Tweet
Vladimir Kazimirov: "There is too much obscurity and fraud in Baku's policy on Karabakh"
Regnum, Russia
Sept 7 2006
Vladimir Kazimirov - Ambassador, in 1992-1996 head of Russia's
mediatory mission, Russian president's plenipotentiary representative
for Nagorno Karabakh, Russian member and co-chair of the OSCE Minsk
Group; presently, Vice President of the Association of Russian
Diplomats.
Kazimirov's article reflects his personal view of the problem of
Armenian-Azeri relations
A few days ago political expert Vafa Guluzade, who has been the
closest man of the three Azeri presidents Mutalibov, Elchibey and
Aliyev, made quite a rash statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
He alleged to REGNUM News Agency that there are no documents discussed
at the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks. "As a person who has had an
immediate relation to the talks, I say with full responsibility that
the negotiating sides have not created a single line... Neither side
can prove the other guilty of any undesirable actions."
If we translate this allegory into common language: since the sides
have not agreed on anything, they cannot blame each other for failing
any obligations. We can only be sorry for such a lapse of memory.
Guluzade should better not open this subject at all. He has not only
made a fool of himself, but he has also made the whole Azeri side look
"hopelessly bad" in the matter. I think it's time to make known some
documents and some things I personally know for sure as a member of
the mediatory mission of 1992-1996.
It's high time to publish the autographs of the plenipotentiary
representatives of the Azerbaijani Republic (AR) under some documents:
Abiyev, Sadykhov, Mamedov, Jalilov, Guliyev, Aliyev.
In 1993 those people repeatedly signed under the commitment to -
very shortly, on a specific date - hold a meeting of the top leaders
of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, but Baku tired to delay its
fulfillment. It was put to paper every time cease-fire was declared.
On September 12-13, 1993, the top officials of Azerbaijan and Nagorno
Karabakh (Jalilov and present Defense Minister Abiyev from Azerbaijan
and Gukasyan from Nagorno Karabakh) prolonged the cease-fire and
adopted a joint communique.
Eager to stop the military actions before presidential election
Heydar Aliyev met with Robert Kocharyan as late as September 25, 1993,
in violation of any deadlines, and demanded secrecy in exchange for
promise to continue the contacts.
The same people repeatedly pledged to stop fire, but, despite their
signatures, the Azeri side broke the cease-fire for four times in hope
to win in the battle field. The most memorable story is the breach
of the cease-fire on December 16, 1993, before the counter-attack of
the Azeri troops at various parts of the front.
Guluzade is certainly aware of this series of agreements and
breaches. If he means only the things the sides "created" on their own
without mediators, given bellow are his own words about the document
signed by all the three sides in July, 1994:
"The wording about the cease-fire - 'till the conclusion of the peace
agreement' - was reached in a roundabout way, on the phone, bypassing
Moscow, Paris, due to the constructivism and cooperation of Zhirayr
Libarityan, former advisor of the former Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossyan, with whom I held direct talks. Along with other
factors, this wording had certainly contributed to the stability
of the cease-fire: it started a peace process and stopped human
casualties. (Zerkalo daily, December 26, 1998).
Why now contradict oneself "with full responsibility"? Either the
sides have borne the magic wording or they have not created "any
single line"? On Feb 6, 1995, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh
concluded an agreement on consolidating the cease-fire regime - an
agreement specifying how to settle incidents on the contact line. For
this purpose, the sides exchanged phone numbers for direct contacts
between political and military leaders.
Almost every day Azerbaijan accuses the Armenians of violating the
cease-fire agreement on the "front line" (that's how they called it
there), but does not fulfill this agreement itself. In March, 2005,
Yerevan said it was ready to fulfill the commitments. In May, 2006,
Stepanakert urged Baku and Yerevan to do this. However, Baku keeps
silence. If this document is imperfect, Baku could suggest revising
it. Azerbaijan reports continuing human casualties, "groans" in its
propaganda, but does not want to fulfill the only agreement concluded
under the OSCE aegis.
Obligations came not only from the talks but also from decisions by
international organizations and forums. For example, the OSCE Budapest
Summit unanimously decided to hold negotiations between the conflicting
sides. Heydar Aliyev did not object. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office
clearly said that NK was also a party to the conflict. However,
for 10 years already Azerbaijan has been debarring NK from the
negotiating process.
Special point - the obligation of UN member states is to fulfill UN
Security Council resolutions. When Kalbajar fell, Azerbaijan asked the
UN SC to adopt Resolution 822, but Azerbaijan failed to meet it itself:
for over a year it ignored its key demand - to stop the military
actions. This demand was reiterated in resolutions 853, 874 and 884.
