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PRESS RELEASE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia
Contact: Information Desk
Tel: 374.10.523531
Email: [email protected]
web: http://www.armeniaforeignministry.am
Minister Oskanian Addresses International Conference by UN University for
Peace in Toronto
Speech by
H.E. Vartan Oskanian
Minister of Foreign Affairs
At the University for Peace Conference on
Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora
October 19, 2006
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
In this conference of experts, I feel right at home. I am, by default, an
expert on Diaspora. I was born in Syria, the heart of the Armenian
Diaspora, came to the homeland for the first time as a Diasporan student
-- and today, I am foreign minister of that homeland which has more of
its nationals living in Diaspora, than at home.
I appreciate the fact that this panel is to tackle the challenges and
opportunities of Transnational Identities. We are in fact transnational
as a consequence of today's homeland-diaspora relationships. It is not
just those living in diaspora who have this multiple identity, but it is
also those in the homeland whose identity alters, ever so slightly even,
because of the diaspora and its perceptions, expressions of who we are. I
believe the opportunities that this new, multilayered, identity produces
are greater than the challenges.
Diaspora is an old concept that has just come home, that has found itself.
In these days of easy, quick and inexpensive air travel, easy, quick and
inexpensive telephone calls, easy, quick and inexpensive internet access,
being in Diaspora no longer means permanent disconnection, distance,
inaccessibilility and alienation from the memories and experiences of
childhood, from a homeland and a home. Today Diaspora means an extension
of the homeland - not a permanent dislocation, not a destructive
dispersion, but life at a distance, that can even be beneficial.
On the one hand, the Armenian Diaspora experience is the archetypal
example of diasporas. The very first studies of diaspora were quick to
mention Armenians, Jews, and soon after the Africans, as the
quintessential examples.
On the other hand, ours is not the traditional duality. Our history, our
reality, and therefore, the diaspora-homeland relationship is more complex
than that.
Let me explain. The Armenian Diaspora, historically, began as those who
permanently left the traditional Armenian homeland. That's how the
Armenian community of Lvov, Ukraine, and in Transylvania, were established
in the 12th century. That's why there are thousands of Armenian graves
throughout south and east Asia from Macao to Bangladesh. That is how it
came to pass that that an Armenian translated the Bible into Chinese. That
is why Martin the Armenian was living in the Plymouth Colony of
Massachusetts in the 1600s. There were also those who left unwillingly,
due to political circumstances. The Shah of Iran, in the 16th century,
moved tens of thousands of Armenian craftsmen, forcibly, to northern Iran.
They lived there for hundreds of years, and left behind incredible
historical, cultural, religious monuments.
Until the early 20th century, the Diaspora was the appendage, while most
Armenians lived on the historic homeland, under some combination of
Russian, Ottoman or Persian domination. It was the Genocide of 1915 that
resulted in a mass exodus from the traditional homelands. The size of the
Armenian Diaspora today is due largely to that wave of settlement. They
were pushed out of their homes, and if they didn't die along the
deportation route, then they made it to the countries of the Syrian
desert. From there, they emigrated to Canada, to the US, and elsewhere.
Today, the independent Republic of Armenia is based on the sliver of land
that was under Russian, not Ottoman domination, and that managed to
declare independence in 1918, consolidate as a political unit that then
was absorbed into the Soviet Union as one of the 15 republics, and then
emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union as an independent republic.
The size of the Diaspora has grown during the last 20 years as a result of
migration from the Soviet Armenian Republic, and until very recently, the
independent Armenian Republic. Today's transnationals are this segment of
diasporans - born into the USSR, resident in a third country, while
feeling emotionally tied to the new, independent republic.
Thus, Armenians of the Diaspora have three sources of identity: 1. The
host countries in which they live today; 2. the homeland I represent
regardless of whether that was their place of origin or not, and 3. the
country of origin - the place that offered refuge between the homeland and
the host countries of today.
That is just one characteristic that makes our situation a bit unusual.
The second is that our numbers are the opposite of the traditional balance
- we have 5 million and more Armenians living outside Armenia, and 3
million in the homeland. Thus, the Diaspora is both larger, and older,
than the homeland. The Diaspora is also not monolithic - There are 2
million Armenians in Russia, more than one million in North America. The
experiences, capacities and expectations of these groups are very
different. Yet, they are the same.
The impact of all this on the Armenia-Diaspora relationship is
multilayered. Let me try to describe some of those layers, including
economic ones, and then finally talk about the reality and the potential
for homeland-diaspora relations in the context of political stability and
peace.
First, we have multiple identities, not just dual identities. Our
homeland, the host country, and our country of origin all have a place in
our hearts. The networks, the experiences, the know-how, that come with
intimate knowledge and deep contacts in three places is invaluable. From
the perspective of the homeland, this means that we benefit from even
greater contacts, ties and links. On the other hand, our foreign
relations, our bilateral relations are sometimes complicated by the
diverse and wide-ranging circumstances in those communities. This
complication arises partly from the reality that we may be an old nation,
but a very new nation-state. Our assumptions and actions are based on our
experiences as a nation. The nation-state is, for us, a new phenomenon,
with new, unknown, rules.
Second, a Diaspora as old as ours is highly structured. For centuries, our
communities have been forced to regulate their social and cultural life,
and as a result, churches, organizations, political parties even have a
long tradition of community self-governance, especially considering that
this was a Diaspora whose homeland was not a sovereign state for most of
its history. Therefore, having such structures and institutions with which
the homeland can interact allows for more productive and predictable
relations. At the same time, because the Diaspora is highly structured,
new mechanisms for new kinds of interaction are difficult to create.
Third, you are a member of the Diaspora only when you say you are. In
order to say you are, you must identify with the homeland which defines
it. One wants to identify with that which is strong, beautiful, proud. Our
Diaspora is no longer suffering or starving. Neither should Armenia be. A
developing country, an emerging democracy - these are concepts difficult
to understand. Armenia is no. 82 on the UN's Human Development Index -
high by regional standards, but not high compared to most of the host
countries. Canada is ranked fifth, for example. Diasporas want homelands
in their image. The challenge is to channel that yearning in a way that
brings the aspiration closer to reality, rather than leading to
unfulfilled dreams and frustrations. It's the thin line between taking
what you have for granted and having grandiose expectations. Diasporas
cannot, should not, take for granted that which is happening in the home
country. Those difficult processes of political and economic institutional
development are not always transparent processes. And impatiently
comparing them to the stable institutions in their host countries can/will
doubtless produce dissatisfaction.
Finally, the size of the Diaspora leads to high expectations all around --
on the part of the Diaspora itself, the homeland and the international
community. With such a large number of Armenians living abroad, and with
most of them comfortable, professional and settled, it is easy to hope for
investments in large numbers, generally massive and significant Diaspora
involvement and engagement, and resettlement perhaps.
The Diaspora's charitable and philanthropic giving predates Armenia's
independence. Refugees, survivors, living in the Middle East received help
and assistance from the Western Diaspora throughout the 20th century. The
Soviet Republic was the recipient of aid and know-how, especially in the
cultural sphere. Then later, after the earthquake of 1988, professionals,
young people, everyone pitched in to help. So, with independence, it was
expected that this kind of engagement would continue in even more
significant ways.
And it is true that there are large amounts of humanitarian assistance -
from individuals and organizations - pouring in. I know that scholars like
Khachig Tololyan and others are constantly trying to put numbers on this
kind of assistance. I don't have them. But that kind of generosity and
largesse is visible throughout the country. Renovated schools, improved
infrastructure, educational and training programs, health care assistance
- all made possible by donations from the Diaspora. The Diaspora's
humanitarian engagement is more visible, has quick impact and is easier to
accomplish. The donor feels good, quickly, and is not overwhelmed or bound
by long term obligations.
Individual remittances, too, continue to be significant for Armenia's
economy. Funds sent regularly to families by individual Diasporans are
often the difference between survival and destitution for many in the
homeland. The numbers are very high - nearly half a billion dollars a year
- but they are from individuals to individuals. They are indispensable for
immediate relief. But not long-term sustainability.
It's economic investment that fuels long-term sustainability. Diaspora
engagement in IT, tourism, diamond and jewelry production all have
Diasporans at the other end of the network. The significance of this kind
of networking is obvious.
The challenge for homelands is how to increase such high-impact
participation. Helping the homeland in the humanitarian sphere is
comparatively easy. The challenge is to find ways to use diaspora networks
and know-how to bring in lasting cooperation, making it as satisfying as
the easy, quick donation.
Now let me talk about homeland-diaspora relations in the context of
political stability and peace. The Armenia example may be a bit extreme
in that our foreign relations challenges are many. We live in a difficult
neighborhood, and we are faced with problems that Armenia alone cannot
solve. Our neighbors must want solutions as well. Therefore, Armenia's and
Diaspora's maneuvering space is unusually limited. On the other hand,
exactly because we live in a difficult neighborhood, where Russia, the US,
Europe and other countries have very clear interests and agendas, the
Diaspora factor has been critical.
If I can somewhat oversimplify and quickly summarize our foreign relations
challenges in three key policy areas, the mostly complementary, sometimes
differing views and needs of homeland and diaspora become clear.
1. On the Resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Armenians in
Diaspora and Armenia see the opportunity to right a historic wrong.
2. On Genocide recognition, Armenians in Diaspora and in Armenia see the
opportunity to right a historic wrong.
3. On relations with Turkey, again, in Diaspora and in Armenia, Armenians
see the opportunity to right a historic wrong.
We agree with them. But as authorities responsible for people's security
and prosperity, we also know that all three of these painful, complex
challenges have to be resolved with the future in mind, not the past.
On the Nagorno Karabakh situation, we want a lasting resolution. That must
be based on a respect of the Nagorno Karabakh population's right to
self-determination, to choose their own future. It must be based on
compromise by all parties. It must be based with an eye to Europe where
borders take on less importance as formerly acrimonious neighbors have
found ways to live side-by-side in peace.
On genocide recognition, for Armenians in Armenia and Armenians in the
Diaspora, there is no difference, although Turkey sometimes likes to
project that there is. All Armenians are convinced that Armenians and
Turks need genocide recognition by Turkey, in order to find closure for
this still painful, still open wound. Armenians are able to distinguish
between the perpetrators and today's government of Turkey. Armenia, and
the Diaspora are willing and ready to enter into dialog with Turkey and
Turkish society at all levels, without pre-conditions. We need and want,
above all else, normal relations with our neighbor. For this to happen,
Turkey will have to come to terms with its past.
The Diaspora has an important role to play in this process. They are
largely the victims and the descendants of the victims. Yet Armenians are
the ones extending their hands for dialog.
Unfortunately, Turkey has made give-and-take between our peoples and our
states, impossible. In addition to the restrictions on speech, our borders
remain closed. They are the only closed borders in Europe. Nor are there
diplomatic relations between our countries. In other words, there are no
opportunities for new experiences, new memories, new interactions to build
up alongside the old. Instead, there is a lingering security concern about
a neighbor that has not repudiated state violence.
These are the complex foreign relations issues that the Diaspora has the
opportunity to explain. Diaspora involvement, albeit at a distance, in the
resolution of these conflicts and in the search for lasting understanding
is necessary and useful. It is a way for all of us to make the past work
for the future.
Thank you.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia
Contact: Information Desk
Tel: 374.10.523531
Email: [email protected]
web: http://www.armeniaforeignministry.am
Minister Oskanian Addresses International Conference by UN University for
Peace in Toronto
Speech by
H.E. Vartan Oskanian
Minister of Foreign Affairs
At the University for Peace Conference on
Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora
October 19, 2006
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
In this conference of experts, I feel right at home. I am, by default, an
expert on Diaspora. I was born in Syria, the heart of the Armenian
Diaspora, came to the homeland for the first time as a Diasporan student
-- and today, I am foreign minister of that homeland which has more of
its nationals living in Diaspora, than at home.
I appreciate the fact that this panel is to tackle the challenges and
opportunities of Transnational Identities. We are in fact transnational
as a consequence of today's homeland-diaspora relationships. It is not
just those living in diaspora who have this multiple identity, but it is
also those in the homeland whose identity alters, ever so slightly even,
because of the diaspora and its perceptions, expressions of who we are. I
believe the opportunities that this new, multilayered, identity produces
are greater than the challenges.
Diaspora is an old concept that has just come home, that has found itself.
In these days of easy, quick and inexpensive air travel, easy, quick and
inexpensive telephone calls, easy, quick and inexpensive internet access,
being in Diaspora no longer means permanent disconnection, distance,
inaccessibilility and alienation from the memories and experiences of
childhood, from a homeland and a home. Today Diaspora means an extension
of the homeland - not a permanent dislocation, not a destructive
dispersion, but life at a distance, that can even be beneficial.
On the one hand, the Armenian Diaspora experience is the archetypal
example of diasporas. The very first studies of diaspora were quick to
mention Armenians, Jews, and soon after the Africans, as the
quintessential examples.
On the other hand, ours is not the traditional duality. Our history, our
reality, and therefore, the diaspora-homeland relationship is more complex
than that.
Let me explain. The Armenian Diaspora, historically, began as those who
permanently left the traditional Armenian homeland. That's how the
Armenian community of Lvov, Ukraine, and in Transylvania, were established
in the 12th century. That's why there are thousands of Armenian graves
throughout south and east Asia from Macao to Bangladesh. That is how it
came to pass that that an Armenian translated the Bible into Chinese. That
is why Martin the Armenian was living in the Plymouth Colony of
Massachusetts in the 1600s. There were also those who left unwillingly,
due to political circumstances. The Shah of Iran, in the 16th century,
moved tens of thousands of Armenian craftsmen, forcibly, to northern Iran.
They lived there for hundreds of years, and left behind incredible
historical, cultural, religious monuments.
Until the early 20th century, the Diaspora was the appendage, while most
Armenians lived on the historic homeland, under some combination of
Russian, Ottoman or Persian domination. It was the Genocide of 1915 that
resulted in a mass exodus from the traditional homelands. The size of the
Armenian Diaspora today is due largely to that wave of settlement. They
were pushed out of their homes, and if they didn't die along the
deportation route, then they made it to the countries of the Syrian
desert. From there, they emigrated to Canada, to the US, and elsewhere.
Today, the independent Republic of Armenia is based on the sliver of land
that was under Russian, not Ottoman domination, and that managed to
declare independence in 1918, consolidate as a political unit that then
was absorbed into the Soviet Union as one of the 15 republics, and then
emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union as an independent republic.
The size of the Diaspora has grown during the last 20 years as a result of
migration from the Soviet Armenian Republic, and until very recently, the
independent Armenian Republic. Today's transnationals are this segment of
diasporans - born into the USSR, resident in a third country, while
feeling emotionally tied to the new, independent republic.
Thus, Armenians of the Diaspora have three sources of identity: 1. The
host countries in which they live today; 2. the homeland I represent
regardless of whether that was their place of origin or not, and 3. the
country of origin - the place that offered refuge between the homeland and
the host countries of today.
That is just one characteristic that makes our situation a bit unusual.
The second is that our numbers are the opposite of the traditional balance
- we have 5 million and more Armenians living outside Armenia, and 3
million in the homeland. Thus, the Diaspora is both larger, and older,
than the homeland. The Diaspora is also not monolithic - There are 2
million Armenians in Russia, more than one million in North America. The
experiences, capacities and expectations of these groups are very
different. Yet, they are the same.
The impact of all this on the Armenia-Diaspora relationship is
multilayered. Let me try to describe some of those layers, including
economic ones, and then finally talk about the reality and the potential
for homeland-diaspora relations in the context of political stability and
peace.
First, we have multiple identities, not just dual identities. Our
homeland, the host country, and our country of origin all have a place in
our hearts. The networks, the experiences, the know-how, that come with
intimate knowledge and deep contacts in three places is invaluable. From
the perspective of the homeland, this means that we benefit from even
greater contacts, ties and links. On the other hand, our foreign
relations, our bilateral relations are sometimes complicated by the
diverse and wide-ranging circumstances in those communities. This
complication arises partly from the reality that we may be an old nation,
but a very new nation-state. Our assumptions and actions are based on our
experiences as a nation. The nation-state is, for us, a new phenomenon,
with new, unknown, rules.
Second, a Diaspora as old as ours is highly structured. For centuries, our
communities have been forced to regulate their social and cultural life,
and as a result, churches, organizations, political parties even have a
long tradition of community self-governance, especially considering that
this was a Diaspora whose homeland was not a sovereign state for most of
its history. Therefore, having such structures and institutions with which
the homeland can interact allows for more productive and predictable
relations. At the same time, because the Diaspora is highly structured,
new mechanisms for new kinds of interaction are difficult to create.
Third, you are a member of the Diaspora only when you say you are. In
order to say you are, you must identify with the homeland which defines
it. One wants to identify with that which is strong, beautiful, proud. Our
Diaspora is no longer suffering or starving. Neither should Armenia be. A
developing country, an emerging democracy - these are concepts difficult
to understand. Armenia is no. 82 on the UN's Human Development Index -
high by regional standards, but not high compared to most of the host
countries. Canada is ranked fifth, for example. Diasporas want homelands
in their image. The challenge is to channel that yearning in a way that
brings the aspiration closer to reality, rather than leading to
unfulfilled dreams and frustrations. It's the thin line between taking
what you have for granted and having grandiose expectations. Diasporas
cannot, should not, take for granted that which is happening in the home
country. Those difficult processes of political and economic institutional
development are not always transparent processes. And impatiently
comparing them to the stable institutions in their host countries can/will
doubtless produce dissatisfaction.
Finally, the size of the Diaspora leads to high expectations all around --
on the part of the Diaspora itself, the homeland and the international
community. With such a large number of Armenians living abroad, and with
most of them comfortable, professional and settled, it is easy to hope for
investments in large numbers, generally massive and significant Diaspora
involvement and engagement, and resettlement perhaps.
