The New Great Game

[Kalashian Nyrie]

THE NEW GREAT GAME

Fistful of Euros, Sweden
September 12, 2006

Our next anniversary guest post is written by the the great Jonathan
Edelstein.

It's starting to look like the season of referenda in the near abroad.

On September 17, less than a week from today, voters in the
unrecognized republic of Transnistria, located between Moldova and
Ukraine, will be asked to vote on whether to "renounce [their]
independent status and subsequently become part of the Republic
of Moldova" or "support a policy of independence... and subsequent
free association with the Russian Federation." The option of "free
association" with Russia, which is widely considered a prelude
to outright annexation, is reportedly backed by a large number of
Russian-financed business and political organizations, some with
long-standing presence in Transnistrian politics and others apparently
formed for the occasion. In the meantime, South Ossetia, which had
earlier explored the possibility of petitioning Russia's constitutional
court for annexation, has just announced its own referendum for
November 12, and although Abkhazia currently denies similar plans,
there are rumors that a plebiscite may be in the works there as well.

The referenda, which are rather transparently supported by
Moscow, represent something of a change in policy for the Russian
Federation. It's certainly nothing new for post-Soviet Russia to
attempt to maintain its influence over the countries comprising the
former Soviet Union, and it has at times used Russian citizenship
to cement the "soft" annexation of neighboring territories; for
instance, at least 90 percent of Abkhazians and South Ossetians now
hold Russian passports. Nevertheless, up to now, it has soft-pedaled
the issue of de jure territorial expansion. The forthcoming vote on
whether Transnistria should become a second Kaliningrad suggests that
policymakers in Moscow are at least starting to think seriously about
taking formal responsibility for the territories that have broken
away from other former Soviet republics.

At first glance, it's hard to see why Russia would push such a policy
at the present time. All three of the breakaway republics have
substantial minorities who oppose union with Russia; Transnistria
is almost evenly divided between ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and
Romanians, and despite post-Soviet ethnic cleansing, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia retain Georgian minority enclaves. The recent wave of
terrorist bombings in the Transnistrian capital of Tiraspol may
well be linked to the referendum, and Russian annexation of the
Georgian breakaway republics would only intensify border conflicts
such as the Kodori Gorge. Nor would successful plebiscites lend
a veneer of legitimacy to a Russian annexation; indeed, given the
current international attitude toward non-consensual secessions from
recognized states, this would only make Russia's legal position worse
by transforming it into an occupying power.

In other words, the referenda seem like a recipe for stirring up ethnic
conflict within the breakaway republics, making Moldova and Georgia
even more alarmed over Russian political ambitions than they already
are, and creating new diplomatic and legal problems for Moscow. Which
leads naturally to three questions: why now, what does Russia stand
to gain in compensation for these risks, and how much should the rest
of the world (and particularly Europe) care?

Why now?

The short answer, at least from Moscow's standpoint, is that it may
be now or never. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's method
of choice for projecting influence over the "near abroad" has been
to prop up friendly governments in the CIS nations where they exist
and to install them where they don't. This strategy remains, to a
great extent, effective in central Asia, where democratization is
still at an early stage and where local leaders have few realistic
alternative strategic partners. In the Caucasus and eastern Europe,
however, this system has broken down during the past three years.

To be sure, Russia isn't entirely without clients in these
regions. Moscow can still exercise influence over Belarus, where
Lukashenko needs Putin's patronage to stay in office, and in Armenia,
which has a clientage relationship with Russia similar to Israel's
with the United States. Since the Rose Revolution in Georgia, however,
Tblisi's politics have shifted away from Moscow and toward Brussels,
and similar evolution has taken place in Ukraine and Moldova. Even
Azerbaijan is increasingly developing a mass opposition politics
and has made tentative suggestions about eventual European Union
membership.

The bottom line is that Putin can't be certain that his remaining
Caucasian and European clients will remain in his camp forever. The
three unrecognized republics, which are almost entirely dependent on
Russia for diplomatic and financial support, represent Moscow's best
method of maintaining influence in these regions. And even there,
pro-Russian political alignment may not last forever. In the 2004
Abkhazian presidential election, for instance, Moscow's candidate
initially lost, leading to a controversy which was resolved after
heavy-handed Russian intervention. The 2005 parliamentary election
in Transnistria likewise resulted in victory for the Renewal party,
which ran on an anti-corruption ticket and beat out President Igor
Smirnov's Republican faction. Smirnov himself may, for the first
time in his career, face a serious challenge in elections scheduled
for December. None of these countries can be called a full-fledged
democracy, but domestic politics isn't as domesticated as it has been
in the past.

Granted, neither of these political events have had any immediate
effect in foreign policy terms. The Renewal party has been co-opted
to a considerable extent, and as evidenced by its support of the
referendum, its leaders haven't dissented to a significant degree on
alignment with Russia.

Pro-Russian politics are still the consensus in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as well, particularly the latter. Nevertheless, as Moldova
and Georgia develop more attractive European-oriented economies, the
growing importance of corruption and development issues might spur the
formation of political opposition and put the EU in competition with
Russia for local influence. The political climate even in Transnistria
or the Georgian breakaway provinces might not favor annexation to
Russia five or ten years from now, so Moscow may be striking while
the iron is hot.

What's at stake?

The question remains of what Moscow hopes to gain if the referenda are
successful. The United States, the European Union and Ukraine have
already announced that they won't recognize the referenda and that
they won't regard the results as having any impact on the breakaway
republics' legal status. In the immediate term, Russia stands little
chance of gaining international support for annexation, and given that
Transnistria has neither a seacoast nor a land border with Russia,
the movement of Russian military forces or logistical support into
the region could lead to trouble with Moldova and Ukraine.

The referenda can provide Moscow with leverage to pressure Moldova
and Georgia, however, and even if their results are suspended, they
could be used to create options in the medium to long term.

Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are all the subjects of
international mediation processes - mediation which has been stalled
for various reasons, but which has as its goal a consensual resolution
of the breakaway republics' status. Up to now, the options have been
independence, reabsorption into unitary Georgian or Moldovan states
or some form of local autonomy, with the unrecognized states insisting
on the first, Georgia and Moldova on the second and the international
community not really pushing the last. If a fourth option of annexation
by Russia is brought into the equation, however, and if Moscow can
point to the results of a plebiscite as credible evidence of support
for that option, then autonomy under Russian patronage could become
the middle ground.