After Resolution 884 the Azeri troops actively warred for almost half
a year. Baku agreed to armistice only in the face of total collapse
rather than for the sake of belated fulfillment of the resolution. By
the way, that was the only requirement of the resolution Azerbaijan
has fulfilled so far.
The question is why the UN SC has not adopted any single resolution
on Karabakh since Nov, 1993, even though it has had plenty of new
occasions for that? Exactly because one of the sides refused to
fulfill its key requirement. Azerbaijan was the first to ignore the UN
resolutions in their most important point - the call for stopping the
bloodshed. It began insisting on their fulfillment only in the point
requiring the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories. They
in Baku hope that the war has long been forgotten, and nobody will
notice falseness in their ardent advocacy of UN SC resolutions.
The key point of Azerbaijan's tactics now is to show the odious
picture of the occupation without saying why it happened and why it
is going on. It should be noted that in Azerbaijan there is a ban
on the self-critical analysis of the war, its costs and mistakes. Of
course, occupation is an anomaly in the modern world, but it cannot
be considered separately from the dynamics of the military actions,
from a whole number of Baku's refusals to stop them, from fears that,
once getting its territories back, Baku may violate the agreement
and deal a blow on NK from more favorable positions.
There are obligations of some other origin - obligations Azerbaijan
undertook when joining international organizations. For example, the
OSCE member states recognize all ten equal principles of inter-state
relations, while Baku persists in advocating the imaginary priority
of the principle of territorial integrity. When joining the Council
of Europe, Azerbaijan, just like Armenia, committed itself to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict exclusively by peaceful means, but it
seldom calls it day without official threats to apply force. Nobody
in Baku dares to remember article 9 of own Constitution, which says
that war is not a way to solve international conflicts.
There were cases when Azerbaijan openly reviewed its positions
(in May, 1994, it agreed to sign the "small agreement" of Jan
Eliasson and retracted it right off). Azeri officials keep making
controversial statements (now they say "our patience is not endless"
now they say "time is serving Azerbaijan"; first they say "we have
not coordinated anything in Paris and Bucharest" and then: "2 of
8-9 points are left for coordination"). Baku's dashing from side to
side has already become a tradition: it raises the Nagorno-Karabakh
problems at various international instances in hunt for propaganda
points, but this only hinders the resolution of these problems in
the framework of the OSCE. This swaying and alogisms is not because
of non-professionalism - there is something else behind.
Let's be sincere - there is too much obscurity and fraud in Baku's
policy on Nagorno Karabakh. The bellicose campaign by top officials is
nothing but a mockery at own people, isn't it? No surprise that most
of what they in Azerbaijan do is mistrusted. Banal propaganda tricks
(20% of occupied territories, over million of refugees) could hardly
have another effect.
Of course, the Armenians too used various tricks. In early Sept, 1993,
the Nagorno-Karabakh leaders publicly promised to withdraw their
troops from the town of Kubatli, which they occupied a day before,
but they broke their promise. Oftentimes, the Armenians objected to
preliminary decision on the status of NK before the opening of the
OSCE Minsk conference, but they were inconsistent when demanding that
the status of NK should be the first problem from the package to be
given solution. However, inventive as they are, they are not a match
to their opponents in failing agreements and swindling. I sympathize
with the present OSCE MG co-chairs in their constant pains to find
something strong enough to fix the positions of the sides. Do they
realize in their plod at the "principles" (and then at agreements)
that they constantly have over them the sword of Damocles of compliance
or non-compliance of the sides with what they will sign?
Of course, the one who has dared to give the above facts will be
scolded by certain people once again (this is the easiest thing they
can do), but they can't disprove or, at least, provide some sensible
arguments against these sad facts.
As you may know, the key obstacle to peace in Nagorno Karabakh is deep
mutual distrust. It is exactly this feeling that urges the sides to,
first of all, push forward their own interests. This feeling is the
heritage of the old discord between the Azeris and the Armenians
and the deep scar of the recent war, the fruit of zealous propaganda
and the outcome of the vicious circle of years-long talks. Breaking
one's word, failing one's commitments - this all reveals trickery
and replicates distrust.
It seems that the leadership of each state, especially a young one
facing the hard tasks of building own image on the international arena,
should be the first to wish to gain the reputation of a state that
can hold serious negotiations and fulfill its commitments. It should
be the first to feel uneasy when failing to fulfill them and to avoid
any set-backs that could undermine its reputation,
There are no rules without exceptions. Alas, the fashionable European
orientation is not always a remedy from non-European standards.
