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RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN TENSION RAISE CONCERNS IN ARMENIA, BUT NO REAL IMPACT YET
Haroutiun Khachatrian
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Nov 15 2006
Armenia, a vulnerable country in both the geopolitical and geographical
senses, stands to suffer serious damage due to the increasing tensions
in the crisis in Russian-Georgian relations. The danger has several
aspects. First, Armenia is a military ally to Russia, and risks to
become separated from it by a potential member of NATO, which Georgia
seeks to adhere to.
Second, the Russian-Georgian conflict, not to mention any instability
in Armenia's northern neighbor, would cut the most important
communication link between Armenia and the outer world. As the land
borders of Armenia with two of its neighbors - Azerbaijan and Turkey
- are closed due to political reasons, Armenia can trade goods with
the outer world only through Iran and Georgia, the latter serving
more than half of Armenia's foreign cargo turnover. Third, worsening
Georgian-Russian relations could hinder vital supplies from Russia from
reaching Armenia, first of all natural gas, which flows to Armenia
through a pipeline crossing the territory of Georgia. Fourth, the
large Armenian community of Georgia may be involved in the conflict,
especially the Armenians living in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region
of southern Georgia, whose living standards are poor and who are
traditionally pro-Russian. The latter danger becomes more acute given
the perspective of construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi
railroad, which is to traverse the region, bringing fears among
local Armenians that the region would fall into the sphere of Turkish
influence. Finally, of vital importance for Armenia are not only its
good relations with the immediate parties of the conflict, Georgia
and Russia, but also with the western countries and in particular
the United States. These relations might suffer should Washington
protect Georgia more actively in its conflict with Russia.
Not surprisingly, the tension among Russia and Georgia provoked vivid
discussions in the Armenian political elite. For the second time in
less than a year, politicians - even those belonging to the parties
of the ruling coalition - raised the issue of the necessity of a
revision, or at least clarification, of the terms of the "Strategic
alliance" with Russia. The first instance was in January, when Armenian
politicians were surprised to learn that the "strategic partnership"
with Russia did not protect Armenia from a sudden doubling of the price
of the Russian natural gas. There is a consensus in Yerevan that in
its actions, Russia does not always take into account the interests
of its only ally in the Caucasus. The criticism was especially high
after Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian State Duma, said in
an interview with a local newspaper that Armenia "does not support
its strategic partner [Russia]" in its conflict with Georgia. If
Armenian-Georgian relations are an obstacle for Russia's relations
with Armenia, we [the Russians] have the right to call on Armenia
to choose: either you have normal relations with Russia or you have
normal relations with Georgia," Zatulin said.
The Armenian leadership has managed to escape such a pitfall, at least
for the time being. The transport blockade of Georgian territory did
not harm Armenian cargoes, as formally Russia banned only contacts
with the Georgian transport operators, and Armenian businessmen never
used their services. Ironically, Russia's earlier actions had indeed
hurt the interests of Armenian business, but this did not attract
significant attention. It was the closure of the Verkhnii Lars
(Upper Lars) checkpoint on the Russian-Georgian border last June,
the only land link between Russia and Armenia. By closing it under the
pretext of "repairs", Russia sought to activate an alternative route
through the territory of pro-Russian South Ossetia, not controlled by
Georgian authorities. However, Tbilisi prohibited foreigners from using
this route (and there were no other foreigners except Armenians which
needed it), whereas the citizens of Georgia were free to use it. Thus,
Armenian carriers were forced to switch to other existing options,
namely, through the Black Sea ports of Georgia to Russia or Ukraine,
causing another wave of grumble in Armenia. In any case, these latter
routes were not affected by the Russian October sanctions against
Georgia, and the Armenian businessmen did not suffer anew.
Armenia's gas supplies are also unlikely to suffer, even if Georgia
and Russia fail to reach a purchase agreement for the next year,
similar to what happened last winter in the Ukraine. First, Georgia
is unlikely to take gas set for Armenia, as this would be seen as an
obvious hostile action in Yerevan. Second, in December, Armenia will
inaugurate an alternative gas supply pipeline, from Iran, which can
in principle fully cover the needs of Armenia, enabling Russia simply
to cut its supplies through Georgia.
As for the Samtskhe-Javakheti issue, the surprise October arrest
in Yerevan of Vahan Chakhalian, a radical leader of the Javakheti
Armenians, was interpreted by most of experts as a gesture aimed
to show the Georgian leadership that Yerevan would not support any
actions capable to destabilize that sensitive region.
