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The Calgary Herald (Alberta)
October 26, 2006 Thursday
Final Edition
Motive is key in terror law: Ruling would view terrorists much like
common criminals
To try to understand 9/11 without acknowledging that the attackers
were driven by extreme religious fervour would be absurd. Yet, that's
what the Ontario Superior Court would have Canadian courts do, as
they consider the first charge under the act.
On Monday, Judge Douglas Rutherford ruled in the case of accused
terrorist Momin Khawaja that the federal Anti-terrorism Act's
definition of terrorism was unconstitutional, an affront to freedom
"of religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression and association,"
to "democratic life" itself.
Critics of the act -- actually a package of amendments to the
Criminal Code and other federal legislation -- say Rutherford was
right.
They say the amendments, Ottawa's effort to placate a U.S.
administration that questioned Canadian efforts at internal security,
gave government potentially dangerous powers at the expense of civil
liberties.
Yet, if Rutherford fully understood the nature of terrorism in
Canada, he might not have so quickly downgraded it to common
criminality.
The Antiterrorism Act defined terrorism as an attempt to intimidate a
group involving a major act of violence, with a religious, political
or ideological motive.
Rutherford struck the last requirement, reasoning that examining
motives posed a threat to charter freedoms and could lead to ethnic
profiling.
Removing the definition of motive is a significant alteration.
Some commentators argue that, relieved of the need to prove motive,
prosecutors will more easily secure convictions. To some degree that
may be true, although aspiring martyrs -- usually quick to proclaim
their faith -- seldom place much burden of proof on prosecutors.
What's troubling is that, absent religious or ideological
inspiration, terrorism is diminished in the eyes of the law. Thus,
July's alleged plot to bomb the CSIS headquarters becomes classed
with the kind of industrial sabotage that killed nine Yellowknife
miners during a 1992 labour dispute, or the mayhem of Quebec's biker
wars.
Treating it as just another criminal act may comfort Canadians whose
response to terror is denial, but it's no guide to dealing with it.
The difference is crucial. A strategy to confront criminals seeking
profit from society can afford to deal with events after they happen.
Once a gang is busted, the players are off the board.
Terrorists, however, have much broader ambitions, often seeking to
destroy society. Thus, preventing their acts becomes much more
critical.
Arrests and convictions of a few adherents to a cause do not
eliminate the enemy.
With yet no attack on home soil, many Canadians are tempted to
consider terrorism somebody else's problem.
They should not be so blase, because we are far from immune.
Just ask the 391 victims of Air India Flight 182, whose plane was
bombed in 1985 by Sikh extremists.
Or Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, both of which raise
funds aggressively here, and otherwise abuse Canadian hospitality to
pursue wars elsewhere.
Even Armenian exiles have organized here, and murdered Canadians.
And let us not forget Canada once had its own, homegrown terrorists
-- the ideologically driven FLQ -- nor that Canadian troops in
Afghanistan are not fighting agricultural reformers, but people who
would turn that country into a base for terrorists.
Canada needs a strong anti-terrorism law, not legislation that treats
terrorism as merely a tiresome distraction from the blood sport of
minority government politics.
Ottawa must appeal.
October 26, 2006 Thursday
Final Edition
Motive is key in terror law: Ruling would view terrorists much like
common criminals
To try to understand 9/11 without acknowledging that the attackers
were driven by extreme religious fervour would be absurd. Yet, that's
what the Ontario Superior Court would have Canadian courts do, as
they consider the first charge under the act.
On Monday, Judge Douglas Rutherford ruled in the case of accused
terrorist Momin Khawaja that the federal Anti-terrorism Act's
definition of terrorism was unconstitutional, an affront to freedom
"of religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression and association,"
to "democratic life" itself.
Critics of the act -- actually a package of amendments to the
Criminal Code and other federal legislation -- say Rutherford was
right.
They say the amendments, Ottawa's effort to placate a U.S.
administration that questioned Canadian efforts at internal security,
gave government potentially dangerous powers at the expense of civil
liberties.
Yet, if Rutherford fully understood the nature of terrorism in
Canada, he might not have so quickly downgraded it to common
criminality.
The Antiterrorism Act defined terrorism as an attempt to intimidate a
group involving a major act of violence, with a religious, political
or ideological motive.
Rutherford struck the last requirement, reasoning that examining
motives posed a threat to charter freedoms and could lead to ethnic
profiling.
Removing the definition of motive is a significant alteration.
Some commentators argue that, relieved of the need to prove motive,
prosecutors will more easily secure convictions. To some degree that
may be true, although aspiring martyrs -- usually quick to proclaim
their faith -- seldom place much burden of proof on prosecutors.
What's troubling is that, absent religious or ideological
inspiration, terrorism is diminished in the eyes of the law. Thus,
July's alleged plot to bomb the CSIS headquarters becomes classed
with the kind of industrial sabotage that killed nine Yellowknife
miners during a 1992 labour dispute, or the mayhem of Quebec's biker
wars.
Treating it as just another criminal act may comfort Canadians whose
response to terror is denial, but it's no guide to dealing with it.
The difference is crucial. A strategy to confront criminals seeking
profit from society can afford to deal with events after they happen.
Once a gang is busted, the players are off the board.
Terrorists, however, have much broader ambitions, often seeking to
destroy society. Thus, preventing their acts becomes much more
critical.
Arrests and convictions of a few adherents to a cause do not
eliminate the enemy.
With yet no attack on home soil, many Canadians are tempted to
consider terrorism somebody else's problem.
They should not be so blase, because we are far from immune.
Just ask the 391 victims of Air India Flight 182, whose plane was
bombed in 1985 by Sikh extremists.
Or Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, both of which raise
funds aggressively here, and otherwise abuse Canadian hospitality to
pursue wars elsewhere.
Even Armenian exiles have organized here, and murdered Canadians.
And let us not forget Canada once had its own, homegrown terrorists
-- the ideologically driven FLQ -- nor that Canadian troops in
Afghanistan are not fighting agricultural reformers, but people who
would turn that country into a base for terrorists.
Canada needs a strong anti-terrorism law, not legislation that treats
terrorism as merely a tiresome distraction from the blood sport of
minority government politics.
Ottawa must appeal.