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LESSONS OF THE GAS PUMP
by Michael Klare
ZNet, MA
Oct 4 2006
Tom Paine
What the hell is going on here? Just six weeks ago, gasoline prices
at the pump were hovering at the $3 per gallon mark; today, they're
inching down toward $2--and some analysts predict even lower numbers
before the November elections. The sharp drop in gas prices has been
good news for consumers, who now have more money in their pockets to
spend on food and other necessities--and for President Bush, who has
witnessed a sudden lift in his approval ratings.
Is this the result of some hidden conspiracy between the White House
and Big Oil to help the Republican cause in the elections, as some
are already suggesting? How does a possible war with Iran fit into the
gas-price equation? And what do falling gasoline prices tell us about
"peak-oil" theory, which predicts that we have reached our energy
limits on the planet?
Since gasoline prices began their sharp decline in mid-August, many
pundits have attempted to account for the drop, but none have offered
a completely convincing explanation, lending some plausibility to
claims that the Bush administration and its long-term allies in the
oil industry are manipulating prices behind the scenes. In my view,
however, the most significant factor in the downturn in prices has
simply been a sharp easing of the "fear factor" --the worry that crude
oil prices would rise to $100 or more a barrel due to spreading war
in the Middle East, a Bush administration strike at Iranian nuclear
facilities, and possible Katrina-scale hurricanes blowing through
the Gulf of Mexico, severely damaging offshore oil rigs.
As the summer commenced and oil prices began a steep upward climb,
many industry analysts were predicting a late summer or early fall
clash between the United States and Iran (roughly coinciding with
a predicted intense hurricane season). This led oil merchants and
refiners to fill their storage facilities to capacity with $70-80 per
barrel oil. They expected to have a considerable backlog to sell at
a substantial profit if supplies from the Middle East were cut off
and/or storms wracked the Gulf of Mexico.
Then came the war in Lebanon. At first, the fighting seemed to confirm
such predictions, only increasing fears of a region-wide conflict,
possibly involving Iran. The price of crude oil approached record
heights. In the early days of the war, the Bush administration
tacitly seconded Israeli actions in Lebanon, which, it was widely
assumed, would lay the groundwork for a similar campaign against
military targets in Iran. But Hezbollah's success in holding off the
Israeli military combined with horrific television images of civilian
casualties forced leaders in the United States and Europe to intercede
and bring the fighting to a halt.
We may never know exactly what led the White House to shift course on
Lebanon, but high oil prices--and expectations of worse to come--were
surely a factor in administration calculations. When it became clear
that the Israelis were facing far stiffer resistance than expected,
and that the Iranians were capable of fomenting all manner of mischief
(including, potentially, total havoc in the global oil market),
wiser heads in the corporate wing of the Republican Party undoubtedly
concluded that any further escalation or regionalization of the war
would immediately push crude prices over $100 per barrel.
Prices at the gas pump would then have been driven into the $4-5 per
gallon range, virtually ensuring a Republican defeat in the mid-term
elections. This was still early in the summer, of course, well before
peak hurricane season; mix just one Katrina-strength storm in the
Gulf of Mexico into this already unfolding nightmare scenario and
the fate of the Republicans would have been sealed.
In any case, President Bush did allow Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice to work with the Europeans to stop the Lebanon fighting and has
since refrained from any overt talk about a possible assault on Iran.
Careful never explicitly to rule out the military option when it
comes to Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities, since June he has
nonetheless steadfastly insisted that diplomacy must be given a chance
to work. Meanwhile, we have made it most of the way through this year's
hurricane season without a single catastrophic storm hitting the U.S.
For all these reasons, immediate fears about a clash with Iran,
a possible spreading of war to other oil regions in the Middle East,
and Gulf of Mexico hurricanes have dissipated, and the price of crude
has plummeted. On top of this, there appears to be a perceptible
slowing of the world economy--precipitated, in part, by the rising
prices of raw materials--leading to a drop in oil demand. The result?
Retailers have abundant supplies of gasoline on hand and the laws of
supply and demand dictate a decline in prices.
How long will this combination of factors prevail?
Best guess: The slowdown in global economic growth will continue for
a time, further lowering prices at the pump. This is likely to help
retailers in time for the Christmas shopping season, projected to
be marginally better this year than last precisely because of those
lower gas prices.
Once the election season is past, however, President Bush will have
less incentive to muzzle his rhetoric on Iran and we may experience a
sharp increase in Ahmadinejad-bashing. If no progress has been made
by year's end on the diplomatic front, expect an acceleration of
the preparations for war already underway in the Persian Gulf area
(similar to the military buildup witnessed in late 2002 and early
2003 prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq). This will naturally lead
to an intensification of fears and a reversal of the downward spiral
of gas prices, though from a level that, by then, may be well below
$2 per gallon.
Now that we've come this far, does the recent drop in gasoline prices
and the seemingly sudden abundance of petroleum reveal a flaw in the
argument for this as a peak-oil moment? Peak-oil theory, which had
been getting ever more attention until the price at the pump began
to fall, contends that the amount of oil in the world is finite;
that once we've used up about half of the original global supply,
production will attain a maximum or "peak" level, after which daily
output will fall, no matter how much more is spent on exploration
and enhanced extraction technology.
Most industry analysts now agree that global oil output will eventually
reach a peak level, but there is considerable debate as to exactly when
that moment will arise. Recently, a growing number of specialists--many
joined under the banner of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil
--are claiming that we have already consumed approximately half the
world's original inheritance of 2 trillion barrels of conventional
(i.e., liquid) petroleum, and so are at, or very near, the peak-oil
moment and can expect an imminent contraction in supplies.
In the fall of 2005, as if in confirmation of this assessment, the CEO
of Chevron, David O'Reilly, blanketed U.S. newspapers and magazines
with an advertisement stating, "One thing is clear: the era of easy
oil is over ... Demand is soaring like never before ... At the same
time, many of the world's oil and gas fields are maturing.
And new energy discoveries are mainly occurring in places where
resources are difficult to extract, physically, economically, and
even politically. When growing demand meets tighter supplies, the
result is more competition for the same resources."
But this is not, of course, what we are now seeing.
Petroleum supplies are more abundant than they were six months ago.
There have even been some promising discoveries of new oil and
gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico, while--modestly adding to global
stockpiles--several foreign fields and pipelines have come on line
in the last few months, including the $4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Turkey's Mediterranean coast,
which will bring new supplies to world markets. Does this indicate
that peak-oil theory is headed for the dustbin of history or, at least,
that the peak moment is still safely in our future?
As it happens, nothing in the current situation should lead us to
conclude that peak-oil theory is wrong. Far from it. As suggested
by Chevron's O'Reilly, remaining energy supplies on the planet are
mainly to be found "in places where resources are difficult to extract,
physically, economically, and even politically." This is exactly what
we are seeing today.
For example, the much-heralded new discovery in the Gulf of Mexico,
Chevron's Jack No. 2 Well , lies beneath five miles of water and rock
some 175 miles south of New Orleans in an area where, in recent years,
hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, and Rita have attained their maximum strength
and inflicted their greatest damage on offshore oil facilities. It
is naive to assume that, however promising Jack No. 2 may seem in
oil-industry publicity releases, it will not be exposed to Category
5 hurricanes in the years ahead, especially as global warming heats
the Gulf and generates ever more potent storms.
Obviously, Chevron would not be investing billions of dollars in
costly technology to develop such a precarious energy resource if
there were better opportunities on land or closer to shore--but so
many of those easy-to-get-at places have now been exhausted, leaving
the company little choice in the matter.
Or take the equally ballyhooed BTC pipeline, which shipped its
first oil in July, with top U.S. officials in attendance . This
conduit stretches 1,040 miles from Baku in Azerbaijan to the
Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, passing no less than six
active or potential war zones along the way: the Armenian enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia; the
Muslim separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia;
and the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Is this where anyone in their right
mind would build a pipeline? Not unless you were desperate for oil,
and safer locations had already been used up.
