WHEN VOTERS SETTLE NOTHING
Economist
April 3 2008
UK
Why more and more ballots are inconclusive
Electoral passions in Pakistan"PEOPLE have given their verdict, we
respect it." When, in February, a spokesman for Pakistan's ruling
party made that stoical analysis of a parliamentary election, cynics
braced themselves for a long struggle: despite his party's self-denying
words, President Pervez Musharraf would resist all efforts to dislodge
him. And that is what has happened.
Whatever the final outcome of last weekend's ballot in Zimbabwe, it
too could be followed by an ever-lengthening set of wrangles that
determine nothing quickly. In a typically inconclusive election,
results take ages to trickle out, the outcome is disputed by the
opposition and by foreign observers; and, most important, the outcome
is (at best) one element in a broader political settlement, or (at
worst) a catalyst for even more power struggles.
In theory, votes should be decisive. People are consulted; a new
government is formed; the losers accept the result and political
discussions begin again on a new basis. The recent elections in Spain,
Taiwan and Malaysia conform to that ideal.
But even in the most stable countries, it does not always happen
that way. In rare cases, voters are so evenly split that they cannot
decide who should form a government-as happened in America's 2000
presidential election. But normally vote tallies and the shape of
the new government are clear pretty soon. And that is true even
in countries with proportional representation and traditions of
coalition-building. People in such places can usually guess who will
head the new coalition and what its overall complexion will be.
Recent months have seen an increasing number of elections in which
the vote itself is only a small factor in the eventual outcome. The
Kenyan poll in December 2007 is the best case. There was a vote and,
in principle, a new government. But the link between the two was
tenuous. Tribal violence, internationally sponsored power-sharing
talks and constitutional amendments had as much to do with the shape
of the deal as the election did.
This was an extreme case, but not a unique one. Two recent polls in
the Caucasus failed to bring stability: after Georgia's presidential
race in January, the opposition staged a hunger strike to contest the
results. A far bloodier outcome followed Armenia's ballot in February:
eight people were killed when the police laid into supporters of an
aggrieved opposition.
Two parliamentary elections in Asia-in Thailand in December 2007,
and then Pakistan's-have helped to remove the power base of military
dictators but left a lot of what might be called ordinary politics
undecided. If you include Belgium, where a new government took nine
months to settle and seems to have been formed with scantish reference
to the poll result, you find that of 21 countries which have elected
new governments in the past four months, the result of the vote itself
was less than decisive in at least six.
The number seems to be rising. In 2006, four or possibly five elections
fell into the "inconclusive" category: parliamentary votes in Thailand
and Fiji were both overridden by the army; a general election in the
Czech Republic produced a long stalemate; the presidential election
in the Congo was disputed, though eventually accepted. The loser also
disputed Mexico's presidential result and staged street protests,
though the Federal Electoral Tribunal confirmed the outcome. There
were 70 national votes for president or parliament that year (excluding
referendums).
The year 2000 saw roughly the same number: the American presidential
election, plus five other such votes, out of 64 in total (the others
were in Thailand again, Peru, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Serbia).
Going back further, all but three of the 48 national elections held
in 1990 had clear, accepted results (exceptions were Myanmar, Grenada
and Suriname). In 1980, all the national elections were decisive.
So the number of inconclusive elections seems to be rising. Why? One
simple answer is that there are more elections now, and that some go
off at half-cock. According to Freedom House, an American think-tank,
the number of electoral democracies has risen from fewer than 70 in the
1980s to almost 100 in 1992 and to 121 in 2007. Many recent polls took
place in new democracies where those in power are reluctant to step
down (because ceding power risks losing everything) and opponents balk
at accepting the result because they (rightly) mistrust their rulers.
Another factor: the prevalence of election monitors may have changed
the way elections are rigged. Instead of claiming to have won by 99%
before lunch, new democracies put on a show of sophistication and
claim modest victories by, say, 53% to 47%. (Sceptics note that 53%
was the winning share claimed in both Armenia and Georgia; but in
the Georgian case observers did agree that the incumbent, Mikheil
Saakashvili, had clearly topped the poll.)
When the margin is slim, counting disputes increase and challenges are
more likely. Sometimes this produces dramatic outcomes: the uprisings
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-05 all sprang from disputed
polls. And sometimes it merely prolongs political machinations.
Elections, in fact, are just one part of the network of institutions
(like honest courts) that need to be in place for democracy to work
properly. Without those institutions, voting sometimes seems, at
least in the short term, to make things worse.
--Boundary_(ID_ma4dfErydvydwdjJVXt1FQ)--
Economist
April 3 2008
UK
Why more and more ballots are inconclusive
Electoral passions in Pakistan"PEOPLE have given their verdict, we
respect it." When, in February, a spokesman for Pakistan's ruling
party made that stoical analysis of a parliamentary election, cynics
braced themselves for a long struggle: despite his party's self-denying
words, President Pervez Musharraf would resist all efforts to dislodge
him. And that is what has happened.
Whatever the final outcome of last weekend's ballot in Zimbabwe, it
too could be followed by an ever-lengthening set of wrangles that
determine nothing quickly. In a typically inconclusive election,
results take ages to trickle out, the outcome is disputed by the
opposition and by foreign observers; and, most important, the outcome
is (at best) one element in a broader political settlement, or (at
worst) a catalyst for even more power struggles.
In theory, votes should be decisive. People are consulted; a new
government is formed; the losers accept the result and political
discussions begin again on a new basis. The recent elections in Spain,
Taiwan and Malaysia conform to that ideal.
But even in the most stable countries, it does not always happen
that way. In rare cases, voters are so evenly split that they cannot
decide who should form a government-as happened in America's 2000
presidential election. But normally vote tallies and the shape of
the new government are clear pretty soon. And that is true even
in countries with proportional representation and traditions of
coalition-building. People in such places can usually guess who will
head the new coalition and what its overall complexion will be.
Recent months have seen an increasing number of elections in which
the vote itself is only a small factor in the eventual outcome. The
Kenyan poll in December 2007 is the best case. There was a vote and,
in principle, a new government. But the link between the two was
tenuous. Tribal violence, internationally sponsored power-sharing
talks and constitutional amendments had as much to do with the shape
of the deal as the election did.
This was an extreme case, but not a unique one. Two recent polls in
the Caucasus failed to bring stability: after Georgia's presidential
race in January, the opposition staged a hunger strike to contest the
results. A far bloodier outcome followed Armenia's ballot in February:
eight people were killed when the police laid into supporters of an
aggrieved opposition.
Two parliamentary elections in Asia-in Thailand in December 2007,
and then Pakistan's-have helped to remove the power base of military
dictators but left a lot of what might be called ordinary politics
undecided. If you include Belgium, where a new government took nine
months to settle and seems to have been formed with scantish reference
to the poll result, you find that of 21 countries which have elected
new governments in the past four months, the result of the vote itself
was less than decisive in at least six.
The number seems to be rising. In 2006, four or possibly five elections
fell into the "inconclusive" category: parliamentary votes in Thailand
and Fiji were both overridden by the army; a general election in the
Czech Republic produced a long stalemate; the presidential election
in the Congo was disputed, though eventually accepted. The loser also
disputed Mexico's presidential result and staged street protests,
though the Federal Electoral Tribunal confirmed the outcome. There
were 70 national votes for president or parliament that year (excluding
referendums).
The year 2000 saw roughly the same number: the American presidential
election, plus five other such votes, out of 64 in total (the others
were in Thailand again, Peru, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Serbia).
Going back further, all but three of the 48 national elections held
in 1990 had clear, accepted results (exceptions were Myanmar, Grenada
and Suriname). In 1980, all the national elections were decisive.
So the number of inconclusive elections seems to be rising. Why? One
simple answer is that there are more elections now, and that some go
off at half-cock. According to Freedom House, an American think-tank,
the number of electoral democracies has risen from fewer than 70 in the
1980s to almost 100 in 1992 and to 121 in 2007. Many recent polls took
place in new democracies where those in power are reluctant to step
down (because ceding power risks losing everything) and opponents balk
at accepting the result because they (rightly) mistrust their rulers.
Another factor: the prevalence of election monitors may have changed
the way elections are rigged. Instead of claiming to have won by 99%
before lunch, new democracies put on a show of sophistication and
claim modest victories by, say, 53% to 47%. (Sceptics note that 53%
was the winning share claimed in both Armenia and Georgia; but in
the Georgian case observers did agree that the incumbent, Mikheil
Saakashvili, had clearly topped the poll.)
When the margin is slim, counting disputes increase and challenges are
more likely. Sometimes this produces dramatic outcomes: the uprisings
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-05 all sprang from disputed
polls. And sometimes it merely prolongs political machinations.
Elections, in fact, are just one part of the network of institutions
(like honest courts) that need to be in place for democracy to work
properly. Without those institutions, voting sometimes seems, at
least in the short term, to make things worse.
--Boundary_(ID_ma4dfErydvydwdjJVXt1FQ)--