Regnum, Russia
Sept 7 2006
Vladimir Kazimirov - Ambassador, in 1992-1996 head of Russia's
mediatory mission, Russian president's plenipotentiary representative
for Nagorno Karabakh, Russian member and co-chair of the OSCE Minsk
Group; presently, Vice President of the Association of Russian
Diplomats.
Kazimirov's article reflects his personal view of the problem of
Armenian-Azeri relations
A few days ago political expert Vafa Guluzade, who has been the
closest man of the three Azeri presidents Mutalibov, Elchibey and
Aliyev, made quite a rash statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
He alleged to REGNUM News Agency that there are no documents discussed
at the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks. "As a person who has had an
immediate relation to the talks, I say with full responsibility that
the negotiating sides have not created a single line... Neither side
can prove the other guilty of any undesirable actions."
If we translate this allegory into common language: since the sides
have not agreed on anything, they cannot blame each other for failing
any obligations. We can only be sorry for such a lapse of memory.
Guluzade should better not open this subject at all. He has not only
made a fool of himself, but he has also made the whole Azeri side look
"hopelessly bad" in the matter. I think it's time to make known some
documents and some things I personally know for sure as a member of
the mediatory mission of 1992-1996.
It's high time to publish the autographs of the plenipotentiary
representatives of the Azerbaijani Republic (AR) under some documents:
Abiyev, Sadykhov, Mamedov, Jalilov, Guliyev, Aliyev.
In 1993 those people repeatedly signed under the commitment to -
very shortly, on a specific date - hold a meeting of the top leaders
of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, but Baku tired to delay its
fulfillment. It was put to paper every time cease-fire was declared.
On September 12-13, 1993, the top officials of Azerbaijan and Nagorno
Karabakh (Jalilov and present Defense Minister Abiyev from Azerbaijan
and Gukasyan from Nagorno Karabakh) prolonged the cease-fire and
adopted a joint communique.
Eager to stop the military actions before presidential election
Heydar Aliyev met with Robert Kocharyan as late as September 25, 1993,
in violation of any deadlines, and demanded secrecy in exchange for
promise to continue the contacts.
The same people repeatedly pledged to stop fire, but, despite their
signatures, the Azeri side broke the cease-fire for four times in hope
to win in the battle field. The most memorable story is the breach
of the cease-fire on December 16, 1993, before the counter-attack of
the Azeri troops at various parts of the front.
Guluzade is certainly aware of this series of agreements and
breaches. If he means only the things the sides "created" on their own
without mediators, given bellow are his own words about the document
signed by all the three sides in July, 1994:
"The wording about the cease-fire - 'till the conclusion of the peace
agreement' - was reached in a roundabout way, on the phone, bypassing
Moscow, Paris, due to the constructivism and cooperation of Zhirayr
Libarityan, former advisor of the former Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossyan, with whom I held direct talks. Along with other
factors, this wording had certainly contributed to the stability
of the cease-fire: it started a peace process and stopped human
casualties. (Zerkalo daily, December 26, 1998).
Why now contradict oneself "with full responsibility"? Either the
sides have borne the magic wording or they have not created "any
single line"? On Feb 6, 1995, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh
concluded an agreement on consolidating the cease-fire regime - an
agreement specifying how to settle incidents on the contact line. For
this purpose, the sides exchanged phone numbers for direct contacts
between political and military leaders.
Almost every day Azerbaijan accuses the Armenians of violating the
cease-fire agreement on the "front line" (that's how they called it
there), but does not fulfill this agreement itself. In March, 2005,
Yerevan said it was ready to fulfill the commitments. In May, 2006,
Stepanakert urged Baku and Yerevan to do this. However, Baku keeps
silence. If this document is imperfect, Baku could suggest revising
it. Azerbaijan reports continuing human casualties, "groans" in its
propaganda, but does not want to fulfill the only agreement concluded
under the OSCE aegis.
Obligations came not only from the talks but also from decisions by
international organizations and forums. For example, the OSCE Budapest
Summit unanimously decided to hold negotiations between the conflicting
sides. Heydar Aliyev did not object. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office
clearly said that NK was also a party to the conflict. However,
for 10 years already Azerbaijan has been debarring NK from the
negotiating process.
Special point - the obligation of UN member states is to fulfill UN
Security Council resolutions. When Kalbajar fell, Azerbaijan asked the
UN SC to adopt Resolution 822, but Azerbaijan failed to meet it itself:
for over a year it ignored its key demand - to stop the military
actions. This demand was reiterated in resolutions 853, 874 and 884.