In fact, virtually all of the other new fields being developed or
considered by U.S. and foreign energy firms--ANWR in Alaska, the
jungles of Colombia, northern Siberia, Uganda, Chad, Sakhalin Island
in Russia's Far East--are located in areas that are hard to reach,
environmentally sensitive, or just plain dangerous. Most of these
fields will be developed, and they will yield additional supplies of
oil, but the fact that we are being forced to rely on them suggests
that the peak-oil moment has indeed arrived and that the general
direction of the price of oil, despite period drops, will tend to
be upwards as the cost of production in these out-of-the-way and
dangerous places continues to climb.
Some peak-oil theorists have, however, done us all a disservice by
suggesting, for rhetorical purposes, that the peak-oil moment is ...
well, a sharp peak. They paint a picture of a simple, steep, upward
production slope leading to a pinnacle, followed by a similarly neat
and steep decline. Perhaps looking back from 500 years hence, this
moment will have that appearance on global oil production charts. But
for those of us living now, the "peak" is more likely to feel like a
plateau--lasting for perhaps a decade or more--in which global oil
production will experience occasional ups and downs without rising
substantially (as predicted by those who dismiss peak-oil theory),
nor falling precipitously (as predicted by its most ardent proponents).
During this interim period, particular events--a hurricane, an outbreak
of conflict in an oil region--will temporarily tighten supplies,
raising gasoline prices, while the opening of a new field or pipeline,
or simply (as now) the alleviation of immediate fears and a temporary
boost in supplies will lower prices. Eventually, of course, we will
reach the plateau's end and the decline predicted by the theory will
commence in earnest.
In the meantime, for better or worse, we live on that plateau today.
If this year's hurricane season ends with no major storms, and we get
through the next few months without a major blowup in the Middle East,
we are likely to start 2007 with lower gasoline prices than we've seen
in a while. This is not, however, evidence of a major trend. Because
global oil supplies are never likely to be truly abundant again,
it would only take one major storm or one major crisis in the Middle
East to push crude prices back up near or over $80 a barrel. This is
the world we now inhabit, and it will never get truly better until we
develop an entirely new energy system based on petroleum alternatives
and renewable fuels.
Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies
at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts and the author of Blood
and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency
on Imported Petroleum . This piece originally appeared in TomDispatch.
by Michael Klare
ZNet, MA
Oct 4 2006
Tom Paine
What the hell is going on here? Just six weeks ago, gasoline prices
at the pump were hovering at the $3 per gallon mark; today, they're
inching down toward $2--and some analysts predict even lower numbers
before the November elections. The sharp drop in gas prices has been
good news for consumers, who now have more money in their pockets to
spend on food and other necessities--and for President Bush, who has
witnessed a sudden lift in his approval ratings.
Is this the result of some hidden conspiracy between the White House
and Big Oil to help the Republican cause in the elections, as some
are already suggesting? How does a possible war with Iran fit into the
gas-price equation? And what do falling gasoline prices tell us about
"peak-oil" theory, which predicts that we have reached our energy
limits on the planet?
Since gasoline prices began their sharp decline in mid-August, many
pundits have attempted to account for the drop, but none have offered
a completely convincing explanation, lending some plausibility to
claims that the Bush administration and its long-term allies in the
oil industry are manipulating prices behind the scenes. In my view,
however, the most significant factor in the downturn in prices has
simply been a sharp easing of the "fear factor" --the worry that crude
oil prices would rise to $100 or more a barrel due to spreading war
in the Middle East, a Bush administration strike at Iranian nuclear
facilities, and possible Katrina-scale hurricanes blowing through
the Gulf of Mexico, severely damaging offshore oil rigs.
As the summer commenced and oil prices began a steep upward climb,
many industry analysts were predicting a late summer or early fall
clash between the United States and Iran (roughly coinciding with
a predicted intense hurricane season). This led oil merchants and
refiners to fill their storage facilities to capacity with $70-80 per
barrel oil. They expected to have a considerable backlog to sell at
a substantial profit if supplies from the Middle East were cut off
and/or storms wracked the Gulf of Mexico.
