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CRISIS LOOMS IN THE CAUCASUS
by Dr. Ariel Cohen
The Heritage
www.heritage.org
October 10, 2006
Amid great power fretting over North Korea's nuclear test and
continuing Iranian truculence against the West, Russia escalated
its confrontation with the neighboring Georgia. Moscow is now using
Georgia's arrest of four alleged Russian intelligence officers two
weeks ago as a pretext to escalate its conflicts with Tbilisi.
This is a dangerous development for the West, and specifically
the United States, which could see its influence in the Caucasus
region crumble if Russia is successful in forcing Georgia into its
sphere of influence. U.S. policy must walk a fine line of encouraging
settlement of the current dispute without becoming a liability through
over-involvement.
Georgia may have overplayed its hand in arresting the Russian military
intelligence officers, whom it accused of sabotage, and not just
expelling them quietly--the normal modus operandi in such cases. In
response to the arrests, Moscow recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi,
evacuated diplomats and their families, and halted issuing visas to
Georgian citizens. The Russian military forces stationed in Georgia
are on high alert. Russia cut air and railroad links to Georgia,
and blocked money transfers from Georgians working in Russia, an
important source of income for many Georgian families.
Bearing the brunt of this invigorated conflict is one-million-strong
Georgian Diaspora in Russia. Ethnic Georgians, including children,
were loaded onto cargo planes and expelled from Russia. Russia cites
their illegal immigration status. Prominent Georgian intellectuals
who are Russian citizens are being harassed by the tax police.
Georgian businesses in Moscow are being singled out by law enforcement
authorities. The handling of this crisis is further damaging Russia's
international standing as a dependable member of the G-8.
Georgian Overkill?
Since Mikheil Saakashvili rose to power in the Rose Revolution of
2003, Russia has warily witnessed anti-Russian statements by Georgian
leaders, a relentless push to evacuate Russian military bases (to which
Russia had agreed previously), an attempt to join NATO, and opposition
to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization. In response,
the Putin administration has embargoed Georgia's key exports into
Russia: Borjomi mineral water and wine.
Russia has made little secret of its desire to spark a war
in the Caucasus to force regime change in Tbilisi. (See Ariel
Cohen, "Preventing a Russian-Georgian Military Confrontation,"
Heritage Foundation Webmemo No. 1024, March 31, 2006, at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEuras ia/ wm1024.cfm.) It may
get its wish. In September, South Ossetian separatists, who receive
Russian military support, fired on a Georgian helicopter carrying the
Georgian Minister of Defense. This provocation, if successful, could
have led to renewed hostilities in the small secessionist territory
that is a part of Georgia.
Geopolitical Roots
Russia's regional and global strategic aims explain why Moscow is
escalating its conflict with Georgia. First, Russia has attempted
before to block NATO enlargement into former Soviet territory. In 1999,
Russia fulminated against the Baltic States' NATO membership. But
at that time, Russia was extricating itself from the 1998 economic
crisis while a power struggle was afoot in Moscow to succeed President
Boris Yeltsin. In part because energy prices were much lower in 1999,
Western European countries supported the Baltic States' NATO bid
despite Russian protests. Today, with the West increasingly dependent
on Russia's Gazprom, they are taking Russia's foreign policy positions
much more seriously.
Second, the Kremlin is now buoyed by $250 billion in petro-dollar
reserves. These funds can buy a lot of hardware for the Trans-Caucasus
Military District and pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
Third, Russia is uneasy over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export
pipeline (MEP), which takes Azeri oil to Mediterranean markets and
crosses Georgia but bypasses Russia. Soon the Absheron-Erzurum gas
pipeline will come online, bringing Azeri gas to Turkey and Europe,
again bypassing Russia. Gazprom fears that this gas pipeline may
eventually allow Turkmeni and Kazakhstani gas to circumvent its
pipeline network on its way to Europe.
A Balance of Power Shift
If Georgia comes under the Russian sway, neighboring Azerbaijan and
Armenia will feel the full weight of the Russian presence. Foreign
policy experts in Moscow believe that the Russian government is angry
that Azerbaijan has not allocated enough oil patches to Russian
companies and has facilitated its oil exports via Turkey instead
of Russia. With increased power in the region, Russia will act on
these concerns.
Armenian opposition openly seeks a more pro-Western and less
pro-Russian policy, pointing out that close ties with Moscow did
not improve Armenia's abysmal living standards and did not bring
international recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh,
a breakaway province of Azerbaijan, populated mostly by Armenians.
A pro-Russian Georgia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization
of the Commonwealth of Independent States would permit Russia and
Iran to dominate Azerbaijan and Armenia, severely limiting U.S.
policy options there. Furthermore, such a development would put to
rest American ambitions in Central Asia and could cut off strategically
important Kazakhstan from western energy markets.
The Kosovo Ripple Effect
Russia has warned repeatedly that it will retaliate severely if Kosovo
is granted independence against the will of Serbia, a historic ally,
and Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for the imposition of
the Kosovo criteria on separatist enclaves in the former Soviet Union,
including Transnistria (a part of Moldova), Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Under this policy, Russia would enforce referenda
in these territories and recognize their independence, opening the
door to their eventual incorporation in the Russian Federation. This
approach would create a dangerous precedent for the Crimea, where
the majority of the Russian-speaking population is pro-Russian;
Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine; and the predominantly Slavic
Northern Kazakhstan.
Violations and alternations of the current borders of the former
Soviet Union could generate severe tensions in Europe and open a
Pandora's box of territorial claims and ethnically based border
challenges there and elsewhere, such as in Iraq and Kurdistan.
Conclusion
The United States today is preoccupied with Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran,
and North Korea. Russia is a key player in all of these, and its
increased cooperation in these disputes would be welcome. The future of
U.S.-Russian relations and global security requires that Moscow behave
responsibly and constructively. Quickly defusing the Georgian crisis
through diplomacy would be a good place to start. Washington should
encourage the European powers, the European Union, and Turkey to become
more engaged in defusing the Georgian-Russian confrontation. Finally,
the U.S. should advise Georgia not to escalate its rhetoric on Russia
unnecessarily or needlessly antagonize its large neighbor. After
all, a peaceful and prosperous Caucasus is in Russian, Georgian,
and American interests.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Security at the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Dr. Ariel Cohen
The Heritage
www.heritage.org
October 10, 2006
Amid great power fretting over North Korea's nuclear test and
continuing Iranian truculence against the West, Russia escalated
its confrontation with the neighboring Georgia. Moscow is now using
Georgia's arrest of four alleged Russian intelligence officers two
weeks ago as a pretext to escalate its conflicts with Tbilisi.
This is a dangerous development for the West, and specifically
the United States, which could see its influence in the Caucasus
region crumble if Russia is successful in forcing Georgia into its
sphere of influence. U.S. policy must walk a fine line of encouraging
settlement of the current dispute without becoming a liability through
over-involvement.
Georgia may have overplayed its hand in arresting the Russian military
intelligence officers, whom it accused of sabotage, and not just
expelling them quietly--the normal modus operandi in such cases. In
response to the arrests, Moscow recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi,
evacuated diplomats and their families, and halted issuing visas to
Georgian citizens. The Russian military forces stationed in Georgia
are on high alert. Russia cut air and railroad links to Georgia,
and blocked money transfers from Georgians working in Russia, an
important source of income for many Georgian families.
Bearing the brunt of this invigorated conflict is one-million-strong
Georgian Diaspora in Russia. Ethnic Georgians, including children,
were loaded onto cargo planes and expelled from Russia. Russia cites
their illegal immigration status. Prominent Georgian intellectuals
who are Russian citizens are being harassed by the tax police.
Georgian businesses in Moscow are being singled out by law enforcement
authorities. The handling of this crisis is further damaging Russia's
international standing as a dependable member of the G-8.
Georgian Overkill?
Since Mikheil Saakashvili rose to power in the Rose Revolution of
2003, Russia has warily witnessed anti-Russian statements by Georgian
leaders, a relentless push to evacuate Russian military bases (to which
Russia had agreed previously), an attempt to join NATO, and opposition
to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization. In response,
the Putin administration has embargoed Georgia's key exports into
Russia: Borjomi mineral water and wine.
