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MAKING THEIR VOTES COUNT
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
Oct 3 2006
Breakaway Republics Start a New Round of Referendums
Fifteen years after the "parade of sovereignties" that was the end
of the Soviet Union, a new march is beginning in the Eurasian space.
This time it is a "parade of referendums" being held by the
unrecognized republics that form a kind of parallel Commonwealth of
Independent States.
On September 17, the breakaway Moldovan region of Transdnestr
held a referendum that included two questions. The first was: "Do
you support the course toward independence of the Transdnestrian
Moldovan Republic and the subsequent free joining of Transdnestr to
the Russian Federation?"; the second was "Do reject the independence
of the Transdnestrian Moldovan Republic with the subsequent entry of
Transdnestr into the Republic of Moldova?"
On November 12, South Ossetia will hold a referendum on its
independence from Georgia. The South Ossetian vote will be held
simultaneously with presidential elections in the unrecognized
republic. This is no coincidence: President Eduard Kokoity is trying
to gain additional legitimacy by asking people to identify him
as the force behind independence. It appears that definitions of
"legitimacy" are being used to justify the political situation in
unrecognized republics.
Legitimacy, however, is not the same as recognition from the
international community. Quite the opposite - the wave of referendums
is unacknowledged by influential international organizations. Terry
Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, expressed
doubt as to whether the results of the South Ossetian referendum will
be recognized at all. He added that the South Ossetian authorities
should start talks with Georgia aimed at finding a peaceful solution.
"The secessionist authorities of the South Ossetian region of Georgia
are wasting time and effort on the organization of a referendum on
independence in November," he said
In an interview with Kommersant-Ukraina, EU Special Representative to
Moldova Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, said that international law made
Transdnestrian secession an impossibility. "Separating Transdnestr
can happen only if agreement is reached with Moldova," he said.
But if legitimacy is understood as the local population accepting
the authorities as "their own," then legitimacy exists, even if it
is unrecognized. In South Ossetia, like the other de facto states,
authorities that maintain no ties with the recognized "mother
state" are seen as "ours." Thus, this fall will likely see another
manifestation of unrecognized legitimacy. In addition to the previously
mentioned referendums, Nagorno-Karabakh will hold a vote in December
on a project for formulating a Basic Law that will govern the region's
relationship with Azerbaijan. The question of independence for the
region and its status is seen as closed for further discussion. The
region's foreign minister, Georgy Petrosyan, said: "Independence for
Nagorno- Karabakh is of the highest value to the republic's people
and was supported by a popular referendum on state independence of
December 10, 1991."
Virtually all the unrecognized post-Soviet republics held referendums
in the early 1990s. On January 19, 1992, South Ossetia approved a
referendum to secede from Georgia and to join Russia. Transdnestr
has already held six referendums before Sept. 17, including votes to
approve a Transdnestrian Constitution and to confirm the republic's
existence.
The current "parade of referendums" seems justified on three grounds.
First, as a rule, the plebiscites of the early 1990s took place
against a backdrop of armed conflict between the breakaway territories
and their "mother countries." In this sense, they enjoy much less
legitimacy than equivalent votes during peacetime. Fifteen years
later, the de facto states have demonstrated their viability not
only to the countries of which they are part, but also to the whole
world. Transdnestr, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh all have territory
under their control and their own legal structures.
Even among these areas, however, South Ossetia is a special case. The
region is not ethnically homogeneous and the capital, Tskhinvali,
is cut off from North Ossetia - and therefore from Russia - by the
"Liakhvsky corridor," a strip of Georgian villages along the river of
the same name. Nevertheless, polls and other sociological research
- including some conducted in 2003 by the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University - among South Ossetians aged
20-27 show that support for Georgian jurisdiction is zero. Thus,
the new wave of referendums is a test of viability and evidence of
the sustainability of unrecognized statehood.
