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DAMNED IF THEY SAY NO, DAMNED IF THEY SAY YES!
by Huseyin Bagci
The New Anatolian, Turkey
Sept 4 2006
Opinions
Huseyin Bagci takes a look at Turkish history and finds the roots
of the Turkish dilemma over sending troops to Lebanon: New players
are introducing themselves to the Mideast should Turkey stay out,
he explores
There is reasonable certainty that the government motion on sending
Turkish troops to Lebanon will be approved by Parliament tomorrow.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's principal differences with the
government on the issue still remain, but the government now is
stronger in its position through many intellectuals' direct support
from across the political spectrum.
Yet, there are still many opposed to sending troops to Lebanon under
UN mandate, but in all the debates last week one could see that
the government decision is now more and more widely accepted among
the public.
In his Address to the Nation, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
was not at all convincing.
His rhetoric was a bit aggressive against those who oppose the
government's decision. However, the main idea that Turkey should be
present in the Middle East was the key message, and it reached its
goal. Opposition parties are against sending troops to Lebanon, but
their arguments do not convince the public. There's an impression
now that actually they would act in the same way if they were in
the government.
Their criticism mainly aims to weaken the Justice and Development
(AK) Party government because they can't criticize the government's
economic policies. Indeed, the AKP government will get more points by
this decision in the long run and many wise men in Turkish politics
support the government now, in stark contrast to the situation before
the March 1, 2003 motion.
Erdogan knows that he can control his party and that sending troops
to Lebanon is not only the decision expected by the world but also
an imperative of his proactive Middle East policy from his four
years in power. One should neither exaggerate nor make too much of
this decision.
But more importantly, Erdogan knows exactly what he wants and no doubt
he shows an example of leadership par excellence for Turkish history.
Why is this so?
First, Turkey is a part of the region's history by nature. Turkey
could only stay ignorant or indifferent to the region in the first two
decades of the republic during the interwar period (1923-45). Both
Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, first and second presidents of the
young republic, could stay away because they were the founders of
modern Turkey and were acutely aware that the European states like
France and Great Britain, in the form of colonization, dominated
the region. However, parliamentary records show the secret debates
of Parliament in the '30s and how the Republican People's Party
(CHP, the only party established and allowed by Ataturk) was more
enthusiastic to "get back" all the lost territories of the Ottoman
Empire. There were neo-Ottomans in the early years of the republic.
After World War II, Turkey was one of the founding members of the
UN. Turkey was the only Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949
when Inonu was president. Throughout the '50s Turkey wanted to play
a big brother role in the Middle East within the Cold War conditions:
it took the side of the Western bloc and even sent some 29,000 troops
to the Korean War in order to help the UN operation. Turks have always
supported UN resolutions, and up to today Turkey has lost over 700
soldiers in fighting in UN-led operations. Even today the Korean
syndrome is still there, but the result was that Turkey joined NATO
and the South Koreans still remember what the Turks contributed to
their freedom from communist North Korea.
The establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 was the real involvement
of Turkey in the Middle East. Lebanon was the first country visited by
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Arab nationalism, which was supported
by the Soviet Union at that time, was the biggest problem for Turkey.
Turkey's Middle East policy gained further momentum in the '60s and
'70s when it started to participate in meetings of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Cold War forced Turkey again to join
the side of the U.S., and the Lebanese civil war in the '70s, which
was not only destructive for the Lebanese but also the Israeli-Arab
conflict, was also another dimension. Just a few years after the
beginning of the Lebanese civil war, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
signed the peace treaty with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin
in 1978 in Camp David with U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Sadat paid
for his political act with his life when he was assassinated in 1981.
Turkey also supported the Palestinians very strongly, and since
1979 there has been a PLO representative, presently at the rank of
ambassador, in Turkey.
It was actually Turgut Ozal who started Turkey's involvement in the
Middle East through an economic dimension. In the '80s and '90s Turkey
discovered the Middle East as an economic area, and Turks met, for
the first time, with many Arabs as tourists in Turkey in the mid-'80s.
Turkey's closeness to the Middle East also turned into a political
problem when the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism
emerged. The Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and the PKK camps in Syria created
a very negative image of Arab countries. However, today Syria is one
of Turkey's best friends beside Iran and some other Arab countries.
Lebanon was also considered a source of evil by many Turks because
Turkish leftist terrorists were educated in Lebanon when Turkey
had almost a civil war situation in the '70s. Later on, PKK founder
Ocalan was also living there and many Turkish leftist journalists
and politicians visited him there. The Lebanese image is also very
bad because the Lebanese Parliament recognizes the so-called Armenian
genocide, although in Lebanon the majority is Muslim.
But now the AKP government has continued this active involvement in
the Middle East, and Lebanon is also important as a key economic
country. It is a political reality that Israel destroyed a great
part of the country and UN troops have to be deployed there. Turkey,
for its part, cannot remain an outside player. There is also the new
fact that the European Union is getting heavily involved there. Thus,
our involvement will have impact on Turkish-EU relations. In the case
of the Middle East, the EU will replace the classical actors of the
Cold War, the U.S. and Russia, and the "political vacuum" will be
filled by the EU. Is this good for Turkey? The answer is yes. The
fact is that since the '50s there are new players, but Turkey is
always present in political calculations.
Erdogan is just continuing the traditional Turkish presence in the
Middle East under the UN mandate.
The visit of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan this week is the
confirmation of Turkey's presence in the Middle East. The debate over
whether there will be a permanent peace is an open one. But if Turkey
doesn't follow this UN call, then this might have negative consequences
for the country. After weighing all the worst-case scenarios, in the
end Turkey should make a choice whether it is indeed part of this
political, cultural and religious world there or not. The future
of the Middle East may be not so shiny but without Turkey it would
more problematic.
Turkey as a founding nation of the UN is also obliged to rehabilitate
the reputation of the organization. If you're not at the table,
than you have nothing to say in the post-conflict formula. Turkey
should stay at the table of the Middle East despite many risks. Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes formulated this in the early '50s when he
made the decision to send troops to Korea. It's a similar situation
to the one that confronts Erdogan. But it's also a domestic political
decision for his party whether he is indeed a leader or not. The
members of the AKP have to prove tomorrow whether they will stay
with their leader or not. Any failure would have consequences both
for the party and the country.
A difficult choice for all. Damned if they decide to, and damned if
they decide not to!
This is the dilemma of the government and Parliament.
by Huseyin Bagci
The New Anatolian, Turkey
Sept 4 2006
Opinions
Huseyin Bagci takes a look at Turkish history and finds the roots
of the Turkish dilemma over sending troops to Lebanon: New players
are introducing themselves to the Mideast should Turkey stay out,
he explores
There is reasonable certainty that the government motion on sending
Turkish troops to Lebanon will be approved by Parliament tomorrow.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's principal differences with the
government on the issue still remain, but the government now is
stronger in its position through many intellectuals' direct support
from across the political spectrum.
Yet, there are still many opposed to sending troops to Lebanon under
UN mandate, but in all the debates last week one could see that
the government decision is now more and more widely accepted among
the public.
In his Address to the Nation, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
was not at all convincing.
His rhetoric was a bit aggressive against those who oppose the
government's decision. However, the main idea that Turkey should be
present in the Middle East was the key message, and it reached its
goal. Opposition parties are against sending troops to Lebanon, but
their arguments do not convince the public. There's an impression
now that actually they would act in the same way if they were in
the government.
Their criticism mainly aims to weaken the Justice and Development
(AK) Party government because they can't criticize the government's
economic policies. Indeed, the AKP government will get more points by
this decision in the long run and many wise men in Turkish politics
support the government now, in stark contrast to the situation before
the March 1, 2003 motion.
Erdogan knows that he can control his party and that sending troops
to Lebanon is not only the decision expected by the world but also
an imperative of his proactive Middle East policy from his four
years in power. One should neither exaggerate nor make too much of
this decision.
But more importantly, Erdogan knows exactly what he wants and no doubt
he shows an example of leadership par excellence for Turkish history.
Why is this so?
First, Turkey is a part of the region's history by nature. Turkey
could only stay ignorant or indifferent to the region in the first two
decades of the republic during the interwar period (1923-45). Both
Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, first and second presidents of the
young republic, could stay away because they were the founders of
modern Turkey and were acutely aware that the European states like
France and Great Britain, in the form of colonization, dominated
the region. However, parliamentary records show the secret debates
of Parliament in the '30s and how the Republican People's Party
(CHP, the only party established and allowed by Ataturk) was more
enthusiastic to "get back" all the lost territories of the Ottoman
Empire. There were neo-Ottomans in the early years of the republic.
