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GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: CONSIDERING TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN IRAQ
Stratfor
Oct 16 2006
Reports are circulating that jihadist groups in northern and central
Iraq are in the process of creating an "emirate," an independent
region in the Sunni areas. The Shia are already in effective control
of their own region in the south, and the Kurds have controlled
their region of northern Iraq for an extended period of time. There
are ethnically diffuse and disputed areas in and around Baghdad,
so this hardly solves the problem of sectarian violence, but this
regional autonomy is becoming a de facto reality. We now need to
start considering some aspects of a potential partition.
The most important issue here is to recognize what the Sunnis already
know: a partition along ethno-sectarian lines would make the Sunni
region, economically speaking, an abortion. The Shia control Iraq's
southern oil fields. The Kurds control the northern oil fields. The
Sunnis control nothing. If partition occurs in accordance with current
boundaries, the Sunni position will deteriorate and collapse.
Therefore, it is essential for all involved (given the Sunni unrest
and prospects of violence) that the Sunnis have a share in Iraq's oil.
To be more precise, the Sunnis must control Kirkuk, a center of the
oil industry and a city in which conflict rages for these reasons.
The Kurds now hold Kirkuk; the Sunnis must take it. The Sunnis are
fighting on four fronts: against the Shia, against the Kurds, against
the Americans and against each other. The Kurds, on the other hand,
are fighting only the Sunnis at this point. Therefore, logic would
have it that the Sunnis don't stand a chance.
But another element must be added to this calculus: Turkey. Turkey
has tried to keep out of the Iraq war and, so far, has done fairly
well at it. But Turkey does not want to see the Kurdish autonomous
region expand, let alone give rise to an independent Kurdish state.
Such a state would become a focal point for Kurdish nationalism and,
since the Turks would face growing breakaway tendencies in their
own Kurdish region, they would not welcome this development --
particularly if Baghdad collapses as Iraq's center.
Therefore, the Turks will want to weaken the Kurds. They also will
want to make sure that there is a strong buffer between them and the
Iraqi Shia -- a buffer other than the Kurds. That would mean it is
in Turkey's national interest to see the Sunnis strengthened right now.
It should be recalled that the Turks intervened extensively in
Iraq prior to 2003. They are old players in the region with ties to
Sunni tribal leaders. If they are facing a Kurdish state, they might
well choose to reassert themselves in the region by strengthening
the Sunnis.
Now, the Turks are vehemently opposed to the jihadists, but in this
they share an interest with Sunni tribal leaders, who see the jihadists
as a potential threat to their own authority. While it is the jihadists
who have declared an emirate, neither the Sunni leadership nor the
Turks would want to see the jihadists having any role to play if
independence becomes a reality. The Turks would want to weaken the
Kurds; the Sunnis would want to dominate oil in the north. Alliances
have been formed on less.
There are few constraints on the Turks. They do not expect to be
admitted to the European Union and, given France's decision to raise
the question of the Armenian holocaust, the Turks have written off
accession, in the intermediate term at least. Nor do they need it.
Turkey has been doing quite well -- better than France or Germany,
economically. As for the Iranians, they would have no problem
with seeing the Kurds seriously weakened and the Sunni jihadists
undermined. So long as the Shia control the south and the Iranians
have influence with the Shia in Iraq, they can live with Turkish
influence among the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the United States seems to be making plans for deploying
forces in northern Iraq. Any such plan would require Turkish support,
as logistical support from Kuwait makes for a long, tough line. If the
United States wants a role in Iraq after redeployment, it will have
to take Turkish interests into account. The United States previously
has backed Kurdish interests. But the Americans need the Turks and
have little to offer them. The one thing the Turks might want --
EU membership without strings -- is something Washington can't help
them with.
It is now time to turn the focus from Baghdad to the north, and the
political evolution there.
Stratfor
Oct 16 2006
Reports are circulating that jihadist groups in northern and central
Iraq are in the process of creating an "emirate," an independent
region in the Sunni areas. The Shia are already in effective control
of their own region in the south, and the Kurds have controlled
their region of northern Iraq for an extended period of time. There
are ethnically diffuse and disputed areas in and around Baghdad,
so this hardly solves the problem of sectarian violence, but this
regional autonomy is becoming a de facto reality. We now need to
start considering some aspects of a potential partition.
The most important issue here is to recognize what the Sunnis already
know: a partition along ethno-sectarian lines would make the Sunni
region, economically speaking, an abortion. The Shia control Iraq's
southern oil fields. The Kurds control the northern oil fields. The
Sunnis control nothing. If partition occurs in accordance with current
boundaries, the Sunni position will deteriorate and collapse.
Therefore, it is essential for all involved (given the Sunni unrest
and prospects of violence) that the Sunnis have a share in Iraq's oil.
To be more precise, the Sunnis must control Kirkuk, a center of the
oil industry and a city in which conflict rages for these reasons.
The Kurds now hold Kirkuk; the Sunnis must take it. The Sunnis are
fighting on four fronts: against the Shia, against the Kurds, against
the Americans and against each other. The Kurds, on the other hand,
are fighting only the Sunnis at this point. Therefore, logic would
have it that the Sunnis don't stand a chance.
But another element must be added to this calculus: Turkey. Turkey
has tried to keep out of the Iraq war and, so far, has done fairly
well at it. But Turkey does not want to see the Kurdish autonomous
region expand, let alone give rise to an independent Kurdish state.
Such a state would become a focal point for Kurdish nationalism and,
since the Turks would face growing breakaway tendencies in their
own Kurdish region, they would not welcome this development --
particularly if Baghdad collapses as Iraq's center.
Therefore, the Turks will want to weaken the Kurds. They also will
want to make sure that there is a strong buffer between them and the
Iraqi Shia -- a buffer other than the Kurds. That would mean it is
in Turkey's national interest to see the Sunnis strengthened right now.
It should be recalled that the Turks intervened extensively in
Iraq prior to 2003. They are old players in the region with ties to
Sunni tribal leaders. If they are facing a Kurdish state, they might
well choose to reassert themselves in the region by strengthening
the Sunnis.
Now, the Turks are vehemently opposed to the jihadists, but in this
they share an interest with Sunni tribal leaders, who see the jihadists
as a potential threat to their own authority. While it is the jihadists
who have declared an emirate, neither the Sunni leadership nor the
Turks would want to see the jihadists having any role to play if
independence becomes a reality. The Turks would want to weaken the
Kurds; the Sunnis would want to dominate oil in the north. Alliances
have been formed on less.
There are few constraints on the Turks. They do not expect to be
admitted to the European Union and, given France's decision to raise
the question of the Armenian holocaust, the Turks have written off
accession, in the intermediate term at least. Nor do they need it.
Turkey has been doing quite well -- better than France or Germany,
economically. As for the Iranians, they would have no problem
with seeing the Kurds seriously weakened and the Sunni jihadists
undermined. So long as the Shia control the south and the Iranians
have influence with the Shia in Iraq, they can live with Turkish
influence among the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the United States seems to be making plans for deploying
forces in northern Iraq. Any such plan would require Turkish support,
as logistical support from Kuwait makes for a long, tough line. If the
United States wants a role in Iraq after redeployment, it will have
to take Turkish interests into account. The United States previously
has backed Kurdish interests. But the Americans need the Turks and
have little to offer them. The one thing the Turks might want --
EU membership without strings -- is something Washington can't help
them with.
It is now time to turn the focus from Baghdad to the north, and the
political evolution there.