The second justification for the referendums is as a demonstration
of the foreign-policy priorities of the unrecognized territories,
although this rule will be observed differently in each case. In
Transdnestr and South Ossetia, the referendums will serve as a
strategic choice in Russia's favor, while in Nagorno-Karabakh the
vote on the constitution is primarily about territorial and political
institutionalization. Many in the region hope that deciding on the
final arbiter of the state's viability - the Constitution - will
significantly hasten international recognition of the region.
Third and finally, the current wave of plebiscites is a reaction to
the Balkan example of ethnic self-determination.
Although both the United States and the European Union have said that
the cases of Montenegro and Kosovo are unique and should not be used as
templates for blind political copying, the former Soviet unrecognized
states are adopting political decisions aimed at acquiring additional
legitimacy and, finally, at becoming de jure independent based on
the concept of ethnic self-determination.A struggle for international
recognition based on the Balkan precedents will take place, regardless
of the genuinely significant differences between Montenegro and Kosovo
and the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
As the largest and most influential state in the post-Soviet
space, Russia faces the problem of how to act in the face of this
"Balkanization." Moscow has two basic options - either continue
to support the status quo, hoping to prolong this state of affairs
indefinitely, or, if Kosovo is recognized, to attempt to escalate the
situation by recognizing Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh
and Transdnestr as a "symmetrical measure."
By choosing to defend the status quo, Russia would be saying,
in essence, that it will not carry out the political will of these
regions. The wishes of the de facto states are obvious, and even evoke
some political sympathies, but identifying their political interests
with those of Russia would be incorrect. Russia is a major player on a
global scale and needs to calculate the best use of its resources and
its opportunities for politicking regarding the unrecognized states.
Obviously, international recognition of Transdnestr, Abkhazia or South
Ossetia should not just mean recognition by Russia. This would not be
satisfactory for the breakaway republics and risks the possibility
of the "Balkanization" of Russia itself. Russia needs to look for
allies in the changing configuration of the post-Soviet space. But
for this it first needs coherent arguments as to why it should take
up the case of the unrecognized republics, as well as clear criteria
to present to the international community as a whole.
The first criterion should be the countries' viability - both in terms
of the strength of their political structures and their territorial
stability. Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr, for example, are states
that already exist, and for this reason their peaceful reintegration
into their former "mother countries" is an impossibility.
The second criterion could be the ability of the mother countries
to control the "breakaway territory" in question by means other
than wholesale deportation or ethnic cleansing. In other words,
reintegration should be considered impossible if it will lead to
subsequent military conflict. A third criterion could be evidence
of democratic procedures in the unrecognized regions. All of these
states have been through several electoral cycles, and leaders have
been changed by popular vote - an extremely difficult procedure for
the post-Soviet space and something that cannot be said about many
recognized post-Soviet states.
In addition to these criteria, which are focused on the public
political space, dialogue must be carried out behind the scenes. This
requires other arguments and other issues, including the stability of
the Caucasus region as a whole and the fate of the regions' valuable
energy resources and energy transport systems. But this kind of
backstairs horse-trading should be supplemented by active public
measures, since influencing the opinion of Brussels, Washington,
and individual EU capitals in a particular direction also relies on
forming expert and public opinion in the countries in question. This
in turn requires speaking to the West in language it understands -
the language of human rights, ethnic minority rights, guarantees for
minority languages, and the inadmissibility of military solutions.
Last, but certainly not least, recognition of the unrecognized states
is not the same as their inclusion into Russia. These two ideas must
be clearly separated. Russia will not fight alongside separatists
in the Galsk region of Abkhazia or the villages of Tamarasheni and
Kekhvi in South Ossetia, or end up with Transdnestr as a second
exclave alongside Kaliningrad - especially given that in all these
cases the local elites are certainly not dreaming about the arrival
of Russian prosecutors or tame Kremlin governors.
Only by defining such clear criteria, calculating available resources,
and undertaking serious informational and diplomatic efforts can
Russia attempt to find a final solution to the problem of unrecognized
territories. The most important thing to remember in this process is
that is should be guided not by abstract humanism, or by the interests
of the self-proclaimed elites, but by Russian national self-interest.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the international relations department
of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. He
contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
Oct 3 2006
Breakaway Republics Start a New Round of Referendums
Fifteen years after the "parade of sovereignties" that was the end
of the Soviet Union, a new march is beginning in the Eurasian space.
