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RUSSIA AND THE FROZEN WARS
Prepared by: Lionel Beehner
Council on Foreign Relations, New York
Sept 6 2006
Separation anxiety abounds in the former Soviet Union. The empire's
dissolution led to turmoil in parts of the north and south Caucasus,
and the status of a number of important enclaves remains unsettled.
Some call for more autonomy from Moscow, while others want closer
ties. As on-and-off wars in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and northern
Georgia illustrate, at times, these so-called "frozen conflicts"
have heated up; more often, though, they simmer beneath the surface,
leaving restless nationals in their wake. Experts agree on one thing:
The road to resolve these conflicts goes through Moscow.
Yet with ethnic Albanian Kosovars calling for independence from
Serbia, Russia finds itself in a bind, writes Chris Stephen of
the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. On one hand, Moscow
supports, both with money and manpower, the struggles of separatists
in Moldova's Trans-Dniester and Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia
regions. Yet there is an obvious "wariness about encouraging separatism
elsewhere." Russians are worried that if Chechnya breaks away from
the federation, then Dagestan, Tatarstan, and other Russian republics
would follow in domino-like fashion. Not to mention Russia does not
want to anger its best friend in the Balkans, Serbia, which refuses
to accept statehood for Kosovo.
For its part, Georgia is keen to come to an understanding with Russia
on its separatist problems. The leaders who took office after the Rose
Revolution struck a quick deal with Russia to resolve problems with
the breakaway Ajaria region but Moscow-Tbilisi ties have deteriorated
with Georgia's unification push. Moscow has jacked up the price of
its gas, as well as embargoed exports like Georgian wine and mineral
water. Relations are also tense over Tbilisi's bid to join NATO. Yet
Georgia can ill afford to provoke Moscow because, as the Economist
reports, "it would in effect be war against Russia."
These frozen conflicts have far-reaching ramifications beyond
their immediate regions. Many of them (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia)
are situated on important energy corridors. That partially explains
recent Western calls for an international police force to monitor
northern Georgia and the $295 million grant doled out by the U.S.
Millennium Challenge Corporation. Meanwhile, Trans-Dniester remains
a popular route for traffickers of drugs, arms, and sex workers (BBC).
Perhaps the most potentially hazardous of these conflicts is
Nagorno-Karabakh. Ethnic Armenians took control of the enclave and
a chunk of Azerbaijan in 1993 after a war that killed some 25,000
people and displaced hundreds of thousands. "This barely frozen
conflict threatens a hot war that would devastate the region," write
Ana Palacio and Daniel Twining in the Washington Post. They propose
a "mini-Marshall Plan" to remove Russian bases from the southern
Caucasus and end outstanding sanctions by some Western states against
Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation says Moscow has a "major
incentive" to leave conflicts unresolved, knowing the West will not
be interested in strategic partnerships "with rumps of countries
that are open to Russian-orchestrated pressures" (Word doc). Hence,
Russia's preferred strategy is to maintain the status quo, writes Nicu
Popescu of the Centre for European Policy Studies. "The conflicts are
not frozen at all," he says. "It is their settlement that is frozen."
Prepared by: Lionel Beehner
Council on Foreign Relations, New York
Sept 6 2006
Separation anxiety abounds in the former Soviet Union. The empire's
dissolution led to turmoil in parts of the north and south Caucasus,
and the status of a number of important enclaves remains unsettled.
Some call for more autonomy from Moscow, while others want closer
ties. As on-and-off wars in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and northern
Georgia illustrate, at times, these so-called "frozen conflicts"
have heated up; more often, though, they simmer beneath the surface,
leaving restless nationals in their wake. Experts agree on one thing:
The road to resolve these conflicts goes through Moscow.
Yet with ethnic Albanian Kosovars calling for independence from
Serbia, Russia finds itself in a bind, writes Chris Stephen of
the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. On one hand, Moscow
supports, both with money and manpower, the struggles of separatists
in Moldova's Trans-Dniester and Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia
regions. Yet there is an obvious "wariness about encouraging separatism
elsewhere." Russians are worried that if Chechnya breaks away from
the federation, then Dagestan, Tatarstan, and other Russian republics
would follow in domino-like fashion. Not to mention Russia does not
want to anger its best friend in the Balkans, Serbia, which refuses
to accept statehood for Kosovo.
For its part, Georgia is keen to come to an understanding with Russia
on its separatist problems. The leaders who took office after the Rose
Revolution struck a quick deal with Russia to resolve problems with
the breakaway Ajaria region but Moscow-Tbilisi ties have deteriorated
with Georgia's unification push. Moscow has jacked up the price of
its gas, as well as embargoed exports like Georgian wine and mineral
water. Relations are also tense over Tbilisi's bid to join NATO. Yet
Georgia can ill afford to provoke Moscow because, as the Economist
reports, "it would in effect be war against Russia."
These frozen conflicts have far-reaching ramifications beyond
their immediate regions. Many of them (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia)
are situated on important energy corridors. That partially explains
recent Western calls for an international police force to monitor
northern Georgia and the $295 million grant doled out by the U.S.
Millennium Challenge Corporation. Meanwhile, Trans-Dniester remains
a popular route for traffickers of drugs, arms, and sex workers (BBC).
Perhaps the most potentially hazardous of these conflicts is
Nagorno-Karabakh. Ethnic Armenians took control of the enclave and
a chunk of Azerbaijan in 1993 after a war that killed some 25,000
people and displaced hundreds of thousands. "This barely frozen
conflict threatens a hot war that would devastate the region," write
Ana Palacio and Daniel Twining in the Washington Post. They propose
a "mini-Marshall Plan" to remove Russian bases from the southern
Caucasus and end outstanding sanctions by some Western states against
Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation says Moscow has a "major
incentive" to leave conflicts unresolved, knowing the West will not
be interested in strategic partnerships "with rumps of countries
that are open to Russian-orchestrated pressures" (Word doc). Hence,
Russia's preferred strategy is to maintain the status quo, writes Nicu
Popescu of the Centre for European Policy Studies. "The conflicts are
not frozen at all," he says. "It is their settlement that is frozen."