There is, after all, precedent in the Balkans. The 1995 constitution of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, which was brokered at Dayton,
created an autonomous "Republika Srpska" with 49 percent of the
country's land area and the authority to "establish special parallel
relationships with neighboring states." This Serb canton has maintained
broad de facto autonomy, including its own paramilitary police, and has
tended to align its politics with the Serbian state. It may be that
Russia's long-term ambition in the South Caucasus and Transnistria
is similar - not to annex the breakaway territories per se, but
to use the prospect of annexation to manipulate the international
mediation processes and secure a legally recognized arrangement under
which Moscow can maintain influence through autonomous provincial
governments.

Why should the EU care?

The impact of Russian neo-imperial ambitions and clashing nationalisms
on stability in the Caucasus and the countries bordering the Dniester
is reason enough to care. For those who are looking for a more concrete
reason (and have a fascination with worst-case scenarios), the European
Union could inherit the Transnistria conflict sooner than it might
think. In less than four months, barring unforeseen complications in
Brussels, Romania will become an EU member state. At that point, the
slumbering issue of Moldovan reunification with Romania would take
on a new dimension, given that reunion would be a means for Moldova
to jump the queue and receive the benefits of EU membership a decade
or two ahead of schedule. This isn't something that seems likely to
happen soon - nationalist politics in Moldova would pull both ways,
Russia's capital in Chisinau isn't entirely spent, the costs would
potentially be prohibitive from the Romanian side and sorting out
financial obligations would be a major headache - but the chances
of it happening eventually are greater than zero. If so, then the
Transnistria issue, and its potential for direct conflict with Russia,
would suddenly be inside the EU's borders.

Even barring such an extreme scenario, developments in the Transnistria
and South Caucasus conflicts could potentially complicate relations
with EU candidate states. The Transnistria referendum, for instance,
has already created yet another rift in Ukraine's ethnically-charged
politics. The Ukrainian government has refused to send observers
to monitor the referendum, but Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych's
Party of Regions will be sending an independent delegation. If the
referendum results in a decision favoring "free association" with
Russia and if the issue of Dniester transit rights comes before the
Verkhovna Rada, then Transnistria policy could become both politically
and (given Transnistria's 30-percent Ukrainian minority) ethnically
divisive. If it becomes divisive enough, then it could impact Ukraine's
still-unfinished democratization.

The Caucasian republics are farther from Europe, but the crises there
- and particularly the EU's role or lack thereof in resolving those
crises - could nevertheless have an eventual impact. Unlike Moldova,
where European integration is a fairly natural progression, the
Caucasus has several other potential partners, and it isn't inevitable
that the Caucasian states will become European-aligned. And at least
one of the factors that will play a part in whether countries like
Georgia ultimately opt for a European orientation is how reliable the
EU's soft power is in protecting them against Russia. If South Ossetia,
or ultimately Abkhazia, petitions to join the Russian Federation,
then Tblisi will need to see some concrete opposition from Brussels,
and the latter may face a choice between losing Georgia or supporting
solutions that it doesn't really favor.

The overriding possibility is that, if Europe and the remainder of
the international community let the referenda happen without making
any proposals themselves to break the deadlock, they risk losing
the diplomatic initiative to Russia and having their future regional
options constrained. I'm not nearly familiar enough with the politics
and needs of the region to suggest what kind of proposal should
be made or what tactics should be used to persuade the parties to
compliance. Continuing to keep the crises on a back burner, though,
which after all amounts to de facto support of the status quo, may
not be a viable option for much longer.

Comments I am afraid there is a question you haven't touched.

Are these areas worth confronting Russia? Good relations with Russia
are important, good relations with Georgia less so.

Secondly, the western position on unilateral secession is less crystal
clear than you state. We didn't ask Serbia whether Montenegro might
secede, to give only the latest example.

Thirdly, you write about stability. Is autonomy a stable
situation? We've seen a nasty case of autonomy statutes being revoked
leading to major trouble.

Posted by: Oliver at September 12, 2006 10:06 AM Montenegro always
had a constitutional right to dissolve the union. Completely different
situation.

Kosovar secession, otoh, would expose the west to charges of hypocrisy.

Posted by: David Weman at September 12, 2006 10:29 AM I am absolutely
stunned that such an article could be written without any reference
to the current Kosovo status talks.

The main reason why these issues are coming to prominence right now
is because Russia sees an opportunity to use Kosovo independence as
means by which to push its case in these territories. The misguided
view promoted by some that Kosovo is sui generis is nonsense. As David
just noted, granting Kosovo independence and denying the same right
to these states would open the West to charges of hypocrisy. Moscow
simply will not accept one favourable precedent for Western satellite
states and have to then accept another unfavourable one for its own.

Now we are seeing the real consequences of promoting Kosovo
independence and failing to seize an opportunity to create a new
form of super-autonomy in divided states that would work to limit
secessionist tendencies; not just in the Caucasus and Transdniestra,
but also in the Balkans (Bosnia Serbs are making ominous noises now
as well), Iraq and in any number of other places.

Posted by: Jim at September 12, 2006 11:03 AM I don't agree that
Kosovos Independence would put West in difficult situation.. As far
as I know in Kosovo albanians are majority and in Abkhazia before the
war, georgians were if not majority, then equally represented. 250
thousands of refugges should return to abkhazia and then they can
hold plebiscits, referendums or whatever..

South Ossetias problem is even more ridiculous: georgian and ossetian
villages are like chess-board, they are so mixed and this territory
is so tiny that only neo-imperialist Russians could have such a
stupid plan.

Russia can simulate and make parallels (like today Putin in
FT:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/76e205b2-40e5-11db-8 27f-0000779e2340.html)

between Kosovo and other post-soviet seeparatist quasi-states, untill
West really studies this subject...

Posted by: Levan at September 12, 2006 01:25 PM Levan - the corrolary
of your view is that as long as the Abkhazians could define a piece
of contiguous territory on which they (historically?) constitute
a majority then the validity of their claims would in your opinion
change.

Whilst your analysis of the Southern Ossetian position is accurate,
it is less clear at which point a territory becomes so fragmented so
as to deny any territorial claims.

As a thought exercise, what would be your reaction be to Russian
support for a 'Republic of Lazistan' - taking a chunk out of Turkey
and a smaller chunk out of Georgia ?

Posted by: Chris Stiles at September 12, 2006 01:53 PM

Article 60 of the former Constitution of Serbia and Montenegro allows
member states to secede after a three-year waiting period. Montenegro's
secession was by consent - given in advance and subject to conditions,
but consent.

Jim is right - I'm now slapping my forehead for not mentioning Kosovo
(although there was some mention of the possible Kosovo precedent in
this linked thread).

It is possible to make a plausible claim that Kosovo is sui generis,
given that it (1) is a relatively recent addition to the Serbian state,
(2) was separately administered during the Yugoslav period, and (3)
had de facto equality with Serbia during much of that period. On
the other hand, there are plenty of territories in the FSU that can
make at least two of these claims and some that can make all three,
and Russia would have an interest in interpreting the Kosovar example
as broadly as possible. I'm not sure it could even be distinguished
so easily on ethnic grounds, given that most of these post-conflict
settlements end up ratifying mutual ethnic cleansing.

Of course, Kosovo is a two-edged sword - if the final status talks
don't result in independence, then Russia will be the one open to
charges of hypocrisy for supporting independence in Transnistria
but not Kosovo. Not to mention that any Kosovar precedent could
potentially be applied to secessionist regions within the Russian
Federation itself.

In any event, though, I'd guess that Russia is less interested in the
independence precedent than in super-autonomy along the lines of the
Republika Srpska or the proposed Turkish canton of Annan Plan Cyprus,
in which its sponsored provinces would have limited foreign relations
authority and a veto over federal legislation that affects them. That
way, Moscow would get the best of both worlds - it would avoid the
stigma of dismembering Georgia and Moldova, get credit for helping
to broker the peace, effectively retain all three regions as its
fiefdoms, and gain a permanent proxy voice in Georgian and Moldovan
national affairs.

I tend to believe that some form of super-autonomy would be the best
solution in the long term, but that Russian-sponsored super-autonomy
wouldn't be. It might be a good thing if the EU offered a few
incentives to Moldova and Georgia (whose refusal to discuss meaningful
autonomy is IMO a substantial part of the problem) and work out an
arrangement in which the breakaway regions wouldn't depend on Russia
for political patronage.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 12, 2006 02:36 PM Chris,
I just wanted to be more close to real politics. Abkhazians came to
this territory from North Caucasus, but to take this conflict in to
historical dimension (especially in Caucasus, where all are very
"proud" of their history), won't contribute solving this problem,
I think. The only peaceful way to move frozen conflict from its
standpoint is to start IDPs returning process. Abkhazian de-facto
leaders are against this directly or indirectly and this once again
underlines their destructive role in peaceful resolution of conflict
and makes unclear what they really want..

My reaction to any Russian post-imperialistic ambitions are
negative. If we want to exercise on turkeys problems their are more
evident ones their..

Posted by: Levan at September 12, 2006 03:02 PM Sorry Levan - Perhaps
I should have made my point better.

You are right that the situation in Kosovo are different from that
in Abkhazia/Ossetia, however it is less clear to me that one could
come up with an objective set of guidelines which would seperate one
sort of situation from another.

The questions I pose are hypothetical and meant to illustrate that
point. I personally feel that the best future of most of the countries
in the Caususas is going to be multi-ethnic.

Posted by: Chris Stiles at September 12, 2006 03:16 PM

You are right that the situation in Kosovo are different from that
in Abkhazia/Ossetia

Any two situations are always different. But you'll not find the
one overriding, obvious difference. Every population came somewhence
else, somewhen.

I personally feel that the best future of most of the countries in
the Caususas is going to be multi-ethnic.

Without large scale ethnic cleansing this is unavoidable. But it
hardly is an argument for one specific territory to be part of one
country or the other.

Posted by: Oliver at September 12, 2006 04:17 PM The article says
that "Transnistria is almost evenly divided between ethnic Russians,
Ukrainians and Romanians," but the interesting thing here is that
most of the ethnic Romanians (or Moldovans, to be precise) who live
there are actually united with the Slavs (Russians/Ukrainians) in
wanting independence.

As a UN report noted, for the most part they don't have any wish to
be united with Moldova proper.

Some interesting background on this at
http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/179: Ethnic Moldovans in
Pridnestrovie prefer independence over unification with Moldova

Posted by: Bill M. at September 12, 2006 04:34 PM "It is possible to
make a plausible claim that Kosovo is sui generis"

Which brings us, of course, to the tough little nuts of Catalonia,
Euskadi, Corsica and Flanders.

"I tend to believe that some form of super-autonomy would be the best
solution in the long term"

I agree. This may be the end result in Euskadi, and this could then
serve as a model. At the same time it would offer the same type of
solution for the long suffering Gibraltar problem, as well as offering
a formula for resolving the Turkish 'entity' in Cyprus.

Seems to have lots of potential this idea.

Posted by: Edward at September 12, 2006 04:38 PM Jonathan, I think
you have hit the mark! I also don't think Russia really wants to
promote secession in these places. I think that it would much prefer
them to have a high degree of autonomy. In this manner it has a way
of exerting some control, albeit in an indirect manner through the
autonomous entities on the other states. However, Moscow is using
these events to make a clear statement of policy regarding its own
power in world affairs. If Kosovo is allowed to go its own way because
that is what Washington wants then it reserves the right to make a
similar demand on territories over which it has influence.

