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The Dark Side of Democracy
An Interview with Michael Mann
by Michael Mann and Khatchig Mouradian; October 18, 2006
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?I temID=11222
Michael Mann is a British-born sociology professor of at the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA). He was a reader in sociology at the London
School of Economics and Sociology from 1977 to 1987 and received his PhD in
Sociology from Oxford University. He is the author of The Sources of Social
Power (Cambridge, 1986, 1993), Fascists (Cambridge, 2004), and The Dark Side
of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, 2005).
The latter has been widely reviewed and praised as a "groundbreaking" work
in genocide studies. It attempts to explain the worst manifestations of evil
in human civilization through the study of a number of cases, including the
Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide.
We discuss some of the issues highlighted in The Dark Side of Democracy in
the following interview conducted by phone, from Beirut.
Khatchig Mouradian: In the preface of your book The Dark Side of Democracy,
you write: "Evil does not arrive from outside of our civilization, from a
separate realm we are tempted to call 'primitive.' Evil is generated by
civilization itself." Can you explain?
Michael Mann: Each civilization creates new problems for human beings.
Sometimes, man succeeds in coping with these problems with a fair degree of
humanity, and sometimes he doesn't. There is a tendency to say that ethnic
cleansing and genocide are committed by "aliens." In fact, perpetrators of
such atrocities are dealing with the same problems that our own [Western]
civilization dealt with earlier, and sometimes with equally disastrous
outcomes. So it makes it easier for us to understand the Nazis and the Young
Turks, if we understand that the problems they failed to deal with are
problems that confront human civilization as a whole.
K.M.: You say, "Now, the epicenter of ethnic cleansing has moved to the
south of the world. Unless Humanity takes evasive action, it will continue
to spread until democracies-hopefully not ethnically cleansed ones-rule
the world." Is the situation in Darfur and in Africa, in general, a
reflection of this shift?
M.M.: The notion of a people ruling themselves becomes potentially
problematic when more than one ethnic group generates a claims over shared
territory. Africa is very multi-ethnic, and it has to cope with that. The
problem areas there tend to be where there are two great factions. In Sudan,
for example, there are two visions, by Arabs and Africans, and claims over
land have pitted them against one another. In Rwanda, there were only two
significant ethnic groups-the Hutus and the Tutsis-and the ethnic rivalry
underlay the genocide.
K.M.: You have titled the book "The Dark Side of Democracy." Murderous
ethnic cleansing, however, is rarely committed by established democracies,
as you and others have pointed out. Rather, the "danger zone" seems to be
during the transition phase from a non-democratic regime to a democratic
one. It is during the transition stage that different ethnic groups haven't
yet resolved their issues, and that allows for situations where ethnic
cleansing could occur. Do you think Iraq is facing the perils of this
"transition phase" today?
M.M.: You are quite right. The problem is more during the transition period.
Once democracy is established, there is a decline in ethnic cleansing. I
think Iraq is a very good example of what I write about. Just to have
elections in a bi- or tri-ethnic context like Iraq almost guarantees that
the Shiites will vote for certain parties, and the Sunnis and Kurds for
other parties. The U.S. has introduced elections and the outcome is
disastrous. It has increased the polarization of the country and it might
end up with ethnic cleansing.
Genocide and democracies are logically incompatible. What I am pointing to
is the process of democratization, during which ideas can be perverted. You
can see this in the careers of the perpetrators themselves. When they began
the process of constitutional transformation, the Young Turks were in
alliance with the Armenian nationalists of the time. But then, in the course
of events, ideas become perverted. I don't think democracies are perfect,
but the problem is the process of democratization. In multi-ethnic
situations, where there is an aspiration for democracy after the fall of an
empire, we have the kind of circumstance that can lead to ethnic cleansing
and genocide. Democracy gives the perpetrators a notion of ideals. They
characteristically think they are doing it for a purpose.
K.M.: Many genocide scholars argue that war is one of the major contributing
factors to the manifestation of genocidal intent. What's your take on that?
M.M.: War brings forth radicals. These extreme cases normally require
turbulent geopolitical situations and also war. I don't really think there
would have been the Genocide of the Armenians in the absence of the cover of
WWI. Of course, this does not mean that no atrocities were committed against
the Armenians before WWI. The pressures of war created the context, which is
also the case in Rwanda and in Sudan. I do not think ethnic cleansing is a
common feature, but it is a persistent feature.
K.M.: You write: "I'm not attempting to morally blur good and evil. In the
real world, they are connected." How do you explain this connection?
M.M.: The main point of that quote is, first, to cast doubt on the notion of
collective responsibility-that is, on the notion that all Turks were
responsible for the Armenian Genocide or that all Germans were responsible
for the Holocaust.
Secondly, I try to cast doubt on the issue of intentionality from the very
beginning. In my account, perpetrators escalate their plans for the
repression or elimination of the ethnic enemy in response to frustrations
over earlier plans. They don't have the intention of murdering everyone
from the very beginning.
I also explain that all ethnic groups are capable of committing atrocities.
Jews were the victims of the Holocaust, but Israel treats Palestinians in
ways that somewhat resembles the Nazis. I'm not accusing Israel of
committing genocide, of course. I ask myself, if I had been a professor of
sociology in Germany in the 1920s or early 1930s, could I have been a Nazi?
K.M.: This is where the issue of bystanders comes in. It is never easy to
say which side of human nature dominates in situations where genocide is
taking place, and how Turks in the Ottoman Empire, for example, reacted to
orders to deport and kill the Armenians.
M.M.: That's right. This is the most difficult part of explaining, because
our evidence is never wonderful. I cite a variety of motives among the
perpetrators. Some of them are rather mundane: greed and obedience to
authority are obvious motives. In these situations, comradeship becomes an
important factor, as well. Also, we all have prejudices, which can be
intensified in conflict situations. Of course, during genocide, the number
of people in the dominant group that engage in the killing is nowhere near a
majority. So, the guilt of most Turks was that of being bystanders, of just
watching the Armenians march past them to their death.
K.M.: You are reluctant to use the term "genocide" when referring to some
cases of ethnic cleansing. One such case is Cambodia. How do you view the
problem of defining genocide?
M.M.: I do use quite a restrictive definition of genocide, and I wouldn't
apply it to most of the Communist cases. People have accused me of
minimizing the Communist atrocities because I don't use the word
"genocide." But I am not in any way minimizing the number of people that
were killed. I am just saying that it wasn't ethnically targeted. I think
the term "genocide" has been used too broadly in recent years. I don't
think Yugoslavia was genocide. For me, genocide is the attempt to annihilate
an entire ethnic group. The UN definition allows for a "partial"
destruction of an ethnic group. I think one needs another term when the main
point is to expel a group from a certain territory. That isn't quite as
abominable as trying to wipe out an entire ethnic group.
K.M.: Genocide deniers, when referring to the Armenian, Jewish or other
cases, argue that the victims provoked the killings. Genocide scholars,
however, have pointed out that in most major cases of genocide, the
"provocation" is insignificant, and that there comes a point where
genocide is inevitable, even without provocation. How do you view this
so-called "provocation thesis?"
M.M.: I think the latter comes closest to being true with the Holocaust: The
Jews did virtually nothing to provoke the Germans. I agree with the argument
by and large, but the concept of provocation also has to be viewed in the
full context of the situation. It's not just a question of whether the
Armenians did anything directly against Turks to provoke them; one has to
take account Russia, the war, the activities of a few Armenian nationalist
groups. As I say this, I am in no way approving the perspective of the
perpetrator. But I am trying to understand it. The Armenians did not
directly provoke the Turks, and even if very few Armenians were involved in
some sort of "provocation," the [Turkish] attack was not on the provokers,
but on the whole ethnic group.
K.M.: In a footnote in one of your chapters dealing with the Armenian
Genocide, you say: "We lack frank accounts from Turks. We know more about
the victims, which must bias us toward Armenian views of events. As long as
Turkish governments continue to deny genocide, as long as Turkish archives
remain largely closed, and as long as most Turkish accounts remain
implausible, this bias will continue. Only Turkey is harmed by this." Can
you elaborate?
M.M.: We know very few mitigating circumstances. The picture is unreservedly
bleak. In the case of the Holocaust, we do know that there were Nazis who
opposed it. In the case of the Armenian Genocide, we only have a few memoirs
indicating that there were some differences among the Young Turks. The
opening of the archives and the end of the denial campaign in Turkey would
enable us to know more about the different attitudes among Turks during the
Genocide. There are obviously many Turks who helped Armenians. The execution
of the Genocide was decentralized and there must have been different
outcomes in different parts of the country. And apart from everything else,
it is unhealthy to regard Turks in general as being equally responsible for
the Genocide of the Armenians. However, until the archives are opened and
there is an honest acknowledgement of history, many people won't be able to
fully get beyond such stereotypes.
K.M.: In recent years, more and more Turkish scholars are coming forth and
trying to question the Turkish state's denialist policy.
M.M.: That is one of the healthiest things in the last few years. These
scholars are pushing hard for every inch. But still, there is a long way to
go.
K.M.: You conclude your chapters on the Armenian Genocide with the following
extremely powerful words depicting the "organic" connection between the
past and the present: "[The Young Turks] erred, not only morally, but also
factually. Armenians did not constitute such a threat, and their elimination
weakened the Ottoman war effort. Genocide contributed to defeat. The leaders
then fled into exile, where they fell to the bullets of Armenian assassins.
They might claim that the genocide was a long-term success, since the
disappearance of the Armenians made it easier after the war to unite and
centralize Turkey. Yet the country remains bedeviled by two Young Turk
legacies: military authoritarianism and an organized nationalism that now
represses Kurds rather than Armenians. The Young Turks fatally weakened
their country by pursuing organic nationalism; their successors struggle in
their shadow." Let us conclude this interview by your thoughts on these
words.
M.M.: First, let me explain what I mean when I say that "genocide
contributed to defeat." Of course, the Genocide was not the direct reason
for their defeat. But if there were a few thousand Armenians fighting with
the Russians, there were also hundreds of thousands of them in the Turkish
army, and there was no indication they would have changed sides. Killing
these Armenians is something that weakened the war effort. Also, the
deportations and the massacres demanded a lot of resources. What I mean when
I say that "their successors struggle in their shadow," is that the
Genocide intensified the authoritarian nature and the "closedness" of the
Turkish Republic; generated a feeling of common guilt or shame; and created
and continues to create a lot of problems within Turkish society. Had the
Armenians survived, there would have been a better way of dealing with
ethnic minorities, especially Kurds. I think that Kurds suffered enormously
from the Armenian Genocide.
Khatchig Mouradian is a Lebanese-Armenian writer, translator, and
journalist. He is an editor of the daily newspaper Aztag, published in
Beirut. He can be contacted at [email protected]
The Dark Side of Democracy
An Interview with Michael Mann
by Michael Mann and Khatchig Mouradian; October 18, 2006
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?I temID=11222
Michael Mann is a British-born sociology professor of at the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA). He was a reader in sociology at the London
School of Economics and Sociology from 1977 to 1987 and received his PhD in
Sociology from Oxford University. He is the author of The Sources of Social
Power (Cambridge, 1986, 1993), Fascists (Cambridge, 2004), and The Dark Side
of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, 2005).
The latter has been widely reviewed and praised as a "groundbreaking" work
in genocide studies. It attempts to explain the worst manifestations of evil
in human civilization through the study of a number of cases, including the
Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide.
We discuss some of the issues highlighted in The Dark Side of Democracy in
the following interview conducted by phone, from Beirut.
Khatchig Mouradian: In the preface of your book The Dark Side of Democracy,
you write: "Evil does not arrive from outside of our civilization, from a
separate realm we are tempted to call 'primitive.' Evil is generated by
civilization itself." Can you explain?
Michael Mann: Each civilization creates new problems for human beings.
Sometimes, man succeeds in coping with these problems with a fair degree of
humanity, and sometimes he doesn't. There is a tendency to say that ethnic
cleansing and genocide are committed by "aliens." In fact, perpetrators of
such atrocities are dealing with the same problems that our own [Western]
civilization dealt with earlier, and sometimes with equally disastrous
outcomes. So it makes it easier for us to understand the Nazis and the Young
Turks, if we understand that the problems they failed to deal with are
problems that confront human civilization as a whole.
K.M.: You say, "Now, the epicenter of ethnic cleansing has moved to the
south of the world. Unless Humanity takes evasive action, it will continue
to spread until democracies-hopefully not ethnically cleansed ones-rule
the world." Is the situation in Darfur and in Africa, in general, a
reflection of this shift?
M.M.: The notion of a people ruling themselves becomes potentially
problematic when more than one ethnic group generates a claims over shared
territory. Africa is very multi-ethnic, and it has to cope with that. The
problem areas there tend to be where there are two great factions. In Sudan,
for example, there are two visions, by Arabs and Africans, and claims over
land have pitted them against one another. In Rwanda, there were only two
significant ethnic groups-the Hutus and the Tutsis-and the ethnic rivalry
underlay the genocide.
