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COMPLEMENTARISM: NEXT STOPOVER IN ECUATORIAL GUINEA
James Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 20 2006
While the Armenian government has remembered about the Strategy of
National Security and is hopeful to have this bill adopted in the
pre-election fuss, events are underway in the world which can make any
document redundant for Armenia, for the simple reason that they can
make Armenia generally redundant. This opinion may sound exaggerated,
but now even the smallest geopolitical event threatens Armenia,
and disappointment is becoming a usual thing.
The U.S. Senate adopted a bill on November 17, which supports the
membership of Georgia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to NATO. It is
interesting that support is not words but finance. The four countries
will get 20 million dollars for the development of security in the
process of membership to the NATO, and the greater share, 10 million
goes to Georgia.
It is so unfair. One guarantees the victory of the Democrats in the
Senate and others adopt a bill. Instead of adopting the first bill
on the Genocide of the Armenians who made so much effort durig the
election, the U.S. Senate again went in for defending the interests
of their country.
Ingratutude is striking. But it would be too good if we sustained a
moral defeat only. The problem is that the bill adopted by the Senate
disappoints not only the Armenian lobby in the United States but
also the entire political establishment of Armenia. This expression
is, of course, a complement for the community who sustain their
families rather than the state. But the problem is that in forgetting
about their own state, they were energetically teaching a lesson to
Sahakashvili saying that the United States would not support them in
the conflict with Russia.
Meanwhile, the bill adopted by the Senate is evidence to the
opposite. Of course, it does not mean that Georgia will be accepted
to NATO in the assembly of NATO on November 28 and 29. On the other
hand, however, the bill of the U.S. Senate will evidently support
Sahakashvili, both morally and financially, even if the Senate meant
to harm the Russians rather than to support Georgia, who were much
happier about the reelection of Kokoyti and the outcome of the
referendum on independence than the Ossetians.
However, it was a bad surprise for Armenia, which keeps saying that the
separate membership of the South Caucasus to NATO could be a serious
threat for the stable and peaceful development of the region, because
the presence of two security systems, NATO and the Organization of the
Collective Security Pact in the same region is impossible. It becomes
clear from the decision of the Senate that the vision of Armenia again
does not overlap with the logic of the geopolitical developments. And
this is threatened by an essential consequence. The point is that the
more the prospect of Georgia's membership is becoming real, the more
independent and unrestrained this country's relations with Russia will
be. In that case, they will start thinking in Russia that chauvinism
will no longer be instrumental in the relations with Georgia. In
that case, either Russia has to have no relations with Georgia or
should build a horizontal rather than vertical relation. The second
option is possible, because the first means for Russia to leave the
Caucasus, even if the Russian dominance is sustained in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.
Russia does not need these territories as such, and Putin has announced
about this. These are attractive with their present status, as a tool
in the relations with Georgia. In other words, Russia, nevertheless,
needs the relation with Georgia, even more than Georgia needs this
relation. The problem is that Russia cannot turn its economic
dominance in Armenia into a real factor if it is not present in
Georgia. Consequently, the Kremlin will eventually agree to this
proposal to have at least economic presence in Georgia. And the
quality of the Russian-Georgian relation actually deprives Armenia
of the last chance of Armenia to be useful, or at least handy in any
matter in the region.
James Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 20 2006
While the Armenian government has remembered about the Strategy of
National Security and is hopeful to have this bill adopted in the
pre-election fuss, events are underway in the world which can make any
document redundant for Armenia, for the simple reason that they can
make Armenia generally redundant. This opinion may sound exaggerated,
but now even the smallest geopolitical event threatens Armenia,
and disappointment is becoming a usual thing.
The U.S. Senate adopted a bill on November 17, which supports the
membership of Georgia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to NATO. It is
interesting that support is not words but finance. The four countries
will get 20 million dollars for the development of security in the
process of membership to the NATO, and the greater share, 10 million
goes to Georgia.
It is so unfair. One guarantees the victory of the Democrats in the
Senate and others adopt a bill. Instead of adopting the first bill
on the Genocide of the Armenians who made so much effort durig the
election, the U.S. Senate again went in for defending the interests
of their country.
Ingratutude is striking. But it would be too good if we sustained a
moral defeat only. The problem is that the bill adopted by the Senate
disappoints not only the Armenian lobby in the United States but
also the entire political establishment of Armenia. This expression
is, of course, a complement for the community who sustain their
families rather than the state. But the problem is that in forgetting
about their own state, they were energetically teaching a lesson to
Sahakashvili saying that the United States would not support them in
the conflict with Russia.
Meanwhile, the bill adopted by the Senate is evidence to the
opposite. Of course, it does not mean that Georgia will be accepted
to NATO in the assembly of NATO on November 28 and 29. On the other
hand, however, the bill of the U.S. Senate will evidently support
Sahakashvili, both morally and financially, even if the Senate meant
to harm the Russians rather than to support Georgia, who were much
happier about the reelection of Kokoyti and the outcome of the
referendum on independence than the Ossetians.
However, it was a bad surprise for Armenia, which keeps saying that the
separate membership of the South Caucasus to NATO could be a serious
threat for the stable and peaceful development of the region, because
the presence of two security systems, NATO and the Organization of the
Collective Security Pact in the same region is impossible. It becomes
clear from the decision of the Senate that the vision of Armenia again
does not overlap with the logic of the geopolitical developments. And
this is threatened by an essential consequence. The point is that the
more the prospect of Georgia's membership is becoming real, the more
independent and unrestrained this country's relations with Russia will
be. In that case, they will start thinking in Russia that chauvinism
will no longer be instrumental in the relations with Georgia. In
that case, either Russia has to have no relations with Georgia or
should build a horizontal rather than vertical relation. The second
option is possible, because the first means for Russia to leave the
Caucasus, even if the Russian dominance is sustained in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.
Russia does not need these territories as such, and Putin has announced
about this. These are attractive with their present status, as a tool
in the relations with Georgia. In other words, Russia, nevertheless,
needs the relation with Georgia, even more than Georgia needs this
relation. The problem is that Russia cannot turn its economic
dominance in Armenia into a real factor if it is not present in
Georgia. Consequently, the Kremlin will eventually agree to this
proposal to have at least economic presence in Georgia. And the
quality of the Russian-Georgian relation actually deprives Armenia
of the last chance of Armenia to be useful, or at least handy in any
matter in the region.