Russia has made little secret of its desire to spark a war
in the Caucasus to force regime change in Tbilisi. (See Ariel
Cohen, "Preventing a Russian-Georgian Military Confrontation,"
Heritage Foundation Webmemo No. 1024, March 31, 2006, at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEuras ia/ wm1024.cfm.) It may
get its wish. In September, South Ossetian separatists, who receive
Russian military support, fired on a Georgian helicopter carrying the
Georgian Minister of Defense. This provocation, if successful, could
have led to renewed hostilities in the small secessionist territory
that is a part of Georgia.
Geopolitical Roots
Russia's regional and global strategic aims explain why Moscow is
escalating its conflict with Georgia. First, Russia has attempted
before to block NATO enlargement into former Soviet territory. In 1999,
Russia fulminated against the Baltic States' NATO membership. But
at that time, Russia was extricating itself from the 1998 economic
crisis while a power struggle was afoot in Moscow to succeed President
Boris Yeltsin. In part because energy prices were much lower in 1999,
Western European countries supported the Baltic States' NATO bid
despite Russian protests. Today, with the West increasingly dependent
on Russia's Gazprom, they are taking Russia's foreign policy positions
much more seriously.
Second, the Kremlin is now buoyed by $250 billion in petro-dollar
reserves. These funds can buy a lot of hardware for the Trans-Caucasus
Military District and pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
Third, Russia is uneasy over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export
pipeline (MEP), which takes Azeri oil to Mediterranean markets and
crosses Georgia but bypasses Russia. Soon the Absheron-Erzurum gas
pipeline will come online, bringing Azeri gas to Turkey and Europe,
again bypassing Russia. Gazprom fears that this gas pipeline may
eventually allow Turkmeni and Kazakhstani gas to circumvent its
pipeline network on its way to Europe.
A Balance of Power Shift
If Georgia comes under the Russian sway, neighboring Azerbaijan and
Armenia will feel the full weight of the Russian presence. Foreign
policy experts in Moscow believe that the Russian government is angry
that Azerbaijan has not allocated enough oil patches to Russian
companies and has facilitated its oil exports via Turkey instead
of Russia. With increased power in the region, Russia will act on
these concerns.
Armenian opposition openly seeks a more pro-Western and less
pro-Russian policy, pointing out that close ties with Moscow did
not improve Armenia's abysmal living standards and did not bring
international recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh,
a breakaway province of Azerbaijan, populated mostly by Armenians.
A pro-Russian Georgia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization
of the Commonwealth of Independent States would permit Russia and
Iran to dominate Azerbaijan and Armenia, severely limiting U.S.
policy options there. Furthermore, such a development would put to
rest American ambitions in Central Asia and could cut off strategically
important Kazakhstan from western energy markets.
The Kosovo Ripple Effect
Russia has warned repeatedly that it will retaliate severely if Kosovo
is granted independence against the will of Serbia, a historic ally,
and Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for the imposition of
the Kosovo criteria on separatist enclaves in the former Soviet Union,
including Transnistria (a part of Moldova), Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Under this policy, Russia would enforce referenda
in these territories and recognize their independence, opening the
door to their eventual incorporation in the Russian Federation. This
approach would create a dangerous precedent for the Crimea, where
the majority of the Russian-speaking population is pro-Russian;
Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine; and the predominantly Slavic
Northern Kazakhstan.
Violations and alternations of the current borders of the former
Soviet Union could generate severe tensions in Europe and open a
Pandora's box of territorial claims and ethnically based border
challenges there and elsewhere, such as in Iraq and Kurdistan.
Conclusion
The United States today is preoccupied with Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran,
and North Korea. Russia is a key player in all of these, and its
increased cooperation in these disputes would be welcome. The future of
U.S.-Russian relations and global security requires that Moscow behave
responsibly and constructively. Quickly defusing the Georgian crisis
through diplomacy would be a good place to start. Washington should
encourage the European powers, the European Union, and Turkey to become
more engaged in defusing the Georgian-Russian confrontation. Finally,
the U.S. should advise Georgia not to escalate its rhetoric on Russia
unnecessarily or needlessly antagonize its large neighbor. After
all, a peaceful and prosperous Caucasus is in Russian, Georgian,
and American interests.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Security at the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress