian-Georgian spy scandal
started, Georgia stated that the actions of the Russian spies were
coordinated from Yerevan. This statement did not appear to have a
continuation but it is notable that Armenia did not react. Official
Yerevan did not try to demand explanations from Tbilisi. The reason
might be that Tbilisi could give an explanation. In that case, it
would be Yerevan's turn to explain.
Even if there was espionage, and was instigated by the Russians, it
is related to Armenia if it was coordinated from Yerevan. And it is
already an issue of national security when the territory of a country
is turned into headquarters of spies in the region.
Considering this, the seriousness of the accusation from Tbilisi
becomes apparent, and in this context the silence of official Yerevan
kindles doubts that in reality it was considered more expedient to keep
silent about this fact rather than demand explanation. And in politics
everything has its price. Tbilisi agrees to keep silent, and Yerevan
agrees to keep the processes in Javakheti under control. And whatever
they cannot keep under control they keep at the remand prison of the
National Security, like in the case of Vahagn Chakhalyan, who did not
agree to join the national organizations of the Armenians of Javakheti
gathered under the flag of the ruling political party of Georgia, which
got 70 percent of votes in the local election by official statistics.
In fact, it was the victory of official Tbilisi and Yerevan rather
than the Armenians of Javakheti, and the toast to this victory may
have been drunk at the Parvana, in advance. It will become clear
in the course of time what this victory will bring to Javakheti. It
should be noted, however, that Yerevan and Tbilisi have always reached
agreement on Javakheti, and the only problem that has been solved is
enclosing the exiting problems successfully.
James Hakobyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
Javakheti is a country of lakes. In this territory with a population
of about 70 thousand there are about 20 big and small lakes. The
most famous, the biggest and the "water symbol" of Javakheti is
Lake Parvana. It is difficult to say what the minister of defense
hinted when he invited the foreign minister of Georgia and his
Armenian counterpart to dine at the Parvana Restaurant. Perhaps
he had calculated that even if Bejuashvili were reluctant to speak
about Javakheti, the name of the restaurant would constantly remind
him of it. On the other hand, it is possible that Bejuashvili had
greater interest to speak about Javakheti. And it is possible that
he considered this in choosing the Parvana for dinner. Perhaps it
was a hint that the Armenians are the host in Parvana. However, it is
hardly possible that Georgia does not know this and needs additional
remarks. Otherwise, official Tbilisi would not try its best to replace
the hosting side in Javakheti and would not visit Armenia on the eve
of the local election there. Meanwhile, in this context the relation
with Armenia has a definite purpose. Georgia realizes that at least
in the upcoming few years the demographic pattern in Javakheti will
be in favor of the Armenians. Radical actions are required to change
it quickly. But radical actions would lead to an adequate reaction of
the population and instability. This is not favorable for Georgia at
the moment. Therefore, Tbilisi does not make radical moves in Javakheti
like in the case of the Azerbaijanis of Marneuli. Sahakashvili started
a real chase there and made it clear in this relation that the power
would belong to Tbilisi.
Georgia has chosen a different tactics with regard to the issue of
Javakheti, and thinking and considering that for the time being
they can have little influence on the Armenians of Javakheti,
Tbilisi tries to set up relations with the Javakheti Armenians
via the Armenian government or influential figures of the Armenian
government. In other words, if the Armenians of Javakheti are not
subject to Tbilisi, they must make efforts to make them subject to
Yerevan. And perhaps Bejuashvili was trying to settle this problem by
having a meal in Armenia before the local election. On the other hand,
it is a rather dangerous game for Georgia because if the Armenian
government establishes its influence in Javakheti, it may "take away"
this region from the Georgians. Apparently, however, Tbilisi has
thought about this. Before coming to dinner in Armenia Georgia hinted
at its reluctance to pay for anything and stated that Armenia should
do. It was not accidental that when the Russian-Georgian spy scandal
started, Georgia stated that the actions of the Russian spies were
coordinated from Yerevan. This statement did not appear to have a
continuation but it is notable that Armenia did not react. Official
Yerevan did not try to demand explanations from Tbilisi. The reason
might be that Tbilisi could give an explanation. In that case, it
would be Yerevan's turn to explain.
Even if there was espionage, and was instigated by the Russians, it
is related to Armenia if it was coordinated from Yerevan. And it is
already an issue of national security when the territory of a country
is turned into headquarters of spies in the region.
Considering this, the seriousness of the accusation from Tbilisi
becomes apparent, and in this context the silence of official Yerevan
kindles doubts that in reality it was considered more expedient to keep
silent about this fact rather than demand explanation. And in politics
everything has its price. Tbilisi agrees to keep silent, and Yerevan
agrees to keep the processes in Javakheti under control. And whatever
they cannot keep under control they keep at the remand prison of the
National Security, like in the case of Vahagn Chakhalyan, who did not
agree to join the national organizations of the Armenians of Javakheti
gathered under the flag of the ruling political party of Georgia, which
got 70 percent of votes in the local election by official statistics.
In fact, it was the victory of official Tbilisi and Yerevan rather
than the Armenians of Javakheti, and the toast to this victory may
have been drunk at the Parvana, in advance. It will become clear
in the course of time what this victory will bring to Javakheti. It
should be noted, however, that Yerevan and Tbilisi have always reached
agreement on Javakheti, and the only problem that has been solved is
enclosing the exiting problems successfully.