Then came the war in Lebanon. At first, the fighting seemed to confirm
such predictions, only increasing fears of a region-wide conflict,
possibly involving Iran. The price of crude oil approached record
heights. In the early days of the war, the Bush administration
tacitly seconded Israeli actions in Lebanon, which, it was widely
assumed, would lay the groundwork for a similar campaign against
military targets in Iran. But Hezbollah's success in holding off the
Israeli military combined with horrific television images of civilian
casualties forced leaders in the United States and Europe to intercede
and bring the fighting to a halt.
We may never know exactly what led the White House to shift course on
Lebanon, but high oil prices--and expectations of worse to come--were
surely a factor in administration calculations. When it became clear
that the Israelis were facing far stiffer resistance than expected,
and that the Iranians were capable of fomenting all manner of mischief
(including, potentially, total havoc in the global oil market),
wiser heads in the corporate wing of the Republican Party undoubtedly
concluded that any further escalation or regionalization of the war
would immediately push crude prices over $100 per barrel.
Prices at the gas pump would then have been driven into the $4-5 per
gallon range, virtually ensuring a Republican defeat in the mid-term
elections. This was still early in the summer, of course, well before
peak hurricane season; mix just one Katrina-strength storm in the
Gulf of Mexico into this already unfolding nightmare scenario and
the fate of the Republicans would have been sealed.
In any case, President Bush did allow Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice to work with the Europeans to stop the Lebanon fighting and has
since refrained from any overt talk about a possible assault on Iran.
Careful never explicitly to rule out the military option when it
comes to Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities, since June he has
nonetheless steadfastly insisted that diplomacy must be given a chance
to work. Meanwhile, we have made it most of the way through this year's
hurricane season without a single catastrophic storm hitting the U.S.
For all these reasons, immediate fears about a clash with Iran,
a possible spreading of war to other oil regions in the Middle East,
and Gulf of Mexico hurricanes have dissipated, and the price of crude
has plummeted. On top of this, there appears to be a perceptible
slowing of the world economy--precipitated, in part, by the rising
prices of raw materials--leading to a drop in oil demand. The result?
Retailers have abundant supplies of gasoline on hand and the laws of
supply and demand dictate a decline in prices.
How long will this combination of factors prevail?
Best guess: The slowdown in global economic growth will continue for
a time, further lowering prices at the pump. This is likely to help
retailers in time for the Christmas shopping season, projected to
be marginally better this year than last precisely because of those
lower gas prices.
Once the election season is past, however, President Bush will have
less incentive to muzzle his rhetoric on Iran and we may experience a
sharp increase in Ahmadinejad-bashing. If no progress has been made
by year's end on the diplomatic front, expect an acceleration of
the preparations for war already underway in the Persian Gulf area
(similar to the military buildup witnessed in late 2002 and early
2003 prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq). This will naturally lead
to an intensification of fears and a reversal of the downward spiral
of gas prices, though from a level that, by then, may be well below
$2 per gallon.
Now that we've come this far, does the recent drop in gasoline prices
and the seemingly sudden abundance of petroleum reveal a flaw in the
argument for this as a peak-oil moment? Peak-oil theory, which had
been getting ever more attention until the price at the pump began
to fall, contends that the amount of oil in the world is finite;
that once we've used up about half of the original global supply,
production will attain a maximum or "peak" level, after which daily
output will fall, no matter how much more is spent on exploration
and enhanced extraction technology.
Most industry analysts now agree that global oil output will eventually
reach a peak level, but there is considerable debate as to exactly when
that moment will arise. Recently, a growing number of specialists--many
joined under the banner of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil
--are claiming that we have already consumed approximately half the
world's original inheritance of 2 trillion barrels of conventional
(i.e., liquid) petroleum, and so are at, or very near, the peak-oil
moment and can expect an imminent contraction in supplies.
In the fall of 2005, as if in confirmation of this assessment, the CEO
of Chevron, David O'Reilly, blanketed U.S. newspapers and magazines
with an advertisement stating, "One thing is clear: the era of easy
oil is over ... Demand is soaring like never before ... At the same
time, many of the world's oil and gas fields are maturing.
And new energy discoveries are mainly occurring in places where
resources are difficult to extract, physically, economically, and
even politically. When growing demand meets tighter supplies, the
result is more competition for the same resources."
But this is not, of course, what we are now seeing.
Petroleum supplies are more abundant than they were six months ago.