Yerevan has managed to keep stable relations with both conflicting
parties, which was demonstrated in a series of recent contacts,
including the Russian-Armenian summit meeting in Moscow in late
October and a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and
Georgia, also in Moscow. The relations with Washington have not
suffered either, as evident from the recent statements of American
officials that the Millennium Challenge program of Armenia will not
be interrupted despite the calls of human rights watchdogs.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_articl e.php?articleid=4566
Haroutiun Khachatrian
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Nov 15 2006
Armenia, a vulnerable country in both the geopolitical and geographical
senses, stands to suffer serious damage due to the increasing tensions
in the crisis in Russian-Georgian relations. The danger has several
aspects. First, Armenia is a military ally to Russia, and risks to
become separated from it by a potential member of NATO, which Georgia
seeks to adhere to.
Second, the Russian-Georgian conflict, not to mention any instability
in Armenia's northern neighbor, would cut the most important
communication link between Armenia and the outer world. As the land
borders of Armenia with two of its neighbors - Azerbaijan and Turkey
- are closed due to political reasons, Armenia can trade goods with
the outer world only through Iran and Georgia, the latter serving
more than half of Armenia's foreign cargo turnover. Third, worsening
Georgian-Russian relations could hinder vital supplies from Russia from
reaching Armenia, first of all natural gas, which flows to Armenia
through a pipeline crossing the territory of Georgia. Fourth, the
large Armenian community of Georgia may be involved in the conflict,
especially the Armenians living in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region
of southern Georgia, whose living standards are poor and who are
traditionally pro-Russian. The latter danger becomes more acute given
the perspective of construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi
railroad, which is to traverse the region, bringing fears among
local Armenians that the region would fall into the sphere of Turkish
influence. Finally, of vital importance for Armenia are not only its
good relations with the immediate parties of the conflict, Georgia
and Russia, but also with the western countries and in particular
the United States. These relations might suffer should Washington
protect Georgia more actively in its conflict with Russia.
Not surprisingly, the tension among Russia and Georgia provoked vivid
discussions in the Armenian political elite. For the second time in
less than a year, politicians - even those belonging to the parties
of the ruling coalition - raised the issue of the necessity of a
revision, or at least clarification, of the terms of the "Strategic
alliance" with Russia. The first instance was in January, when Armenian
politicians were surprised to learn that the "strategic partnership"
with Russia did not protect Armenia from a sudden doubling of the price
of the Russian natural gas. There is a consensus in Yerevan that in
its actions, Russia does not always take into account the interests
of its only ally in the Caucasus. The criticism was especially high
after Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian State Duma, said in
an interview with a local newspaper that Armenia "does not support
its strategic partner [Russia]" in its conflict with Georgia. If
Armenian-Georgian relations are an obstacle for Russia's relations
with Armenia, we [the Russians] have the right to call on Armenia
to choose: either you have normal relations with Russia or you have
normal relations with Georgia," Zatulin said.
The Armenian leadership has managed to escape such a pitfall, at least
for the time being. The transport blockade of Georgian territory did
not harm Armenian cargoes, as formally Russia banned only contacts
with the Georgian transport operators, and Armenian businessmen never
used their services. Ironically, Russia's earlier actions had indeed
hurt the interests of Armenian business, but this did not attract
significant attention. It was the closure of the Verkhnii Lars
(Upper Lars) checkpoint on the Russian-Georgian border last June,
the only land link between Russia and Armenia. By closing it under the
pretext of "repairs", Russia sought to activate an alternative route
through the territory of pro-Russian South Ossetia, not controlled by
Georgian authorities. However, Tbilisi prohibited foreigners from using
this route (and there were no other foreigners except Armenians which
needed it), whereas the citizens of Georgia were free to use it. Thus,
Armenian carriers were forced to switch to other existing options,
namely, through the Black Sea ports of Georgia to Russia or Ukraine,
causing another wave of grumble in Armenia. In any case, these latter
routes were not affected by the Russian October sanctions against
Georgia, and the Armenian businessmen did not suffer anew.
Armenia's gas supplies are also unlikely to suffer, even if Georgia
and Russia fail to reach a purchase agreement for the next year,
similar to what happened last winter in the Ukraine. First, Georgia
is unlikely to take gas set for Armenia, as this would be seen as an
obvious hostile action in Yerevan. Second, in December, Armenia will
inaugurate an alternative gas supply pipeline, from Iran, which can
in principle fully cover the needs of Armenia, enabling Russia simply
to cut its supplies through Georgia.
As for the Samtskhe-Javakheti issue, the surprise October arrest
in Yerevan of Vahan Chakhalian, a radical leader of the Javakheti
Armenians, was interpreted by most of experts as a gesture aimed
to show the Georgian leadership that Yerevan would not support any
actions capable to destabilize that sensitive region.
Yerevan has managed to keep stable relations with both conflicting
parties, which was demonstrated in a series of recent contacts,
including the Russian-Armenian summit meeting in Moscow in late
October and a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and
Georgia, also in Moscow. The relations with Washington have not
suffered either, as evident from the recent statements of American
officials that the Millennium Challenge program of Armenia will not
be interrupted despite the calls of human rights watchdogs.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_articl e.php?articleid=4566