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NATO DOES NOT HAVE A UNIFORM APPROACH TO PROBLEMATIC ZONES OF THE CIS
Translated by Pavel Pushkin
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 13, 2006, p. 16
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
November 15, 2006 Wednesday
NATO WILL NOT HELP;
by Sergei Markedonov, deputy director of the department of inter-ethnic
relations department of the Institute of Political and Military
Analysis
RUSSIA IS SCARED BY NATO EXPANSION ON ACCOUNT OF CIS COUNTRIES BUT
NATO DOES NOT HAVE A UNIFORM APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM; A new round
of Russian-Georgian confrontation highlighted the role of NATO in
post-Soviet geopolitics and in resolving the "frozen conflicts"
in the CIS.
A new round of Russian-Georgian confrontation highlighted the role
of NATO in post-Soviet geopolitics and in resolving the "frozen
conflicts" in the CIS. On the one hand, it is alarming that countries
that announce entrance into NATO as their strategic prospect view
Russia as a "potential opponent" and view its role in resolving the
"frozen conflicts" only negatively. There is also the other side.
There is a question, "What does NATO to do with this?"
NATO is not a branch of the US Department of State. Overall, it is
wrong to identify NATO and the US. NATO is an organization established
on the basis of a treaty among separate national states having their
own interests often different from each other including such interests
in post-Soviet space. NATO includes Bulgaria and Romania that wish
to internationalize the Black Sea, whereas Turkey is interested in
preserving "Black Sea Ltd" where the principal shareholders are
Turkey and Russia (that is not a NATO member at all)! Such NATO
members as Poland and Romania have different views on post-Soviet
space too. Poland does its best to maintain territorial integrity of
Ukraine and acts as its patron on the path to NATO and the European
Union. Romania has a difficult and controversial history of border
relations with Ukraine. Although the problem of North Bukovina
has remained in the past, Romania is still disputing belonging of
Zmeiny Island to Ukraine. Besides, Romania is a patron of Moldova in
NATO. Hence there is difference in the views of Warsaw and Bucharest on
the Trans-Dniester regulation. It is possible to recall that France is
a co-chair of the Minsk OSCE group for the Nagorno-Karabakh regulation
and Turkey has had economic blockage of Armenia (because of occupation
of a part of Azerbaijani territory by this republic) since 1993.
Thus, NATO is a complex institution that makes all decisions
(including those on attitude to the "frozen conflicts") on the basis
of consensus. This circumstance turns NATO (especially after its
expansion) into an insufficiently mobile and efficient institution.
Besides the policy of NATO in the CIS (as an institution) there is
also policy of separate NATO members in the Caucasus or in other
regions of the CIS. Whereas the US views the Caucasus as a rear line
of its Middle Eastern front, the European Union countries view it as
a testing ground for trial of the "good neighborhood policy."
So, what is the challenge of NATO to Russia? In our opinion, one of the
main problems of Russia's diplomacy is inability to clearly formulate
the essence of "NATO fears." Most likely, Russia is afraid of not
NATO itself that experiences bad times. Russia is rather afraid of
NATO expansion on account of the states being, to put this mildly,
unfriendly to our country, which may change the Russian vector of
NATO policy. In this aspect the biggest apprehensions are caused by
the "special conditions" stated by Brussels for NATO neophytes. The
NATO establishment is insufficiently demanding to the former Soviet
republics.
To date, one of the most important conditions for entrance into NATO
was an internal consensus in the political elite and in the population
of a candidate country. It is obvious that there is no such consensus
in Ukraine or in Georgia. If we speak about Georgia in the borders of
the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia), it is clear that such consensus is impossible. This idea is
rejected in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi. However, it seems that nobody hears
this. At any rate, after passing the resolution of the UN Security
Council on Georgia opinion of official NATO representatives was
corrected noticeably. In one of the latest interviews NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer admitted conduction of "intensive dialog"
with Georgia but said, "This does not mean that Georgia will soon
enter NATO. Although Tbilisi has been obviously striving for this,
further steps will depend on the extent to which Georgia is adherent
to the basic principles of NATO like peaceful resolving of internal
and external contradictions. The matter is about resolving conflicts
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia."
That is why it is logical to ask: is it worth encouraging potential
members with prospects of their soonest entrance into NATO or is this
a long and drawn out process? Would it be more honest to hint that
NATO is not a political resource in their struggle against Russia?
Moreover so that their own ethnocratic and authoritarian trends are
often disguised as the struggle against "empire ambitions."
Translated by Pavel Pushkin
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 13, 2006, p. 16
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
November 15, 2006 Wednesday
NATO WILL NOT HELP;
by Sergei Markedonov, deputy director of the department of inter-ethnic
relations department of the Institute of Political and Military
Analysis
RUSSIA IS SCARED BY NATO EXPANSION ON ACCOUNT OF CIS COUNTRIES BUT
NATO DOES NOT HAVE A UNIFORM APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM; A new round
of Russian-Georgian confrontation highlighted the role of NATO in
post-Soviet geopolitics and in resolving the "frozen conflicts"
in the CIS.
A new round of Russian-Georgian confrontation highlighted the role
of NATO in post-Soviet geopolitics and in resolving the "frozen
conflicts" in the CIS. On the one hand, it is alarming that countries
that announce entrance into NATO as their strategic prospect view
Russia as a "potential opponent" and view its role in resolving the
"frozen conflicts" only negatively. There is also the other side.
There is a question, "What does NATO to do with this?"
NATO is not a branch of the US Department of State. Overall, it is
wrong to identify NATO and the US. NATO is an organization established
on the basis of a treaty among separate national states having their
own interests often different from each other including such interests
in post-Soviet space. NATO includes Bulgaria and Romania that wish
to internationalize the Black Sea, whereas Turkey is interested in
preserving "Black Sea Ltd" where the principal shareholders are
Turkey and Russia (that is not a NATO member at all)! Such NATO
members as Poland and Romania have different views on post-Soviet
space too. Poland does its best to maintain territorial integrity of
Ukraine and acts as its patron on the path to NATO and the European
Union. Romania has a difficult and controversial history of border
relations with Ukraine. Although the problem of North Bukovina
has remained in the past, Romania is still disputing belonging of
Zmeiny Island to Ukraine. Besides, Romania is a patron of Moldova in
NATO. Hence there is difference in the views of Warsaw and Bucharest on
the Trans-Dniester regulation. It is possible to recall that France is
a co-chair of the Minsk OSCE group for the Nagorno-Karabakh regulation
and Turkey has had economic blockage of Armenia (because of occupation
of a part of Azerbaijani territory by this republic) since 1993.
Thus, NATO is a complex institution that makes all decisions
(including those on attitude to the "frozen conflicts") on the basis
of consensus. This circumstance turns NATO (especially after its
expansion) into an insufficiently mobile and efficient institution.
Besides the policy of NATO in the CIS (as an institution) there is
also policy of separate NATO members in the Caucasus or in other
regions of the CIS. Whereas the US views the Caucasus as a rear line
of its Middle Eastern front, the European Union countries view it as
a testing ground for trial of the "good neighborhood policy."
So, what is the challenge of NATO to Russia? In our opinion, one of the
main problems of Russia's diplomacy is inability to clearly formulate
the essence of "NATO fears." Most likely, Russia is afraid of not
NATO itself that experiences bad times. Russia is rather afraid of
NATO expansion on account of the states being, to put this mildly,
unfriendly to our country, which may change the Russian vector of
NATO policy. In this aspect the biggest apprehensions are caused by
the "special conditions" stated by Brussels for NATO neophytes. The
NATO establishment is insufficiently demanding to the former Soviet
republics.
To date, one of the most important conditions for entrance into NATO
was an internal consensus in the political elite and in the population
of a candidate country. It is obvious that there is no such consensus
in Ukraine or in Georgia. If we speak about Georgia in the borders of
the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia), it is clear that such consensus is impossible. This idea is
rejected in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi. However, it seems that nobody hears
this. At any rate, after passing the resolution of the UN Security
Council on Georgia opinion of official NATO representatives was
corrected noticeably. In one of the latest interviews NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer admitted conduction of "intensive dialog"
with Georgia but said, "This does not mean that Georgia will soon
enter NATO. Although Tbilisi has been obviously striving for this,
further steps will depend on the extent to which Georgia is adherent
to the basic principles of NATO like peaceful resolving of internal
and external contradictions. The matter is about resolving conflicts
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia."
That is why it is logical to ask: is it worth encouraging potential
members with prospects of their soonest entrance into NATO or is this
a long and drawn out process? Would it be more honest to hint that
NATO is not a political resource in their struggle against Russia?
Moreover so that their own ethnocratic and authoritarian trends are
often disguised as the struggle against "empire ambitions."