Of course, there is a very easy way out of this mess: go for
partition. Serbia agress to give up Kosovo in return for keeping the
northernmost 15% around Mitrovica. Many observers believe that Belgrade
would take this, albeit with some pressure. Although not ideal, it at
least keeps the principle of state consent for secession intact. As
for the idea that this would amount to the unwelcome ethnic partition
of Kosovo, the simple response is to ask why people who cite this
reason seem to have no problem with the ethnic partition of Serbia
simply because the Albanians don't want to live with the Serbs? As for
the idea of keeping a few Serbs scattered across Kosovo in order to
try to get around the hypocrisy of creating a purely Albanian state
in Kosovo, we all know that this is a farce. The Serbs in Kosovo
have no hope of freedom or security under Albanian rule. After six
years of international rule, all that has happened is that pattern
of oppression has been reversed. They will leave in no time.

All-in-all, we come down to the same point that Kosovo independence
against Serbia's will is about to set a dangerous new precedent. Your
excellent commentary on the Caucasus and Transdniestra just serves
to highlight the point.

Posted by: Jim at September 12, 2006 04:46 PM ...or persuade
the Albanians in Kosovo to go for super-autonomy, as Belgrade has
suggested. The trouble is that it is too late in the day for that. This
should have been the international position from the start: Kosovo
would be under international rule until Milosevic was replaced by a
democratic government in Belgrade. Then it would be re-incorporated
under 'super-autonomy' (which I also believe has a lot of potential
in international affairs). Instead, we are left with the current mess!

Posted by: Jim at September 12, 2006 04:52 PM This comment would have
been more apt two years ago, but at some point along the European
programme, after a common market, common currency, common macroeconomic
policy, common defense policy, one will have to ask the question,
What powers will the members states have left to reserve themselves
in granting autonomy to some region? If the traditional functions
of non-local government are exercised by the EU on behalf of its
members states, is there any functional difference between autonomy
and sovereignty?

Now already there are plenty of snippets and scraps of turf that
cannot work as nation-states, but might work as constituencies
of a federal Europe. Unfortunately for them, there is no federal
Europe. Nonetheless, those whose idea of the endpoint of the
Europeanisation process involves a federal Europe might do well to
think about what they think that endpoint looks like, where the
separation of powers lies. However politically impossible to get
today's members states to sign up to, it might make an interesting
offer to those regions for whom traditional categories of statehood
do not appear viable.

Posted by: Cyrus at September 12, 2006 05:02 PM "However politically
impossible to get today's members states to sign up to, it might make
an interesting offer to those regions for whom traditional categories
of statehood do not appear viable."

100% agree Cyrus. That was my point (made on Afoe) about the
'coalition of the willing' being a way out of the gridlock on the
constitution front.

The 'coalition' would be formed by:

i) Those (like many on this site) who feel themselves to be primarily
European, rather than belonging to any particular nation. This group
can co-opt the rest of the pro-constitution crowd

ii) The members of the 'nations without a state' who find themselves
inside the EU boundaries. This group could be quite extensive, if
the substantial autonomy idea was better developed and put across.

iii) Those 'new Europeans' currently on their way here in boats from
Mauritania to the Canary Islands. By these I mean all those recent EU
immigrants and their descendants who have so much difficulty situating
themselves within the old ethnic idea of the nation state as it exists
in Europe.

So what I am saying is that the idea of having a 'European citizenship'
- just like US citizenship effectively - may well be the long
term answer to all this agro. It might well serve the same role as
forgetting all the old 'England forever' stuff in the UK and creating
British identity did.

Posted by: Edward at September 12, 2006 05:16 PM Jonathan, great
post. Good to have you aboard.

Longer comment tomorrow, but one point now: "all politics is
local". There are internal issues pushing Russia in this direction,
too.

Doug M.

Posted by: Doug M. at September 12, 2006 05:40 PM Bill M:

the interesting thing here is that most of the ethnic Romanians (or
Moldovans, to be precise) who live there are actually united with
the Slavs (Russians/Ukrainians) in wanting independence

That's plausible, but (1) I'd be very wary of accepting articles in
the PMR official media as proof of anything, and (2) at least some
of them may be voting no with bombs. We'll see how they vote on Sunday.

Edward:

Which brings us, of course, to the tough little nuts of Catalonia,
Euskadi, Corsica and Flanders.

Some might argue that the first and last of these have super-autonomy
already, which raises the question of exactly what super-autonomy is
and how to distinguish it from garden-variety autonomy. Pretty much
all the mentions of "super-autonomy" I've seen use it as a term of
art without attempting a generic definition.

Super-autonomy is, I suppose, a constitutional status with more
and/or better-entrenched incidents of sovereignty than are possessed
by a typical autonomous province. One possible definition of a
super-autonomous region may be a territory that has one or more of
the following: (1) the right to regulate local citizenship, domicile
and/or property ownership; (2) authority to conduct foreign relations;
(3) the power to nullify certain federal laws within its territory;
(4) a veto over some or all federal legislation; (5) enhanced local
police power including but not limited to border controls; or (6) the
right to secede. Of course, by this definition, some regions are more
super-autonomous than others, and Swiss cantons are super-autonomous
or even super-duper-autonomous.

This may be the end result in Euskadi, and this could then serve as
a model.

I'm actually not sure why Moldova is so resistant to this for
Transnistria, given that it granted exactly such status to Gagauzia. In
both Moldova's and Georgia's case, though, substantive progress may
have to wait for a change of government.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 12, 2006 08:01 PM

Any two situations are always different. But you'll not find the
one overriding, obvious difference. Every population came somewhence
else, somewhen.

Yes, which is why "it is less clear to me that one could come up
with an objective set of guidelines which would seperate one sort of
situation from another"

Posted by: Chris Stiles at September 12, 2006 08:05 PM

The unofficial Gaugauz flag is like the best ever:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gagauz

Posted by: David Weman at September 12, 2006 08:07 PM "Some might
argue that the first and last of these have super-autonomy already,"

Well here in Catalonia there are many who would challenge
that. What Ibarretxe (who is PNV note *not* Batasuna) is arguing
for is effectively some form of dual sovereignty, where Euskadi
remains inside Spain, but in a purely notional sense. Given that
all of this would be under an EU umbrella pragmatically I don't see
the problem. Obviously Euskadi wants the right to conduct its own
migration and foreign policy (no EU state now controls citizenship
in the last resort since members of other states now have all the
principal rights associated with this apart from voting in national
elections) and so, in the longer run, does Catalonia.

"I'm actually not sure why Moldova is so resistant to this for
Transnistria"

I think the point is - and I suspect this will become eventually
very evident in the Sebian case with Kosovo - this process is *not*
asymmetrical. I mean by this that it doesn't simply involve giving
one group of people a special set of rights, but rather a complete
reconfiguration of the body politic and everyone else's sense of
identity.

As I say, I think the Serbian case would be interesting. It may not
be very likely, but via a thought experiment, we could imagine that
Kosovo and Serbia are re-united in a new entity with Kosovo having the
very special idea of autonomy we are discussing. Then two questions
immediately present themselves:

i) What would that new entity be? (It couldn't simply be a revamped
Serbia) ii) What would be Serbia's identity, since it would no longer
be a 'sovereign state' in the sense it is now.

This, I suspect, would be a big issue for the Serbs.

My experience here in Spain makes this plain to me.

The Catalans and the Basques assert that they are not Spanish
(I'm not taking a substantive posture here, simply reporting what
people say they *feel*, and what people *feel* is so important in
identitarian issues; that Catalans feel themselves to be a nation
is now part of the preamble to the new statute). Now imagine we move
forward to a 'state within a state' form of autonomy in Spain at some
point. The issue which presents itself isn't so much in the two new
'mini states' but in the rest of Spain. I mean on the most simple
level, should the entity keep the same name, or should it adopt a
new one: Iberian Federation for example? Because the issue is that
the Catalans and the Basques will then know who they are, but it is
the Spanish who feel that somehow something has changed and that it
is they who have the identity crisis. Or you can keep the name Spain,
but then who are the people who are neither Basque or Catalan?

This is why the idea of British, and British citizenship has been so
important in the UK.

So I suspect that this is the kind of issue which is knocking around
in Moldova and elsewhere. You can give the other group total autonomy,
but then who the hell are you?

Similar issues, of course, arise in the context of immigration,
where many are most vociferous that their new fellow citizens need to
'integrate' without recognising that it is not just migrants who need
to adapt to the new evolving entity which emerges.

"a veto over some or all federal legislation"

This I think is the most difficult part, as we are now seeing in the
context of the EU constitution debate.

Of course, in the new super-dooper autonomy context, it is hard to
see what 'nation state federal legislation' means in an EU context:
some sort of clearing house to facilitate a common voice on areas of
mutual interest I guess.

Posted by: Edward at September 13, 2006 06:35 AM Now imagine we move
forward to a 'state within a state' form of autonomy in Spain at some
point. The issue which presents itself isn't so much in the two new
'mini states' but in the rest of Spain.

If you semidisassemble Spain along ethnic lines there is a rest called
"Castillia" or something similar. The nations of Spain are confined
to the Iberian peninsula and small adjacent areas. Catalonia wants
to be Catalonia, not part of something else.

If you apply that to Moldova it would vanish. You'd get Slavs and
Romanians who would be part of Ukraine (if you look at it rationally)
and Romania. If you give up the idea of Moldavian citizenship there's
no reason for Moldavia to exist at all. The only problem might
ironically be Romania unwilling to pay for integrating the lost tribe.

In the other cases you should notice that these peoples live in
areas where politics is still a matter of life & death. Governments
breaking promises or the next government declaring void what the
predecessors did is not unknown, nor sending in the army to uphold
the law and sovereignty.

The idea of superautonomy requires great amounts of trust and
peacefullness. It's nice to say what should be, but solutions need
to be robust. And we cannot send EU troops into every civil war to
stop it and impose superautonomy.

Posted by: Oliver at September 13, 2006 08:05 AM "If you
semidisassemble Spain along ethnic lines"

I think the whole point here Oliver is that we are moving in Europe
away from the old ethnic model of the state. This is a long hard road.

Eastern Europe is, of course, considerably behind the 'modernisation'
curve, as is indicated not only in this context but also, as we can see
in the fertility case, in the gender equality and sexual orientation
areas too.

The population decline which is taking place in Eastern Europe is
simply serving to make this transition much more difficult.

Posted by: Edward at September 13, 2006 08:54 AM I think the whole
point here Oliver is that we are moving in Europe away from the old
ethnic model of the state. This is a long hard road.

It is a road you'll have to walk leaving the majority of citizens
behind. As the very example of Spain shows the nation is strong,
even gaining strength.

It seems to me that the movement of supranationality peaked in the
late 80ies and the pendulum is swinging back.

Posted by: Oliver at September 13, 2006 10:14 AM As an aside,
'Britishness' seems to be on the wane at the moment, and not just in
Scotland. Militant unionism and the union flag have been tainted on
the mainland by the far right, leading to a resurgence in England of
the English flag as a more 'acceptable' national symbol. Devolution has
made the West Lothian question a reality, leading to people calling for
'English votes for English affairs'. We're also seemingly on the brink
of having a Scottish prime minister from a Scottish constituency, which
could bring the matter to a head. The trouble is, there's no sensible
way to have a devolved England as some people demand, because with more
than 80% of the population and even more of the wealth, England and
its parliament/leader would dominate the Union, alienating the Scots,
Welsh and Northern Irish further. Regional devolution of England would
be practical, but is unpopular as it goes against English nationalism,
and bizarrely, a popular EU conspiracy theory says that the EU wants
to break up England into regions in order to destroy England's power
to resist Brussels via Westminster. I'd give the UK a few years yet
before holding it up as an example of a successful post-national state.

However, one ray of hope is that when immigrants and children
of immigrants assimilate, it is generally to a British identity
rather than an English etc one. I wonder if the same will be true in
Catalonia, with its recent surge of immigration? Probably too soon
to say.

Posted by: Colin Reid at September 13, 2006 12:54 PM "However, one ray
of hope is that when immigrants and children of immigrants assimilate,
it is generally to a British identity rather than an English etc one."

Yep, I think this was the main point I wanted to get across. In the
end I don't see any big issue with English people manifesting their
'englishness' like Chinese Americans might highlight the fact that
they are Chinese, but the English are far from being the only people
who now live in England (I hearthere are now half a million more Poles
and Hungarians there) and I doubt that a majority of the people who
live in England now strongly feel themselves to be English. Of course,
as you say, those that do tend to make a lot of political noise.

"I wonder if the same will be true in Catalonia, with its recent
surge of immigration?"

Clearly no place is perfect, and I would be the last to romanticise
these things, there are xenophobes here just like anywhere else,
but I am not pessimistic.

The problem is more complex in the Basque country. The basic thing
is that Catalan is a culture not an ethnos, it is simply anyone who
lives and works in Catalonia and who speaks Catalan. At this level
there is no discrimination as such. The thing is, recent immigrants
in general have no special antipathy to the language. But only the
future will show.

On another topic:

"a veto over some or all federal legislation"

well, we have some interesting news in today about Russia and the
European Airbus project. They want a veto.

Russia is seeking a blocking stake in European aerospace giant EADS
or representation on the firm's board in order to have a say in
management, a newspaper has reported.

Talks are ongoing on either buying up a blocking stake or being
included among principal shareholders "so that we can take part in
management", a senior government official was quoted by Vedomosti
business daily as saying Wednesday. A Putin aide said on Tuesday that
Russia was aiming for a key role in EADS.

"If the question is raised in that context and if we see an
accompanying economic interest, then we will insist on a stake through
which we would at least have a blocking minority," Kremlin aide Sergei
Prikhodko told reporters. EADS officials said Vneshtorgbank's stake
purchase would not change a "shareholder pact" agreed between key
company shareholders to make strategic decisions in the group.

The core shareholders are the French state, which has 15 percent,
the French group Lagardere with 15 percent, German-US auto giant
DaimlerChrysler with 22.32 percent, and Spain, which holds 5.5 percent
through the SEPI holding.

Posted by: Edward at September 13, 2006 01:42 PM - Any two situations
are always different. But you'll not find the one overriding, obvious
difference. Every population came somewhence else, somewhen.

- I personally feel that the best future of most of the countries in
the Caususas is going to be multi-ethnic.

The problem is in Russia... georgians are often blamed to put all
the problems on Russia, but it's in 80% really so.

For Russia this post-soviet ethnic conflicts were like the weapon to
punish States that were striving for independence and looking towards
west during 90's.

Abkhazia was always beloved resort place for Communist tyrants
beginning from Stalin ending up with post-soviet nomenclature. Russias
politics are still driven with imperialistic ambitions, they don't
care about Abkhaz people at all, they are just using them for putting
pressure on Georgia and for some other domestic or international
speculations. Russian oligarchs and businessmen are buying-up real
estate belonging to IDP's. Russia thinks that abkhazia would become
their territory like Sochi, which was cut from Georgia in 1829.

Georgians would never give up Abkhazia. And abkhazia can
never be fully Independent. I have interesting videoconference
between abkhazian and georgian with english subtitles on my Blog:
http://taktaka.blogspot.com/2006/09/together -apart.html Georgian
government is ready to give Abkhazia very wide Autonomy. I believe
that without russias intervention abkhaz and georgian people could
find way out of this morass.

Caucasus without multi ethnic regions is impossible to imagine,
but to leave that to Russia (after Chechnia's ethnic cleansing),
seems to me just opposite, for reaching this goal.

Posted by: Levan at September 13, 2006 02:20 PM Transnistria? If
there's no Muslim aspects to the story, we're not interested.

Signed, The U.S. government and 99% of the American population

Posted by: Peter at September 13, 2006 04:42 PM "I wonder if
the same will be true in Catalonia, with its recent surge of
immigration? Probably too soon to say."

If the Castilian immigrants became Catalans than it is really likely
that the new immigrants become Catalans to.

Posted by: Charly at September 13, 2006 05:02 PM Abkhazia is important
because the Iranian/European gaspipeline would go through it.

Posted by: Charly at September 13, 2006 05:17 PM no EU state now
controls citizenship in the last resort since members of other states
now have all the principal rights associated with this apart from
voting in national elections

This is true as far as it goes, but in some ways, it's like saying
"men have all the principal rights associated with pregnancy apart
from childbirth." The concept of citizenship in a democratic state is
founded on a normative right to participate in making national policies
and determining the distribution of public resources. EU citizens
may do this directly in their countries of nationality by running
for public office and voting in national elections and referenda.

Non-citizens can do so only indirectly.

The right to live and work in a state, and even the local franchise,
can be expanded to non-citizens without eliminating the state as
a self-defining polity. British and Irish citizens have had these
rights in each other's countries for more than half a century. The
national franchise is what really defines the politics and priorities
of a state.

So I suspect that this is the kind of issue which is knocking around
in Moldova and elsewhere. You can give the other group total autonomy,
but then who the hell are you?

Hmmm. Moldova: 3.4 million people, 75 percent ethnic Romanian/Moldovan
and becoming more so (2004 census).

Transnistria: about 600,000 people, with 30 percent being Moldovan
and most of the ethnic Moldovans concentrated in certain towns
and regions. It wouldn't be that hard to create a super-autonomous
Transistria-excluding-Bendery that is mostly non-Moldovan and only
about three times as populous as Gagauzia. Moldova would still, to
all intents and purposes, be a federal state consisting of "Moldova
proper" and two autonomous regions rather than a binational entity.

Likewise, would Serbia with a super-autonomous Kosovo (and an
autonomous Vojvodina) be any less sovereign than it was as a
constituent state of "Serbia and Montenegro?"

I take your point, though, that mathematical asymmetry can often be
less important than the perception of asymmetry. The United Kingdom is,
after all, highly asymmetric if you only look at the population of its
constituent units. There are other issues that arise in asymmetric
federations - internal migration in the UK, long-term demographic
trends in Serbia/Kosovo - that can confuse national identities at
the center while hardening those at the peripheries. In that case,
the result is either the development of a "British" type overlay or
increasing centrifugal pressure.

I tend to think these issues could be overcome in Moldova. The
demographic trends favor the ethnic Moldovans, and most of the
migration in an EU-affiliated Moldovan federation would be to Bucharest
or western Europe rather than Chisinau.

Moldovans would still be able to feel that they lived in a Moldovan
state, or at minimum to develop an overlay that's mostly Moldovan. I'm
less sanguine about similar arrangements working out in Georgia
or Serbia.