This time it is a "parade of referendums" being held by the
unrecognized republics that form a kind of parallel Commonwealth of
Independent States.
On September 17, the breakaway Moldovan region of Transdnestr
held a referendum that included two questions. The first was: "Do
you support the course toward independence of the Transdnestrian
Moldovan Republic and the subsequent free joining of Transdnestr to
the Russian Federation?"; the second was "Do reject the independence
of the Transdnestrian Moldovan Republic with the subsequent entry of
Transdnestr into the Republic of Moldova?"
On November 12, South Ossetia will hold a referendum on its
independence from Georgia. The South Ossetian vote will be held
simultaneously with presidential elections in the unrecognized
republic. This is no coincidence: President Eduard Kokoity is trying
to gain additional legitimacy by asking people to identify him
as the force behind independence. It appears that definitions of
"legitimacy" are being used to justify the political situation in
unrecognized republics.
Legitimacy, however, is not the same as recognition from the
international community. Quite the opposite - the wave of referendums
is unacknowledged by influential international organizations. Terry
Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, expressed
doubt as to whether the results of the South Ossetian referendum will
be recognized at all. He added that the South Ossetian authorities
should start talks with Georgia aimed at finding a peaceful solution.
"The secessionist authorities of the South Ossetian region of Georgia
are wasting time and effort on the organization of a referendum on
independence in November," he said
In an interview with Kommersant-Ukraina, EU Special Representative to
Moldova Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, said that international law made
Transdnestrian secession an impossibility. "Separating Transdnestr
can happen only if agreement is reached with Moldova," he said.
But if legitimacy is understood as the local population accepting
the authorities as "their own," then legitimacy exists, even if it
is unrecognized. In South Ossetia, like the other de facto states,
authorities that maintain no ties with the recognized "mother
state" are seen as "ours." Thus, this fall will likely see another
manifestation of unrecognized legitimacy. In addition to the previously
mentioned referendums, Nagorno-Karabakh will hold a vote in December
on a project for formulating a Basic Law that will govern the region's
relationship with Azerbaijan. The question of independence for the
region and its status is seen as closed for further discussion. The
region's foreign minister, Georgy Petrosyan, said: "Independence for
Nagorno- Karabakh is of the highest value to the republic's people
and was supported by a popular referendum on state independence of
December 10, 1991."
Virtually all the unrecognized post-Soviet republics held referendums
in the early 1990s. On January 19, 1992, South Ossetia approved a
referendum to secede from Georgia and to join Russia. Transdnestr
has already held six referendums before Sept. 17, including votes to
approve a Transdnestrian Constitution and to confirm the republic's
existence.
The current "parade of referendums" seems justified on three grounds.
First, as a rule, the plebiscites of the early 1990s took place
against a backdrop of armed conflict between the breakaway territories
and their "mother countries." In this sense, they enjoy much less
legitimacy than equivalent votes during peacetime. Fifteen years
later, the de facto states have demonstrated their viability not
only to the countries of which they are part, but also to the whole
world. Transdnestr, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh all have territory
under their control and their own legal structures.
Even among these areas, however, South Ossetia is a special case. The
region is not ethnically homogeneous and the capital, Tskhinvali,
is cut off from North Ossetia - and therefore from Russia - by the
"Liakhvsky corridor," a strip of Georgian villages along the river of
the same name. Nevertheless, polls and other sociological research
- including some conducted in 2003 by the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University - among South Ossetians aged
20-27 show that support for Georgian jurisdiction is zero. Thus,
the new wave of referendums is a test of viability and evidence of
the sustainability of unrecognized statehood.
