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Neither Putin nor Saakashvili looks likely to step back from stand-off
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, Associated Press Writer
Associated Press Worldstream
October 6, 2006 Friday
Who will blink first? The leaders of Russia and Georgia are locked
in a contest of political wills that appears to be fueled as much by
their styles as by the grievances piled up between the neighboring
nations since the Soviet collapse.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili whom some pro-Kremlin protesters
have caricatured as Hitler minces no words when describing his quest
to restore Georgia's territorial integrity and full independence,
and that means resisting what he calls Russia's bullying.
He came out swinging at the U.N. General Assembly last month, accusing
Russia of the "gangster occupation" of parts of his country and of
condoning ethnic cleansing.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has condescendingly referred
to Saakashvili as a hot-tempered native of the Caucasus, a region
Russians associated with warring tribes, wily traders and banditry.
When Saakashvili tried to arrange a meeting with Putin last summer to
reduce escalating tensions, the Kremlin said Putin was too busy. And
Putin, a former KGB agent who has stuffed Russia's ruling elite with
one-time secret service colleagues, has ironically likened the actions
of the Georgian leadership to the policies of Lavrenty Beria Josef
Stalin's henchman who ran the precursor to the KGB.
Georgians respond to Putin's barbs with a touch of bravado, joking
that the tall Saakashvili is "the big dictator of a small country,
and Putin the small dictator of a large one."
By now, Putin and Saakashvili have dug themselves so deeply into
their political trenches that it's hard to imagine who will be the
first to cave in.
Behind each leader stands an army of politicians and aides eager to
outdo each other in devotion to the national interest.
After years of mutual verbal sparring, Georgia last week arrested four
Russian military officers alleged to be spies. Russia responded by
suspending the issuance of visas to Georgian citizens and slapping
a transport and postal blockade on Georgia. Police in Moscow have
closed down several casinos suddenly discovered allegedly to be run
by the Georgian mafia and have combed marketplaces and restaurants
to detain and deport Georgians without work permits.
"The Kremlin has driven itself into a dead end: it can end sanctions
without losing face only if it forces Saakashvili to his knees,"
Moscow-based political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin told The Associated
Press. "The Georgian elite also can't conduct any rational talks with
Russia without losing face. Bilateral ties have been spoiled for good."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the sanctions will stay
in place until Georgia changes its anti-Russian course.
"That's only the beginning of our sanctions, we could exert such a
pressure on them that even a mouse wouldn't sneak through," boasted
Andrei Kokoshin, the head of Russian parliament's committee for ties
with ex-Soviet nations.
But Georgia looks unlikely to bend. Beyond Saakashvili's natural
inclination for dramatic steps, defiance appears to be Georgia's
strategy for attracting Western support and pressing its case to
join NATO.
Putin's strategy in applying such unprecedented pressure against a
former Soviet republic is less clear.
"The hawks in the Kremlin don't have any positive program," Oreshkin
said. "They aren't pursuing any long-term strategic goals; all they
want is to punish Georgia and hit it hard."
Several Russian politicians have already raised the prospect of cutting
natural gas to Georgia, but such a move would also block supplies to
Russia's closest ally in the Caucasus, Armenia.
Some Russian commentators said the Kremlin apparently hoped that
the burden of sanctions would encourage Georgians to unite against
Saakashvili. But such hopes appear illusory: the blockade and Russian
police crackdown on the Georgian diaspora would badly hurt ordinary
people but Saakashvili would likely not be blamed. In fact, the
perception of Russian interference could very well shore up support
for the president, whose popularity has been falling amid persistent
poverty and high unemployment.
"It looks like Russia needs to reach the limits of absurdity to
realize that such pressure only makes Georgia more pro-Western,"
Georgy Nodia, the head of the Tbilisi-based Institue for Peace and
Democracy and Development, told the AP.
Some pro-Kremlin lawmakers and political analysts have suggested that
Russia could go so far as to recognize the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia and even move to incorporate them. South Ossetia
has already scheduled an independence referendum next month.
However, an attempt to annex the separatist regions would effectively
shatter Russia's already freezing ties with the United States and put
it on a collision course with other Western nations an outcome clearly
not in the interests of the Kremlin striving for closer integration
into the global economy.
"Under no circumstances will the Russian leaders wage a war against
Georgia, recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or
provide them with official military assistance," analyst Stanislav
Belkovsky wrote in a recent commentary, adding that the Kremlin
wouldn't risk its economic interests in the West.
Associated Press Writer Vladimir Isachenkov has been reporting on
political affairs in Russia and the former Soviet Union since 1991.
Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili contributed to this report from Tbilisi.
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, Associated Press Writer
Associated Press Worldstream
October 6, 2006 Friday
Who will blink first? The leaders of Russia and Georgia are locked
in a contest of political wills that appears to be fueled as much by
their styles as by the grievances piled up between the neighboring
nations since the Soviet collapse.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili whom some pro-Kremlin protesters
have caricatured as Hitler minces no words when describing his quest
to restore Georgia's territorial integrity and full independence,
and that means resisting what he calls Russia's bullying.
He came out swinging at the U.N. General Assembly last month, accusing
Russia of the "gangster occupation" of parts of his country and of
condoning ethnic cleansing.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has condescendingly referred
to Saakashvili as a hot-tempered native of the Caucasus, a region
Russians associated with warring tribes, wily traders and banditry.
When Saakashvili tried to arrange a meeting with Putin last summer to
reduce escalating tensions, the Kremlin said Putin was too busy. And
Putin, a former KGB agent who has stuffed Russia's ruling elite with
one-time secret service colleagues, has ironically likened the actions
of the Georgian leadership to the policies of Lavrenty Beria Josef
Stalin's henchman who ran the precursor to the KGB.
Georgians respond to Putin's barbs with a touch of bravado, joking
that the tall Saakashvili is "the big dictator of a small country,
and Putin the small dictator of a large one."
By now, Putin and Saakashvili have dug themselves so deeply into
their political trenches that it's hard to imagine who will be the
first to cave in.
Behind each leader stands an army of politicians and aides eager to
outdo each other in devotion to the national interest.
After years of mutual verbal sparring, Georgia last week arrested four
Russian military officers alleged to be spies. Russia responded by
suspending the issuance of visas to Georgian citizens and slapping
a transport and postal blockade on Georgia. Police in Moscow have
closed down several casinos suddenly discovered allegedly to be run
by the Georgian mafia and have combed marketplaces and restaurants
to detain and deport Georgians without work permits.
"The Kremlin has driven itself into a dead end: it can end sanctions
without losing face only if it forces Saakashvili to his knees,"
Moscow-based political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin told The Associated
Press. "The Georgian elite also can't conduct any rational talks with
Russia without losing face. Bilateral ties have been spoiled for good."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the sanctions will stay
in place until Georgia changes its anti-Russian course.
"That's only the beginning of our sanctions, we could exert such a
pressure on them that even a mouse wouldn't sneak through," boasted
Andrei Kokoshin, the head of Russian parliament's committee for ties
with ex-Soviet nations.
But Georgia looks unlikely to bend. Beyond Saakashvili's natural
inclination for dramatic steps, defiance appears to be Georgia's
strategy for attracting Western support and pressing its case to
join NATO.
Putin's strategy in applying such unprecedented pressure against a
former Soviet republic is less clear.
"The hawks in the Kremlin don't have any positive program," Oreshkin
said. "They aren't pursuing any long-term strategic goals; all they
want is to punish Georgia and hit it hard."
Several Russian politicians have already raised the prospect of cutting
natural gas to Georgia, but such a move would also block supplies to
Russia's closest ally in the Caucasus, Armenia.
Some Russian commentators said the Kremlin apparently hoped that
the burden of sanctions would encourage Georgians to unite against
Saakashvili. But such hopes appear illusory: the blockade and Russian
police crackdown on the Georgian diaspora would badly hurt ordinary
people but Saakashvili would likely not be blamed. In fact, the
perception of Russian interference could very well shore up support
for the president, whose popularity has been falling amid persistent
poverty and high unemployment.
"It looks like Russia needs to reach the limits of absurdity to
realize that such pressure only makes Georgia more pro-Western,"
Georgy Nodia, the head of the Tbilisi-based Institue for Peace and
Democracy and Development, told the AP.
Some pro-Kremlin lawmakers and political analysts have suggested that
Russia could go so far as to recognize the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia and even move to incorporate them. South Ossetia
has already scheduled an independence referendum next month.
However, an attempt to annex the separatist regions would effectively
shatter Russia's already freezing ties with the United States and put
it on a collision course with other Western nations an outcome clearly
not in the interests of the Kremlin striving for closer integration
into the global economy.
"Under no circumstances will the Russian leaders wage a war against
Georgia, recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or
provide them with official military assistance," analyst Stanislav
Belkovsky wrote in a recent commentary, adding that the Kremlin
wouldn't risk its economic interests in the West.
Associated Press Writer Vladimir Isachenkov has been reporting on
political affairs in Russia and the former Soviet Union since 1991.
Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili contributed to this report from Tbilisi.