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RUSSIA ISN'T DENYING THAT THE ARRESTED OFFICERS ARE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS
by Pavel Felgenhauer
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Novaya Gazeta, No. 75, October 2-4, 2006, p. 3
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
October 3, 2006 Tuesday
Why were they operating without diplomatic cover?
Russia must not fight a war against Georgia; It was incredibly stupid
to keep a group of Russian intelligence agents without reliable cover
in Georgia, a country which is striving to join NATO and quarreling
with Russia. Just like in the Qatar incident, our leaders failed
their own officers and Russia as a whole.
>From here in Moscow, it's impossible to figure out the exact nature
of the crimes committed by the Russian officers arrested in Georgia:
Colonel Alexander Savva, Lieutenant-Colonel Dmitri Kazantsev, Colonel
Alexander Zavgorodnyi, Major Alexander Baranov - and Lieutenant-Colonel
Konstantin Pichugin, who is still avoiding arrest by staying inside
the headquarters of the Group of Russian Troops in the Trans-Caucasus
(GRVZ) in Tbilisi. Georgia is displaying evidence in the form of
compromising tapes, video footage, and testimony from recruited
agents. Moscow is denying all of it. But the Georgians also claim
that the arrested men are from the Russian General Staff's Main
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) - and our side isn't denying that.
So what were these GRU officers doing on the territory of a
neighbor-state without diplomatic cover? Professional intelligence
agents, by definition, engage in collecting secret information and
recruiting agents. The GRU has a points system for assessing the
performance of its officers in the field, based on how many agents
they manage to recruit and what kind of information they manage
to obtain. It's perfectly obvious that GRU officers on Georgian
territory must have been engaged in these activities - otherwise
they would have faced reprimands from their superiors. Moreover, in
recent years classic peacetime espionage has sometimes escalated into
diversionary-terrorist activity: like the incident in Qatar in 2004,
for example, when Russian special service officers used a car-bomb to
kill former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and his driver,
also seriously injuring Yandarbiyev's young son.
According to the Russian-Georgian troop withdrawal agreement of 2005,
all heavy hardware has been removed from the Akhalkalaki base and
most has been removed from the Batumi base. In the past, the GRVZ was
aimed against Turkey: a NATO state hosting some important American
bases. But now only fragments of the GRVZ remain in Georgia; its
capacities for electronic and technological espionage on the other
side of the former Soviet border have been greatly reduced.
Obviously, the Georgian authorities had every reason to suspect
that the GRU officers with the GRVZ were working against Georgia,
and to keep the officers under close surveillance. But in general,
even if the officers were supposed to be working against Turkish
and US military forces rather than Georgia, it was incredibly,
astoundingly stupid to keep a group of professional intelligence
agents without reliable cover in a country which is striving to join
NATO and quarreling with Russia. Just like in the Qatar incident,
our leaders failed their own officers and Russia as a whole. As a
result, the situation is heading for war.
Since the start of this year, Russia has imposed one round of economic
sanctions after another on Georgia: import bans on wine, mineral
water, agricultural produce. In January, a major gas pipeline and
a high-voltage electricity power-line leading to the Trans-Caucasus
were blown up. The Russian authorities declared this to be "sabotage
by international terrorists and Chechen guerrillas."
The Georgians didn't believe that story - and they were right to
disbelieve it, since our investigators haven't managed to track
down a single perpetrator or name any names. But at the site of the
electricity power-line bombing, investigators did find part of a
device using plastic explosives - which the guerrillas don't have,
but which is used by GRU special assignment teams.
In response, Tbilisi took measures to reduce its dependence on Russian
energy resources. Georgia is no longer buying electricty from Russia -
and shutting off gas supplies to Georgia would also affect Armenia,
our ally. Moreover, Tbilisi could temporarily cover its needs by
buying gas from Azerbaijan and Iran.