After Resolution 884 the Azeri troops actively warred for almost half
a year. Baku agreed to armistice only in the face of total collapse
rather than for the sake of belated fulfillment of the resolution. By
the way, that was the only requirement of the resolution Azerbaijan
has fulfilled so far.
The question is why the UN SC has not adopted any single resolution
on Karabakh since Nov, 1993, even though it has had plenty of new
occasions for that? Exactly because one of the sides refused to
fulfill its key requirement. Azerbaijan was the first to ignore the UN
resolutions in their most important point - the call for stopping the
bloodshed. It began insisting on their fulfillment only in the point
requiring the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories. They
in Baku hope that the war has long been forgotten, and nobody will
notice falseness in their ardent advocacy of UN SC resolutions.
The key point of Azerbaijan's tactics now is to show the odious
picture of the occupation without saying why it happened and why it
is going on. It should be noted that in Azerbaijan there is a ban
on the self-critical analysis of the war, its costs and mistakes. Of
course, occupation is an anomaly in the modern world, but it cannot
be considered separately from the dynamics of the military actions,
from a whole number of Baku's refusals to stop them, from fears that,
once getting its territories back, Baku may violate the agreement
and deal a blow on NK from more favorable positions.
There are obligations of some other origin - obligations Azerbaijan
undertook when joining international organizations. For example, the
OSCE member states recognize all ten equal principles of inter-state
relations, while Baku persists in advocating the imaginary priority
of the principle of territorial integrity. When joining the Council
of Europe, Azerbaijan, just like Armenia, committed itself to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict exclusively by peaceful means, but it
seldom calls it day without official threats to apply force. Nobody
in Baku dares to remember article 9 of own Constitution, which says
that war is not a way to solve international conflicts.
There were cases when Azerbaijan openly reviewed its positions
(in May, 1994, it agreed to sign the "small agreement" of Jan
Eliasson and retracted it right off). Azeri officials keep making
controversial statements (now they say "our patience is not endless"
now they say "time is serving Azerbaijan"; first they say "we have
not coordinated anything in Paris and Bucharest" and then: "2 of
8-9 points are left for coordination"). Baku's dashing from side to
side has already become a tradition: it raises the Nagorno-Karabakh
problems at various international instances in hunt for propaganda
points, but this only hinders the resolution of these problems in
the framework of the OSCE. This swaying and alogisms is not because
of non-professionalism - there is something else behind.
Let's be sincere - there is too much obscurity and fraud in Baku's
policy on Nagorno Karabakh. The bellicose campaign by top officials is
nothing but a mockery at own people, isn't it? No surprise that most
of what they in Azerbaijan do is mistrusted. Banal propaganda tricks
(20% of occupied territories, over million of refugees) could hardly
have another effect.
Of course, the Armenians too used various tricks. In early Sept, 1993,
the Nagorno-Karabakh leaders publicly promised to withdraw their
troops from the town of Kubatli, which they occupied a day before,
but they broke their promise. Oftentimes, the Armenians objected to
preliminary decision on the status of NK before the opening of the
OSCE Minsk conference, but they were inconsistent when demanding that
the status of NK should be the first problem from the package to be
given solution. However, inventive as they are, they are not a match
to their opponents in failing agreements and swindling. I sympathize
with the present OSCE MG co-chairs in their constant pains to find
something strong enough to fix the positions of the sides. Do they
realize in their plod at the "principles" (and then at agreements)
that they constantly have over them the sword of Damocles of compliance
or non-compliance of the sides with what they will sign?
Of course, the one who has dared to give the above facts will be
scolded by certain people once again (this is the easiest thing they
can do), but they can't disprove or, at least, provide some sensible
arguments against these sad facts.
As you may know, the key obstacle to peace in Nagorno Karabakh is deep
mutual distrust. It is exactly this feeling that urges the sides to,
first of all, push forward their own interests. This feeling is the
heritage of the old discord between the Azeris and the Armenians
and the deep scar of the recent war, the fruit of zealous propaganda
and the outcome of the vicious circle of years-long talks. Breaking
one's word, failing one's commitments - this all reveals trickery
and replicates distrust.
It seems that the leadership of each state, especially a young one
facing the hard tasks of building own image on the international arena,
should be the first to wish to gain the reputation of a state that
can hold serious negotiations and fulfill its commitments. It should
be the first to feel uneasy when failing to fulfill them and to avoid
any set-backs that could undermine its reputation,
There are no rules without exceptions. Alas, the fashionable European
orientation is not always a remedy from non-European standards.