The Diaspora's charitable and philanthropic giving predates Armenia's
independence. Refugees, survivors, living in the Middle East received help
and assistance from the Western Diaspora throughout the 20th century. The
Soviet Republic was the recipient of aid and know-how, especially in the
cultural sphere. Then later, after the earthquake of 1988, professionals,
young people, everyone pitched in to help. So, with independence, it was
expected that this kind of engagement would continue in even more
significant ways.
And it is true that there are large amounts of humanitarian assistance -
from individuals and organizations - pouring in. I know that scholars like
Khachig Tololyan and others are constantly trying to put numbers on this
kind of assistance. I don't have them. But that kind of generosity and
largesse is visible throughout the country. Renovated schools, improved
infrastructure, educational and training programs, health care assistance
- all made possible by donations from the Diaspora. The Diaspora's
humanitarian engagement is more visible, has quick impact and is easier to
accomplish. The donor feels good, quickly, and is not overwhelmed or bound
by long term obligations.
Individual remittances, too, continue to be significant for Armenia's
economy. Funds sent regularly to families by individual Diasporans are
often the difference between survival and destitution for many in the
homeland. The numbers are very high - nearly half a billion dollars a year
- but they are from individuals to individuals. They are indispensable for
immediate relief. But not long-term sustainability.
It's economic investment that fuels long-term sustainability. Diaspora
engagement in IT, tourism, diamond and jewelry production all have
Diasporans at the other end of the network. The significance of this kind
of networking is obvious.
The challenge for homelands is how to increase such high-impact
participation. Helping the homeland in the humanitarian sphere is
comparatively easy. The challenge is to find ways to use diaspora networks
and know-how to bring in lasting cooperation, making it as satisfying as
the easy, quick donation.
Now let me talk about homeland-diaspora relations in the context of
political stability and peace. The Armenia example may be a bit extreme
in that our foreign relations challenges are many. We live in a difficult
neighborhood, and we are faced with problems that Armenia alone cannot
solve. Our neighbors must want solutions as well. Therefore, Armenia's and
Diaspora's maneuvering space is unusually limited. On the other hand,
exactly because we live in a difficult neighborhood, where Russia, the US,
Europe and other countries have very clear interests and agendas, the
Diaspora factor has been critical.
If I can somewhat oversimplify and quickly summarize our foreign relations
challenges in three key policy areas, the mostly complementary, sometimes
differing views and needs of homeland and diaspora become clear.
1. On the Resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Armenians in
Diaspora and Armenia see the opportunity to right a historic wrong.
2. On Genocide recognition, Armenians in Diaspora and in Armenia see the
opportunity to right a historic wrong.
3. On relations with Turkey, again, in Diaspora and in Armenia, Armenians
see the opportunity to right a historic wrong.
We agree with them. But as authorities responsible for people's security
and prosperity, we also know that all three of these painful, complex
challenges have to be resolved with the future in mind, not the past.
On the Nagorno Karabakh situation, we want a lasting resolution. That must
be based on a respect of the Nagorno Karabakh population's right to
self-determination, to choose their own future. It must be based on
compromise by all parties. It must be based with an eye to Europe where
borders take on less importance as formerly acrimonious neighbors have
found ways to live side-by-side in peace.
On genocide recognition, for Armenians in Armenia and Armenians in the
Diaspora, there is no difference, although Turkey sometimes likes to
project that there is. All Armenians are convinced that Armenians and
Turks need genocide recognition by Turkey, in order to find closure for
this still painful, still open wound. Armenians are able to distinguish
between the perpetrators and today's government of Turkey. Armenia, and
the Diaspora are willing and ready to enter into dialog with Turkey and
Turkish society at all levels, without pre-conditions. We need and want,
above all else, normal relations with our neighbor. For this to happen,
Turkey will have to come to terms with its past.
The Diaspora has an important role to play in this process. They are
largely the victims and the descendants of the victims. Yet Armenians are
the ones extending their hands for dialog.
Unfortunately, Turkey has made give-and-take between our peoples and our
states, impossible. In addition to the restrictions on speech, our borders
remain closed. They are the only closed borders in Europe. Nor are there
diplomatic relations between our countries. In other words, there are no
opportunities for new experiences, new memories, new interactions to build
up alongside the old. Instead, there is a lingering security concern about
a neighbor that has not repudiated state violence.
These are the complex foreign relations issues that the Diaspora has the
opportunity to explain. Diaspora involvement, albeit at a distance, in the
resolution of these conflicts and in the search for lasting understanding
is necessary and useful. It is a way for all of us to make the past work
for the future.
Thank you.