I think the whole point here Oliver is that we are moving in Europe
away from the old ethnic model of the state.

Europe is moving away from the ethnic state, certainly, but
isn't there also a countervailing trend toward regional ethnic
self-determination? Many or even most of the autonomous region-states
that currently exist, as well as those being proposed as part
of devolution or conflict-resolution packages, have an ethnic or
ethno-cultural base. Granted, some are more cultural and some are
more ethnic, but I think the difference is one of degree rather than
kind; most ethnic groups have de facto means of entry for outsiders,
and cultures still set barriers to assimilation.

This is why, to answer a question you posed earlier in the thread,
I suspect that a federal Europe will look something like Belgium:
i.e., a two-dimensional framework consisting of territorial and
non-territorial entities. The territories, some of which will
correspond to present-day nation-states and others of which won't,
will have primary authority over inherently territorial matters such as
infrastructure, land use and economic development. The non-territorial
units, which will be based on language and/or culture (along with a
"secular" stream for us rootless cosmos), will have primary authority
over education, cultural expression and similar things. The EU,
as supranational entity, will handle defense and foreign policy
(except within the constituent units' areas of competence), provide
a uniform commercial law and guarantee free movement and human rights.

The trouble is that I'm not sure Belgium is really a model for a
successful multinational state.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 13, 2006 05:49 PM Oliver:

In the other cases you should notice that these peoples live in areas
where politics is still a matter of life & death [...] The idea of
superautonomy requires great amounts of trust and peacefullness.

You know, the more familiar I become with the Balkans and the Caucasus,
the more I realize that there's nothing unique or even particularly
unusual about Israelis and Palestinians. And in the interest of
avoiding a flamewar, I'll leave it at that, except to agree that
there are some cases in which super-autonomy or other federalist
arrangements won't work. There's no such thing as a one-size-fits-all
cure for nationalist conflicts; each solution has to be tailored to
the circumstances.

Levan:

Georgian government is ready to give Abkhazia very wide Autonomy.

Is this true? My impression was that Saakashvili has taken a relatively
hard line and that he isn't prepared to give Abkhazia much more than
he gave Adjaria, but I'm willing to be proven wrong.

Charly:

I wonder if the same will be true in Catalonia, with its recent surge
of immigration?

Immigrants who are not themselves part of a concentrated population
tend to assimilate to the locally dominant cultural stream - for
instance, immigrants to Israel who are neither Jewish nor Arab tend
to adopt secular Jewish culture. For that reason, I'd tend to think
that immigrants to Catalonia will become Catalans.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 13, 2006 06:00 PM I quoted
Colin Reid

There was a massive immigration of Spaniard to Barcelona in the 50's
where you had whole neighborhoods completely occupied by Spaniards
and even they assimilated even though they were highly concentrated.

Also the immigration outside of marriage of non Jews is a very recent
phenomen in Israel. To claim that they will adopt secular Jewish
culture is to soon to tell. I personally think that the Jewishness
of the Israeli state will prevent them from adopting that culture.

Posted by: Charly at September 13, 2006 06:23 PM Jonathan,

Just to say thanks for a very nice and interesting post and
comments. In your last response you raise so many interesting and
relevant points that I hardly know where to start. So basically - apart
from one or two loose comments I won't. What I will do is express the
hope that you'll agree with David to come back from time to time and
pick out one or other detail from the chest of drawers that we seem
to have opened here and so we can try to go into them in some detail,
taking this post as a starting point.

Basically this whole discussion has moved quite a long way on from
where you started (in one sense), and in another it has gone to the
heart of the issues.

Basically my own personal view is that it is hard to separate most
of the ethnically related issues which are evolving in Eastern
Europe from mother Russia, and since I don't think you can address
the question of 'whither Russia' without talking about demography,
and since I'm tired of banging that particular drum, I thought I'd
try and explore the identitarian issues.

At the end of the day I think identitarian issues lie at the heart most
of the big topics which we talk about here on this blog. What happens
is that these identitarian issues come out in the guise of debates
about which social model to adopt, or something like that. I mean if
you glance through the comments on the Referm is a Dirty Word post,
you'll see that what we are really talking about there is identity
and how people have trouble handling identity transitions.

This normally comes out under the rubric of an increased feeling of
insecurity. Basically this is what the Constitution 'debate' has
been all about, rather than a serious reflection on what type of
constitution the EU really needs.

"but isn't there also a countervailing trend toward regional ethnic
self-determination?"

Yes, but this isn't normally EU secessionist, it's often just about
throwing of the old yoke (as in 'off with the Norman yoke'). The
regionalists normally aspire to talking tu a tu with the central power,
without another interlocutor as intermediary.

"Immigrants who are not themselves part of a concentrated population
tend to assimilate to the locally dominant cultural stream"

Yes, so this is why in times of increasing migratory flows people
want to assert themselves, since they want the migrant to see their's
as the reference culture, to assert the culture of the periphery,
against that of the centre, if you like.

Going back to Eastern Europe to finish, it is important to realise that
there are both centrifugal and centripetal processes at work, and that
these forces are at the present time stonger than ever before. What
this means is that some people can 'couple' very rapidly indeed, while
others can be thrown out just as rapidly in the cockpit ejector seat.

If we look at economic development in what used to be the third world
we can now see that a large part of this is 'coupling' very rapidly, in
a way which wasn't foreseeable in the 1990s. One symptom of this is the
fact that the debate about reforming the IMF is really a non-debate,
since no-one is really that interested any more. This is a huge
change from the days when the IMF was really seen as the 'bad guy',
and the IMF itself hasn't really changed that much in the meantime.

OTOH the UN has actually singled out 18 countries who are going
backwards while all this is happening. These countries are either
in Southern Africa (where AIDS is a big part of the picture) or,
surprise, surprise, in some parts of the old USSR. And this, I think,
is the background against which we need to think about all this
nascent nationalism that we are seeing there. In many ways this is
a nationalism of despair, and that, as history has shown us often
enough, is a very dangerous thing.