K.M.: You have titled the book "The Dark Side of Democracy." Murderous
ethnic cleansing, however, is rarely committed by established democracies,
as you and others have pointed out. Rather, the "danger zone" seems to be
during the transition phase from a non-democratic regime to a democratic
one. It is during the transition stage that different ethnic groups haven't
yet resolved their issues, and that allows for situations where ethnic
cleansing could occur. Do you think Iraq is facing the perils of this
"transition phase" today?
M.M.: You are quite right. The problem is more during the transition period.
Once democracy is established, there is a decline in ethnic cleansing. I
think Iraq is a very good example of what I write about. Just to have
elections in a bi- or tri-ethnic context like Iraq almost guarantees that
the Shiites will vote for certain parties, and the Sunnis and Kurds for
other parties. The U.S. has introduced elections and the outcome is
disastrous. It has increased the polarization of the country and it might
end up with ethnic cleansing.
Genocide and democracies are logically incompatible. What I am pointing to
is the process of democratization, during which ideas can be perverted. You
can see this in the careers of the perpetrators themselves. When they began
the process of constitutional transformation, the Young Turks were in
alliance with the Armenian nationalists of the time. But then, in the course
of events, ideas become perverted. I don't think democracies are perfect,
but the problem is the process of democratization. In multi-ethnic
situations, where there is an aspiration for democracy after the fall of an
empire, we have the kind of circumstance that can lead to ethnic cleansing
and genocide. Democracy gives the perpetrators a notion of ideals. They
characteristically think they are doing it for a purpose.
K.M.: Many genocide scholars argue that war is one of the major contributing
factors to the manifestation of genocidal intent. What's your take on that?
M.M.: War brings forth radicals. These extreme cases normally require
turbulent geopolitical situations and also war. I don't really think there
would have been the Genocide of the Armenians in the absence of the cover of
WWI. Of course, this does not mean that no atrocities were committed against
the Armenians before WWI. The pressures of war created the context, which is
also the case in Rwanda and in Sudan. I do not think ethnic cleansing is a
common feature, but it is a persistent feature.
K.M.: You write: "I'm not attempting to morally blur good and evil. In the
real world, they are connected." How do you explain this connection?
M.M.: The main point of that quote is, first, to cast doubt on the notion of
collective responsibility-that is, on the notion that all Turks were
responsible for the Armenian Genocide or that all Germans were responsible
for the Holocaust.
Secondly, I try to cast doubt on the issue of intentionality from the very
beginning. In my account, perpetrators escalate their plans for the
repression or elimination of the ethnic enemy in response to frustrations
over earlier plans. They don't have the intention of murdering everyone
from the very beginning.
I also explain that all ethnic groups are capable of committing atrocities.
Jews were the victims of the Holocaust, but Israel treats Palestinians in
ways that somewhat resembles the Nazis. I'm not accusing Israel of
committing genocide, of course. I ask myself, if I had been a professor of
sociology in Germany in the 1920s or early 1930s, could I have been a Nazi?
K.M.: This is where the issue of bystanders comes in. It is never easy to
say which side of human nature dominates in situations where genocide is
taking place, and how Turks in the Ottoman Empire, for example, reacted to
orders to deport and kill the Armenians.
M.M.: That's right. This is the most difficult part of explaining, because
our evidence is never wonderful. I cite a variety of motives among the
perpetrators. Some of them are rather mundane: greed and obedience to
authority are obvious motives. In these situations, comradeship becomes an
important factor, as well. Also, we all have prejudices, which can be
intensified in conflict situations. Of course, during genocide, the number
of people in the dominant group that engage in the killing is nowhere near a
majority. So, the guilt of most Turks was that of being bystanders, of just
watching the Armenians march past them to their death.
K.M.: You are reluctant to use the term "genocide" when referring to some
cases of ethnic cleansing. One such case is Cambodia. How do you view the
problem of defining genocide?
M.M.: I do use quite a restrictive definition of genocide, and I wouldn't
apply it to most of the Communist cases. People have accused me of
minimizing the Communist atrocities because I don't use the word
"genocide." But I am not in any way minimizing the number of people that
were killed. I am just saying that it wasn't ethnically targeted. I think
the term "genocide" has been used too broadly in recent years. I don't
think Yugoslavia was genocide. For me, genocide is the attempt to annihilate
an entire ethnic group. The UN definition allows for a "partial"
destruction of an ethnic group. I think one needs another term when the main
point is to expel a group from a certain territory. That isn't quite as
abominable as trying to wipe out an entire ethnic group.