The second justification for the referendums is as a demonstration
of the foreign-policy priorities of the unrecognized territories,
although this rule will be observed differently in each case. In
Transdnestr and South Ossetia, the referendums will serve as a
strategic choice in Russia's favor, while in Nagorno-Karabakh the
vote on the constitution is primarily about territorial and political
institutionalization. Many in the region hope that deciding on the
final arbiter of the state's viability - the Constitution - will
significantly hasten international recognition of the region.
Third and finally, the current wave of plebiscites is a reaction to
the Balkan example of ethnic self-determination.
Although both the United States and the European Union have said that
the cases of Montenegro and Kosovo are unique and should not be used as
templates for blind political copying, the former Soviet unrecognized
states are adopting political decisions aimed at acquiring additional
legitimacy and, finally, at becoming de jure independent based on
the concept of ethnic self-determination.A struggle for international
recognition based on the Balkan precedents will take place, regardless
of the genuinely significant differences between Montenegro and Kosovo
and the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
As the largest and most influential state in the post-Soviet
space, Russia faces the problem of how to act in the face of this
"Balkanization." Moscow has two basic options - either continue
to support the status quo, hoping to prolong this state of affairs
indefinitely, or, if Kosovo is recognized, to attempt to escalate the
situation by recognizing Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh
and Transdnestr as a "symmetrical measure."
By choosing to defend the status quo, Russia would be saying,
in essence, that it will not carry out the political will of these
regions. The wishes of the de facto states are obvious, and even evoke
some political sympathies, but identifying their political interests
with those of Russia would be incorrect. Russia is a major player on a
global scale and needs to calculate the best use of its resources and
its opportunities for politicking regarding the unrecognized states.
Obviously, international recognition of Transdnestr, Abkhazia or South
Ossetia should not just mean recognition by Russia. This would not be
satisfactory for the breakaway republics and risks the possibility
of the "Balkanization" of Russia itself. Russia needs to look for
allies in the changing configuration of the post-Soviet space. But
for this it first needs coherent arguments as to why it should take
up the case of the unrecognized republics, as well as clear criteria
to present to the international community as a whole.
The first criterion should be the countries' viability - both in terms
of the strength of their political structures and their territorial
stability. Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr, for example, are states
that already exist, and for this reason their peaceful reintegration
into their former "mother countries" is an impossibility.
The second criterion could be the ability of the mother countries
to control the "breakaway territory" in question by means other
than wholesale deportation or ethnic cleansing. In other words,
reintegration should be considered impossible if it will lead to
subsequent military conflict. A third criterion could be evidence
of democratic procedures in the unrecognized regions. All of these
states have been through several electoral cycles, and leaders have
been changed by popular vote - an extremely difficult procedure for
the post-Soviet space and something that cannot be said about many
recognized post-Soviet states.
In addition to these criteria, which are focused on the public
political space, dialogue must be carried out behind the scenes. This
requires other arguments and other issues, including the stability of
the Caucasus region as a whole and the fate of the regions' valuable
energy resources and energy transport systems. But this kind of
backstairs horse-trading should be supplemented by active public
measures, since influencing the opinion of Brussels, Washington,
and individual EU capitals in a particular direction also relies on
forming expert and public opinion in the countries in question. This
in turn requires speaking to the West in language it understands -
the language of human rights, ethnic minority rights, guarantees for
minority languages, and the inadmissibility of military solutions.
Last, but certainly not least, recognition of the unrecognized states
is not the same as their inclusion into Russia. These two ideas must
be clearly separated. Russia will not fight alongside separatists
in the Galsk region of Abkhazia or the villages of Tamarasheni and
Kekhvi in South Ossetia, or end up with Transdnestr as a second
exclave alongside Kaliningrad - especially given that in all these
cases the local elites are certainly not dreaming about the arrival
of Russian prosecutors or tame Kremlin governors.
Only by defining such clear criteria, calculating available resources,
and undertaking serious informational and diplomatic efforts can
Russia attempt to find a final solution to the problem of unrecognized
territories. The most important thing to remember in this process is
that is should be guided not by abstract humanism, or by the interests
of the self-proclaimed elites, but by Russian national self-interest.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the international relations department
of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. He
contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress