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BROWBEATEN INTO LIBERALISM? AKP DISCUSSES REFORM PACKAGE
By Gareth Jenkins
Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 3 2008
DC
With less than a month to go before it is due to present its initial
defense before the Constitutional Court in the case for its closure
filed with by Public Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya on March 14
(see EDM, March 17), there are signs that Turkey's ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) may be rediscovering its EU aspirations.
On April 2, during an official visit to Sweden, Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan declared that his government was determined to push ahead
with liberalizing reforms to enable Turkey to meet the criteria for EU
accession, including further easing of restrictions on broadcasting in
Kurdish and reforming the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish Penal
Code, which makes it a criminal offence to denigrate "Turkishness."
"For us, the EU is a strategic target on our path to modernization,"
declared Erdogan. "Turkish accession to the EU has always been a
priority for our government" (Radikal, Milliyet, Hurriyet, April 3).
In truth, this is not how it has always appeared to outside observers,
least of all to the EU itself. The AKP introduced a battery of reforms
in the first three years after coming to power in November 2002, and
it officially opened accession negotiations in October 2005. Since
then the AKP has appeared to lose interest in the EU process. Not
only did it fail to introduce any new reforms but it was reluctant to
implement fully those that it had already legislated or to honor all
the commitments it had given to the EU in order to open accession
negotiations. The most notable of these was a promise to open its
ports and airports to ships and planes from the Greek Cypriot Republic
of Cyprus.
Writers and intellectuals have also continued to be prosecuted under
Article 301. On March 31, in a response to a parliamentary question,
Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin admitted that in 2006 the Turkish
courts had heard 835 cases under Article 301, involving 1,533 people,
of whom 1,314 were men and 219 women. During the first three months
of 2007, the latest period for which Sahin gave figures, a further
185 cases were opened under Article 301. (Hurriyet webpage, March 31)
Although, Sahin did not provide statistics, the majority of cases
concluded to date appear to have ended in acquittal. Most of the
minority found guilty have received suspended sentences rather than
time in jail. Nevertheless, for every person prosecuted there are
undoubtedly dozens, perhaps hundreds, who are reluctant to express
an opinion for fear of ending up in court. Even more worryingly,
prosecution under Article 301 frequently results in the accused
receiving death threats from ultranationalist extremists and-as
happened with the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink
in January 2007-can flag them as targets for assassination.
Turkish politicians have a long tradition of being hawks at home
and doves abroad, placating their foreign listeners with promises of
democratizing reforms and then failing to implement them when they
return home for fear of antagonizing authoritarian opinion. However,
this time at least, self-interest appears to be on the side of
liberalism.
Ever since Yalcinkaya first filed his application for the closure
of the AKP, and particularly since it was formally accepted by the
Constitutional Court on March 31 (see EDM, April 1), party members
have been feverishly discussing the introduction of a reform package.
The only serious point of contention is whether the government
should only seek to amend the articles of the constitution that allow
political parties to be closed (see EDM, March 21) or whether these
amendments should be part of a broader democratization package that
would also lift other restrictions.
All major decisions in the AKP are taken by Erdogan himself (see EDM,
February 15). If he consults with anybody else at all, it is with an
inner court of trusted advisors rather than the party as whole.
Before Erdogan left for Sweden, the indications were that he had
yet to make up his mind. Privately, however, some members of the
AKP parliamentary party admit that they would be very uncomfortable
with a reform package that only benefited the AKP. There is even
a possibility that, if such a package came before parliament, they
would join with the opposition in voting against it.
Erdogan's statement in Sweden has reinforced the impression that he
will actively seek foreign support in staving off what many in the AKP
regard as an attempted judicial coup. Whether the Constitutional Court
will eventually rule to outlaw the AKP remains unclear. In the past,
Turkish political parties have been closed down by the court on much
flimsier evidence than that contained in Yalcinkaya's indictment.
One of the many ironies of Turkish politics is that each time an
Islamist party has been closed, it has been replaced by a more liberal
one. In the 1970s, Erdogan was a member of the National Salvation Party
(MSP), whose members often explicitly called for the establishment
of an Islamic state. After the MSP was closed down following the
1980 military coup, its former members established the Welfare
Party (RP), which was less hard-line than the MSP but still very
anti-Western and committed to establishing a state based on religious
principles. When the RP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in
1998, it was replaced by the Virtue Party (FP), which was still very
conservative but which nevertheless became the first Turkish Islamist
party to support EU accession. When the FP too was closed down in
2001, it was replaced by the AKP. On taking power in November 2002,
the AKP introduced more pro-EU, liberalizing reforms than any other
political party, Islamist or otherwise, in recent Turkish history.
There is little doubt that on each occasion the prosecutors who
filed the closure cases simply wanted to remove the party in question
from the political arena. Yet, through the use of authoritarian and
undemocratic methods, they appear to have inadvertently browbeaten
them into becoming more liberal.
By Gareth Jenkins
Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 3 2008
DC
With less than a month to go before it is due to present its initial
defense before the Constitutional Court in the case for its closure
filed with by Public Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya on March 14
(see EDM, March 17), there are signs that Turkey's ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) may be rediscovering its EU aspirations.
On April 2, during an official visit to Sweden, Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan declared that his government was determined to push ahead
with liberalizing reforms to enable Turkey to meet the criteria for EU
accession, including further easing of restrictions on broadcasting in
Kurdish and reforming the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish Penal
Code, which makes it a criminal offence to denigrate "Turkishness."
"For us, the EU is a strategic target on our path to modernization,"
declared Erdogan. "Turkish accession to the EU has always been a
priority for our government" (Radikal, Milliyet, Hurriyet, April 3).
In truth, this is not how it has always appeared to outside observers,
least of all to the EU itself. The AKP introduced a battery of reforms
in the first three years after coming to power in November 2002, and
it officially opened accession negotiations in October 2005. Since
then the AKP has appeared to lose interest in the EU process. Not
only did it fail to introduce any new reforms but it was reluctant to
implement fully those that it had already legislated or to honor all
the commitments it had given to the EU in order to open accession
negotiations. The most notable of these was a promise to open its
ports and airports to ships and planes from the Greek Cypriot Republic
of Cyprus.
Writers and intellectuals have also continued to be prosecuted under
Article 301. On March 31, in a response to a parliamentary question,
Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin admitted that in 2006 the Turkish
courts had heard 835 cases under Article 301, involving 1,533 people,
of whom 1,314 were men and 219 women. During the first three months
of 2007, the latest period for which Sahin gave figures, a further
185 cases were opened under Article 301. (Hurriyet webpage, March 31)
Although, Sahin did not provide statistics, the majority of cases
concluded to date appear to have ended in acquittal. Most of the
minority found guilty have received suspended sentences rather than
time in jail. Nevertheless, for every person prosecuted there are
undoubtedly dozens, perhaps hundreds, who are reluctant to express
an opinion for fear of ending up in court. Even more worryingly,
prosecution under Article 301 frequently results in the accused
receiving death threats from ultranationalist extremists and-as
happened with the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink
in January 2007-can flag them as targets for assassination.
Turkish politicians have a long tradition of being hawks at home
and doves abroad, placating their foreign listeners with promises of
democratizing reforms and then failing to implement them when they
return home for fear of antagonizing authoritarian opinion. However,
this time at least, self-interest appears to be on the side of
liberalism.
Ever since Yalcinkaya first filed his application for the closure
of the AKP, and particularly since it was formally accepted by the
Constitutional Court on March 31 (see EDM, April 1), party members
have been feverishly discussing the introduction of a reform package.
The only serious point of contention is whether the government
should only seek to amend the articles of the constitution that allow
political parties to be closed (see EDM, March 21) or whether these
amendments should be part of a broader democratization package that
would also lift other restrictions.
All major decisions in the AKP are taken by Erdogan himself (see EDM,
February 15). If he consults with anybody else at all, it is with an
inner court of trusted advisors rather than the party as whole.
Before Erdogan left for Sweden, the indications were that he had
yet to make up his mind. Privately, however, some members of the
AKP parliamentary party admit that they would be very uncomfortable
with a reform package that only benefited the AKP. There is even
a possibility that, if such a package came before parliament, they
would join with the opposition in voting against it.
Erdogan's statement in Sweden has reinforced the impression that he
will actively seek foreign support in staving off what many in the AKP
regard as an attempted judicial coup. Whether the Constitutional Court
will eventually rule to outlaw the AKP remains unclear. In the past,
Turkish political parties have been closed down by the court on much
flimsier evidence than that contained in Yalcinkaya's indictment.
One of the many ironies of Turkish politics is that each time an
Islamist party has been closed, it has been replaced by a more liberal
one. In the 1970s, Erdogan was a member of the National Salvation Party
(MSP), whose members often explicitly called for the establishment
of an Islamic state. After the MSP was closed down following the
1980 military coup, its former members established the Welfare
Party (RP), which was less hard-line than the MSP but still very
anti-Western and committed to establishing a state based on religious
principles. When the RP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in
1998, it was replaced by the Virtue Party (FP), which was still very
conservative but which nevertheless became the first Turkish Islamist
party to support EU accession. When the FP too was closed down in
2001, it was replaced by the AKP. On taking power in November 2002,
the AKP introduced more pro-EU, liberalizing reforms than any other
political party, Islamist or otherwise, in recent Turkish history.
There is little doubt that on each occasion the prosecutors who
filed the closure cases simply wanted to remove the party in question
from the political arena. Yet, through the use of authoritarian and
undemocratic methods, they appear to have inadvertently browbeaten
them into becoming more liberal.