K.M.: Genocide deniers, when referring to the Armenian, Jewish or other
cases, argue that the victims provoked the killings. Genocide scholars,
however, have pointed out that in most major cases of genocide, the
"provocation" is insignificant, and that there comes a point where
genocide is inevitable, even without provocation. How do you view this
so-called "provocation thesis?"
M.M.: I think the latter comes closest to being true with the Holocaust: The
Jews did virtually nothing to provoke the Germans. I agree with the argument
by and large, but the concept of provocation also has to be viewed in the
full context of the situation. It's not just a question of whether the
Armenians did anything directly against Turks to provoke them; one has to
take account Russia, the war, the activities of a few Armenian nationalist
groups. As I say this, I am in no way approving the perspective of the
perpetrator. But I am trying to understand it. The Armenians did not
directly provoke the Turks, and even if very few Armenians were involved in
some sort of "provocation," the [Turkish] attack was not on the provokers,
but on the whole ethnic group.
K.M.: In a footnote in one of your chapters dealing with the Armenian
Genocide, you say: "We lack frank accounts from Turks. We know more about
the victims, which must bias us toward Armenian views of events. As long as
Turkish governments continue to deny genocide, as long as Turkish archives
remain largely closed, and as long as most Turkish accounts remain
implausible, this bias will continue. Only Turkey is harmed by this." Can
you elaborate?
M.M.: We know very few mitigating circumstances. The picture is unreservedly
bleak. In the case of the Holocaust, we do know that there were Nazis who
opposed it. In the case of the Armenian Genocide, we only have a few memoirs
indicating that there were some differences among the Young Turks. The
opening of the archives and the end of the denial campaign in Turkey would
enable us to know more about the different attitudes among Turks during the
Genocide. There are obviously many Turks who helped Armenians. The execution
of the Genocide was decentralized and there must have been different
outcomes in different parts of the country. And apart from everything else,
it is unhealthy to regard Turks in general as being equally responsible for
the Genocide of the Armenians. However, until the archives are opened and
there is an honest acknowledgement of history, many people won't be able to
fully get beyond such stereotypes.
K.M.: In recent years, more and more Turkish scholars are coming forth and
trying to question the Turkish state's denialist policy.
M.M.: That is one of the healthiest things in the last few years. These
scholars are pushing hard for every inch. But still, there is a long way to
go.
K.M.: You conclude your chapters on the Armenian Genocide with the following
extremely powerful words depicting the "organic" connection between the
past and the present: "[The Young Turks] erred, not only morally, but also
factually. Armenians did not constitute such a threat, and their elimination
weakened the Ottoman war effort. Genocide contributed to defeat. The leaders
then fled into exile, where they fell to the bullets of Armenian assassins.
They might claim that the genocide was a long-term success, since the
disappearance of the Armenians made it easier after the war to unite and
centralize Turkey. Yet the country remains bedeviled by two Young Turk
legacies: military authoritarianism and an organized nationalism that now
represses Kurds rather than Armenians. The Young Turks fatally weakened
their country by pursuing organic nationalism; their successors struggle in
their shadow." Let us conclude this interview by your thoughts on these
words.
M.M.: First, let me explain what I mean when I say that "genocide
contributed to defeat." Of course, the Genocide was not the direct reason
for their defeat. But if there were a few thousand Armenians fighting with
the Russians, there were also hundreds of thousands of them in the Turkish
army, and there was no indication they would have changed sides. Killing
these Armenians is something that weakened the war effort. Also, the
deportations and the massacres demanded a lot of resources. What I mean when
I say that "their successors struggle in their shadow," is that the
Genocide intensified the authoritarian nature and the "closedness" of the
Turkish Republic; generated a feeling of common guilt or shame; and created
and continues to create a lot of problems within Turkish society. Had the
Armenians survived, there would have been a better way of dealing with
ethnic minorities, especially Kurds. I think that Kurds suffered enormously
from the Armenian Genocide.
Khatchig Mouradian is a Lebanese-Armenian writer, translator, and
journalist. He is an editor of the daily newspaper Aztag, published in
Beirut. He can be contacted at [email protected]