Now our leaders are threatening to deport Georgians who are living
and working in Russia, while forbidding them to send money to
their families in Georgia. This will lead to nothing but harm and
additional embarrassment. The ruble is now fully convertible, so
there are no restrictions on foreigners sending money abroad, and
post office transfers can always be routed via other countries -
via friends in Armenia, for example. Deporting Georgians en masse
would be logicstically difficult, criminal, and completely unethical.
Since no other forms of leverage remain, Russia announced on September
28 that it is recalling its ambassador from Georgia, and evacuated
almost all diplomatic personnel on September 30: only two Russian
diplomats and some security staff remain at the Russian Embassy
in Tbilisi. In effect, diplomatic relations with Georgia have been
broken off; all that remains is to take the final step - launching
aggression by sea, air, and land.
Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told a press conference
that in the near future, under the guise of a military exercise,
substantial forces from Russia's 58th Army would move toward the
Rok Tunnel on the border between North Ossetia and South Ossetia,
while Black Sea Fleet ships would be deployed off the coast of Georgia.
Georgia's security and law enforcement leaders - Merabishvili and
Defense Minister Iraklii Okruashvili - say they're not afraid of
further escalation in relations with Russia, since they don't believe
that the decrepit Russian Armed Forces are capable of fighting
a successful offensive war in the Trans-Caucasus. And even if they
could - how much glory would there be in crushing Georgia? A "victory"
would mean destabilization in Georgia and throughout the Caucasus,
international isolation for Russia, and general contempt.
An unsuccessful operation would be an even bigger disgrace, with
Russian troops and peacekeepers driven out.
President Putin could still salvage the situation if he were to
visit Tbilisi in person, right now - fortunately, he's currently
at his Sochi residence, not far away. He could lift the absurd
trade embargo, take the arrested officers home aboard his own jet,
and promise to support Georgia's territorial integrity in deeds as
well as words. A friendly Georgia, peacefully reintegrated, would be
far more advantageous and useful for Russia than frozen conflicts,
semi-criminal unrecognized regims, and the inevitable end result -
a chaotic bloodbath in the Caucasus.
by Pavel Felgenhauer
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Novaya Gazeta, No. 75, October 2-4, 2006, p. 3
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
October 3, 2006 Tuesday
Why were they operating without diplomatic cover?
Russia must not fight a war against Georgia; It was incredibly stupid
to keep a group of Russian intelligence agents without reliable cover
in Georgia, a country which is striving to join NATO and quarreling
with Russia. Just like in the Qatar incident, our leaders failed
their own officers and Russia as a whole.
>From here in Moscow, it's impossible to figure out the exact nature
of the crimes committed by the Russian officers arrested in Georgia:
Colonel Alexander Savva, Lieutenant-Colonel Dmitri Kazantsev, Colonel
Alexander Zavgorodnyi, Major Alexander Baranov - and Lieutenant-Colonel
Konstantin Pichugin, who is still avoiding arrest by staying inside
the headquarters of the Group of Russian Troops in the Trans-Caucasus
(GRVZ) in Tbilisi. Georgia is displaying evidence in the form of
compromising tapes, video footage, and testimony from recruited
agents. Moscow is denying all of it. But the Georgians also claim
that the arrested men are from the Russian General Staff's Main
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) - and our side isn't denying that.
So what were these GRU officers doing on the territory of a
neighbor-state without diplomatic cover? Professional intelligence
agents, by definition, engage in collecting secret information and
recruiting agents. The GRU has a points system for assessing the
performance of its officers in the field, based on how many agents
they manage to recruit and what kind of information they manage
to obtain. It's perfectly obvious that GRU officers on Georgian
territory must have been engaged in these activities - otherwise
they would have faced reprimands from their superiors. Moreover, in
recent years classic peacetime espionage has sometimes escalated into
diversionary-terrorist activity: like the incident in Qatar in 2004,
for example, when Russian special service officers used a car-bomb to
kill former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and his driver,
also seriously injuring Yandarbiyev's young son.
According to the Russian-Georgian troop withdrawal agreement of 2005,
all heavy hardware has been removed from the Akhalkalaki base and
most has been removed from the Batumi base. In the past, the GRVZ was
aimed against Turkey: a NATO state hosting some important American
bases. But now only fragments of the GRVZ remain in Georgia; its
capacities for electronic and technological espionage on the other
side of the former Soviet border have been greatly reduced.
Obviously, the Georgian authorities had every reason to suspect
that the GRU officers with the GRVZ were working against Georgia,
and to keep the officers under close surveillance. But in general,
even if the officers were supposed to be working against Turkish
and US military forces rather than Georgia, it was incredibly,
astoundingly stupid to keep a group of professional intelligence
agents without reliable cover in a country which is striving to join
NATO and quarreling with Russia. Just like in the Qatar incident,
our leaders failed their own officers and Russia as a whole. As a
result, the situation is heading for war.
Since the start of this year, Russia has imposed one round of economic
sanctions after another on Georgia: import bans on wine, mineral
water, agricultural produce. In January, a major gas pipeline and
a high-voltage electricity power-line leading to the Trans-Caucasus
were blown up. The Russian authorities declared this to be "sabotage
by international terrorists and Chechen guerrillas."
The Georgians didn't believe that story - and they were right to
disbelieve it, since our investigators haven't managed to track
down a single perpetrator or name any names. But at the site of the
electricity power-line bombing, investigators did find part of a
device using plastic explosives - which the guerrillas don't have,
but which is used by GRU special assignment teams.
In response, Tbilisi took measures to reduce its dependence on Russian
energy resources. Georgia is no longer buying electricty from Russia -
and shutting off gas supplies to Georgia would also affect Armenia,
our ally. Moreover, Tbilisi could temporarily cover its needs by
buying gas from Azerbaijan and Iran.
Now our leaders are threatening to deport Georgians who are living
and working in Russia, while forbidding them to send money to
their families in Georgia. This will lead to nothing but harm and
additional embarrassment. The ruble is now fully convertible, so
there are no restrictions on foreigners sending money abroad, and
post office transfers can always be routed via other countries -
via friends in Armenia, for example. Deporting Georgians en masse
would be logicstically difficult, criminal, and completely unethical.
Since no other forms of leverage remain, Russia announced on September
28 that it is recalling its ambassador from Georgia, and evacuated
almost all diplomatic personnel on September 30: only two Russian
diplomats and some security staff remain at the Russian Embassy
in Tbilisi. In effect, diplomatic relations with Georgia have been
broken off; all that remains is to take the final step - launching
aggression by sea, air, and land.
Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told a press conference
that in the near future, under the guise of a military exercise,
substantial forces from Russia's 58th Army would move toward the
Rok Tunnel on the border between North Ossetia and South Ossetia,
while Black Sea Fleet ships would be deployed off the coast of Georgia.
Georgia's security and law enforcement leaders - Merabishvili and
Defense Minister Iraklii Okruashvili - say they're not afraid of
further escalation in relations with Russia, since they don't believe
that the decrepit Russian Armed Forces are capable of fighting
a successful offensive war in the Trans-Caucasus. And even if they
could - how much glory would there be in crushing Georgia? A "victory"
would mean destabilization in Georgia and throughout the Caucasus,
international isolation for Russia, and general contempt.
An unsuccessful operation would be an even bigger disgrace, with
Russian troops and peacekeepers driven out.
President Putin could still salvage the situation if he were to
visit Tbilisi in person, right now - fortunately, he's currently
at his Sochi residence, not far away. He could lift the absurd
trade embargo, take the arrested officers home aboard his own jet,
and promise to support Georgia's territorial integrity in deeds as
well as words. A friendly Georgia, peacefully reintegrated, would be
far more advantageous and useful for Russia than frozen conflicts,
semi-criminal unrecognized regims, and the inevitable end result -
a chaotic bloodbath in the Caucasus.