After World War II, Turkey was one of the founding members of the
UN. Turkey was the only Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949
when Inonu was president. Throughout the '50s Turkey wanted to play
a big brother role in the Middle East within the Cold War conditions:
it took the side of the Western bloc and even sent some 29,000 troops
to the Korean War in order to help the UN operation. Turks have always
supported UN resolutions, and up to today Turkey has lost over 700
soldiers in fighting in UN-led operations. Even today the Korean
syndrome is still there, but the result was that Turkey joined NATO
and the South Koreans still remember what the Turks contributed to
their freedom from communist North Korea.
The establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 was the real involvement
of Turkey in the Middle East. Lebanon was the first country visited by
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Arab nationalism, which was supported
by the Soviet Union at that time, was the biggest problem for Turkey.
Turkey's Middle East policy gained further momentum in the '60s and
'70s when it started to participate in meetings of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Cold War forced Turkey again to join
the side of the U.S., and the Lebanese civil war in the '70s, which
was not only destructive for the Lebanese but also the Israeli-Arab
conflict, was also another dimension. Just a few years after the
beginning of the Lebanese civil war, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
signed the peace treaty with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin
in 1978 in Camp David with U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Sadat paid
for his political act with his life when he was assassinated in 1981.
Turkey also supported the Palestinians very strongly, and since
1979 there has been a PLO representative, presently at the rank of
ambassador, in Turkey.
It was actually Turgut Ozal who started Turkey's involvement in the
Middle East through an economic dimension. In the '80s and '90s Turkey
discovered the Middle East as an economic area, and Turks met, for
the first time, with many Arabs as tourists in Turkey in the mid-'80s.
Turkey's closeness to the Middle East also turned into a political
problem when the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism
emerged. The Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and the PKK camps in Syria created
a very negative image of Arab countries. However, today Syria is one
of Turkey's best friends beside Iran and some other Arab countries.
Lebanon was also considered a source of evil by many Turks because
Turkish leftist terrorists were educated in Lebanon when Turkey
had almost a civil war situation in the '70s. Later on, PKK founder
Ocalan was also living there and many Turkish leftist journalists
and politicians visited him there. The Lebanese image is also very
bad because the Lebanese Parliament recognizes the so-called Armenian
genocide, although in Lebanon the majority is Muslim.
But now the AKP government has continued this active involvement in
the Middle East, and Lebanon is also important as a key economic
country. It is a political reality that Israel destroyed a great
part of the country and UN troops have to be deployed there. Turkey,
for its part, cannot remain an outside player. There is also the new
fact that the European Union is getting heavily involved there. Thus,
our involvement will have impact on Turkish-EU relations. In the case
of the Middle East, the EU will replace the classical actors of the
Cold War, the U.S. and Russia, and the "political vacuum" will be
filled by the EU. Is this good for Turkey? The answer is yes. The
fact is that since the '50s there are new players, but Turkey is
always present in political calculations.
Erdogan is just continuing the traditional Turkish presence in the
Middle East under the UN mandate.
The visit of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan this week is the
confirmation of Turkey's presence in the Middle East. The debate over
whether there will be a permanent peace is an open one. But if Turkey
doesn't follow this UN call, then this might have negative consequences
for the country. After weighing all the worst-case scenarios, in the
end Turkey should make a choice whether it is indeed part of this
political, cultural and religious world there or not. The future
of the Middle East may be not so shiny but without Turkey it would
more problematic.
Turkey as a founding nation of the UN is also obliged to rehabilitate
the reputation of the organization. If you're not at the table,
than you have nothing to say in the post-conflict formula. Turkey
should stay at the table of the Middle East despite many risks. Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes formulated this in the early '50s when he
made the decision to send troops to Korea. It's a similar situation
to the one that confronts Erdogan. But it's also a domestic political
decision for his party whether he is indeed a leader or not. The
members of the AKP have to prove tomorrow whether they will stay
with their leader or not. Any failure would have consequences both
for the party and the country.
A difficult choice for all. Damned if they decide to, and damned if
they decide not to!
This is the dilemma of the government and Parliament.