Posted by: Edward at September 13, 2006 06:44 PM - Is this true? My
impression was that Saakashvili has taken a relatively hard line and
that he isn't prepared to give Abkhazia much more than he gave Adjaria,
but I'm willing to be proven wrong.

Jonathan your concerns are not groundless and I can imagine Abkhazs
and Ossetians fears about that subject.. I think it was a big mistake
from georgian government dealing with Adjaria's autonomy status,
but otoh after fled of russian supported Abashidze, in Adjaria their
was not real demand for Adjarias special status.

Saakashvili is not alone and he has some radical memebrs of government
who maybe would like to see Abkhazia in the same situation as Adjaria,
but Saakashvili has expressed georgias aspirations for europe and
western values wholly and I think he understands what that means...

Posted by: Levan at September 13, 2006 07:04 PM "whole neighborhoods
completely occupied by Spaniards and even they assimilated even though
they were highly concentrated."

I wouldn't exactly put it in this way Charly, but you are essentially
right. In fact they didn't occupy neighbourhoods, they came and built
'barracas' in open fields, with no running water or electricity,
and then the neighbourhoods and cities were built around them.

Both Badalona and Hospitalet are among the top ten cities in Spain,
yet these were small villages when the 'great migration' started.

Now the grandchildren of these migrants have been to university and
are fuelling the housing boom by buying flats in another set of 'new
neighbourhoods', but guess what, these neighbourhoods are not being
occupied on any kind of Catalan/Spanish axis, they are completely
integrated. We are all 'Catalans' now.

So yes, Catalonia has a huge tradition of accepting and assimilating
migrants (I mean, and this is a big topic, it would have started on
this path with the large-scale incorporation of the converso Jews,
it is absoluetly impossible, for eg, for Catalonia ever to succumb
to anti-semitism quite simply because, if there is an ethnic core,
it is a semitic one, you would know better than me on this Jonathan,
but on some versions the etymological origins of Barcelona are
fromsome variant of 'community across the sea' in Hebrew) and the
process normally works well, which is why I am pretty optimistic for
the future. Basically Barcelona was one of the European capitals of
modernism, and it now aspires to be one of the cultural capitals
of 'post-modernism'. It has no longing whatsoever to be a stupid
particularist backwater.

Posted by: Edward at September 13, 2006 07:11 PM Europe is moving away
from the ethnic state, certainly, but isn't there also a countervailing
trend toward regional ethnic self-determination?

What? If I may point out that the last 20 years saw:

-dissolution of the USSR along ethnic lines -dissolution of
Czechoslovakia along ethnic lines -dissolution of Yugoslavia along
ethnic lines in addition it saw:

- far reaching autonomy in Belgium - devolution in the UK - always
increasing regional autonomy in Spain - a separatist party in the
Italian government

You will notice that the movements didn't go all the way in western
Europe, yet. If you do that, then you should consider that western
Europe is filthy rich and in all regards slower and weaker to react
to social changes (UK partially exempt) in general.

What we have seen is basically a radical decline of the multiethnic
state, not the nation state.

Furthermore, by world standards, western Europe is an abnormity,
whose solutions cannot be exported.

Posted by: Oliver at September 13, 2006 08:28 PM dissolution of the
USSR along ethnic lines

I wouldn't say that. The borders of the former Soviet republics follow
ethnic lines about as much as African borders do, and for very similar
reasons - arbitrary frontier adjustments, internal migrations and
deportations, the presence of indigenous minorities and sponsored
colonial settlement by ethnic Russians.

Pretty much every country that was once part of the Soviet Union is
an ethnic melange, which is the cause of much of the recent unrest.

I'll grant you Yugoslavia and, to a certain extent, the Czech
Republic. The current trend in western Europe, however, and
to an increasing extent in the east, is toward ethno-cultural
self-determination within multi-ethnic states. Of course, this is made
possible to a large degree by supranational rule of law structures such
as the Framework Convention on National Minorities and the European
Court of Human Rights, and may not be viable in the absence of these
or similar structures.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 13, 2006 10:19 PM Also the
immigration outside of marriage of non Jews is a very recent phenomen
in Israel. To claim that they will adopt secular Jewish culture is
to soon to tell.

Non-Jewish immigration outside marriage isn't all that new; it began
taking place on a substantial scale during the wave of migration from
the FSU, and is now being augmented by the naturalization of guest
workers' children. The latter group, at least, has reportedly been
assimilating rapidly.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 13, 2006 10:22 PM What I
will do is express the hope that you'll agree with David to come back
from time to time and pick out one or other detail from the chest of
drawers that we seem to have opened here and so we can try to go into
them in some detail, taking this post as a starting point.

I'd be glad to if David is agreeable, although my last direct European
ancestor left the continent during the 19th century.

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at September 13, 2006 10:59 PM The USSR
blew up in 1991, That is 15 years or in other words very recent. Way
to soon to see assimilation.

Also most the people from the FSU claimed to be jewish. Only now do
you get immigrants from Romania etc. who do not claim to be Jewish.

Posted by: Charly at September 13, 2006 11:19 PM Pretty much every
country that was once part of the Soviet Union is an ethnic melange,
which is the cause of much of the recent unrest.

But the new states have at least majorities of the titular nations
(sometimes only barely). The process is of course not yet completed.

The current trend in western Europe, however, and to an increasing
extent in the east, is toward ethno-cultural self-determination within
multi-ethnic states.

You are mistaking an incomplete process for a different process. I
can give you examples for processes that went further in the east
than in the west, as yet.

- rise of nationalist parties east: taking over government in Poland,
Slovakia, Yugoslavia west: Le Pen, Vlams Blok, Denmark, NPD in Germany,
FPO in Austria

- rise of leftist antiglobalisation (the newest trend) east: Smer
(government) west: WASG, Constitution referendum in France

- neoliberalism east: radical social cuts, flat taxes in several states
west: some cuts in unemployment benefits, retirement age, some tax cuts

- cities flowering, countryside declining east: universal west:
northern east Germany, mountainous areas of Switzerland, Austria and
southern Germany, Spain

As you can see, western Europe is simply behind the curve. I can
see no evidence for it being different in the case of the decline of
multiethnic states

Posted by: Oliver at September 14, 2006 09:51 AM