There have even been some promising discoveries of new oil and
gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico, while--modestly adding to global
stockpiles--several foreign fields and pipelines have come on line
in the last few months, including the $4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Turkey's Mediterranean coast,
which will bring new supplies to world markets. Does this indicate
that peak-oil theory is headed for the dustbin of history or, at least,
that the peak moment is still safely in our future?
As it happens, nothing in the current situation should lead us to
conclude that peak-oil theory is wrong. Far from it. As suggested
by Chevron's O'Reilly, remaining energy supplies on the planet are
mainly to be found "in places where resources are difficult to extract,
physically, economically, and even politically." This is exactly what
we are seeing today.
For example, the much-heralded new discovery in the Gulf of Mexico,
Chevron's Jack No. 2 Well , lies beneath five miles of water and rock
some 175 miles south of New Orleans in an area where, in recent years,
hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, and Rita have attained their maximum strength
and inflicted their greatest damage on offshore oil facilities. It
is naive to assume that, however promising Jack No. 2 may seem in
oil-industry publicity releases, it will not be exposed to Category
5 hurricanes in the years ahead, especially as global warming heats
the Gulf and generates ever more potent storms.
Obviously, Chevron would not be investing billions of dollars in
costly technology to develop such a precarious energy resource if
there were better opportunities on land or closer to shore--but so
many of those easy-to-get-at places have now been exhausted, leaving
the company little choice in the matter.
Or take the equally ballyhooed BTC pipeline, which shipped its
first oil in July, with top U.S. officials in attendance . This
conduit stretches 1,040 miles from Baku in Azerbaijan to the
Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, passing no less than six
active or potential war zones along the way: the Armenian enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia; the
Muslim separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia;
and the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Is this where anyone in their right
mind would build a pipeline? Not unless you were desperate for oil,
and safer locations had already been used up.
In fact, virtually all of the other new fields being developed or
considered by U.S. and foreign energy firms--ANWR in Alaska, the
jungles of Colombia, northern Siberia, Uganda, Chad, Sakhalin Island
in Russia's Far East--are located in areas that are hard to reach,
environmentally sensitive, or just plain dangerous. Most of these
fields will be developed, and they will yield additional supplies of
oil, but the fact that we are being forced to rely on them suggests
that the peak-oil moment has indeed arrived and that the general
direction of the price of oil, despite period drops, will tend to
be upwards as the cost of production in these out-of-the-way and
dangerous places continues to climb.
Some peak-oil theorists have, however, done us all a disservice by
suggesting, for rhetorical purposes, that the peak-oil moment is ...
well, a sharp peak. They paint a picture of a simple, steep, upward
production slope leading to a pinnacle, followed by a similarly neat
and steep decline. Perhaps looking back from 500 years hence, this
moment will have that appearance on global oil production charts. But
for those of us living now, the "peak" is more likely to feel like a
plateau--lasting for perhaps a decade or more--in which global oil
production will experience occasional ups and downs without rising
substantially (as predicted by those who dismiss peak-oil theory),
nor falling precipitously (as predicted by its most ardent proponents).
During this interim period, particular events--a hurricane, an outbreak
of conflict in an oil region--will temporarily tighten supplies,
raising gasoline prices, while the opening of a new field or pipeline,
or simply (as now) the alleviation of immediate fears and a temporary
boost in supplies will lower prices. Eventually, of course, we will
reach the plateau's end and the decline predicted by the theory will
commence in earnest.
In the meantime, for better or worse, we live on that plateau today.
If this year's hurricane season ends with no major storms, and we get
through the next few months without a major blowup in the Middle East,
we are likely to start 2007 with lower gasoline prices than we've seen
in a while. This is not, however, evidence of a major trend. Because
global oil supplies are never likely to be truly abundant again,
it would only take one major storm or one major crisis in the Middle
East to push crude prices back up near or over $80 a barrel. This is
the world we now inhabit, and it will never get truly better until we
develop an entirely new energy system based on petroleum alternatives
and renewable fuels.
Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies
at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts and the author of Blood
and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency
on Imported Petroleum . This piece originally appeared in TomDispatch.