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KARABAKH PEACE IN QUESTION AFTER ARMENIAN VOTE
By Emil Danielyan
Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 3 2008
DC
Armenia's post-election political crisis and Azerbaijan's apparent
attempts to take advantage of it are dealing a serious blow to
international mediators' hopes for a near-term solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The conflicting parties are hardening
their positions and stepping up mutually hostile rhetoric, despite
significant progress made in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks in the
past two years.
The talks have centered on the basic principles of a Karabakh
settlement proposed by the US, Russian and French diplomats co-chairing
the OSCE Minsk Group. A relevant agreement was formally submitted
to Baku and Yerevan by the Foreign Ministers of the three mediating
powers in November 2007. They expressed the hope that it would be
finalized in the coming months.
The agreement calls for a phased settlement of the Karabakh conflict
that would start with the restoration of economic links between the
two South Caucasus states parallel to the liberation of virtually all
Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh that were occupied by Armenian
forces during the 1992-1994 war. The disputed territory's status,
the main bone of contention, would be determined by its predominantly
Armenian population in a future referendum. Karabakh would remain
under Armenian control in the interim.
Presidents Robert Kocharian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan
were close to cutting a peace deal along these lines in early 2006.
The talks collapsed, however, apparently because of last-minute
disagreements on the timetable for Armenian troop withdrawal and the
practical modalities of the Karabakh vote. The mediators modified their
proposals and revived the peace process in the following months. The
final version of those proposals in November 2007 set no time frames
holding the referendum on self-determination, suggesting that it
might never be held. The logic behind this compromise formula is
obvious: While effectively legitimizing continued Armenian control
over Karabakh, it does not force Azerbaijan to drop its claim to
the territory.
According to Western diplomats privy to the Armenian-Azerbaijani talks,
the parties essentially agreed on the key points of the Minsk Group
plan by the end of 2007. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew
Bryza spoke of the need to "work out the remaining small differences"
as he visited the conflict zone together with the group's two other
co-chairs, Russia's Yuri Merzlyakov and France's Bernard Fassier,
in January 2008. The mediators seemed satisfied with their talks
with Aliyev and Kocharian. "We sense that they are trying to finish
the process as soon as possible," Bryza told reporters in Yerevan
(RFE/RL Armenia Report, January 17).
The co-chairs had hoped that the two sides would sign the framework
peace accord some time after Armenia's February 2008 presidential
election, clearly expecting it to be won by Kocharian's longtime chief
lieutenant, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Sargsyan's victory proved
extremely controversial, sparking opposition protests in Yerevan that
were brutally suppressed by the ruling regime on March 1. Kocharian and
Sargsyan are currently busy trying to neutralize further opposition
challenges to their rule. Although they both have voiced support for
the proposed Karabakh settlement, it remains to be seen whether they
are really committed to it and ready to risk alienating nationalist
elements in the ruling regime that are opposed to any territorial
concessions to Azerbaijan. The loyalty of pro-government groups such
as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as the Dashnak
Party) is now essential for a successful transfer of power from
Kocharian to Sargsyan.
The search for Karabakh peace was further complicated on March 14
when the UN General Assembly passed an Azerbaijani-drafted resolution
demanding an "immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of
Armenian forces" from occupied Azerbaijani lands. The United States,
Russia and France voted against the non-binding resolution, backed
by 39 mostly Islamic nations, saying that it was at odds with their
existing peace proposals largely accepted by Azerbaijan. Baku responded
by accusing the mediators of favoring the Armenian side and threatening
to demand that the Minsk Group be co-headed by other countries.
The Armenian side construed this threat as an attempt to disband a body
that has spearheaded international efforts to resolve the Karabakh
dispute since 1992. Kocharian warned on March 20 that Armenia would
officially recognize the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
as an independent state if Azerbaijan pulled out of the Minsk Group
process.
The Minsk Group co-chairs, meanwhile, urged Aliyev and Sargsyan
to hold their first-ever talks on the sidelines of the upcoming
NATO summit in Bucharest. In a March 19 statement, they said that
the two sides had agreed "in principle" to such a meeting. Aliyev,
however, has subsequently refused to meet his newly elected Armenian
counterpart. His chief foreign policy aide, Novruz Mammadov, claimed
on March 29 that the embattled Sargsyan needed such an encounter to
shore up his "domestic position," rather than to achieve a breakthrough
in the negotiation process (Turan, March 29).
This was seen by Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian as a further
indication that Baku wanted to avoid signing a "document created
as a result of two years of work by the Armenian and Azerbaijani
parties." (Armenian Public Television, March 31.) During a March 31
visit to the Karabakh capital of Stepanakert, Kocharian stressed the
need for Armenia to recognize the NKR, either immediately or in the
near future. In remarks clearly addressed to his incoming successor,
the outgoing president said Yerevan should at least sign a defense
pact with the Karabakh Armenian leadership (lragir.am, March 31).
