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ARMENIA'S IMPOSSIBLE CHOICE
The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 25 2006
Visiting Yerevan last week, Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma, Sergei
Baburin, delivered a stark message to Armenia. Clearly incensed by
complaints that the Russian sanctions on Georgia are hurting totally
innocent Armenia, he declared that Yerevan must choose between Moscow
and Tbilisi, or suffer in silence.
In so saying the nationalist leader, who reportedly counts Jean
Marie le Pen and Radovan Karad~^ic among his personal friends, not
only demonstrably thumbed his nose at ever reliable Armenia, he also
unwittingly pointed to a central reality of what it means to count
Russia as a strategic partner: it means nothing to count Russia as
a strategic partner.
Russia and Armenia are, on paper, strong allies. Armenian foreign
policy is consistently in line with Russia's, Gazprom can buy whatever
they like and there is no unpleasant talk about wanting to join
NATO. In return Russia sides with Yerevan over Nagorno-Karabakh,
supplies cheap gas and hosts a huge number of Armenian workers,
whose remittances keep the country afloat financially.
But recently, Russia seems to be ignoring the interests of its only
friend in the region. Armenia's only link with its fair weather
patron is through Georgia, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh meaning
the Turkish and Azeri borders are thoroughly closed. Armenia is still
technically at war with Azerbaijan, so the road north is actually a
vital lifeline. Yet Russia, in its haste to punish Georgia, totally
sets aside the interests Armenia time and time again. When the only
legally functioning border checkpoint between Russia and Georgia
was closed this summer, the Armenians were even more surprised-and
harmed-than the Georgians. Georgian goods and people could at least go
through Azerbaijan, but Armenia was left with only expensive flights
or ferries.
The fact that Russia did not even bother to inform its supposedly
strategic partner must have stung, but worse was to follow. With the
closure of maritime links Armenian goods now have to go to Georgia,
then on to Ukraine, Bulgaria or Romania and then on to Russia, making
them more expensive and less competitive. The anti-Georgian hornets'
nest the Kremlin has stirred up in Russia itself is hardly going
to benefit the Armenians, even if they aren't going to be forcibly
deported for trumped up violations anyone with a tan is now at risk
in Russia.
If, as seems exceedingly likely, gas prices shoot up for Russian gas
for Georgia, Tbilisi is sure to try to recoup some of those losses by
upping the transit costs to Armenia, which receives its gas through
the same pipes as Georgia (indeed, the 'mystery explosions' on the
pipeline in North Ossetia last year would have been disastrous for
Armenia too, had it not been for their nuclear power station), yet
again hurting Armenia, which has totally stayed out of the duispute.
So quite why Armenia should 'choose Russia' is becoming increasingly
unclear. Yerevan clearly can't do without its strong ally, but it
certainly can't do without Georgia either. A hostile Georgia would
make Armenia an island in a sea of enemies, and its already shaky
security would become untenably weakened.
Baburin's 'choice' also poses questions for the rest of Russia's
neigbours, if Russia treats its loyal allies with such disdain,
ignoring their interests in order to pursue vengeful, xenophobic
policies towards states it considers 'its turf', then what is the
benefit of loyalty? Belarus' autocrat Alexander Lukashenka has started
to question the benefit of his alliance, which is paying fewer and
fewer dividends as time goes by. Even the separatists in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia must be worrying that, if it serves a short term
objective, Russia might just sell them down the river.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 25 2006
Visiting Yerevan last week, Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma, Sergei
Baburin, delivered a stark message to Armenia. Clearly incensed by
complaints that the Russian sanctions on Georgia are hurting totally
innocent Armenia, he declared that Yerevan must choose between Moscow
and Tbilisi, or suffer in silence.
In so saying the nationalist leader, who reportedly counts Jean
Marie le Pen and Radovan Karad~^ic among his personal friends, not
only demonstrably thumbed his nose at ever reliable Armenia, he also
unwittingly pointed to a central reality of what it means to count
Russia as a strategic partner: it means nothing to count Russia as
a strategic partner.
Russia and Armenia are, on paper, strong allies. Armenian foreign
policy is consistently in line with Russia's, Gazprom can buy whatever
they like and there is no unpleasant talk about wanting to join
NATO. In return Russia sides with Yerevan over Nagorno-Karabakh,
supplies cheap gas and hosts a huge number of Armenian workers,
whose remittances keep the country afloat financially.
But recently, Russia seems to be ignoring the interests of its only
friend in the region. Armenia's only link with its fair weather
patron is through Georgia, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh meaning
the Turkish and Azeri borders are thoroughly closed. Armenia is still
technically at war with Azerbaijan, so the road north is actually a
vital lifeline. Yet Russia, in its haste to punish Georgia, totally
sets aside the interests Armenia time and time again. When the only
legally functioning border checkpoint between Russia and Georgia
was closed this summer, the Armenians were even more surprised-and
harmed-than the Georgians. Georgian goods and people could at least go
through Azerbaijan, but Armenia was left with only expensive flights
or ferries.
The fact that Russia did not even bother to inform its supposedly
strategic partner must have stung, but worse was to follow. With the
closure of maritime links Armenian goods now have to go to Georgia,
then on to Ukraine, Bulgaria or Romania and then on to Russia, making
them more expensive and less competitive. The anti-Georgian hornets'
nest the Kremlin has stirred up in Russia itself is hardly going
to benefit the Armenians, even if they aren't going to be forcibly
deported for trumped up violations anyone with a tan is now at risk
in Russia.
If, as seems exceedingly likely, gas prices shoot up for Russian gas
for Georgia, Tbilisi is sure to try to recoup some of those losses by
upping the transit costs to Armenia, which receives its gas through
the same pipes as Georgia (indeed, the 'mystery explosions' on the
pipeline in North Ossetia last year would have been disastrous for
Armenia too, had it not been for their nuclear power station), yet
again hurting Armenia, which has totally stayed out of the duispute.
So quite why Armenia should 'choose Russia' is becoming increasingly
unclear. Yerevan clearly can't do without its strong ally, but it
certainly can't do without Georgia either. A hostile Georgia would
make Armenia an island in a sea of enemies, and its already shaky
security would become untenably weakened.
Baburin's 'choice' also poses questions for the rest of Russia's
neigbours, if Russia treats its loyal allies with such disdain,
ignoring their interests in order to pursue vengeful, xenophobic
policies towards states it considers 'its turf', then what is the
benefit of loyalty? Belarus' autocrat Alexander Lukashenka has started
to question the benefit of his alliance, which is paying fewer and
fewer dividends as time goes by. Even the separatists in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia must be worrying that, if it serves a short term
objective, Russia might just sell them down the river.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress