WHY MOSCOW DOESN'T HAVE A LOT OF FRIENDS
By Georgy Bovt
The Moscow Times
April 10 2008
Russia
Some members of Moscow's political establishment considered the recent
NATO summit in Bucharest a partial victory since Georgia and Ukraine
were not invited to join the alliance. But far from saying "no,"
NATO promised that these countries would eventually become members.
But the main questions for Moscow are: Why are two members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States so eager to join NATO? Why do
our allies want to establish closer ties with the West? Why does the
prospect of better relations with Russia hold so little appeal?
Russia currently has only two staunch allies among CIS countries. The
first is Armenia -- a country that is going through difficult
economic times, is dependent upon Russia for its energy supplies
and has chilly relations with most of its other neighbors. Russia's
other ally is Belarus, a rogue state ruled by a dictator with whom
even Moscow sometimes has difficulty maintaining a dialogue.
The Kremlin has a few theories as to why the former Soviet republics
find NATO membership so appealing. The most popular explanation is
the conspiracy theory. This scenario has the United States continuing
its Cold War struggle for global influence by displacing Russia as
the dominant player in the CIS region. According to this theory,
Washington wins the favor of the political elite in the republics
and then foments color revolutions against Moscow to prevent it from
regaining power. Conspiracy theorists believe that the United States'
main objective is to seize Russia's limitless natural resources and
take direct control of the country, or else to exercise indirect
control by reducing Russia to an "appendage of the West" that
submissively supplies it with raw materials.
According to this theory, the foreign policy of the United States
and its allies reflects a single aim: to encroach upon Russia using
every weapon in its arsenal -- propaganda, economic pressure and even
direct military intervention.
A competing theory holds that the political elite in the former
Soviet republics are the ones pushing for NATO's expansion. These
leaders supposedly view their countries as being too small to have any
voice among European nations unless they gain membership in powerful
international organizations such as NATO or the European Union. Some
among the Russian elite believe that Ukraine and Georgia fear losing
their status as independent countries unless they join NATO or the
European Union.
These different views reflect the worldviews of the various factions
within Russia's political elite. Any attempt to dissuade them from
these convictions is futile. Anti-Western, and especially anti-U.S.,
sentiment has reached such heights that the Kremlin summarily dismisses
worthy arguments without even listening.
While these theorists heap scorn on the West, they don't bother
to ask whether Russia could be a more appealing partner for its
neighbors. Using the energy card as a negotiating tool against other
countries clearly won't do the trick. Neither will preaching about the
virtues of a multipolar world and the vices of a U.S.-led unipolar
world, and taking every possible opportunity to criticize the West
while rejecting any constructive proposals it puts forward.
Russia must first offer its own society -- and only later the world
-- an attractive model for development that other countries would
want to follow. The government should formulate a set of political
principles that it would be able to manifest in actual deeds, not
just words. Only then can these values and principles gradually take
root in Russian society.
Then, Moscow's foreign policy would serve as a logical continuation
of those principles practiced at home. Unfortunately, this strategy
is not part of the Kremlin's agenda.
Georgy Bovt is a political analyst and hosts a radio program on
City-FM.
By Georgy Bovt
The Moscow Times
April 10 2008
Russia
Some members of Moscow's political establishment considered the recent
NATO summit in Bucharest a partial victory since Georgia and Ukraine
were not invited to join the alliance. But far from saying "no,"
NATO promised that these countries would eventually become members.
But the main questions for Moscow are: Why are two members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States so eager to join NATO? Why do
our allies want to establish closer ties with the West? Why does the
prospect of better relations with Russia hold so little appeal?
Russia currently has only two staunch allies among CIS countries. The
first is Armenia -- a country that is going through difficult
economic times, is dependent upon Russia for its energy supplies
and has chilly relations with most of its other neighbors. Russia's
other ally is Belarus, a rogue state ruled by a dictator with whom
even Moscow sometimes has difficulty maintaining a dialogue.
The Kremlin has a few theories as to why the former Soviet republics
find NATO membership so appealing. The most popular explanation is
the conspiracy theory. This scenario has the United States continuing
its Cold War struggle for global influence by displacing Russia as
the dominant player in the CIS region. According to this theory,
Washington wins the favor of the political elite in the republics
and then foments color revolutions against Moscow to prevent it from
regaining power. Conspiracy theorists believe that the United States'
main objective is to seize Russia's limitless natural resources and
take direct control of the country, or else to exercise indirect
control by reducing Russia to an "appendage of the West" that
submissively supplies it with raw materials.
According to this theory, the foreign policy of the United States
and its allies reflects a single aim: to encroach upon Russia using
every weapon in its arsenal -- propaganda, economic pressure and even
direct military intervention.
A competing theory holds that the political elite in the former
Soviet republics are the ones pushing for NATO's expansion. These
leaders supposedly view their countries as being too small to have any
voice among European nations unless they gain membership in powerful
international organizations such as NATO or the European Union. Some
among the Russian elite believe that Ukraine and Georgia fear losing
their status as independent countries unless they join NATO or the
European Union.
These different views reflect the worldviews of the various factions
within Russia's political elite. Any attempt to dissuade them from
these convictions is futile. Anti-Western, and especially anti-U.S.,
sentiment has reached such heights that the Kremlin summarily dismisses
worthy arguments without even listening.
While these theorists heap scorn on the West, they don't bother
to ask whether Russia could be a more appealing partner for its
neighbors. Using the energy card as a negotiating tool against other
countries clearly won't do the trick. Neither will preaching about the
virtues of a multipolar world and the vices of a U.S.-led unipolar
world, and taking every possible opportunity to criticize the West
while rejecting any constructive proposals it puts forward.
Russia must first offer its own society -- and only later the world
-- an attractive model for development that other countries would
want to follow. The government should formulate a set of political
principles that it would be able to manifest in actual deeds, not
just words. Only then can these values and principles gradually take
root in Russian society.
Then, Moscow's foreign policy would serve as a logical continuation
of those principles practiced at home. Unfortunately, this strategy
is not part of the Kremlin's agenda.
Georgy Bovt is a political analyst and hosts a radio program on
City-FM.