By Emil Danielyan
Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 3 2008
DC
Armenia's post-election political crisis and Azerbaijan's apparent
attempts to take advantage of it are dealing a serious blow to
international mediators' hopes for a near-term solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The conflicting parties are hardening
their positions and stepping up mutually hostile rhetoric, despite
significant progress made in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks in the
past two years.
The talks have centered on the basic principles of a Karabakh
settlement proposed by the US, Russian and French diplomats co-chairing
the OSCE Minsk Group. A relevant agreement was formally submitted
to Baku and Yerevan by the Foreign Ministers of the three mediating
powers in November 2007. They expressed the hope that it would be
finalized in the coming months.
The agreement calls for a phased settlement of the Karabakh conflict
that would start with the restoration of economic links between the
two South Caucasus states parallel to the liberation of virtually all
Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh that were occupied by Armenian
forces during the 1992-1994 war. The disputed territory's status,
the main bone of contention, would be determined by its predominantly
Armenian population in a future referendum. Karabakh would remain
under Armenian control in the interim.
Presidents Robert Kocharian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan
were close to cutting a peace deal along these lines in early 2006.
The talks collapsed, however, apparently because of last-minute
disagreements on the timetable for Armenian troop withdrawal and the
practical modalities of the Karabakh vote. The mediators modified their
proposals and revived the peace process in the following months. The
final version of those proposals in November 2007 set no time frames
holding the referendum on self-determination, suggesting that it
might never be held. The logic behind this compromise formula is
obvious: While effectively legitimizing continued Armenian control
over Karabakh, it does not force Azerbaijan to drop its claim to
the territory.
According to Western diplomats privy to the Armenian-Azerbaijani talks,
the parties essentially agreed on the key points of the Minsk Group
plan by the end of 2007. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew
Bryza spoke of the need to "work out the remaining small differences"
as he visited the conflict zone together with the group's two other
co-chairs, Russia's Yuri Merzlyakov and France's Bernard Fassier,
in January 2008. The mediators seemed satisfied with their talks
with Aliyev and Kocharian. "We sense that they are trying to finish
the process as soon as possible," Bryza told reporters in Yerevan
(RFE/RL Armenia Report, January 17).
The co-chairs had hoped that the two sides would sign the framework
peace accord some time after Armenia's February 2008 presidential
election, clearly expecting it to be won by Kocharian's longtime chief
lieutenant, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Sargsyan's victory proved
extremely controversial, sparking opposition protests in Yerevan that
were brutally suppressed by the ruling regime on March 1. Kocharian and
Sargsyan are currently busy trying to neutralize further opposition
challenges to their rule. Although they both have voiced support for
the proposed Karabakh settlement, it remains to be seen whether they
are really committed to it and ready to risk alienating nationalist
elements in the ruling regime that are opposed to any territorial
concessions to Azerbaijan. The loyalty of pro-government groups such
as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as the Dashnak
Party) is now essential for a successful transfer of power from
Kocharian to Sargsyan.
The search for Karabakh peace was further complicated on March 14
when the UN General Assembly passed an Azerbaijani-drafted resolution
demanding an "immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of
Armenian forces" from occupied Azerbaijani lands. The United States,
Russia and France voted against the non-binding resolution, backed
by 39 mostly Islamic nations, saying that it was at odds with their
existing peace proposals largely accepted by Azerbaijan. Baku responded
by accusing the mediators of favoring the Armenian side and threatening
to demand that the Minsk Group be co-headed by other countries.
The Armenian side construed this threat as an attempt to disband a body
that has spearheaded international efforts to resolve the Karabakh
dispute since 1992. Kocharian warned on March 20 that Armenia would
officially recognize the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
as an independent state if Azerbaijan pulled out of the Minsk Group
process.
The Minsk Group co-chairs, meanwhile, urged Aliyev and Sargsyan
to hold their first-ever talks on the sidelines of the upcoming
NATO summit in Bucharest. In a March 19 statement, they said that
the two sides had agreed "in principle" to such a meeting. Aliyev,
however, has subsequently refused to meet his newly elected Armenian
counterpart. His chief foreign policy aide, Novruz Mammadov, claimed
on March 29 that the embattled Sargsyan needed such an encounter to
shore up his "domestic position," rather than to achieve a breakthrough
in the negotiation process (Turan, March 29).
This was seen by Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian as a further
indication that Baku wanted to avoid signing a "document created
as a result of two years of work by the Armenian and Azerbaijani
parties." (Armenian Public Television, March 31.) During a March 31
visit to the Karabakh capital of Stepanakert, Kocharian stressed the
need for Armenia to recognize the NKR, either immediately or in the
near future. In remarks clearly addressed to his incoming successor,
the outgoing president said Yerevan should at least sign a defense
pact with the Karabakh Armenian leadership (lragir.am, March 31).